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Changes in Self-Reported Cannabis Use: In the United States from 1979 to 2022

By Jonathan P. Caulkins

Background and aims: Multiple countries are considering revising cannabis policies. This study aimed to measure long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States and compare them with alcohol use.

Design and setting: Secondary analysis of United States general population survey data.

Participants: The national surveys had a total of 1 641 041 participants across 27 surveys from 1979 to 2022.

Measurements

Rates of use reported to the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health and its predecessors are described, as are trends in days of use reported. Four milepost years are contrasted: 1979 (first available data and end of relatively liberal policies of the 1970s), 1992 (end of 12 years of conservative Reagan-Bush era policies), 2008 (last year before the Justice Department signaled explicit federal non-interference with state-level legalizations) and 2022 (most recent data available).

Findings

Reported cannabis use declined to a nadir in 1992, with partial recovery through 2008, and substantial increases since then, particularly for measures of more intensive use. Between 2008 and 2022, the per capita rate of reporting past-year use increased by 120%, and days of use reported per capita increased by 218% (in absolute terms from the annual equivalent of 2.3 to 8.1 billion days per year). From 1992 to 2022, there was a 15-fold increase in the per capita rate of reporting daily or near daily use. Whereas the 1992 survey recorded 10 times as many daily or near daily alcohol as cannabis users (8.9 vs. 0.9 M), the 2022 survey, for the first time, recorded more daily and near daily users of cannabis than alcohol (17.7 vs. 14.7 M). Far more people drink, but high-frequency drinking is less common. In 2022, the median drinker reported drinking on 4–5 days in the past month, versus 15–16 days in the past month for cannabis. In 2022, past-month cannabis consumers were almost four times as likely to report daily or near daily use (42.3% vs. 10.9%) and 7.4 times more likely to report daily use (28.2% vs. 3.8%).

Conclusions

Long-term trends in cannabis use in the United States parallel corresponding changes in cannabis policy, with declines during periods of greater restriction and growth during periods of policy liberalization. A growing share of cannabis consumers report daily or near daily use, and their numbers now exceed the number of daily and near daily drinkers.

Addiction, Volume119, Issue9, September 2024, Pages 1648-1652

Modeling the Role of Police Corruption in the Reduction of Organized Crime: Mexico as a Case Study

By Andrés Aldana, Hernán Larralde & Maximino Aldana

Among all types of corruption, police corruption is probably the one that most directly hurts society, as those trusted with protecting the people either side with the criminals that victimize the citizens, or are themselves, criminals. However, both corruption and its effects are very difficult to measure quantitatively other than by perception surveys, but the perception that citizens have of this phenomenon may be different from reality. Using a simple agent-based model, we analyze the effect on crime rates as a result of both corruption and the perception of corruption within law-enforcement corporations. Our results show a phase transition in which crime can propagate across the population even when the majority of police officers are honest. We find that one of the parameters that strongly controls crime incidence is the probability that regular citizens become criminals. In contrast, other actions, such as arresting crime lords, or the amount of crime-associated money that is confiscated, have little impact on the long-term crime incidence. Our results suggest that in addition to combating corruption within law-enforcement institutions, to further reduce the incidence of crime, policymakers should strive to restore confidence in these institutions and the justice system.

Myanmar Opium Survey 2024: Cultivation, Production, and Implications

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific

  This report presents the results of the twenty-second Myanmar opium survey, covering the 2023/2024 opium growing and harvesting season. The last three surveys in Myanmar covering the 2020/2021, 2021/2022, and the 2022/2023 seasons showed an increase at the national level in both areas under opium poppy cultivation and opium production. The 2023 survey reported an 18% increase in the area under cultivation to an estimated 47,100 hectares. For the first time in three years the 2024 survey shows a modest decline in the area under cultivation by 4% to 45,200 hectares, indicating a possible stabilization at recent high levels. Three consecutive years of expanding cultivation followed by a year of limited decline could indicate some degree of saturation in regional heroin markets supplied by Myanmar. Declining prices of fresh opium in Myanmar and declining purity adjusted prices of heroin in regional markets could have dissuaded a further increase of production in Myanmar in 2024. However, information from the field suggests that the stagnation in productivity could also be related to the ongoing internal conflict. While instability and conflict, and their impact on the rule of law have traditionally been seen as a driver of illicit crop cultivation, the expansion of the conflict and shifts in the territorial control of armed actors, especially in the growing areas of Shan and Kachin, have limited the mobility of rural population, and likely prevented farmers from accessing cultivation areas further away from their villages. The dynamics of internal conflict might also explain the uneven development across Myanmar’s states in regions, with some areas showing declines in cultivation and others continued growth. In October 2024, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that there were some 3 million people internally displaced across the country, with Shan and Kachin in particular seeing escalating tensions and clashes in late 2023 and early 2024. The 2024 survey shows decreases in illicit opium cultivation in half of the geographic areas observed, including South Shan which traditionally experienced the most extensive opium cultivation. Eastern Shan, Chin, and Kayah had modest increases between survey years. Overall, cultivation in Shan State, which continues to be the centre of opium production in Myanmar at 88% of total cultivation area, decreased by 4% to 39,700 ha, with decreases in South and North Shan (-9% and -4% respectively) while East Shan increased by 10%. Cultivation in Kachin saw a moderate decrease of 10%, a change from past trends when above-average increases were observed. Estimates for Chin and Kayah, where the overall area remained small in comparison to other areas, showed an 18% and 8% increase, respectively. Overall potential opium production decreased at greater rates than cultivation due to a decline in opium yield. In 2024, average yield declined by 4% from 22.9 kg per hectare to 22kg per hectare, resulting in an estimated opium production of 995 (700-1,580) metric tons, or 8% less than in 2023. Nevertheless, both yield and production remain at high levels across the last decade. The decrease in cultivation and production coincided with a decrease in farmgate prices of both fresh and dry opium in USD terms, by 4% and 8%, respectively. In 2024, fresh opium traded at just over US$300 per kilogram, down from US$317 the year before, although it remained high compared to the last low point in 2021 when it stood at US$131 per kilogram. In combination with lower production, nationally farmers earned slightly less income than the previous year, between US$230 – US$518 million in 2024 (US$271 - US$613 million in 2023). The farmgate value only represents a small share of the overall opiate economy, with heroin manufacture and export making up a larger share. Wholesale prices of heroin in the region declined even more, contributing to a much larger decrease in the value of the total national opiate economy of about 40%, now ranging between US$589 million and US$1.57 billion, representing between 0.9 – 2.4% of Myanmar’s 2023 GDP  

