By United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime - UNODC

Fraud has evolved significantly over the years, adapting to technological advancements and changes in society. It has become increasingly sophisticated, often using psychological manipulation, enabled by information and communications technologies (ICTs). The high volume and severity of fraud pose a significant risk to people, economies and prosperity worldwide, and have a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. However, developing an accurate understanding of fraud presents several challenges. Victims often underreport fraud due to feelings of shame, self blame or embarrassment, as well as a lack of recognition that a crime has occurred. Moreover, a significant portion of fraud targets businesses, many of which choose not to report these crimes to avoid damaging their reputation. The anonymity and remoteness often associated with fraud perpetration conceal the identities of offenders from both victims and authorities, hindering efforts to assess underlying patterns, factors of vulnerability and associated risks. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of fraud — which is constantly being adapted to changes in legal, social, commercial and technological systems — means that new and innovative methods of the offence may go unnoticed within static official data. In many cases, domestic law enforcement entities do not have the capacity to investigate and uncover the offenders and the organized criminal groups behind the crime: international cooperation is required, suggesting the need to give greater prominence to fraud in the policy framework and legislation against organized crime.

The international community has recognized the worrying scale of fraud and the need for joint efforts in preventing and combating it. The General Assembly, in its resolution 78/229, reaffirmed the importance of the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the fulfilment of its mandate in crime prevention and criminal justice, including providing to Member States, upon request and as a matter of high priority, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance, and coordinating with and complementing the work of all relevant and competent United Nations bodies and offices in respect to all forms of organized crime, including fraud. Nevertheless, the intersection between fraud and organized crime is not well understood and is further complicated by overlaps with other key areas, including cybercrime, white-collar crime, money-laundering and corruption. An understanding of organized fraud is necessary to inform the decisions of policymakers and other stakeholders and drive effective responses. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the main global legally binding instrument to prevent and fight all forms and manifestations of transnational organized crime and protect the victims thereof, provides a framework to understand the nature of organized fraud and how the response to it can be integrated into the response to the different threats presented by transnational organized crime.

Scope of the issue paper

Fraud is an expansive category of crime. One of the greatest challenges to understanding it is its scope. It encompasses a range of criminal behaviours that are bound together by the common principle of dishonesty. The opportunities to employ dishonesty for the purposes of fraud span the full range of social, commercial, financial and technological settings, which can vary in different regions of the world. These opportunities are exploited by criminals from highly diverse backgrounds, ranging from professionals exploiting a legitimate corporate position to cybercriminals from within deprived communities. In this way, fraud is distinct from many other criminal categories that cover more discrete criminal behaviours occurring in specific settings (e.g. burglary). This diversity creates challenges in terms of developing a single, cohesive and comprehensive picture of fraud. The present issue paper covers fraud perpetrated by organized criminal groups (i.e. organized fraud). The role of organized crime can vary depending on the type of fraud, although, to a greater or lesser extent, it has a footprint in nearly all types of fraud. For the purposes of containing the scope of the issue paper, the following elements are not included:

• Other crimes in which fraud plays an enabling role, including the fraudulent use of identity to prevent a perpetrator from being traced, such as opening financial accounts to launder the proceeds of crime; fraudulent communications to enter into a relationship with a victim for the purpose of blackmailing or extorting money from them;1 and fraudulent job advertisements for recruiting and trafficking victims into forced labour and servitude.

• Fraud targeting the financial interests of the State (e.g. tax regimes), such as missing trader intra-community fraud (otherwise known as MTIC or VAT fraud); excise fraud, in which duties on imported products are not paid (e.g. fuel); public procurement fraud; and fraudulent applications for government grants and subsidies. The policy and response landscape for addressing these types of fraud can be distinct, being made up of various agencies and regulatory powers beyond law enforcement (e.g. the tax authority). The links between these types of fraud and organized crime are more well established in the literature.

The focus of the issue paper is organized fraud that targets individual members of the public or private institutions for the purposes of obtaining a financial or other material benefit.

Vienna: UNODC< 2024. 82p.

