By Max Smeets

This report is based on chapter one of Max Smeets’ book titled “Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security,” forthcoming with Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishers. Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government's crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies. This report discusses significant milestones in the development of ransomware, and what turned them into a significant threat to human and national security. It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups. 

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2024. 18p.

By Steven Dudley, María Fernanda Ramírez, Anastasia Austin and Gavin Voss

This report aims to better understand the criminal dynamics in Durán. Located in the southwest coastal province of Guayas, Durán is a municipality, or cantón, as they are known in Ecuador, of over 300,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom live in the city bearing the same name.1 It has long been known as a commercial hub and small industrial center. But it is also home to a chaotic mix of shrimp farms, poorly-planned residential developments and favela-like land invasions, and unzoned areas of factories and warehouses that produce and store goods, many of which leave Guayaquil’s various maritime ports en route to all corners of the world. More recently, Durán has become a violent epicenter of criminal activity. Criminal groups use the municipality as a staging area for cocaine exiting on cargo ships through Guayaquil’s ports, while also peddling drugs on a local level. Systemic corruption, underdevelopment, and extreme poverty have facilitated this rise in criminality. More than half of Durán’s residents do not have running water or plumbing. The municipality is bereft of schools and a public university. And recent efforts to revive Durán have waned amid local and national neglect and a series of economic crises. To many residents, Durán is but a ciudad dormitorio (sleeping quarters): They work, shop, and relax in neighboring Samborondón and Guayaquil, returning to Durán to spend the night. Part of what keeps them away these days is insecurity: Durán’s homicide rate reached 147 per 100,000 in 2023 — its highest recorded rate — as crime has metastasized. Once a bustling railroad depot and industrial hub, Durán is now the poster child for the country’s rapid decline into the criminal abyss. Major Findings • Many social, economic, and political factors have converged to make Durán a violent criminal hub. Rapid, uncontained population growth, coupled with widespread corruption and malfeasance, has left a good portion of the municipality bereft of basic services such as potable water and a working sewage system. Unplanned, informal, and criminal urban development has scarred the area and jaded its residents, who have few civil society and religious organizations upon which they can channel their grievances and even fewer political options. And, like so many other parts of the country, the municipality lacks security, judicial, and regulatory forces that can effectively prosecute high-impact criminal activities. • Durán has two primary criminal organizations: the Chone Killers and the Latin Kings. These two engage in an increasingly violent battle for the municipality’s territory and its criminal economies, which include local and international drug trafficking activities. Their ties to transnational criminal networks, however, appear to be sporadic and opportunistic, rather than systemic and long-lasting. Perhaps more alarming is their penetration of the municipal government, where at least one of these groups secured public works contracts, as well as control of key government institutions that preside over everything from land tenure issues to traffic tickets. • Land trafficking is at the core of Durán’s criminal ecosystem. The illegal seizure and development of urban and rural land, often with the direct participation of corrupt officials, offers a deep well of potential profit, ranging from the sale of property to the administration of various public services. Illegal settlements also serve as staging areas for various criminal activities, including transnational drug trafficking, retail drug sales, as well as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. Legalizing illegal settlements brings with it lucrative government contracts and the opportunity for corrupt officials to profit from kickbacks and criminal actors to launder their dirty money. It also leads to violence, including against public officials. • Ecuador’s growing role in transnational drug trafficking has significantly impacted Durán’s criminal, political, and economic landscape. By serving larger national drug trafficking networks, local gangs have gained access to substantial financial resources. Drawing from this new revenue stream, gang leaders have acquired legitimate businesses such as laundromats, hair salons, and construction companies. This interplay of criminal, economic, and political capital has also changed the political landscape, offering local gangs an entry point into the municipal government via campaign contributions, as evidenced by their systematic penetration into key government posts and public works contracts. • Durán’s gangs have a complex and varied relationship with the local communities where they operate. While some gangs exploit residents, the most sophisticated gang leaders offer them protection and other social and economic services, filling the void left by absent, corrupt, or inept state institutions, and providing a semblance of security and opportunity. This calculated approach engenders support that allows them to operate in relative safety, as well as use the community infrastructure and draw employees from a vast pool of recruits. • Homicide trends in Durán largely follow patterns seen in Ecuador over the last several years, including the type of victim, weapons employed, and the place where the murders occur. And, in some ways, Durán is a reflection of the extreme swings in violence in cities along the country’s coast. But Durán’s record 2023 homicide spike was more extreme, in part due to local events, like the murders of key criminal power brokers and the rise of a wayward, volatile new leader. These factors point to gang violence as the primary driver of homicides in the municipality   

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 74p.