Thailand: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific 2024. 88p.

Opium Cultivation in Afghanistan 2024

By The Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),

Now entering its second year of enforcement, the ban continues to hold. In 2024, the area under cultivation was estimated at 12,800 ha, or 19% more than in 2023 (10,800 ha) . Despite the increase, opium poppy cultivation is still far below the priorban levels. In 2022 an estimated 232,000 ha were cultivated. The increase in cultivation came with a geographical shift. The South-western provinces of the country were long the center of cultivation up to and including 2023. In 2024, this changed and now 59% of all cultivation took place in the North-east, particularly in Badakhshan. The rapid and currently sustained decline in poppy cultivation and opium production has important and wide-ranging implications for the country and opiate markets long supplied by product from Afghanistan. Questions remain as to how the country will cope with the continued reduction in opiate income and how opiate markets downstream will react. Farmers that lack sustainable alternatives face a more precarious financial and economic situation and need alternative economic opportunities to become resilient against picking up poppy cultivation in the future. Distributors and dealers closer to destination markets, as well as consumers, are likely to experience supply constraints in the coming years, should the ban remain in place. Following a major hike in 2022 and 2023, dry opium prices stabilized slightly in the first half of 2024 to around US$730. These prices are several times higher than the long-running pre-ban average of US$100 per kilogram. Extremely high farmgate prices and questions about dwindling opium stocks may encourage a resumption in poppy cultivation, especially in places outside of traditional cultivation centers, including neighboring countries. 

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 20p.

Trafficking in Medical Products in the Sahel

By The United Office on Drugs and Crime

  In the Sahel countries and their neighbours, the high prevalence of infectious diseases, including malaria, coupled with challenges in terms of the availability and affordability of and access to healthcare, creates an environment in which the demand for medical products and services is not fully met through formal channels. The disparity between the demand for and supply of regulated pharmaceutical products leaves room for trafficking, provides an incentive for the involvement of organized criminal groups and fuels the ongoing threat to public safety and public health in the Sahel countries. Between January 2017 and December 2021, at least 605 tons of different medical products were seized in West Africa during international operations.  While there are no reliable estimates of the overall quantities of medical products that are trafficked in different ways and forms in the Sahel countries, studies point to a percentage of substandard and falsified medicines in the medical market of between 19 and 50 per cent. Some 40 per cent of the substandard and falsified medical products reported in the Sahel countries between 2013 and 2021 was discovered in the regulated supply chain. Just as regulated medical products can be diverted, illicitly manufactured medical products can find their way into authorized pharmaceutical outlets, which shows how much the regulated (legal) and unregulated (illicit) supply chains are interconnected. The Sahel countries rely heavily on imports of medical products because their pharmaceutical industries are still in the early stages of development. Of total pharmaceutical expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019, imports represented as much as 70 to 90 per cent (roughly 14 billion United States dollars ($)). Medical products diverted from the legal supply chain often originate in the main exporting countries of medical products to the Sahel countries, in particular Belgium and France, and to a lesser extent China and India. Others are manufactured in neighbouring countries, including in North Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The seaports in the Gulf of Guinea, Conakry (Guinea), Tema (Ghana), Lomé (Togo), Cotonou (Benin) and Apapa (Nigeria) can be identified as major entry points for medical products destined for the Sahel countries. Trafficking by air, using postal shipments or carried out by commercial air passengers, is employed for smuggling smaller quantities of medical products. Once in West Africa, trafficked medical products reach the Sahel countries through smugglers who follow traditional trafficking routes using buses, trucks and private cars. Investigations have revealed the involvement of a wide range of opportunistic actors in trafficking in medical products in the Sahel countries, from employees of pharmaceutical companies, public officials, law enforcement officers and health agency workers to street vendors, all motivated by potential financial gain. Despite terrorist groups and non-state armed groups being commonly associated with trafficking in medical products in the Sahel, most reported cases in the region show that the involvement of such groups is limited and mainly revolves around consuming medical products or levying "taxes" on them in the areas under their control. In sub-Saharan Africa, as many as 267,000 deaths per year are linked to falsified and substandard antimalarial medicines. In addition, up to 169,271 are linked to falsified and substandard antibiotics used to treat severe pneumonia in children.     

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 28p.

