By Colleen King

In December 2023, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) offloaded approximately 18,219 pounds of cocaine from the USCG Cutter Waesche. The estimated street value of the cocaine was more than $239 million. The offload occurred as a result of six separate maritime interdictions, performed by separate cutters, taking place over a 17-day period off the coasts of Mexico and Central and South America. The interdictions were performed as part of the USCG’s counternarcotics mission. While interdictions of this size may seem out of the ordinary, the USCG routinely interdicts a variety of vessels, including Go-Fast Vessels and semi submersibles, with massive amounts of drugs (usually cocaine), moving from the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of South America northward to Mexico, the Caribbean, and eventually the United States. One can imagine that prosecuting interdictions like these may raise a variety of questions: could the United States assert jurisdiction over the suspected traffickers; would the maritime location of the interdiction matter; and would it make a difference if the ship carrying the contraband was flagged—registered—by another country? What about the transit time to a U.S. court for an initial appearance where the interdiction occurred over a thousand miles from the United States? The dizzying array of issues confronting a federal prosecutor following a high seas interdiction may not be typical of land-based legal challenges. Fortunately, a body of both federal law and international authorities is instructive on these questions. The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) is the United States’ principal statute addressing high seas drug trafficking and has supported thousands of prosecutions for decades. The MDLEA, as it re lates to controlled substances,5 prohibits the distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute or manufacture, controlled sub stances aboard a “covered vessel.” Its prohibitions apply “outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” and include both attempt and conspiracy liability. And, where an interdiction occurs outside of the United States, venue may be appropriate in your district. This article is intended to serve as an MDLEA primer. It will provide a brief his tory of the MDLEA, identify the MDLEA’s core definitional provisions, discuss its key criminal prohibition, detail its jurisdiction and venue pro vision, describe the MDLEA’s position on the use of international law as a defense, and finally, address its sentencing provisions.

March 2024 DOJ Journal of Federal Law and Practice

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks

Organised crime is not going well. According to the 2021 Global Organized Crime index, ‘the global illicit economy simply continue[s] along the upward trajectory it has followed over the past 20 years, posing an ever-increasing threat to security, development and justice – the pillars of democracy’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 8). Wherever governments seek to draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalise on citizens’ desire or despair. As of now, more than three-quarters of the world’s population ‘live in countries with high levels of criminality, and in countries with low resilience to organized crime’ (Global Initiative, 2021, p. 12). On aggregate, the associated activity amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients, be they the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. The breadth of organised crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects make it difficult to counter. In past SOC ACE research, we argued that the response to organised crime often shares certain pitfalls with counterterrorism, at least since 9/11 (Ucko & Marks, 2022c). Both efforts have been stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head on (be it violence or crime), without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. This convergence is based on the common features of the two phenomena, which are both concerned with i) collective actors, who ii) use violence and coercion among other methods; and who have iii) corrupting, or outright destructive effects on society. Though organised crime is not consciously political in its ideological motivation, it is – like terrorism – deeply political in its origins, activities, and effects. Given the conceptual overlap, and the common pathologies that undermine response, the lessons from countering terrorism are relevant also to the countering of organised crime. Focusing on the concept of ‘irregular warfare’, our past research identified six key lessons, touching upon 1) the socio-political embeddedness of the problem, 2) the tendency to militarise the response, 3) the mirror-imaging of state assistance programmes, 4) the invaluable role of community mobilisation, 5) the dearth of strategy, and 6) the need to engage more closely with questions of political will. As argued elsewhere, these challenges point to a need for greater strategic competence both in assessing the problem of organised crime and in designing a response (Ucko & Marks, 2022c).

