By The Congressional Budget Office

The United States has been experiencing an opioid crisis since the mid-1990s, and opioids have had a significant effect on public health and on the nation’s economic and social outcomes. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office examines the consequences and timeline of the crisis, the contributing factors and federal responses to it, and the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on the crisis.

Deaths. More than 500,000 opioid-involved deaths have occurred since 2000, and the United States has the world’s highest number of opioid-involved deaths per capita. Although federal funding to address the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, opioid overdose mortality has increased as well. Deaths from opioid-involved overdoses were among the leading causes of death in 2020.

Health and Other Effects. The use and misuse of opioids can result in serious health effects: People with certain harmful behaviors that result from opioid misuse—such as an increase in the amount and frequency of opioid use or failure to fulfill major responsibilities at work, home, or school—have opioid use disorder (OUD), which can affect people’s participation in the labor force and their ability to care for their children. Treatment for OUD is used far less than behavioral health professionals recommend.

Changes Over Time. The opioid crisis has occurred in waves distinguished by the different types of opioids involved in overdose deaths and the use of opioids in combination with other drugs.

Contributing Factors. A rise in opioid prescribing, changes in illegal opioid markets, and greater demand for opioids due to worsening economic and social conditions for certain populations are key contributors to the crisis.

Federal Laws. Between 2016 and 2018, three laws enacted in response to the crisis aimed to lower the demand for and supply of opioids and to reduce their harm. The funding in those laws complemented annual appropriations to agencies tasked with responding to substance use disorder, including opioid use disorder.

The Crisis After the Enactment of the Laws and During the Pandemic. Opioid-involved deaths continued to increase after the laws were enacted—initially more slowly than in preceding years but then more rapidly during the pandemic. Opioid misuse increased during the pandemic as people experienced worsened mental health, more social isolation, greater job losses, and reduced access to treatment. In addition, the use of more potent synthetic opioids led to a sharp increase in overdose deaths. The pandemic and other factors have made it difficult to isolate the effect of the laws on the opioid crisis.

Washington, DC: CBO, 2022. 38p.

By Juraj Sikra

I have explored how to improve cybercrime reporting in Scotland by conducting a systematic literature review. Due to the lack of data on Scotland, I have frequently extrapolated from both the UK and the West. The research questions were: 1. What is known about cybercrime in the UK to date? 2. What is known about cybercrime victims in the UK to date? 3. What is known about cybercrime reporting to date? The answers were retrieved by combining Boolean variables with keywords into Scopus, Web of Science and ProQuest. This resulted in the analysis of 100 peer-reviewed articles. This analysis revealed a common trend, a novel taxonomy, and an original conclusion. The common trend is that of responsibilisation, which is the shifting of responsibility for policing cybercrime from the government onto the citizens and private sector, which will inevitably responsibilise consumers. The novel taxonomy is for classifying cybercrime reporting systems according to three pillars, which I referred to as Human-ToHuman (H2H), Human-To-Machine (H2M) and Machine-To-Machine (M2M). The original conclusion is that to improve cybercrime reporting in Scotland, the process needs to be treated also as a social one rather than a purely mathematical one.

Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 2022. 60p.

By the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

In 2021, America experienced an unprecedented increase in cyber attacks and malicious cyber activity. These cyber attacks compromised businesses in an extensive array of business sectors as well as the American public. As the cyber threat evolves and becomes increasingly intertwined with traditional foreign intelligence threats and emerging technologies, the FBI continues to leverage our unique authorities and partnerships to impose risks and consequences on our nation’s cyber adversaries. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) provides the American public with a direct outlet to report cyber crimes to the FBI. We analyze and investigate the reporting to track the trends and threats from cyber criminals and then share this data with our intelligence and law enforcement partners. The FBI, alongside our partners, recognizes how crucial information sharing of cyber activities is to prepare our partners to combat the cyber threat, through a whole-of-government approach. Critical to that approach is public reporting to IC3 - enabling us to fill in the missing pieces with this valuable information during the investigatory process. Not only does this reporting help to prevent additional crimes, it allows us to develop key insights on the ever-evolving trends and threats we face from malign cyber actors. In 2021, IC3 continued to receive a record number of complaints from the American public: 847,376 reported complaints, which was a 7% increase from 2020, with potential losses exceeding $6.9 billion. Among the 2021 complaints received, ransomware, business e-mail compromise (BEC) schemes, and the criminal use of cryptocurrency are among the top incidents reported. In 2021, BEC schemes resulted in 19,954 complaints with an adjusted loss of nearly $2.4 billion.