Jetway Robbery? Homeland Security and Cash Seizures at Airports

By Jennifer McDonald

Across the country, law enforcement agencies routinely seize currency from individuals using civil forfeiture—a legal process that allows agencies to take and keep property without ever charging owners with a crime, let alone securing a conviction. Studies examining civil forfeiture have found it to be a multibillion-dollar industry that punishes people without proving they have done anything wrong. This study is the first to examine how U.S. Department of Homeland Security agencies—U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard—use civil forfeiture to take and keep currency from often unsuspecting travelers at airports across the country. DHS agencies are just a few of the many government agencies that conduct airport seizures, but newly available data give fresh insight into their activity. This study, covering 2000 through 2016, quantifies just how often DHS agencies have seized currency at airports—and just how much currency has flowed into the federal government’s coffers as a result.

Arlington, VA: Institute for Justice, 2020. 32p.

Fuel Trafficking in the Sahel

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The ratio of registered vehicles to people in the Sahel countries is low and per capita daily gasoline consumption is estimated to be among the lowest in the world. Nevertheless, an average at-pump price of $1 per litre would result in a combined annual total market value of at least 5 billion United States dollars ($) for both legal and illegal fuel in the region. Despite some of them producing oil, the Sahel countries rely on fuel imports from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, where fuel is heavily subsidized. It appears that the low fuel prices in Algeria, Libya and Nigeria are among the most significant drivers of fuel trafficking in the Sahel. In addition to fuel trafficking, cheap gasoline and diesel also fuel the activities of illegal non-state armed groups, including groups deemed “terrorist” by the international community. Moreover, there are some indications that there may be deeper linkages to other forms of smuggling, such as trafficking in medical products, drugs and firearms. There are four major fuel trafficking flows into the Sahel countries: from Nigeria via Benin to Burkina Faso and Mali; from Nigeria via the Niger to Mali; from Algeria to Mali; and from Libya to the Niger and Chad. A large portion of the market for trafficked fuel in the Sahel countries appears to be informally organized. However, recent investigations have revealed the involvement of structured groups with links to prominent individuals with interests in retail fuel companies, financial institutions and corrupt law enforcement officials. This highlights the importance of the formal trade in laundering smuggled fuel. Companies associated with individuals under United Nations Security Council sanctions are also reported to be involved in fuel smuggling from the Niger to Mali. The introduction of fuel subsidies and licensing policies has led to the emergence of powerful business elites in the Sahel countries with sufficient political influence to protect fuel smuggling activities. Opportunities to earn illegal revenue indirectly from fuel trafficking through bribery and other forms of corruption compromise the level of repression that the Sahel countries can exercise on the illicit fuel trade. Issues with, and gaps in, the rule of law in some areas, owing to a combination of a high level of insecurity and vast, porous borders, constitute a key enabling

factor for fuel trafficking in the Sahel. The lack of state presence in remote areas gives room for the proliferation of criminal activities.

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 24p.

Analysis of Opiate Stamps Seized in the Indian Ocean (2017-2021)

By Natascha Eichinger, Ekaterina Spassova, Murat Yildiz, et al.

The continued global demand for opiates, and the conditions that sustain opiate production in Afghanistan, pose a threat to public health, governance, and security at regional and global

level. This is likely to continue following the change of regime in Afghanistan in August 2021. Afghan opiates are trafficked to almost every continent worldwide. In 2021, the income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some USD 1.8–2.7 billion: however, much larger sums are accrued by international Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) along illicit drug supply chains outside Afghanistan. While most opiates trafficked from Afghanistan are trafficked by land methods, a proportion of the opiates produced in South-West Asia are also trafficked by maritime methods to global destinations.

� Some of the opiates produced in Afghanistan and South-West Asia are trafficked via the southern route by maritime means. Seizures of opiates – and methamphetamine – have been increasing in the Indian Ocean, the result of sustained interdictions by national authorities and international maritime coalitions including the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the EU Naval Force – Somalia (EUNAVFOR). � Drug packages seized in the Indian Ocean are marked with a wide range of stamps including hand pressed and hand-written markings. These stamps are made up of several elements consisting of sequential and non-sequential numbers, names, locations, and different objects. The stamps can provide some detail on the manufacturers and traffickers involved in the production and transport of drugs to international markets. � Stamps can often be used for branding purposes in a similar way to brand logos used with legitimate goods or can be used to identify or alternatively conceal the producers of a batch of heroin. The number of different stamps marked on a package of heroin can be an indicator of how many producers or traffickers were involved with that package. � Stamps are chosen by individual Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). They appear to be well known amongst DTOs and usually can not be copied by other traffickers. However, in some cases a “franchising” process is possible, with smaller traffickers purchasing the right to use stamps associated with larger DTOs. � Dates printed on heroin packages generally indicate the production year. However, there is less clarity when two dates are stamped on a package. In some cases, the second year may indicate when heroin manufacture continued by the same lab, or alternatively can be the expiry date of the heroin or the date when the package was distributed to international markets. Printed dates can also be updated by hand-written markings. � Sequential and non-sequential numbers stamped on heroin packages are generally seen as being coded communications between heroin manufacturers and traffickers, although the specific messages are not known. Sequential numbers (for example 555 or 777) have been found in both the Indian Ocean between 2017 and 2021, and in Central Asia and the Russian Federation in 2012. By comparison, nonsequential numbers (for example 355 or 787) seized in the Indian Ocean are not seen in Central Asia and are only infrequently seized in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that sequential numbers may be associated with relative purity of the heroin contained in the packages stamped with these numbers. � Words stamped on heroin packages appear to be an indicator of where the heroin was produced. Heroin produced in southern Afghanistan is reportedly stamped with Pashto words, while heroin produced in northern Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more likely to be stamped with Farsi words. Heroin produced in eastern and western Afghanistan often has words in English, Farsi and Pashto, while heroin produced in Pakistan is labelled with words in English and Urdu. � Heroin and methamphetamine manufactured and trafficked by the same DTO may be stamped with the same or very similar stamps. In some cases, heroin packages are stamped with images of

animals which may be an indicator of relative purity of the heroin or an indicator of the location of the manufacturer. � Although some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of heroin stamps seized in the Indian Ocean, there is still a lack of clarity on the meaning and purpose of some stamps – even among the drug traffickers interviewed in Afghanistan. Further analysis is required, including the analysis of drug stamps seized in locations outside of the Indian Ocean. It would be advantageous to develop a database of the different markings of heroin stamps to aid such analysis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2022. 36p.