To generate this strategic competence, this follow-on report sets out an analytical toolkit to assist planners and policymakers with the crafting of strategy. This ‘Framework of Analysis and Action’ builds upon lessons – negative and positive – learned via years of experience with irregular warfare, defined by the Department of Defense as ‘a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 1).1 It is a framework that finds its origins within the U.S. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (CISA), where for two decades it has been used to teach strategic planning for complex and intensely political challenges (Ucko & Marks, 2022a). The framework consists of two parts: the Strategic Estimate of the Situation (which maps the problem, explores its drivers, frames, and methods, and critiques the current response) and the Course of Action (which uses the strategic estimate to design an appropriate strategy, guided by a theory of success). The framework is in this report adapted for organised crime, to enable the mapping of relevant actors and the crafting, thereby, of a viable response. By design, the framework responds to the six key lessons identified in our earlier work. This report goes through the framework and explains its adaptation to organised crime. Appendix A provides a summation of the toolkit, a ‘user’s guide’, that will facilitate application of the framework. Testing to date suggests great potential and we look forward to sustaining a dialogue with those engaged with countering organised crime to further evolve this toolkit. Indeed, since the beginning, this framework has been a living product, enriched by theoretical application in the classroom and practical use in the field.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 19. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 45p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe.

In this issue, we focus on three cases where criminal groups from the region have been active in recent years: the Netherlands, Ecuador and parts of Africa.

These examples illustrate the growing involvement of Balkan criminal groups in some of the world’s hotspots for illicit activity. Research for these articles is facilitated by the Global Initiative’s network of contacts with local investigative journalists, as well as close cooperation between regional observatories of illicit economies, namely South Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America.

As part of the GI-TOC’s analysis of the risks of firearms trafficking from Ukraine, in this issue we show that the Western Balkans remain the main source of illegal weapons in Europe. At present, weapons are still cheap and plentiful in the region, and stockpiles have been augmented by inflows from Turkey via Bulgaria, particularly of gas and alarm guns. More on this topic can be found in a forthcoming GI-TOC report on trends in arms trafficking from the Ukraine conflict.

In this issue, we also report on a major crackdown by Serbian authorities in late 2023 on increasingly violent smugglers operating along the border between Serbia and Hungary, and examine how this has displaced migration flows towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Risk Bulletin No. 18. Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 25p.

By Vlado Vivoda, Ghaleb Krame and Martin Spraggon

Oil theft refers to the exploitation of crude oil or refined petroleum products for criminal purposes. In Mexico, oil theft—referred to as huachicolero—is endemic and widespread. By framing it within the energy security and transition context, this paper offers a new perspective on the problem of oil theft in Mexico. Focusing on crude oil and refined petroleum, the paper demonstrates that Mexico’s energy security—as framed around the 4As (availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptance)—has deteriorated over the past decade. Application of the 4As framework in the Mexican context shows that the increasing frequency of oil theft has contributed to this deterioration. The proposed solution to the energy security and oil theft problems is centred on Mexico moving from gasoline and diesel to electrification in the transportation sector. The paper demonstrates that, while transport electrification in Mexico has been lagging behind other countries, recent developments in the country point to growing momentum among the country’s political and business elites, in tandem with US partners, in support for the energy transition. Areas where further emphasis should be placed to accelerate Mexico’s energy transition in the transportation sector are identified. Finally, the feasibility of and potential limitations associated with implementing the transition are evaluated.

Resources 2023, 12(2), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/resources12020030

By Wendy Grossman 

Who will rule cyberspace? And why should people care? Recently stories have appeared in a variety of news media, from the sensational to the staid, that portray the Internet as full of pornography, pedophilia, recipes for making bombs, lewd and lawless behavior, and copyright violators. And, for politicians eager for votes, or to people who have never strolled the electronic byways, regulating the Net seems as logical and sensible as making your kids wear seat belts. Forget freedom of speech: children can read this stuff.

From the point of view of those on the Net, mass-media's representation of pornography on the Internet grossly overestimates the amount that is actually available, and these stories are based on studies that are at best flawed and at worst fraudulent. To netizens, the panic over the electronic availability of bomb-making recipes and other potentially dangerous material is groundless: the same material is readily available in public libraries. Out on the Net, it seems outrageous that people who have never really experienced it are in a position to regulate it.

