By Abby Córdova

Gangs’ territorial control affects the lives of residents in thousands of neighborhoods across Latin America, particularly in northern Central American countries. I argue that gang dominance constrains the ability of neighborhood residents to mobilize politically and consequently resist gang violence through institutionalized channels. Living in gang-controlled neighborhoods results in fewer incentives and opportunities to make political elites accountable for one’s personal safety. Even residents who have already experienced crime firsthand are discouraged from turning to politics as a strategy to change the status quo. My theoretical insights identify mechanisms through which gangs’ neighborhood control affects nonelectoral and electoral participation. To test my hypotheses, I rely on census and public opinion data collected in seventy-one neighborhoods in El Salvador. This article offers the first systematic statistical analysis of the effect of gangs’ territorial control on political participation in the Latin American context. The findings suggest that living under gang rule undermines residents’ right to engage freely in politics in nuanced ways.

Latin American Research Review. 2019;54(1):201-221. doi:10.25222/larr.387

By Mark Ungar

To explain the high rates of violence in Central America’s Northern Triangle, this article argues that it is rooted in an armed arena comprised of state and nonstate actors with roles in security, ranging from the military to organized crime. In this space of collaboration, those actors bring resources and reap rewards, strengthening their relationships in the process. Of the many activities within the armed arena, one of the most destructive is the trafficking of firearms. Based on fieldwork in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador, this article focuses on two sets of relationships that demonstrate the armed arena’s strength. The first set is the area of criminal justice, centered on investigations, ballistics, inventories, and destruction of arms. The second is the arms market: regional trafficking, internal arms sales, and the state’s licensing system. Evaluating governmental responses, the final section shows that arms control policies are most effective when they target and disrupt these relationships.

Latin American Research Review (2020) 55(3) 445-460

By Luiz Dal Santo

Most of the scholarship on the ‘punitive turn’ has claimed that there have been two main trends in punishment since the 1970s: the rise of incarceration rates (quantitative dimension) and the worsening of prison conditions (qualitative dimension). Scholars argue that, in parallel with the rise of mass incarceration, there has been a fall of the rehabilitative ideal. In this view, prisons in core countries have basically operated as a warehouse, working towards neutralisation and incapacitation. Both trends are also viewed as reflecting a global convergence of penal policies. The analysis of the Brazilian case challenges this supposed universality. Drawing on official prison data, reports from non-governmental organisations, and secondary data, I argue that mass incarceration has not been accompanied by the same qualitative changes to prisons in ‘Western countries’ and Brazil. First, features of the so-called warehouse prison, such as low levels of prison activities, have always been present in Brazilian prisons, and are not an effect of mass incarceration. Furthermore, the consequences of mass incarceration in Brazilian prisons have, in fact, been ambivalent and, in some cases, may have alleviated inmates’ suffering, rather than intensifying experiences of confinement. Finally, instead of neutralising and controlling criminals, Brazilian prisons under mass incarceration have contributed to the emergence, empowerment, recruitment and organisation of gangs, whose powers now transcend the physical barriers of prison walls.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume 61, Issue4 December 2022 Pages 502-518

By Natalia Hanley,  Elisabeth Duursma, Amy Conley Wright, Helen Simpson and Laura Metcalfe

Family visits for people in Australian correctional centres stopped during the COVID-19 pandemic. Video visitation was introduced in most jurisdictions as an alternative option. This paper presents the findings from the first multi-jurisdictional study to explore the experiences and impacts of video visits between fathers in prison and their children. Findings show that there are significant benefits to video visitation for fathers, children and children’s carers, and corrective services. However, video visits are most beneficial as a complement, not alternative, to contact visits. There are opportunities to develop support for fathers and carers by focusing on visit quality.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 683. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 14p.

By Sjoukje van Deuren, Edward Kleemans, and Arjan Blokland

  In recent years, many European countries have taken far-reaching measures to combat the criminal activities of outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs). Meanwhile, empirical research into the ways OMCGs are involved in and influence the crimes of their members is largely lacking. This study presents the main findings of research based on police files of cases that were filed against members of Dutch OMCGs. We apply a criminological scenario approach to analyse to what extent and in which ways OMCGs are involved in the crimes of their members. The results show that OMCG membership particularly plays an indirect role in the criminal behaviour of OMCG members. Board members, for example, give permission for criminal acts, regulate mutual relationships between members, non-members and rival OMCGs during conflict situations, and forbid (criminal) behaviour of members that is harmful to the OMCG. OMCGs function as a pool of co-offenders and as a market for criminal enterprises. Members also use the violent reputation of OMCGs in specific criminal activities. OMCGs are less frequently directly involved in crimes. Direct involvement of OMCGs is most apparent in organized inter-gang violence and violence against their own members.