The Hawala System: Its Operations and Misuse by Opiate Traffickers and Migrant Smugglers

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Key findings • Hawala is a Money or Value Transfer Service (MVTS) that has been used for centuries, originating in the Middle East and South Asia. It is overwhelmingly used for legitimate purposes, including personal and business financial transactions and for the sending of remittances by migrants and refugees to family members. Cultural preferences, convenience, low-threshold accessibility, low processing fees, reliability, and faster value transfer services are some of the reasons for using hawala, and customers using the service come from all walks of life. • Despite being widely used for legitimate purposes, some attributes of the hawala system also make it vulnerable to use by organised crime for the purposes of transferring illicit funds and values. This includes financial transfers by drug traffickers, migrant smugglers and other criminal actors and organisations, as well as safekeeping of funds obtained from illegal activity. The 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study do not commonly ask about the source of money or the reason for sending and receiving money. Additionally, when they did have doubts about the source of the funds, over half of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they had never refused a hawala transaction. • There is no single global regulatory framework for the hawala system. However, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has produced international standards and recommendations for countries to take measures to regulate the hawala system and ensure regular monitoring and compliance. Specific regulations and monitoring regimes vary by country, but FATF recommends countries take a risk-based approach to regulating the hawala system. Of the 18 countries covered by this study, the hawala system was regulated in most of them. However, in four countries it was not regulated, and in Afghanistan – following the events of August 2021 – the current regulatory status of the hawala system is unclear as of the time of writing. • Of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this report, 43 per cent of hawaladars declared they had a license to operate. In jurisdictions where it is a requirement, 25 per cent operated without a license and 31 per cent preferred not to respond. 36 per cent of the interviewed hawaladars stated that they provided reports to the Central Bank or other relevant financial authorities about their hawala activities, while 64 per cent either had never reported or preferred not to answer the question. Licensed hawaladars collected more personal information from their customers and require identification documents, while for unlicensed hawaladars a name and contact number is sufficient to process a transaction. • Of the hawaladars interviewed in this

study, over one-third reported that they ran multiple branches within the same country and more than half of them reported having offices in other countries. Regular hawala customers are likely to receive a discount on commission charges by hawaladars. • People engaging in regular and irregular migration constitute one customer base of the hawaladars interviewed in this study. Over half of reported that they had migrants as customers. The findings of this study suggest that hawaladars – knowingly and unknowingly - facilitate irregular migration and migrant smuggling by providing multiple financial services including, but not limited to, money or value transfer, safekeeping of funds and introducing migrants and refugees to migrant smugglers. • There are multiple reasons why migrants and refugees would use hawala before, during and after traveling, and these are broadly linked to the features of the system, and, for some, lack of access to any other financial system, such as banks or mobile money services. Migrants and refugees may be directed to a hawaladar by a friend or relative, smuggler, fellow traveller, shopkeeper or accommodation provider. • The interviewed hawaladars identified the following services they provided to migrants and refugees during their journeys: guiding migrants on their journey; helping with finding work upon arrival; referring migrants to support organizations; providing temporary accommodation or referring migrants to an individual who provides temporary accommodation; and finding local medical aid, as undocumented migrants may not be able to or may be reluctant to access hospitals. • Some hawaladars also assist migrants and refugees by finding, recommending or introducing them to a smuggler; and finding or directly renting out boats and trucks for transportation. • The majority of customers using the services of the 113 hawaladars interviewed for this study sent funds to countries located in the Near and Middle East/ South-West Asia sub region, followed by Western and Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe subregions. Customers in the Near and Middle Eastern sub-regions frequently sent funds to hawaladars in most of the eighteen countries where interviews were conducted. Customers of the interviewed hawaladars in the countries of the North American sub-region only sent funds to hawaladars interviewed in Afghanistan, Denmark, Nigeria, Somalia, and the United Republic of Tanzania. • Hawala is widely associated with transferring money or value - this was the most common type of service provided by the sample group in this study. However, sending and receiving money is just one among several financial services hawaladars provide. Cash savings, currency exchange, short-term lending, safekeeping of funds, and trade guarantees were other services the interviewed hawaladars provided to their customers to varying degrees. Some of them safekeep customers’ funds. The amount of funds kept for safekeeping with the interviewed hawaladars ranged from US$ 20,000 to US$ 500,000. • Hawaladars often operate additional businesses alongside their hawala business. Some of the side businesses mentioned by interviewed hawaladars were grocery store, travel agency, selling mobile top-up cards, construction company and electronics shops. • A hawala transaction does not always proceed directly from country A to country B. Depending on the source and destination, sometimes a transaction is carried out through one or more intermediary hawaladars located in at least one other country. Hawaladars interviewed for this study reported that there are multiple hawala hubs located in several regions of the world where such intermediary hawaladars operate. • Hawaladars interviewed in this study reported processing both domestic and international transactions, however, nearly three out of four processed mostly international transactions. The amount of a single hawala transaction varies substantially. Transactions handled by the interviewed hawaladars ranged from as low as US$50 and as high