Washington, DC: FBI, 2022. 33p.

By Zach Y. Brown & Eduardo Montero & Carlos Schmidt-Padilla & Maria Micaela Sviatschi

How does gang competition affect extortion? Using detailed data on individual extortion payments to gangs and sales from a leading wholesale distributor of consumer goods and pharmaceuticals in El Salvador, we document evidence on the determinants of extortion payments and the effects of extortion on firms and consumers. We exploit a 2016 nonaggression pact between gangs to examine how collusion affects extortion in areas where gangs previously competed. While the pact led to a large reduction in competition and violence, we find that it increased the amount paid in extortion by approximately 20%. Much of this increase was passed through to retailers and consumers: retailers experienced an increase in delivery fees, leading to an increase in consumer prices. In particular, we find an increase in prices for pharmaceutical drugs and a corresponding increase in hospital visits for chronic illnesses. The results point to an unintended consequence of policies that reduce competition between criminal organizations.

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023. 67p.

By Gabriel Feltran,  Cecília Lero, Marcelli Cipriani, Janaina Maldonado, Fernando de Jesus Rodrigues, Luiz Eduardo Lopes Silva e Nido Farias

The paper proposes an explanation for the variations in homicide rates in Brazil in the past two decades. Based on the comparison of ethnographic experiences lived in the criminal universe of four capital cities (São Paulo, Porto Alegre, São Luís and Maceió), we propose two analytical strategies: 1) the breakdown of quantitative homicide rate data by victim profile, and 2) the construction of historical synopses of conflicts between factions at the local level. We demonstrate how homicide rates, in specific socio-demographic profiles, oscillate based on changes in conflicts between factions at the local level conflicts, and influence variations in the aggregate rates   

  Dilemas, Rev. Estud. Conflito Controle Soc. – Rio de Janeiro – Edição Especial no 4 – 2022 – pp. 349-386  

By Laura Y. Calderón

Mexico had the most violent year in its history in 2019, reporting 29,406 intentional homicide cases, resulting in 34,588 individual victims.1 However, violence remains a highly focalized phenomenon in Mexico, with 23% of all intentional homicide cases concentrated in five municipalities and three major clusters of violence with homicide rates over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants. Following the national trend, the state of Guanajuato also had its most violent year in 2019, with one of its largest cities featured in the country’s top five most violent municipalities. This paper will analyze the surge in violence in Guanajuato in 2019, comparing the number of intentional homicide cases with the increasing problem of fuel theft in the state, and describing some of the state and federal government measures to address both issues.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2020. 28p.

By Nicolas Christin

Online anonymous marketplaces are a relatively recent technological development that enables sellers and buyers to transact online with far stronger anonymity guarantees than on traditional electronic commerce platforms. This has led certain individuals to engage in transactions of illicit or illegal goods.

This report presents an analysis of the online anonymous marketplace data collected by Soska and Christin [13] over late 2011–early 2015. In this report, we focus on drug supply coming from the European Union. Keeping in mind the limitations inherent to such data collection, we found that, for the period and the marketplaces considered.

Lisbon, Portugal: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2017. 25p.

By ENACT Africa

As COVID-19 dominates the world’s stage, nearly every aspect of society has been affected by the deadly pandemic. While the impact of the contagion on countries’ economies, social cohesion, health and security has been widely reported on, less is known about its influence on criminal dynamics. The pandemic has not only become a central component of the everyday lives of Africans, but has also revealed the important role the continent plays in the global economy – both licit and illicit. COVID-19 measures have posed a double burden on African countries by heavily challenging people’s economic livelihood and restricting the freedom of movement of Africans, while also challenging governments in how they balance the need to address the health crisis with the provision of services and security amid declining economies. In this context, organised crime in Africa has evolved and taken advantage of the confusion and frustration wrought by the pandemic; it has filled in the gaps left by state institutions, by both adapting its illicit activities in order to circumvent COVID restrictions and providing new sources of livelihoods and parallel services. Institutional responses to stop the spread of the virus have had a profound impact on movement, trade and business, including in black markets and shadow economies. In Africa, COVID-19 was slower to take effect than in other parts of the world, and even though the continent has had experience in handling other major viral epidemics, the health, economic and security systems of many countries on the continent have found themselves ill-equipped to face the particular challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. As legitimate businesses suffered extensive losses across the continent, people increasingly turned to the informal and illicit economies for alternative sources of livelihood. Meanwhile, those already vulnerable to exploitation become even more at risk due to the paucity of economic opportunities available to them and the isolating restrictions put in place in the interest of public health

ENACT (Africa), 2021. 160p.