By Marie Lynam, David Keatley, Garth Maker, John Coumbaros

Little is known about the prevalence of incapacitating substances present in drug-facilitated sexual assaults (DFSA). Presented here is a literature review conducted to provide background information, such as symptoms, exacerbations, and drug interactions, on drugs typically implicated in DFSA, namely gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD), ketamine, diazepam, oxycodone, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Literature found through Scopus and Pubmed was reviewed to determine the current prevalence of these substances in DFSA with a focus on Australian data. The global literature revealed that there is a wide variety of substances used in DFSA and the prevalence varies by country. For example, it was found that in Northern Ireland, opioids were most prevalent whereas in France, benzodiazepines were most prevalent. In Australia, the review revealed a lack of contemporary data with the most recent report in Victoria using data collected during 2011–2013. The literature also revealed there can be an important difference between self-reported substance use and substances discovered via toxicological analysis. This can be due to the challenges of biological detection, reliability of self-reporting, and the possibility of a substance being introduced to a person’s food or drink without their knowledge. This review highlights the need for the collection and analysis of current data about DFSA reports and the drugs detected, and due to the constantly evolving picture of both licit and illicit drug use, an assessment of the role of prescription medications in DFSA due to drug-drug interactions as well as potential to incapacitate is warranted.  

Forensic Science International: Synergy 9 (2024) 100545  

By Jorge Santos-Hermoso, José Luis González-Álvarez, Miguel Ángel Alcázar-Córcoles, Enrique José Carbonell-Vayá 

This investigation studied the interaction between seven risk factors included in the police risk assessment of the VioGén System and found that these factors formed groups based on the dimensions of violence and psychopathology. The 171 femicides analyzed were categorized into four groups: normalized (23.4%), violent (25.7%), pathological (18.7%), and pathological/violent (32.2%). These groups exhibited significant differences concerning their psychosocial profile and relationship dynamics. One of the main findings is the identification of the pathological type that had not been detected in previous typologies, thus highlighting the importance of the psychological factor when classifying the perpetrators of femicide. These results have important practical implications, as the classification of the aggressor could be a preliminary step taken before the risk assessment, which would make it possible to individualize predictions and improve the protection of the victims as well as the therapies and intervention programs. 

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2024) 30:521–543 

By The Mixed Migration Centre

Drawing on more than 1,000 surveys with refugees and migrants, this infographic examines their perceptions of dangerous locations, direct experiences of abuse and harsh conditions and their interactions with and perceptions of smugglers. Additionally, it explores the sources of information that refugees and migrants relied on before and during their journey, as well as their access to assistance.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 6p.

Edited by Pablo Policzer

Making Sense of Haiti's State Fragility and Violence : Combining Structure and Contingency? / Andreas E. Feldmann -- Operation Condor as an International System of State Violence and Terror : A Historical-Structural Analysis / J. Patrice McSherry -- Written in Black and Red : Murder as a Communicative Act in Mexico / Pablo Piccato -- Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner --Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner -- The Police Ombudsman in Brazil as a Potential Mechanism to Reduce Violence / Anthony W. Pereira -- Democracy, Threat, and Repression : Kidnapping and Repressive Dynamics during the Colombian Conflict / Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín -- To End the War in Colombia : Conversatorios among Security Forces, Ex-Guerrillas, and Political Elites, and Ceasefire Seminars-Workshops for the Technical Sub-Commission / Jennifer Schirmer.

Calgary, Alberta, Canada : University of Calgary Press, [2019]

By Russell G Smith and Amelia Hickman

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. This is the third in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of organised crime in 2016–17. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. While the current estimates were undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic and may reflect changes in criminality resulting from the pandemic, the full economic impact of serious and organised criminal offending committed during the pandemic will not be known for some time. It is clear, however, that the impact of serious and organised crime on the Australian economy is substantial.  

Statistical Report No. 38 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2022 73p.