as US$200,000. To keep a record of these transactions, most hawaladars interviewed in this research reported that they keep a paper (ledger book) as well as an electronic (digital) record of hawala transactions and other services provided. • Hawaladars use a variety of methods to settle their accounts including through cash, reverse transaction, bank transfer or trading in goods and services. Reverse transaction was the most often used method of account settlement among the hawaladars interviewed in this study, followed by settlement through bank transfer. Misuse of the hawala service • In addition to its widespread legitimate use, hawala is vulnerable to misuse by organized crime groups and other criminal actors. More than one-third of the interviewed hawaladars judged the hawala system to be more vulnerable to illegal transactions compared to the formal banking system, while some perceived an equal vulnerability in both systems. A lack of proper oversight by national authorities, a lack of reporting by hawaladars, a lack of regulation, policy, or guidelines for hawaladars to follow, the operation of unlicensed hawaladars, and the closed nature of the hawala system are all potential reasons for vulnerability. • There are no exact estimates as to the extent to which hawaladars, knowingly or unknowingly, facilitate the misuse of their financial services for criminal purposes. Some hawaladars interviewed for this research reported the direct involvement of other hawaladars in transferring funds associated with illegal activities. Additionally, some criminal groups have hawaladars, who may be relatives, working specifically for them for the purposes of transferring funds linked to organised crime. • Several of the interviewed hawaladars reported that they do not ask the purpose of transactions from their customers. As a result, it is possible that hawaladars involved in handling transactions of illicit proceeds are not aware of the nature and source of the money they are transferring or safekeeping. This is particularly the case with hawaladars who are dealing with smaller transactions which usually do not arouse suspicions. However, some hawaladars reported that they could not refuse a transaction from customers connected with Organized Crime Groups (OCGs) due to the risk of negative consequences for themselves and their businesses. • It remains a challenge to precisely document the degree to which hawaladars are transferring illicit funds; it is also difficult to trace illicit financial flows, to separate them from licit flows, and to establish concrete financial links to criminal activities. Law enforcement agencies face challenges in investigating crimes linked to hawala systems, because of the closed nature of the business and, in some cases, the kinship ties of the actors.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. 91p.

Gold Trafficking in the Sahel

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Sahel countries are some of the largest gold producers in Africa. While gold production data can be unreliable, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are estimated to have produced 228 tons of gold in 2021, worth over 12.6 billion United States dollars ($). The gold sector is a major economic driver in the Sahel countries. Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) production is estimated at 108 tons per year in Sahel countries, although official ASGM production data is largely unreliable due to the informal nature of the sector. ASGM provides a livelihood to over 1.8 million people in areas where income-generating activities are limited. The sector is characterized by high levels of informality because it often takes place on unlicensed and undeclared mining sites. Gold mining without licenses is illegal in all Sahel countries, although Member States have taken measures to formalize ASGM. Barriers to accessing mining licences often push communities involved in ASGM into a vicious cycle of illegality. Without protection of the law, they depend on a local economy often controlled by transnational organized crime (TOC) groups to fund their operations and to sell their gold production, with limited opportunities for structural investments. These communities are potentially susceptible to

recruitment by armed groups, including violent extremist groups. Porous borders enable gold to be easily moved within the Sahel countries and smuggled out of the region, including to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 36p.

The Rule of Dons

By Rivke Jaffe

Rivke Jaffe explains how despite Jamaica’s “dons” are associated with crime and violence, they have become figures of political authority and seen as legitimate leaders.

Throughout Kingston, Jamaica, figures known as “dons” exercise political authority and are seen as legitimate leaders despite their associations with crime and violence. In the absence of strong government support, they provide impoverished residents with access to security, conflict resolution, and various forms of welfare through their own resources and connections to Jamaica’s political parties. In The Rule of Dons, Rivke Jaffe shows how dons’ power relies on a widespread belief in their right to rule, explaining how criminal power is legitimized through a set of aesthetic, affective, and spatial mechanisms. She argues that dons must credibly embody an outlaw persona that stands outside of the political establishment while also connecting strategically to state institutions and mobilizing democratic ideals such as freedom and equality. As such, dons represent a form of authority that involves balancing an autocratic form of rule

with an established democratic order. While donmanship represents a historically and culturally specific type of political authority, Jaffe’s analysis of this phenomenon offers insights into the entanglement of violent autocratic rule and democratic institutions far beyond Jamaica.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2024. 217p.