By ENACT Africa

As COVID-19 dominates the world’s stage, nearly every aspect of society has been affected by the deadly pandemic. While the impact of the contagion on countries’ economies, social cohesion, health and security has been widely reported on, less is known about its influence on criminal dynamics. The pandemic has not only become a central component of the everyday lives of Africans, but has also revealed the important role the continent plays in the global economy – both licit and illicit. COVID-19 measures have posed a double burden on African countries by heavily challenging people’s economic livelihood and restricting the freedom of movement of Africans, while also challenging governments in how they balance the need to address the health crisis with the provision of services and security amid declining economies. In this context, organised crime in Africa has evolved and taken advantage of the confusion and frustration wrought by the pandemic; it has filled in the gaps left by state institutions, by both adapting its illicit activities in order to circumvent COVID restrictions and providing new sources of livelihoods and parallel services. Institutional responses to stop the spread of the virus have had a profound impact on movement, trade and business, including in black markets and shadow economies. In Africa, COVID-19 was slower to take effect than in other parts of the world, and even though the continent has had experience in handling other major viral epidemics, the health, economic and security systems of many countries on the continent have found themselves ill-equipped to face the particular challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. As legitimate businesses suffered extensive losses across the continent, people increasingly turned to the informal and illicit economies for alternative sources of livelihood. Meanwhile, those already vulnerable to exploitation become even more at risk due to the paucity of economic opportunities available to them and the isolating restrictions put in place in the interest of public health

ENACT (Africa), 2021. 160p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The Global Organized Crime Index is the first tool of its kind designed to assess levels of organized crime and resilience to organized criminal activity. It includes in its rankings all the UN member states – 193 countries. The results, which draw from a comprehensive dataset informed by experts worldwide, paint a worrying picture of the reach, scale and impact of organized crime. It is a sobering thought, for instance, that nearly 80% of the world’s population today live in countries with high levels of criminality. It is equally alarming to consider that the exploitation of people, in the form of human trafficking, has become the most pervasive criminal economy in the world – a development that serves as a dark reminder of the dehumanizing impact of organized crime. Meanwhile, the Index highlights how state involvement in criminality is a deeply embedded phenomenon around the world: state officials and clientelist networks who hold influence over state authorities are now the most dominant brokers of organized crime, and not cartel leaders or mafia bosses, as one might be forgiven for thinking. And these are but a few stand-out examples of the findings of this Index. This report introduces the Global Organized Crime Index and sets out the results and implications of the 2020 data, the year in which a new pandemic began to ravage the world. Of course, organized crime is not a new phenomenon, but it is now a more urgent issue than ever. Criminal networks and their impact have spread across the globe in the last two decades, driven by geopolitical, economic and technological forces. The analysis in this report conclusively demonstrates that organized crime is the most pernicious threat to human security, development and justice in the world today.

Geneva: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2021. 188p.

By The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

This report provides a technical review of the current body of knowledge regarding synthetic cannabinoids that are monitored by the EU Early Warning System. The aim of this report is to strengthen situational awareness of synthetic cannabinoids in Europe and to help stakeholders prepare for, and respond to, public health and social threats caused by such substances.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2021. 70p.

By Topher L. McDougal

Illicit economies are notoriously difficult to detect and quantify for the simple reason that participants have incentives to keep their activities clandestine. This paper outlines and implements a method for estimating the markets for illicit small arms, sex, and drugs as constituent components of the total cash economy for the San Diego metropolitan area. The method has two parts: first it derives the total cash economy of San Diego; second it fits a model predicting that amount for each available year as a function of index variables for three distinct illicit markets (small arms, sex, and drugs) and the licit cash economy. It estimates that the market for cash-based purchases of small arms in San Diego in 2013 was $920 million – slightly larger than the illicit sex industry, and much smaller than both the market for illicit drugs and the licit cash economy. Limitations of the method are discussed, including the potential for better proxy variables to improve reliability.

San Diego: Small Arms Data Observatory, 2015. 13p.