By Irene María Álvarez-Rodríguez Translated by Victoria Furio

The consolidation of armed civilian collectives in the Mexican state of Michoacán arose in a setting in which the illegal regional economy no longer focused on drug smuggling but had turned to a variety of criminal activities and in which the perspective of a moral economy had been restored. This restructuring of the criminal economy was a strong factor in the emergence of the armed collectives.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 236, Vol. 48 No. 1, January 2021, 231–244

By The International Crisis Group

Launched soon after they retook power in 2021, the Taliban’s campaign against narcotics has drastically reduced opium poppy cultivation and upended Afghanistan’s drug economy. Driven by ideology, the Taliban’s anti-drug efforts include rounding up drug users, eradicating crops, and shuttering drug bazaars. The Taliban’s enforcement impacts the livelihoods of millions of people, particularly poor labourers and rural women. Wealthy traders, meanwhile, are profiting from high prices by selling existing stocks. Many farmers have switched to crops such as wheat, but struggle with the reduced income. The ban’s future is uncertain; although the Taliban are adamant about implementing it, it could collapse under the weight of economic hardship. Foreign donors, who have much to gain from reduced drug production in Afghanistan, should harness the Taliban’s zeal for counter-narcotics and encourage licit economic growth. In the meantime, the Taliban should consider the welfare of the poorest farmers and implement a phased approach to the ban. Implemented with growing seriousness, the Taliban’s anti-narcotics campaign has profoundly affected a country that ranks among the world’s largest suppliers of illegal drugs. The main focus has been opium, a central part of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Enforcement began slowly, but has grown stricter. Taliban forces started with easy targets, herding drug users into jails and rehabilitation centres. They then warned farmers not to cultivate the opium poppies whose resin they have harvested for centuries. When that failed, the Taliban deployed fighters to face down villagers and destroy their crops. As a result, the UN estimates, cultivation declined by 95 per cent – more than any other counter-narcotics campaign in recent history. The Taliban also started to apply pressure on traffickers, despite the fact that some of them backed their movement for decades. More recently the de facto authorities shut down drug bazaars and arrested hundreds of dealers. While underworld kingpins and big landowners have thrived under the ban, reaping the benefits of skyrocketing prices by selling stockpiles, many farmers have suffered. By UN estimates, the halt to opium farming has affected the livelihoods of almost seven million people. These individuals are unlikely to find other work in a stagnant economy burdened with sanctions. Farmers have lost an estimated $1.3 billion annually, or 8 percent of GDP in 2023. Farm work remains the biggest source of employment for Afghan women. The ban has hit them especially hard, given their lack of opportunities under a Taliban regime that severely limits their ability to work. The economic shock has been compounded by the Taliban’s limited capacity to offer farmers and rural workers alternatives. Many switched to cultivating wheat or cotton, but struggle to make ends meet. Development of licit agriculture would require more irrigation, cold storage facilities and better roads. The Taliban does not have the budget to develop such infrastructure. Meanwhile, the opium price has soared, tempting farmers to flout the ban. So far, few dare to defy the Taliban. Farmers respect the ban most faithfully in the south, where the Taliban have many supporters, and where bigger farms produced stocks of opium that could be sold after the ban. Still, pockets of disobedience remain, even in the Taliban’s home province of Kandahar. In the smaller fields of the mountainous north and east, resistance is more widespread. While the Taliban’s measures have shaken the drug sector to its very foundations, the future of the ban remains in doubt. Some experts predict that its economic impact will force the Taliban to back track on a signature policy. Of course, it is also possible that the Taliban leadership will remain stubborn and steadfast. Foreign governments have a lot to gain from Afghanistan no longer flooding global markets with drugs. After the Taliban’s severe restrictions on women’s rights made the regime odious to much of the outside world, the narcotics ban offers a rare opportunity to work with the new authorities on a pressing issue to the benefit of all sides. The Taliban’s strategy of banning drugs without providing alternative jobs risks large-scale displacement of rural Afghans and rising emigration, along with growing desperation among the poor. Donors should support a transition toward licit and equitable growth in the economy, easing the acute poverty crisis the country currently faces. Some already give aid for food security and rehabilitation of drug users, but the assistance falls far short. Effective support at a national scale would require working with the Taliban regime, which is politically difficult and, for many Western policymakers, unpalatable. It would, however, aid Afghan civilians, especially rural women. In the first instance, support could focus on rural development, agricultural support, water conservation and investments in agro-processing. But the reality is that a drug-free agricultural sector will not provide enough jobs, so the country needs a development plan focusing more broadly on non-farm employment, including for women. Regional countries should support Afghanistan’s integration into transport networks and trade arrangements, for their own interests and to stabilise their neighbourhood. All of this will require time. Until the country makes the painful transition away from dependence on narcotics as a cash crop, the Taliban should show a bit of leni ency. Although it is unlikely it will backtrack on the ban, at a minimum the regime should halt more intrusive eradication practices such as house-to-house searches. Adopting more lenient practices such as turning a blind eye to small garden plots of poppy and cannabis would give the poorest farmers a better chance of survival in the coming years. Farmers selling tiny amounts of opium for prices hundreds of times higher than what is paid for other crops would give them a lifeline without jeopardising the ban’s overall objectives. 