European Journal of Criminology 19(6) , 2020.

By Euroopol

  Counterfeit goods sold during the corona crisis do not meet the required quality standards and pose a real threat to public health and safety. People who buy these fake products have a false sense of security, while they are in fact left unprotected against the virus. Therefore, we should not only go after the criminals behind these scams, but also, through prevention work, inform potential victims who are putting themselves and others at risk by using such fake goods.

Europol has been monitoring the activities of counterfeiters during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic since the beginning of the current crisis and can present an updated threat picture. The threat from counterfeit products related to COVID-19, especially those aimed at the healthcare sector, emerged quickly and created a notable impact. However, this threat is likely to subside once the current unique situation and its circumstances have passed. 

The Hague: Europol, 2020. 17p.

By Jessica Larsen & Stephanie Schandorf

According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, only state vessels are mandated to combat maritime piracy. However, private security companies supplement state efforts to protect seafarers and ensure freedom of navigation in piracy-prone regions. This is particularly the case in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea: Private vessel protection rocketed in the 2010s, when piracy disturbed the freedom of navigation of vessels transiting the vital chokepoint for international trade in the Indian Ocean. In this theatre, no ships with armed guards onboard were ever successfully hijacked, and private protection was deemed largely effective.

In the Gulf of Guinea, the situation is different both legally and geographically. As Denmark has an estimated 30-40 vessels within the Gulf of Guinea at any given point, this calls for renewed consideration of how to manage private security operations at sea.

Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2024. 4p.

By  Sine Plambech, Ahlam Chemlali,  and Maria Chiara Cerio

Themes as labour migration, trafficking, sex work, debt and reproductive health, are often tackled separately, but the reality experienced by women on the move shows that they are much more intertwined than it might seem.

This new DIIS Report aims at exploring these connections bringing to the core of the conversation the first-hand experience of migrant women from West Africa. Fifty-one women are interviewed at different points of their journeys from Nigeria and Ivory Coast through Niger, Tunisia, Libya, across the Mediterranean to Italy and onwards to Northern Europe.

Anchored in critical trafficking studies, the report draws on a trafficking-migration continuum to understand how categories of forced, voluntary or irregular migration will vary according to political and moral values. The women interviewed in this study did not define themselves as trafficked, but as women looking for safety and business opportunities. Taking into consideration their personal and individual stories allow us to overcome the invisibility of migrant women usually depicted as just victims of trafficking or criminals crossing European borders, and understanding them as agent with an active role in their migratory experience.

Irregular migrant women face several vulnerabilities as heightened levels of gender-based violence en route, including rape, maternal mortality and limited access to contraception and pregnancy termination. Migrant women en route implement harm reduction strategies to address these vulnerabilities and ultimately survive. Often this implies relying on dangerous and quick solutions and avoiding professional medical assistance or humanitarian aid, due to their fear of being deported or arrested.

Based on the stories and experiences of migrant women and practitioners, this report seeks to develop doable solutions to make this migratory path safer. It speaks directly to NGOs and practitioners in terms of implementing accessible spaces for women and girls’ specific needs, to health and medical organisations in order to provide reproductive health services in numerous points of the journey and finally to policy makers in the hope of bank and debt, sex work and migration policies reforms.

Copenhagen:  DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies, 2022. 72p.