By Benoit Gomis

Since 2013, a number of countries and local jurisdictions around the world have legalised and regulated their cannabis supply chains for non-medical use. Lawmakers, regulators, researchers, and advocates continue to design, enact, implement and revise regulatory frameworks for medical and recreational cannabis. And yet lessons from regulating other psychoactive substances, including tobacco products, are not always fully considered. The experience of the illicit tobacco trade is particularly relevant for cannabis regulation. … The global tobacco market is heavily concentrated. China, Brazil, and India accounted for 63% of all tobacco leaf cultivation in 2019 as part of a global cigarette market dominated by a small number of companies.6 China National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) accounted for 43.9% of global cigarette retail volume in 2019 – the large majority of it is destined for domestic consumption, though the company has been developing a global expansion strategy. Beyond CNTC, Philip Morris International (PMI) (13.4% of global retail volume in 2019), British American Tobacco (BAT) (12.7%), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) (9.1%) and Imperial Brands (4.2%) accounted for 70% of the rest of the world’s market share in 2019. In contrast, cannabis can be grown indoors and therefore almost anywhere across the world. The illicit cannabis market has been characterised by a high number of small-scale growers, including for personal consumption and local distribution.

International Drug Policy Consortium, 2021. 23p.

By Stanislav Vysotsky

This dissertation seeks to understand the tactical differences between two groups of anti-racist activists who confront white supremacists. I dub these activists non-militant and militant anti-racists based on their tactical preferences. Non-militant anti-racists engage in what are understood to be conventional and demonstrative tactics. While militants are also likely to engage in similar tactics, their tactical repertoire also includes confrontational and violent approaches. I am particularly interested in how the two groups of activists explain the differences in their tactical choices; and therefore, posit that each group will use ideological explanations and perceptions of threat to explain their tactical choices. Using a snowball sampling methodology, I developed a sample of 24 anti-racist activists. These activists were given a quantitative survey in order to establish their tactical preference. The survey consisted of an original index developed to establish the militancy of the respondent. Survey results yielded a bi-modal distribution of scores that suggests a distinct difference in tactical preferences among anti-racist activists and confirms the categorization of activists into non-militant and militant categories. Additionally, interviews were conducted with all of the participants in order to 1) validate the results of the quantitative measure of militancy, 2) establish ideological orientation and test whether it had an influence of discussion of tactical preference, and 3) gauge the level of threat perceived and its influence on tactical preference. The results of the survey and interview data indicate distinct differences in tactical preferences between non-militants and militants.. The interview data demonstrate a clear difference in how non-militants and militants explain their tactical preferences. Non-militants adhered to a liberal ideology, but did not make explicit reference to their ideological position to explain their tactical preferences. I posit that this is a result of hegemonic dominance of liberalism.

Boston, MA: Northeastern University, 2009. 237p.

By Maziyar Ghiabi

Iran has one of the world’s highest rates of drug addiction, estimated to be between two and seven per cent of the entire population. This makes the questions this book asks all the more salient: what is the place of illegal substances in the politics of modern Iran? How have drugs affected the formation of the Iranian state and its power dynamics? And how have governmental attempts at controlling and regulating illicit drugs affected drug consumption and addiction? By answering these questions, Maziyar Ghiabi suggests that the Islamic Republic’s image as an inherently conservative state is not only misplaced and inaccurate, but in part a myth. In order to dispel this myth, he skilfully combines ethnographic narratives from drug users, vivid field observations from ‘under the bridge’, with archival material from the pre- and post-revolutionary era, statistics on drug arrests and interviews with public officials

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 236p.

By European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Our overall assessment is that drug availability and use remain at high levels across the European Union, although considerable differences exist between countries. Approximately 83.4 million or 29 % of adults (aged 15–64) in the European Union are estimated to have ever used an illicit drug, with more males (50.5 million) than females (33.0 million) reporting use. Cannabis remains the most widely consumed substance, with over 22 million European adults reporting its use in the last year. Stimulants are the second most commonly reported category. It is estimated that in the last year 3.5 million adults consumed cocaine, 2.6 million MDMA and 2 million amphetamines.

Lisbon: EMCDDA: 2022. 60p.

By Marc Mauer

For more than a quarter century the “war on drugs” has exerted a profound impact on the structure and scale of the criminal justice system. The inception of the “war” in the 1980s has been a major contributing factor to the historic rise in the prison population during this period. From a figure of about 40,000 people incarcerated in prison or jail for a drug offense in 1980, there has since been an 1100% increase to a total of 500,000 today. To place some perspective on that change, the number of people incarcerated for a drug offense is now greater than the number incarcerated for all offenses in 1980. The increase in incarceration for drug offenses has been fueled by sharply escalated law enforcement targeting of drug law violations, often accompanied by enhanced penalties for such offenses. Many of the mandatory sentencing provisions adopted in both state and federal law have been focused on drug offenses. At the federal level, the most notorious of these are the penalties for crack cocaine violations, whereby crack offenses are punished far more severely than powder cocaine offenses, even though the two substances are pharmacologically identical. Despite changes in federal sentencing guidelines, the mandatory provisions still in place require that anyone convicted of possessing as little as five grams of crack cocaine (the weight of two sugar packets) receive a five-year prison term for a first-time offense

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2009. 23p.