Organized Theft Groups (OTG) and Organized Retail Crime (ORC) .  A Comprehensive Educational Guide for Law Enforcement and Financial Crime Investigators  

By Lauren Kohr and Tiffany Polyak,

Organized retail crime (ORC) remains at the forefront of most major news channels across the United States. High-profile “smash-n-grab” robberies, and nationwide cases involving major retailers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, garner the headlines. Recent hearings by the United States Congress, that discuss and debate proposed legislation, target the ability of criminal organizations to resell stolen goods online with relative anonymity.1 ORC is a low-risk, high-reward business line for transnational criminal organizations’ portfolios that presents a significant financial and public safety risk. While retailers and law enforcement partner to investigate ORC cases and provide education on the misconceptions and misunderstandings, it is clear there is a missing link in these partnerships, and that link is financial institutions. Criminal organizations need to launder the nearly 70 billion US dollars of illicit proceeds gained from ORC activities annually. These organizations are looking to launder their billions through the formal financial sector, unregulated payment processors, and online marketplaces. 1. The Brand Protection Professional, Professional Pointer: What Is ORC And Is It Related To IPRC? To combat ORC and take down organized theft groups (OTGs) more effectively, first, financial institutions must be brought into the awareness and education triangle. Second, public-private partnerships and information-sharing channels between retailers, law enforcement, and financial institutions need to be created. Third, as law enforcement and retailers prioritize investigations involving ORC, financial institutions should look to reasonably enhance their anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) programs to detect and report illicit proceeds stemming from these crimes. Financial institutions should ensure proper controls are in place to detect and report illicit activities tied to or involving ORC. While not specifically addressed in the National AML/CFT Priorities issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on June 20, 2021, it should be addressed that ORC has been tied to many of the priorities issued and other heinous crimes, as reflected in this guide.  

ACAMS and Homeland Security Investigations, 53p.

By Yvon DanduranA discussion of organized crime and governance is not complete until it addresses the question of police governance and its impact on the fight against organized crime, illicit markets and money laundering. Given the relative failure of law enforcement to control organized crime and contain illegal markets, a focus on police governance forces us to consider how law enforcement priorities are set and law enforcement strategies adopted and implemented. This in turn may lead us to conclude, as I am about to suggest, that we me need to both increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts and reduce our expectations with respect to the impact that law enforcement can really have on controlling organized crime and illicit markets. In our discussions thus far, we acknowledged that public awareness of organized crime and its consequences is an important starting point, but that we also need to find more effective ways to control organized crime and counter its activities. Most of us recognize that law enforcement and regulatory enforcement are crucial elements of effective action against organized crime, yet we must also recognize that the actual impact of law enforcement is usually quite limited. Countering organized crime requires establishing effective police governance and accountability. Governance includes key management issues such as policy formation and implementation, the determination of priorities and strategies, the allocation of resources, deployment strategies and decisions, the implementation of standards, the prevention of corruption internally, and the maintenance of internal discipline. It follows that weak governance can undermine the effectiveness of police actions against organized crime. At the same time, transnational organized crime entails policing in a transnational context and, with this, come the pressing and complex governance and accountability issues presented by the growth of cross-border policing,  transnational policing, and the growing reliance on multi-jurisdictional police teams. In many instances, one is not talking about a single police force, but broad and ill-defined security networks.3 As Walsh and Conway explained, “(m)achinery that is struggling to cope with the governance and accountability challenges presented by the domestic operations of home based police forces may well prove seriously deficient when confronted with the formers’ activities on other sovereign territories, or domestic operations by foreign based police forces  

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2020. 15p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Colombia’s government has made environmental protection a priority. But armed groups control large parts of the endangered Amazon rainforest, making that goal hard to achieve. One group in particular, the Central Armed Command, or EMC, has shown it has the power to slow or accelerate deforestation at will. Why does it matter? Armed groups’ tightening grip on the Colombian Amazon has further jeopardised the health of a forest that plays a crucial role in the planet’s climate. People living under these groups’ yoke have been left vulnerable to the whims of criminals bent on expanding their illicit businesses. What should be done? Colombia’s government should pursue negotiations with armed groups and plot ways to curb deforestation. But it should also assert its authority in the Amazon through development programs fostering livelihoods that do not harm the environment, efforts to combat large-scale environmental offenders and reinforced coordination of security, peace and environment policies.

Bogotá/New York/Brussels, International Crisis Group,   2024. 32p.