How then, should the lines be drawn in the grey area between cyberspace and the physical world? In net.wars, Wendy Grossman, a journalist who has covered the Net since 1992 for major publications such as Wired, The Guardian, and The Telegraph, assesses the battles that will define the future of this new venue. From the Church of Scientology's raids on Net users to netizens attempts to overthrow both the Communications Decency Act and the restrictions on the export of strong encryption, net.wars explains the issues and the background behind the headlines. Among the issues covered are net scams, class divisions on the net, privacy issues, the Communications Decency Act, women online, pornography, hackers and the computer underground, net criminals and sociopaths, and more.

New York; London: NYU Press, 1998. 256p.

By  James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman

In 1988, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani brought a massive civil racketeering suit against the leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), at the time possibly the most corrupt union in the world. The lawsuit charged that the mafia had operated the IBT as a racketeering enterprise for decades, systematically violating the rights of members and furthering the interests of organized crime. On the eve of trial, the parties settled the case, and twenty years later, the trustees are still on the job.

Breaking the Devil’s Pact is an in-depth study of the U.S. v. IBT, beginning with Giuliani’s lawsuit and the politics surrounding it, and continuing with an incisive analysis of the controversial nature of the ongoing trusteeship. James B. Jacobs and Kerry T. Cooperman address the larger question of the limits of legal reform in the American labor movement and the appropriate level of government involvement.

New York; London: NYU Press, 2011. 320p.

By Matt Hopkins, Rachel Keighley, Teela Sanders

  Thinking about organised crime as an ecosystem is not only novel but also offers much potential to add to the theoretical and policy-based literature in this area. While organised crime is often analysed as relationships between criminal groups and consumers of illicit goods/services, little work has analysed specific forms of organised crime activities as ecosystems where different constituent parts are dependent upon each other for the crime activity to occur. This paper analyses the organisation of sexual exploitation by entrepreneurial organised crime groups sell ing sex in the United Kingdom. Based upon 30 interviews with 23 law enforcement forces in England and Wales and five interviews with Adult Service Website Opera tors; it identifies how an ecosystem is built that ensures (a) profit generation and (b) avoidance of legal prosecution. Our analysis not only illustrates how a market ‘sup ply’ and ‘demand’ ecosystem is generated through mutually convenient ‘organiser’, ‘marketer’ and ‘buyer’ relationships, but also how the roles of these actors ensure sexual exploitation continues. Keywords Organised crime · 

Trends in Organized Crime, trends in Organized Crime. 2024, 20pg

By Janos Mark Szakolczai, Ryan Casey, Amy Cullen, Emily Qvist-Baudry and Alistair Fraser

1.1 Overview

In 2022, the Scottish Government commissioned a study of public space closed circuit television (CCTV) in Scotland, which aimed to update baseline evidence of the provision of public space CCTV in Scotland. The study was undertaken by a team of researchers from the University of Glasgow and the University of Edinburgh, with guidance from a Research Advisory Group consisting of key stakeholders in public space CCTV in Scotland.

The study sought to answer the following research questions:

1) What is the current provision of public space CCTV in Scotland and how, and for what purposes, do local authorities and Police Scotland use public space CCTV?

2) How do communities across Scotland perceive the use, effectiveness, and value of public space CCTV in their local communities?

3) What is the provision, delivery, operation, and maintenance of public space CCTV like in similar jurisdictions, and how does this compare with Scotland?

The project involved an in-depth, mixed methods approach to better understand the current provision and use of public space CCTV across Scotland, to assess the perceived use and value of public space CCTV in local communities, and to make international comparisons.

Glasgow: Scottish Government, 2023. 66p.

By  Sine Plambech, Ahlam Chemlali,  and Maria Chiara Cerio

Themes as labour migration, trafficking, sex work, debt and reproductive health, are often tackled separately, but the reality experienced by women on the move shows that they are much more intertwined than it might seem.

This new DIIS Report aims at exploring these connections bringing to the core of the conversation the first-hand experience of migrant women from West Africa. Fifty-one women are interviewed at different points of their journeys from Nigeria and Ivory Coast through Niger, Tunisia, Libya, across the Mediterranean to Italy and onwards to Northern Europe.