Misuse of Drugs: Regulation and Enforcement

By Claire Duddy, William Downs

What are controlled drugs? Controlled drugs are substances that are considered harmful to human health and subject to legal controls. In the UK, these drugs are categorised as Class A, Class B or Class C according to their potential harm. Class A drugs like heroin and cocaine are considered the most harmful. They are subject to the strictest legal controls and penalties for misuse. Controlled drugs legislation The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 regulates the production, supply and possession of controlled drugs in the UK. The act is complemented by the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, which set out exceptions that allow the lawful possession and use of certain controlled drugs for medical, dental and veterinary use. The regulations categorise drugs into five schedules, according to their medical usefulness and the potential harms of misuse. Schedule 1 drugs are considered to have no legitimate current medical use and are the most tightly controlled. Classification and scheduling decisions The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) is an independent expert advisory body that advises the government on the classification and scheduling of drugs. The Home Secretary can make changes to the classification of a drug after consultation with the ACMD. However, the government is not required to take their advice. The Library Insight Nitrous Oxide becomes a Class C drug describes how nitrous oxide was classified as a Class C substance, despite ACMD advice that it should become a controlled drug. Drug offences and enforcement It is an offence to import, produce, supply or possess a controlled drug, except in circumstances specified in law. The maximum sentences available are specified in schedule 4 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. In England and Wales, sentencing guidelines set out the appropriate sentence for convicted offenders. The drugs market is dominated by serious and organised crime groups, with several UK enforcement agencies involved in seeking to tackle the production, supply and importation of drugs. The National Crime Agency and Regional Organised Crime Units work with regional police forces and the British Transport Police, to tackle drug supply operating across police force boundaries, including county lines. The National Crime Agency also leads on cooperation with international agencies oversees to tackle international supply lines. Border Force is the lead agency for seeking to intercept drug shipments from crossing UK borders. Responding to drug possession The possession of any controlled drug is an offence under section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, carrying a penalty of up to 7 years’ imprisonment. However, in many cases people found in possession of small quantities of drugs for personal use will not be prosecuted. The police have a large degree of discretion when deciding to arrest and prosecute an individual for drug possession or whether instead to issue an out of court resolution. In some areas of England and Wales, drug diversion programmes are being trialled to refer people into drug treatment services as an alternative to criminal justice sanctions entirely. There has also been debate about whether the government should go further in embracing a health-led approach to people who use drugs. For example, the Home Affairs Committee in 2023 called for responsibility for misuse of drugs to be jointly owned by the Home Office and Department of Health and Social Care, and for a wider use of drug diversion schemes and harm reduction measures. Changes to controlled drugs legislation There have been multiple calls for reform of controlled drugs legislation in the UK, including calls to change how drugs are classified and scheduled under the legislation. In December 2024, the Controlled Drugs (Procedure for Specification) Bill, a Private Member’s Bill sponsored by Alex McIntyre MP, is due to have its second reading in the House of Commons. This bill proposes changes to the processes used to change drug classifications. It aims to allow the government to make changes more quickly and allow corresponding changes to the classification of drugs (under the Misuse of Drugs Act) and scheduling of drugs (under the Misuse of Drugs Regulations) to be made at the same time.

Research Briefing, London: House of Commons Library, 2024. 36p.

Derailing the Tren de Aragua

Shocking videos surfaced in late August of gun-wielding Venezuelan migrants storming an apartment building in the suburban city of Aurora, Colorado. One of the migrants, a 20-year-old, confessed that he is part of a Venezuelan gang called Tren de Aragua (TdA, or “Train from Aragua”). The Aurora police department is now beefing up its budget to confront the increased crime spilling over from the sanctuary city next door in Denver.Aurora was just the beginning. In the past 11 months, there have been increasing reports of TdA activity in no fewer than 30 major cities across America. At least 100 federal investigations involving the TdA are underway, catching most of the U.S. law enforcement community by surprise. Shooting two New York City

police officers, building sex trafficking rings in Louisiana, and murdering the Georgia nursing student Laken Riley and 12-year-old Jocelyn Nungaray in Houston are just some of the high- profile violent crimes carried out by the TdA. Moreover, given that the Venezuelan government does not cooperate or provide any data on suspected criminals coming from their country into the United States, some law enforcement officers have dubbed the TdA as “ghost criminals” with little to identify them other than confessions and/ or tattoos. The Tren de Aragua has been around for more than a decade, first as a Venezuelan prison gang, then as a transnational criminal organization (TCO) spreading throughout Latin America, and now as a major street gang terrorizing cities in at least 20 states throughout America—and growing. Many comparisons have been drawn between the TdA and the transnational Salvadoran gang, La Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13). The TdA, however, is expanding much more quickly, likely due to its unique origin and state sponsorship in Venezuela. Unlike MS-13, which was born in Los Angeles in the 1980s, the TdA is foreign-born and was virtually nonexistent in America until 2021, distinct from other major TCOs such as MS-13 or the Mexican cartels. The TdA’s rapid expansion in the United States is a direct consequence of the Biden–Harris Administration’s failed immigration policies and lack of border enforcement.

KEY TAKEAWAYS The TdA’s goal is to establish territorial control and impose a criminal economy that connects illicit networks to penitentiaries in or near those neighborhoods. The new Trump Administration should work with Latin American partners to dismantle the TdA throughout the Western Hemisphere.

BACKGROUNDER No. 3876 | December 5, 2024

Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, the Douglas ans Sarah Alison Center for National Security, 2024. 18p.

Troubled Transitions and Organised Crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia

By Tadesse Simie Metekia and Matt Herbert

Summary Due to their difficult political paths – Ethiopia’s stalled transition and Tunisia’s reversal – these two nations demonstrate the effects of failing transitions and democratic backsliding on rising transnational organised crime. Reversing the current trend of organised crime depends heavily on restoring stability and rule-of-law-based democracies, which could be achieved through a revived political process that embraces dialogue and transitional justice to mitigate the challenges and enable governance structures to tackle the complexities of organised crime. Key points The surge in transnational organised crime in Ethiopia and Tunisia can be seen as a consequence of their unrealised political transitions due to: • ensuing economic upheaval that has been the major driver of transnational organised crimes in both countries • porous borders and ungoverned spaces that allow criminal networks to grow • attention to pressing security challenges, such as conflicts and terrorism, that create space for criminal networks to strengthen and operate with impunity

ENACT Africa, 2024. 48p.

Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 2003–2023

By Matthew F. Garnett and Arialdi M. Miniño

Drug overdoses are one of the leading causes of injury death in adults and have risen over the past several decades in the United States (1–3). Overdoses involving synthetic opioids (fentanyl, for example) and stimulants (cocaine and methamphetamine, for example) have also risen in the past few years (1). This report presents rates of drug overdose deaths from the National Vital Statistics System over a 20-year period by demographic group and by the type of drugs involved, specifically, opioids and stimulants, with a focus on changes from 2022 to 2023. Key findings Data from the National Vital Statistics System ● The age-adjusted rate of drug overdose deaths increased from 8.9deaths per 100,000 standard population in 2003 to 32.6 in 2022; however, the rate decreased to 31.3 in 2023. ● Rates decreased between 2022 and 2023 for people ages 15–54 and increased for adults age 55 and older. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates decreased for White non-Hispanic people, while rates for other race and Hispanic-origin groups generally stayed the same or increased. ● Between 2022 and 2023, rates declined for deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone, heroin, and natural and semisynthetic opioids, while the rate for methadone remained the same. ● From 2022 to 2023, rates increased for deaths involving cocaine by 4.9% (from 8.2 to 8.6) and psychostimulants with abuse potential by 1.9% (10.4 to 10.6)

NCHS Data Brief No. 522, December 2024. 12p.
Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics. 2024. DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15620/cdc/170565.

The Public Health Risks of Counterfeit Pills

By Joseph Friedman, jofriedman@health.uDaniel Ciccarone

Synthetic illicit drugs, such as nitazenes and fentanyls, are becoming commonplace in countries around the world, including in Europe, Australia, and Latin America, which raises concern for overdose crises like those seen in North America. An important dimension of the risk represented by synthetic drugs is the fact that they are increasingly packaged in counterfeit pill form. These pills—often indistinguishable from authentic pharmaceuticals—have substantially widened the scope of populations susceptible to synthetic drug overdose in North America (eg, among adolescents experimenting with pills or tourists from the USA seeking psychoactive medications from pharmacies in Mexico). The non-medical use of diverted prescription medications is relatively more common, and less stigmatised, than the use of powder drugs. Many consumers of counterfeit pills are unaware that they contain synthetic illicit drugs, believe them to be authentic pharmaceuticals, and would be unlikely to consume those drugs knowingly or if in powder form. Given these issues, we recommend the expansion of educational and awareness campaigns, pill testing programmes to help consumers shift demand to safer products, increased monitoring in routine clinical scenarios and overdose death toxicology, and expanding medically managed safer alternatives to counterfeit pill use.\

The Lancet Public Health, Volume 10, Issue 1, e58 - e62 2025.

Resisting Carceral Confinement in Guyana: Legacies of a Colonial State

By Kellie Moss, Kristy Warren

Prisoners in Guyana have been protesting about living conditions and an overtly punitive environment since British colonial rule (1814–1966). Drawing upon official investigations, colonial records and newspaper reports, this article analyses some of the key features of resistance, including uprisings, escapes and everyday breaches of prison rules from the 19th century to the present day. It argues that Guyanese society is still impacted by the punitive nature of colonial plantation society which compels and informs prisoner experiences and responses in the nation's prisons today.

The Howard Journal of Crime and JusticeVolume 63, Issue 4: Colonialism and its aftermaths in prisons in Guyana Dec 2024 Pages 355-480

Organized Fraud Issue Paper

By United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime - UNODC

Fraud has evolved significantly over the years, adapting to technological advancements and changes in society. It has become increasingly sophisticated, often using psychological manipulation, enabled by information and communications technologies (ICTs). The high volume and severity of fraud pose a significant risk to people, economies and prosperity worldwide, and have a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. However, developing an accurate understanding of fraud presents several challenges. Victims often underreport fraud due to feelings of shame, self blame or embarrassment, as well as a lack of recognition that a crime has occurred. Moreover, a significant portion of fraud targets businesses, many of which choose not to report these crimes to avoid damaging their reputation. The anonymity and remoteness often associated with fraud perpetration conceal the identities of offenders from both victims and authorities, hindering efforts to assess underlying patterns, factors of vulnerability and associated risks. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of fraud — which is constantly being adapted to changes in legal, social, commercial and technological systems — means that new and innovative methods of the offence may go unnoticed within static official data. In many cases, domestic law enforcement entities do not have the capacity to investigate and uncover the offenders and the organized criminal groups behind the crime: international cooperation is required, suggesting the need to give greater prominence to fraud in the policy framework and legislation against organized crime.

The international community has recognized the worrying scale of fraud and the need for joint efforts in preventing and combating it. The General Assembly, in its resolution 78/229, reaffirmed the importance of the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the fulfilment of its mandate in crime prevention and criminal justice, including providing to Member States, upon request and as a matter of high priority, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance, and coordinating with and complementing the work of all relevant and competent United Nations bodies and offices in respect to all forms of organized crime, including fraud. Nevertheless, the intersection between fraud and organized crime is not well understood and is further complicated by overlaps with other key areas, including cybercrime, white-collar crime, money-laundering and corruption. An understanding of organized fraud is necessary to inform the decisions of policymakers and other stakeholders and drive effective responses. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the main global legally binding instrument to prevent and fight all forms and manifestations of transnational organized crime and protect the victims thereof, provides a framework to understand the nature of organized fraud and how the response to it can be integrated into the response to the different threats presented by transnational organized crime.