Report No. 340 Kabul/Brussels,  International Crisis Group, 2024. 35p.

By Elizabeth Hacker, Kriti Bhattarai, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked, Bhujel, S. , Danny Burns, Mariah Cannon, Deshar, L. , Anita K.C., Pragya Lamsal, Barsha Luitel, Sudhir Malla, Mishra, N. , Rayamajhi, D. , Shakya, A. , Sherpa, P. , Kapil Shrestha & Amit Timilsina

Spanning five years, the focus of the CLARISSA programme in Nepal was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, with particular attention given to the informal economy where the worst forms of child labour are prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, in Nepal, 12 Participatory Action Research Groups of children and business owners spent between 12 and 18 months learning from action to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour, their lived experience of it, and the businesses in which they work. With a focus on both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour, this paper aims to further understanding of the reasons why children have to work and why businesses employ children. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in and the neighbourhoods where they live. This paper synthesises the detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why worst forms of child labour occur in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, and what can be done about it.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 18,  Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2024. 74p.

By Jody Aked, Danny Burns and A.K.M. Maksud  

CLARISSA (Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South‑Eastern Asia), a research programme on worst forms of child labour (WFCL), aims to identify, evidence, and promote effective multi-stakeholder action to tackle the drivers of WFCL in selected supply chains in Bangladesh and Nepal. Spanning five years, the programme’s focus in Bangladesh was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Dhaka’s leather industry, and particularly the informal economy, where WFCL is prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, 13 participatory action research groups of children and business owners spent 12–18 months learning about actions to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports, and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper synthesises this detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens in Dhaka’s leather industry and what can be done about it. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about child labour in the leather industry in and around Dhaka, Bangladesh. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour and their lived experience of it, alongside the small leather businesses they work in. The aim was to understand why children have to work and why the businesses employ children, looking at both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website,2 which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper looks across this rich and detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens and what can be done about it.   

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 11, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 70p.  

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace ResearchVolume 61, Issue 4, July 2024, Pages 673-693

By Sherry, Suzanna

Last October, progressive Jews were shocked by the raw antisemitism displayed by their erstwhile allies on the political left. After Hamas terrorists tortured, raped, or murdered more than 1200 Israeli civilians and took some 200 civilians hostage, some progressives – especially on college campuses – celebrated. They chanted the Palestinian mantra “from the river to the sea,” seeking to erase Israel (and Jews) from the face of the earth. The number of antisemitic incidents on campus soared, coming from both students and faculty. A Stanford lecturer forced Jewish students to the back of the classroom and labeled them “colonizers.” Jewish students had to barricade themselves inside a library at Cooper Union, and Jewish students at MIT were told by faculty to avoid the university’s main lobby for their own safety. Many university presidents who had previously sent out campus-wide emails condemning the murder of George Floyd, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, and countless other world events suddenly discovered the Kalven Principles and claimed it would be inappropriate for them to take sides, or issued weak statements about how the situation in the Middle East was complicated. This double standard continued as some universities responded to student calls for genocide of Jews by invoking principles of free speech, principles that had been notably ignored when the speech in question was directed at other groups. Most campus DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) offices, especially at the most elite universities, had nothing to say about the surging antisemitism. This essay explains why no one should have been shocked, or even mildly surprised, by the progressive response to the massacre. Progressive or “woke” culture –as exemplified by critical race theory, anti-racism of the Ibram X. Kendi variety, and, especially on college campuses, the DEI juggernaut – is necessarily and inevitably antisemitic at its core. That these related movements have now exposed their antisemitism publicly is no surprise: antisemitism is bred in their bones.

FIU Law Review from Vol. 25 to Vol. 19, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 24-4, 2024. 