Anchored in critical trafficking studies, the report draws on a trafficking-migration continuum to understand how categories of forced, voluntary or irregular migration will vary according to political and moral values. The women interviewed in this study did not define themselves as trafficked, but as women looking for safety and business opportunities. Taking into consideration their personal and individual stories allow us to overcome the invisibility of migrant women usually depicted as just victims of trafficking or criminals crossing European borders, and understanding them as agent with an active role in their migratory experience.

Irregular migrant women face several vulnerabilities as heightened levels of gender-based violence en route, including rape, maternal mortality and limited access to contraception and pregnancy termination. Migrant women en route implement harm reduction strategies to address these vulnerabilities and ultimately survive. Often this implies relying on dangerous and quick solutions and avoiding professional medical assistance or humanitarian aid, due to their fear of being deported or arrested.

Based on the stories and experiences of migrant women and practitioners, this report seeks to develop doable solutions to make this migratory path safer. It speaks directly to NGOs and practitioners in terms of implementing accessible spaces for women and girls’ specific needs, to health and medical organisations in order to provide reproductive health services in numerous points of the journey and finally to policy makers in the hope of bank and debt, sex work and migration policies reforms.

Copenhagen:  DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies, 2022. 72p.

By Jacqueline Beard    

  Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides various measures that enable the police in England and Wales to monitor and manage sex offenders living in the local area. Notification requirements: The “sex offenders register” Certain sex offenders are required to notify the police of personal information such as their name, address and bank and credit card details, and to update the police whenever this information changes. The police record of this information is commonly referred to as the “sex offenders register”. There is no general public access to the “sex offenders register”. The child sex offender disclosure scheme allows parents, carers and guardians to formally ask the police to tell them if someone has a record for child sexual offences. The notification requirements are imposed automatically on offenders convicted of certain offences in the UK but can also be imposed on offenders convicted overseas. The notification requirements are imposed for a fixed or indefinite period, depending on the sentence received. The penalties for breaching notification requirements range from a fine to imprisonment for up to five years. Those offenders subject to an indefinite notification period can apply to the police for a determination that they no longer pose a risk and should no longer be on the register. The earliest point at which such an application can be made is 15 years after the date of the offender’s first notification (or eight years, for those aged under 18 when convicted). Sexual Harm Prevention Orders and Sexual Risk Orders There are two civil orders available to manage sex offenders and those who pose a risk of harm: Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs) and Sexual Risk Orders (SROs). These orders can place a range of restrictions and/or positive requirements on individuals depending on the nature of the case, such as limiting their internet use or preventing travel abroad. The penalties for breach range from a fine to imprisonment for up to five years. Details can be found in the Home Office, Guidance on Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, November 2022.  

London: House of Commons Library, 2023. 23p.

By Louise Marie Hurel

  In February 2020, the Decree 10.222 established Brazil’s National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) — the first official document to provide an overview regarding Brazil’s role in cybersecurity, as well as objectives and guiding principles for its development between 2020 and 2023. With the Covid-19 pandemic, thousands of people, governmental agencies, and businesses have rapidly adapted their activities to a largely virtual environment. This sudden migration led to new threats and attack surfaces for exploiting vulnerabilities. More than ever, different sectors must be prepared and trained to respond to and resist these threats. However, this was precisely the period in which Brazil suffered the worst cyber attack in its history – highlighting, yet again, that many challenges remain for ensuring that concerns with security turn into action across different sectors. This strategic paper identifies the main gaps and challenges for cybersecurity governance in Brazil. We unpack the main elements of E-Ciber in order to understand and place the country’s strategic vision historically as well as in relation to other international experiences. We adopt a principlesbased approach that seeks to strengthen and inform the implementation of strategic cybersecurity objectives in Brazil, which include: national and international coordination and cooperation; knowledge integration; sustainability of efforts; and cybersecurity-related training. 1 See Annex 1 for greater detail on the various challenges. This document is the result of three months of interviews with specialists from various sectors, thematic document analysis, and ethnographic work in different areas, forums, and debates. Challenges identified in interviews and field work include:1 (i) The absence of a shared vocabulary when referring to cybersecurity/digital issues in society; (ii) The association of cybersecurity with military affairs, responsibilities and institutions; (iii) Lack of understanding regarding specific and shared digital risks across sectors; (iv) The absence of mechanisms for sharing information regarding security risks/threats and knowledge across sectors; (v) Lack of normative, strategic, and operational alignment for incident response; and (vi) (vi)The existence of various cybersecurity maturity levels throughout society

Brazil: Igarape Institute, 2021. 43p.