Scope of the issue paper

Fraud is an expansive category of crime. One of the greatest challenges to understanding it is its scope. It encompasses a range of criminal behaviours that are bound together by the common principle of dishonesty. The opportunities to employ dishonesty for the purposes of fraud span the full range of social, commercial, financial and technological settings, which can vary in different regions of the world. These opportunities are exploited by criminals from highly diverse backgrounds, ranging from professionals exploiting a legitimate corporate position to cybercriminals from within deprived communities. In this way, fraud is distinct from many other criminal categories that cover more discrete criminal behaviours occurring in specific settings (e.g. burglary). This diversity creates challenges in terms of developing a single, cohesive and comprehensive picture of fraud. The present issue paper covers fraud perpetrated by organized criminal groups (i.e. organized fraud). The role of organized crime can vary depending on the type of fraud, although, to a greater or lesser extent, it has a footprint in nearly all types of fraud. For the purposes of containing the scope of the issue paper, the following elements are not included:

  • Other crimes in which fraud plays an enabling role, including the fraudulent use of identity to prevent a perpetrator from being traced, such as opening financial accounts to launder the proceeds of crime; fraudulent communications to enter into a relationship with a victim for the purpose of blackmailing or extorting money from them;1 and fraudulent job advertisements for recruiting and trafficking victims into forced labour and servitude.

  • Fraud targeting the financial interests of the State (e.g. tax regimes), such as missing trader intra-community fraud (otherwise known as MTIC or VAT fraud); excise fraud, in which duties on imported products are not paid (e.g. fuel); public procurement fraud; and fraudulent applications for government grants and subsidies. The policy and response landscape for addressing these types of fraud can be distinct, being made up of various agencies and regulatory powers beyond law enforcement (e.g. the tax authority). The links between these types of fraud and organized crime are more well established in the literature.

The focus of the issue paper is organized fraud that targets individual members of the public or private institutions for the purposes of obtaining a financial or other material benefit.

Vienna: UNODC< 2024. 82p.

Detecting and Reporting the Illicit Financial Flows Tied to...

Organized Theft Groups (OTG) and Organized Retail Crime (ORC) .  A Comprehensive Educational Guide for Law Enforcement and Financial Crime Investigators  

By Lauren Kohr and Tiffany Polyak,

Organized retail crime (ORC) remains at the forefront of most major news channels across the United States. High-profile “smash-n-grab” robberies, and nationwide cases involving major retailers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, garner the headlines. Recent hearings by the United States Congress, that discuss and debate proposed legislation, target the ability of criminal organizations to resell stolen goods online with relative anonymity.1 ORC is a low-risk, high-reward business line for transnational criminal organizations’ portfolios that presents a significant financial and public safety risk. While retailers and law enforcement partner to investigate ORC cases and provide education on the misconceptions and misunderstandings, it is clear there is a missing link in these partnerships, and that link is financial institutions. Criminal organizations need to launder the nearly 70 billion US dollars of illicit proceeds gained from ORC activities annually. These organizations are looking to launder their billions through the formal financial sector, unregulated payment processors, and online marketplaces. 1. The Brand Protection Professional, Professional Pointer: What Is ORC And Is It Related To IPRC? To combat ORC and take down organized theft groups (OTGs) more effectively, first, financial institutions must be brought into the awareness and education triangle. Second, public-private partnerships and information-sharing channels between retailers, law enforcement, and financial institutions need to be created. Third, as law enforcement and retailers prioritize investigations involving ORC, financial institutions should look to reasonably enhance their anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) programs to detect and report illicit proceeds stemming from these crimes. Financial institutions should ensure proper controls are in place to detect and report illicit activities tied to or involving ORC. While not specifically addressed in the National AML/CFT Priorities issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on June 20, 2021, it should be addressed that ORC has been tied to many of the priorities issued and other heinous crimes, as reflected in this guide.  

ACAMS and Homeland Security Investigations, 53p.

Organized Crime, Illegal Markets, and Police Governance

By Yvon DanduranA discussion of organized crime and governance is not complete until it addresses the question of police governance and its impact on the fight against organized crime, illicit markets and money laundering. Given the relative failure of law enforcement to control organized crime and contain illegal markets, a focus on police governance forces us to consider how law enforcement priorities are set and law enforcement strategies adopted and implemented. This in turn may lead us to conclude, as I am about to suggest, that we me need to both increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts and reduce our expectations with respect to the impact that law enforcement can really have on controlling organized crime and illicit markets. In our discussions thus far, we acknowledged that public awareness of organized crime and its consequences is an important starting point, but that we also need to find more effective ways to control organized crime and counter its activities. Most of us recognize that law enforcement and regulatory enforcement are crucial elements of effective action against organized crime, yet we must also recognize that the actual impact of law enforcement is usually quite limited. Countering organized crime requires establishing effective police governance and accountability. Governance includes key management issues such as policy formation and implementation, the determination of priorities and strategies, the allocation of resources, deployment strategies and decisions, the implementation of standards, the prevention of corruption internally, and the maintenance of internal discipline. It follows that weak governance can undermine the effectiveness of police actions against organized crime. At the same time, transnational organized crime entails policing in a transnational context and, with this, come the pressing and complex governance and accountability issues presented by the growth of cross-border policing,  transnational policing, and the growing reliance on multi-jurisdictional police teams. In many instances, one is not talking about a single police force, but broad and ill-defined security networks.3 As Walsh and Conway explained, “(m)achinery that is struggling to cope with the governance and accountability challenges presented by the domestic operations of home based police forces may well prove seriously deficient when confronted with the formers’ activities on other sovereign territories, or domestic operations by foreign based police forces  

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2020. 15p.