By Rupert Horsley

This report details the key trends and developments in human smuggling in Libya in 2023. In large degree, the year was one of continuity with the patterns seen in 2022. Over the course of the year, for example, 77 470 migrants departed the Libyan coast, only marginally higher than 2022’s figure of 75 500.1 Furthermore, hybrid migration, in which migrants travel to Libya regularly or semi-regularly before attempting the sea crossing to Europe, accounted for an estimated 75% of these departures, also roughly similar to the proportion recorded in 2022. Many of the migrants involved in hybrid journeys first arrived in Libya at Benina airport in the east of the country. This indicates the increasing importance of eastern Libya to human smuggling writ large. In addition to the migrant arrivals at Benina airport, eastern Libya also saw a dramatic rise in departures from the coastal areas in and around Tobruk in 2023, with some 40% of sea crossings in the first half of the year taking place from there. Some, though not all, of the migrants leaving from the east coast had arrived in Benina. While heightened enforcement by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) suppressed departures from the Tobruk hub in the second half of 2023, the body reportedly continued to allow Benina to be used as the main air travel arrival point for hybrid migration for the rest of the year. Thus, the LAAF clearly emerged as one of the main actors influencing hybrid migration in Libya in 2023. Following the shutdown of the Tobruk system, hybrid migration sea crossings were displaced to the west coast. By August, departures from this area had increased significantly and there were reports of migrants accumulating in warehouses in several hubs. In October, a notably large series of departures from Zuwara occurred at a remarkable rate. Increased departures from the west coast indicate that entrenched smuggling networks remain ready to seize opportunities. Given the political and security fragmentation of the region, these networks are likely to underpin the resilience of human smuggling in Libya for the foreseeable future. A notable element that remained marginal in 2023 was trans-Saharan smuggling through Libya. This was once a major route for migrants departing from Libya, but has declined significantly since 2017/18 due to insecurity and migrant abuse in Libya and law enforcement action in downstream countries. One of the few significant developments was the relatively moderate but growing number of Sudanese refugees fleeing the civil war in that country. However, this was not substantial enough to drive systematic changes in the dynamics of overland human smuggling. Similarly, Sudanese nationals did not leave the Libyan coast in large numbers. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Libya. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2017, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Libya, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.2   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 36p.

By Ingri Bøe Buer

This article reconsiders peace and security from the perspectives of community leaders, educators and activists in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2019–2020. Through a critical lens, it argues that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro resembles a form of new wars where the state is a major producer of insecurity. It questions the meaning of peace and top-down pacification processes in a city where the favelas, since their origin, have been considered dangerous areas needing to be pacified and controlled. The article introduces favela peace formation as a concept to describe alternative processes working to reduce the inter-sectional forms of violence in these communities: non-violent, locally legitimate peace processes working to slowly construct a positive, sustainable peace. To conclude, it discusses how favela peace formation presents a way of imagining peace as ‘care’ instead of ‘order’ in response to the state’s violent peace as ‘control’

Peacebuilding, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2024.2354083

By Gaurav Verma, Rynaa Grover, Jiawei Zhou, Binny Mathew, Jordan Kraemer, Munmun De Choudhury, Srijan Kumar

Violence-provoking speech -- speech that implicitly or explicitly promotes violence against the members of the targeted community, contributed to a massive surge in anti-Asian crimes during the pandemic. While previous works have characterized and built tools for detecting other forms of harmful speech, like fear speech and hate speech, our work takes a community-centric approach to studying anti-Asian violence-provoking speech. Using data from ~420k Twitter posts spanning a 3-year duration (January 1, 2020 to February 1, 2023), we develop a codebook to characterize anti-Asian violence-provoking speech and collect a community-crowdsourced dataset to facilitate its large-scale detection using state-of-the-art classifiers. We contrast the capabilities of natural language processing classifiers, ranging from BERT-based to LLM-based classifiers, in detecting violence-provoking speech with their capabilities to detect anti-Asian hateful speech. In contrast to prior work that has demonstrated the effectiveness of such classifiers in detecting hateful speech (F1=0.89), our work shows that accurate and reliable detection of violence-provoking speech is a challenging task (F1=0.69). We discuss the implications of our findings, particularly the need for proactive interventions to support Asian communities during public health crises.

2024

By Raul Zepeda Gil

One of the main inquiry topics within crime and conflict studies is how inequalities or poverty fosters or deters participation in organized violence. Since the late 1990s, the increase in violence in Latin America has boosted the use of Global North criminology and conflict studies to explain this phenomenon. Although helpful, the question about the link between inequality and violence remains elusive. Instead, this research uses occupational mobility and life course approaches to analyze the latest Mexican inmate survey data. With this data, we can understand the factors behind youth recruitment into violent criminal organizations during the current drug war. The main findings point to youth transitions from school and low-skilled manual employment towards criminal violent activities as an option out of work precariousness. This research proposes researching transitions to organized violence as an occupational choice in market economies and post-conflict settlements as a possible causal mechanism that explains inequalities and violence.

   Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 1–15, 2024