By Carlos Vilalta and Gustavo Fondevila 

Not much information can be found on the size and trends of the prison population in Latin America. Over the past few years, our knowledge base has started to increase. Now we know, with certainty, that prison populations have been growing much faster than the general population, and that their living conditions are extremely harsh. 3 Thus it should not surprise us when we often hear of deadly prison riots happening in countries like Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico, as a consequence of overcrowding and poor living conditions. Although living conditions in prisons in the region are still appalling, rapid growth seems to have come to an end. Trend data suggests that the Latin American prison population rate has stabilized. The objective of this study is to offer a data driven review of the growth, trends, and the principle reasons behind the rapid expansion of the prison population in the region during the past two decades. A key factor appears to be  the rise of prison populism. We do not provide an argument for the recent decrease in the growth rate, it is too early to determine whether the recent slow-down in prison population growth is due to a regime shift in the time series, or the effect of random variation. Still, ceteris paribus, we provide a projection of the prison population rate for the region. This Strategic Note fills a gap in the literature. Our particular contribution consists of the compilation of quantitative data of the region´s prison population, with the purpose of providing a broad but novel overview of the rapid growth and challenges to a wide audience of researchers and practitioners worldwide. 

Brazil: Igarape Institute, 2019. 16p.

By Nikita Lalwani

For much of the twentieth century, the United States did little to help repatriate looted antiquities, thanks to a powerful coalition of art collectors, museums, and numismatists who preferred an unregulated art market. Today, however, the country treats the protection of cultural property as an important national-security issue. What changed? This Essay tells the story of how a confluence of events—including the high-profile destruction and looting of cultural property in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the revelation that looted antiquities were helping to bankroll terrorist organizations in the Middle East—convinced both Congress and the State Department to take the issue seriously. It then asks what this shift says about how the United States sets its policy agenda and reflects on how cultural property law should evolve from here.