By Katharine Neill Harris

There were a lot of reasons to think that 2021 would be a pivotal year for criminal justice reform in Texas: widespread popularity of relaxing cannabis laws, public support for addressing police violence and systemic racism in the justice system, and the pandemic turning overcrowded jails from a simmering public health risk into a crisis too big to ignore. Two weeks after a Minneapolis police officer killed George Floyd, a Houston native, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott indicated there was a bipartisan appetite for reform when he floated the idea of a “George Floyd Act, to make sure that we prevent police brutality like this from happening in the future in Texas.” Calling Floyd’s death “the most horrific tragedy [he had] ever personally observed,” the governor insisted that those “who have suffered because of racism for far too long” would lead the way on reform.1 During the 87th legislative session, not only did Governor Abbott neglect these concerns, he actively worked against them, opposing modest proposals to improve the justice system and prioritizing legislation that further harms the very communities he claimed to support. As other states work to address justice system inequities, recent developments in Texas expose the persistent challenges to ending the war on drugs and other policies that propagate systemic racism.

Houston, TX: The Baker Institute, 7p.

By Murray Chisholm

This study builds on a close examination of an archive of files that advised the Australian Commonwealth Executive on Papua New Guineans found guilty of capital offenses in PNG between 1954 and 1965. These files provide telling insight into conceptions held by officials at different stages of the justice process into justice, savagery and civilization, and colonialism and Australia's role in the world. The particular combination of idealism and self-interest, liberalism and paternalism, and justice and authoritarianism axiomatic to Australian colonialism becomes apparent and enables discussion of Australia’s administration of PNG in the lead-up to the acceptance of independence as an immediate policy goal. The files show Australia gathering the authority to grant mercy into the hands of the Commonwealth and then devolving it back to the territories. In these transitions, the capital case review files show the trajectory of Australian colonialism during a period when the administration was unsure of the duration and nature of its future relationship with PNG.

Canberra: ANU Press, 2024. 282p.

By Gallup

 The world is contending with an unsettling reality: Violence continues to permeate our societies, threatening lives and undermining the foundations of safety and security that are crucial to sustainable development. Globally, 5% of people report being victims of violent crime in the past two years — a figure that, while seemingly small, represents millions of disrupted lives, shattered families, and communities gripped by fear. Exacerbating the global crisis of violence is the growing threat posed by state conflicts. According to the Global Peace Index, there are currently 56 active conflicts worldwide — the highest number since World War II. Even the leaders tasked with ensuring our safety are not immune; since 2022, attempts and successful assassinations of current and former heads of state have occurred in countries ranging from the U.S., Pakistan and Slovenia to Argentina and Japan. As the world grapples with these escalating threats, another peril looms: the rise of fear. Yet, measuring fear is complex. Traditional metrics, such as crime rates and conflict reports, provide essential data on physical security — but fail to capture how safe people feel, which profoundly impacts how they live. Our research consistently shows that when people feel safe, they are free to thrive — experiencing greater economic stability, contributing positively to their communities, and living longer, healthier lives. To build truly flourishing societies, we must address both physical safety and the critical need for people to feel safe. Recognizing the importance of this two-pronged approach, world leaders have integrated “subjective safety” into their development agendas. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 includes “feel[ing] safe walking alone at night” as an indicator (16.1.4). Gallup annually tracks this indicator worldwide, and we highlight its findings in our 2024 Global Safety Report. This year’s report offers encouraging insights: Global perceptions of safety and confidence in police have risen compared with a decade ago, largely due to increasing confidence in local law enforcement. Regardless of a country’s wealth, confidence in local police is one of the strongest predictors of people feeling safe. There are also remarkable examples of national progress. El Salvador, once notorious as the murder capital of the world, ranked second to last out of 134 countries for safety in 2016. Today, it has climbed to a tie for 8th out of 140 countries. Yet, challenges remain, particularly in addressing the safety perception gap between men and women, as men are over 20% more likely than women to say they feel safe in their communities. Ensuring everyone, regardless of where they live, can feel safe and secure in their daily lives is not just a moral imperative; it is the first step to sustainable growth and prosperous societies. The data in the following report show where the world stands on that vital first step — but it also reminds us that much work remains to be done  

Washington, DC: Gallup, 2024. 24p.