By European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

Our overall assessment is that drug availability and use remain at high levels across the European Union, although considerable differences exist between countries. Approximately 83.4 million or 29 % of adults (aged 15–64) in the European Union are estimated to have ever used an illicit drug, with more males (50.5 million) than females (33.0 million) reporting use. Cannabis remains the most widely consumed substance, with over 22 million European adults reporting its use in the last year. Stimulants are the second most commonly reported category. It is estimated that in the last year 3.5 million adults consumed cocaine, 2.6 million MDMA and 2 million amphetamines.

Around 1 million Europeans used heroin or another illicit opioid in the last year. Although the prevalence of use is lower for opioid use than for other drugs, opioids still account for the greatest share of harms attributed to illicit drug use. This is illustrated by the presence of opioids, often in combination with other substances, which was found in around three quarters of fatal overdoses reported in the European Union for 2020. It is important to note that most of those with drug problems will be using a range of substances. We are also seeing considerably more complexity in drug consumption patterns, with medicinal products, non-controlled new psychoactive substances and substances such as ketamine and GBL/GHB now associated with drug problems in some countries or among some groups. This complexity is reflected in an increasing recognition that drug use is linked with, or complicates how we respond to, a wide range of today’s most pressing health and social issues. Among these issues are mental health problems and self-harm, homelessness, youth criminality and the exploitation of vulnerable individuals and communities.

Lisbon: EMCDDA, 2022. 60p.

By Mariana Viollaz and Jeni Klugman

In this note, we experiment with potential improvements on the measurement of violence in the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Index to better reflect the reality on the ground in countries experiencing high levels of gang violence. First, we propose an extension to the measure of conflict from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program—currently the most comprehensive measure of organized violence—by including a more accurate number of deaths associated with gang violence alongside “battle deaths.” We show what difference this would make to WPS Index rankings for a set of four Central American countries and Mexico.

Washington, DC: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, 2018. 12p.

Edited by Cynthia J. Arnson and Eric L. Olson

In early May 2011, dozens of gunmen entered a farm in Guatemala’s Petén region, murdering and decapitating 27 people. Guatemalan authorities as well as speculation in the press have blamed the Zetas, a violent Mexican drug trafficking cartel increasingly active in Guatemala and other parts of Central America . Whether a vengeance killing following the murder of a presumed drug lord, or a struggle amongst the Zetas and Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel for the control of territory and smuggling routes, the massacre underscores the vulnerability of the civilian population in unsecured border areas between Mexico and Guatemala, where narcotics and human trafficking flourish. In response, the government of President Álvaro Colom declared a state of siege similar to the one declared from December 2010-February 2011 in the department of Alta Verapaz. This incident and others like it underscore the serious threat to democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law posed by organized crime in Central America. The international community has begun to address the burgeoning crisis and commit significant resources to the fight against crime and violence; indeed, not since the Central American wars of the 1980s-1980s has the region commanded so much attention in the international arena. To better understand the nature, origins, and evolution of organized crime in Central America, and thereby contribute to the efforts of policymakers and civil society to address it, the Latin American Program commissioned a series of case studies that looked at the countries of the so-called Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras— and at the broader regional context affecting national dynamics. Our interest was to understand more fully how organized crime has evolved in Central America, and to examine the links between organized crime and traffickers in Central America, Mexico and Colombia. What role does Central America play in the supply chain for illegal goods between the Andes and the United States, and how have trafficking organizations from these areas related to one another over time? The growing presence and activities of organized crime groups in Central America has worsened an already alarming crisis of citizen security. In mid- 2010, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that Latin America had the highest levels of youth violence in the world . UN figures indicate that the rate of youth homicide in Latin America is more than double that of Africa, and 36 times the rate of developed countries . An oft-referenced study by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) noted in 2009 that the seven countries of Central America—Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama—register the highest levels of non-political violence in the world; this observation has been echoed in statements by the U.S. Department of Defense . The situation is most acute in the countries of the Northern Triangle6 . In El Salvador alone, sixty-eight percent of homicide victims are between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four, and nine out of ten victims are male7 . Countries such as Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Belize are also witnessing rising rates of insecurity associated with the increased presence of organized crime.

Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2011. 254p.