Yale Law Journal, VOLUME 130, 2020-2021

By  James Porteous

This report examines human trafficking linked to organised crime groups involved in illegal betting and related criminal activity in four key regions in Southeast Asia. Research was primarily via desktop information gathering conducted in 2022/23, supplemented by the expertise and existing knowledge of the Mekong Club and the Asian Racing Federation Council on Anti-Illegal Betting and Related Financial Crime in human trafficking and illegal betting, respectively. Key findings are: • Tens of thousands of people are being held in modern slavery conditions to work in organised illegal betting and cyber-scam operations across Southeast Asia. • These operations, which are run by individuals with long histories of involvement in illegal betting and organised crime across Asia, are estimated to make at least USD 40 to 100 billion a year in illicit profits from such activity. • Some individuals are recruited on false job advertisements, have their passports removed and are kept in dormitories attached to fully contained casino compounds as forced labour to promote illegal betting websites and engage in industrial-scale cyber-fraud such as “pig butchering”, romance scams, and cryptocurrency Ponzi schemes. • Workers are typically not permitted to leave without paying large ransoms to their captors, and can be sold and traded between organised crime groups. Fines for breaking rules or failing to hit monetary targets are added to victims’ ransoms. • Reports on victim testimony and online video shows “staff” being beaten with iron bars, shocked with cattle prods, tied up, and subject to other forms of torture. Female victims have been forced into sex work for failing to meet targets. • The groups running such operations have been active in organising and promoting gambling across Asia since at least the 1990s. Because many of the core activities in this business (e.g., movement of money across borders, violent debt collection, bribery of local officials, provision of related “entertainment” such as narcotics and sex), are illicit, such operations have by necessity been closely associated with, or directly run by, individuals with organised crime backgrounds. • In the early 2000s, this business was supercharged by the development of online gambling (both casino games and sports betting), run directly out of existing casinos or related properties, which massively increased the target market, and has grown to be a trillion dollar illegal industry funding organised crime. • Attempts to profit from this by governments in Southeast Asia, typically by licensing operators for a fee, have led to the spread of such operations across the region and had major negative impacts, including widespread corruption. It has also concentrated operations in self-contained compounds and so-called special economic zones which local police are often unwilling or unable to enter or investigate. • Hundreds of thousands of workers are required to serve the industry in marketing, customer recruitment, funds transfers, tech support and related fields. • Pre-pandemic, demand for workers was usually satisfied by voluntary means, although an unknown percentage of “voluntary” arrivals were held in modern-slavery like conditions, and there were related human trafficking aspects such as trafficking of sex workers to serve the industry. • This began to change in 2018 as a result of China’s growing concern over cross-border illegal betting, and change was accelerated massively by travel restrictions due to the pandemic, which cut off the supply of workers. • At the same time, the organised criminal groups had a key business line – land-based casinos – essentially closed down because of travel restrictions. As a result, they greatly expanded and developed existing cyber-scam operations, leveraging their expertise and technology in areas such as social media marketing, customer recruitment and cryptocurrency, which were in place from their online illegal betting operations. • Now, as the pandemic recedes, the organised crime groups running these operations have, in effect, hugely increased their potential revenue by complementing illegal betting with cyber-scam operations of comparable scale. • The success of such operations has been an enormous financial boon to organised crime, for whom cyber scams and illegal betting are just two of many illicit business lines that include money laundering as a service, illicit wildlife trafficking and production and distribution of methamphetamine and heroin. • The vast profits from such operations have provided plentiful ammunition to corrupt local authorities, and the operations in this group are frequently protected by powerful politicians and/or armed militias. • Global attention on the issue has not eliminated this activity, just displaced it into even more vulnerable jurisdictions, leading some to fear the industry could lead to geopolitical instability.   

Hong Kong: Asian Racing Federation, 2023. 39p.

By Martin Purbrick  

The report provides an analysis of variable Betting Duty (tax) rates on racing and sports betting operators to assess the impact on legal markets of higher rates and the related impact on betting turnover in the illegal betting markets. The economic impact of excessive Betting Duty in the Internet age is to drive consumers to the illegal betting market.

  • The highest rate of Betting Duty noted is in Hong Kong, at 75% of GGR. • The lowest rate of Betting Duty noted is in South Africa, at 6% of GGR. • The median rate of Betting Duty noted is in France, at 37.7% of GGR. • The highest Betting Duty rate in Hong Kong exists with an estimated illegal market of USD 257 per head of population, with lessening illegal markets per head of population with correspondingly lower Betting Duty rates of USD 61 in Singapore (25% Betting Duty), USD 59 per head in South Africa (6.5%), USD30 in Australia (10% to 20%), and USD 11.44 in the USA (6.75% to 51%). • Betting Duty rates have an impact on the turnover in betting markets, causing customers to potentially move from legal (licensed) to illegal (unlicensed) betting channels. • Higher Betting Duty rates lead to an increased theoretical margin to betting odds (which betting operators build in to ensure a profit margin), consequent increases to the takeout rate of the operator, increased prices for the customer, and inevitably drive customers to illegal betting markets where odds are better value because of no take out rate. • Illegal betting operators pay no Betting Duty or any other taxes and hence have no theoretical margin relating to taxation costs. There is hence a permanent price differential between the legal and illegal betting markets, with illegal markets consequently offering better odds (prices) to consumers. Betting customers, like the consumers of most products, are price sensitive and all things being equal prefer a cheaper betting product. • Higher Betting Duty rates also have increasingly less impact on consumer protection (when intended to discourage betting and gambling in society) as raising rates has the impact of migrating customers from the more expensive legal to the less expensive illegal betting market.  Government policy makers and gambling regulators should seek a commercially reasonable and stable Betting Duty rate that provides a balance between channelling gambling demand to the legal betting sector and allowing licensed betting operators to effectively compete with the illegal market.  
Hong Kong: Asian Racing Federation Council on Anti-Illegal Betting & Related Financial Crime, 2023. 30p.

By Oluwaseun Kugbayi and Adeleke Adegbami

Many towns and villages in Nigeria have been experiencing bandits activities, vis-à-vis kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, rape, cattle-rustling, and violent actions in recent years. These activities have continued to escalate despite the presence of security agencies such as – the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Air Force, the Nigerian Police, the State Security Service, the National Intelligence Agency, and the Defence Intelligence among others. The unabated bandits' activities in part of the country depict a picture of ungoverned spaces, which suggests that there are territories that are experiencing a vacuum of political order. The study for that reason examines the connections between banditry and the ungoverned spaces, as well as, analyses the effects of bandits' activities on Nigeria and Nigerians. Using the discourse analysis that relies on secondary sources, the paper argues that the inability to govern some territories adequately in Nigeria has created a vacuum for bandits’ activities to thrive.
Law Research Review Quarterly, (4), 399-418. https://doi.org/10.15294/lrrq.v9i4.71054

By Global Commission on Drug Policy 

Illegal drug markets provide an immense source of power and revenue for organized criminal groups. That has remained the case despite the vast investment of political, financial, social, and military capital into the global “war on drugs,” which has also generated a vast and tragic human cost. Far from curtailing drug markets, which are in fact expanding in scale and complexity worldwide, repressive criminal justice and military responses to drug trafficking have exacerbated the already profound impacts of drug-related organized crime, from prolific violence in certain states to increased corruption, and undermined political and economic stability. Deep-seated schisms continue in international debates on drug policy. Despite renewed commitment to the prohibitionist approach at the March 2019 Ministerial Declaration of the United Nations (UN) Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), there is increasing acknowledgement within the UN system of the harms of the current drug control regime, and the need to pursue options such as decriminalization of use and possession for personal use. Countries are increasingly adopting decriminalization models, and the legalization and regulation of cannabis for recreational use is becoming a reality in a number of jurisdictions. Yet at the same time, other countries have moved in the opposite direction, redoubling efforts to eradicate drug use through punitive approaches which harm health and human rights. Given this highly polarized context, the need for reform-minded states to advocate for evidence-based responses to organized crime and drug trafficking is greater than ever. This report supports this effort by building on the five key pathways towards improving drug policy as outlined in the Global Commission’s 2014 report. Alongside strategies to ensure the health and safety of those using drugs, this coherent five-fold program advocates for refocused enforcement responses to drug trafficking and organized crime as an essential part of drug policy reform. This report provides an overview of how the global “war on drugs” has, counter to its ostensible aims, fed and empowered transnational organized crime. More effective responses to transnational organized crime and drug trafficking – through both targeted and measured law enforcement approaches and development strategies which counter the root causes of organized crime – are possible and may be enacted even while markets remain illegal. The legal regulation of drugs offers an unprecedented opportunity to move drugs markets out of criminal control, as the Global Commission stated last year, but also presents new challenges for countering organized crime. This report explores lessons learned both in a context of prohibition and of a legally regulated market. Implementation of more progressive drug policies has often been held back by the international control regime; through a lack of coherence among UN entities, between regional bodies, and the deep-seated conservatism in the international regime. As such, this report considers the past record of the international drug control regime with respect to the fight against drug trafficking, and how more effective coordination could be achieved in the future, if political will is to be found. 

Geneva: The Global Commission, 2020. 52p.

By Beau Kilmer | Bryce Pardo | Toyya A. Pujol | Jonathan P. Caulkins

Background and aims: Synthetic opioids, mostly illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF), were mentioned in 60% of United States (US) drug overdose deaths in 2020, with dramatic variation across states that mirrors variation in IMF supply. However, little is known about IMF markets in the United States and how they are changing. Researchers have previously used data from undercover cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine purchases and seizures to examine how their use and related harms respond to changes in price and availability. This analysis used US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data to address two questions: (i) “To what extent does IMF supply vary over time and geography?” and (ii) “What has happened to the purity-adjusted price of IMF?” Methods: We developed descriptive statistics and visualizations using data from 66 713 observations mentioning IMF and/or heroin from the DEA’s System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE; now STARLIMS) from 2013 to 2021. Price regressions were estimated with city-level fixed effects examining IMF-only powder observations with purity and price information at the low-to-medium wholesale level (>1 g to ≤100 g; n = 964). Results: From 2013 to 2021, the share of heroin and/or IMF observations mentioning IMF grew from near zero to more than two-thirds. The share of heroin observations also containing IMF grew from <1% to 40%. There is important geographic variation: in California, most IMF seizures involved counterfeit tablets, whereas New York and Massachusetts largely involved powder formulation. The median price per pure gram of IMF powder sold at the >10 to ≤100 g level fell by more than 50% from 2016 to 2021; regression analyses suggested an average annual decline of 17% (P < 0.001). However, this price decline appears to have been driven by observations from the Northeast. Conclusions: Since 2013, the illegally manufactured fentanyl problem in the United States has become more deadly and more diverse. 

Addiction. 2022;117:2745–2749. 

By Julia A Dilley, Susan M Richardson, Beau Kilmer, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Mary B Segawa, Magdalena Cerdá

Methods| The Washington Healthy Youth Survey (HYS) 2 is an anonymous, school-based survey of 8th, 10th, and 12th graders and the state’s primary source of information about health behavior among youths. The HYS has been implemented in the fall of even-numbered years since 2002, using a simple random sample of public schools to generate a state-representative sample. Response rates (incorporating school and student response) in 2016 were 80% for 8th grade, 69% for 10th grade, and 49% for 12th grade. The study was approved by the Washington State Institutional Review Board, whose general policy waives informed patient consent when data are de-identified. We Generated Covariate-adjusted prevalence estimates, modeling as closely as possible to Cerdá et al. Prevalence was based on modeled estimates (ie, SUDAAN predMARG [RTI International] postestimation command). Because the the MTF is not designed to provide state-representative estimates, the article generated covariate-adjusted modeled prevalence estimates for each state. The article suggested complex association between legalization and cannabis use among youths: increases in prevalence among Washington 8th and 10th graders, but not among 12th graders, relative to use in states without legalization of recreational marijuana.

The authors noted that, “the sample design may lead to discrepancies between MTF results and those found in other large-scale surveillance efforts.”1(p148) The purpose of the present study was to assess whether trends in cannabis use prevalence among youths from Washington’s state-based youth survey are consistent with findings from the MTF.

JAMA pediatrics, 173(2) 2019

By Bridget E. Weller,  Stephen Magura,  Dawn R. Smith, Matthew M. Saxton, Piyadarsha Amaratunga

  Background: Drug monitoring by drug testing of individuals under arrest provides an opportunity to detect drug use patterns within geographic areas. However, women have been omitted from large-scale monitoring efforts in criminal justice populations. The purpose of this study was to examine whether gender differences exist in drug use indicated by oral fluid collected in one U.S. jail. Methods: The study analyzed data collected in 2019-2020 from individuals under arrest (N = 191). Twenty-four percent of the sample identified as female. Oral fluid specimens were collected and then analyzed with enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay and liquid chromatography/tandem mass spectrometry. Logit regression models examined gender differences. Results: Women were more likely to test positive for methamphetamines than men (41% versus 22%, OR = 0.42, 95% CI 0.21-0.84). Significant gender differences were not found for other substances (marijuana, cocaine, and opioids), legality of drugs, or overall drug use. Conclusions: Because the National Institute on Drug Abuse aims to promote health equity, future drug monitoring in criminal justice populations should employ sampling approaches representing both women and men. This research would identify possible gender-based patterns of drug use and inform gender-based policies and clinical practices to prevent and treat drug misuse.

J Subst Use. 2023 ; 28(4): 541–544.