By Jacqueline Beard    

  Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides various measures that enable the police in England and Wales to monitor and manage sex offenders living in the local area. Notification requirements: The “sex offenders register” Certain sex offenders are required to notify the police of personal information such as their name, address and bank and credit card details, and to update the police whenever this information changes. The police record of this information is commonly referred to as the “sex offenders register”. There is no general public access to the “sex offenders register”. The child sex offender disclosure scheme allows parents, carers and guardians to formally ask the police to tell them if someone has a record for child sexual offences. The notification requirements are imposed automatically on offenders convicted of certain offences in the UK but can also be imposed on offenders convicted overseas. The notification requirements are imposed for a fixed or indefinite period, depending on the sentence received. The penalties for breaching notification requirements range from a fine to imprisonment for up to five years. Those offenders subject to an indefinite notification period can apply to the police for a determination that they no longer pose a risk and should no longer be on the register. The earliest point at which such an application can be made is 15 years after the date of the offender’s first notification (or eight years, for those aged under 18 when convicted). Sexual Harm Prevention Orders and Sexual Risk Orders There are two civil orders available to manage sex offenders and those who pose a risk of harm: Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs) and Sexual Risk Orders (SROs). These orders can place a range of restrictions and/or positive requirements on individuals depending on the nature of the case, such as limiting their internet use or preventing travel abroad. The penalties for breach range from a fine to imprisonment for up to five years. Details can be found in the Home Office, Guidance on Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, November 2022.  

London: House of Commons Library, 2023. 23p.

By Louise Marie Hurel

  In February 2020, the Decree 10.222 established Brazil’s National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) — the first official document to provide an overview regarding Brazil’s role in cybersecurity, as well as objectives and guiding principles for its development between 2020 and 2023. With the Covid-19 pandemic, thousands of people, governmental agencies, and businesses have rapidly adapted their activities to a largely virtual environment. This sudden migration led to new threats and attack surfaces for exploiting vulnerabilities. More than ever, different sectors must be prepared and trained to respond to and resist these threats. However, this was precisely the period in which Brazil suffered the worst cyber attack in its history – highlighting, yet again, that many challenges remain for ensuring that concerns with security turn into action across different sectors. This strategic paper identifies the main gaps and challenges for cybersecurity governance in Brazil. We unpack the main elements of E-Ciber in order to understand and place the country’s strategic vision historically as well as in relation to other international experiences. We adopt a principlesbased approach that seeks to strengthen and inform the implementation of strategic cybersecurity objectives in Brazil, which include: national and international coordination and cooperation; knowledge integration; sustainability of efforts; and cybersecurity-related training. 1 See Annex 1 for greater detail on the various challenges. This document is the result of three months of interviews with specialists from various sectors, thematic document analysis, and ethnographic work in different areas, forums, and debates. Challenges identified in interviews and field work include:1 (i) The absence of a shared vocabulary when referring to cybersecurity/digital issues in society; (ii) The association of cybersecurity with military affairs, responsibilities and institutions; (iii) Lack of understanding regarding specific and shared digital risks across sectors; (iv) The absence of mechanisms for sharing information regarding security risks/threats and knowledge across sectors; (v) Lack of normative, strategic, and operational alignment for incident response; and (vi) (vi)The existence of various cybersecurity maturity levels throughout society

Brazil: Igarape Institute, 2021. 43p.

By Carlos Vilalta and Gustavo Fondevila 

Not much information can be found on the size and trends of the prison population in Latin America. Over the past few years, our knowledge base has started to increase. Now we know, with certainty, that prison populations have been growing much faster than the general population, and that their living conditions are extremely harsh. 3 Thus it should not surprise us when we often hear of deadly prison riots happening in countries like Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico, as a consequence of overcrowding and poor living conditions. Although living conditions in prisons in the region are still appalling, rapid growth seems to have come to an end. Trend data suggests that the Latin American prison population rate has stabilized. The objective of this study is to offer a data driven review of the growth, trends, and the principle reasons behind the rapid expansion of the prison population in the region during the past two decades. A key factor appears to be  the rise of prison populism. We do not provide an argument for the recent decrease in the growth rate, it is too early to determine whether the recent slow-down in prison population growth is due to a regime shift in the time series, or the effect of random variation. Still, ceteris paribus, we provide a projection of the prison population rate for the region. This Strategic Note fills a gap in the literature. Our particular contribution consists of the compilation of quantitative data of the region´s prison population, with the purpose of providing a broad but novel overview of the rapid growth and challenges to a wide audience of researchers and practitioners worldwide. 

Brazil: Igarape Institute, 2019. 16p.

By Marcial A. G. Suarez, Luís Antônio Francisco de Souza, Carlos Henrique Aguiar Serra

This paper discusses the deadly use of violence as a public security agenda, focusing on police lethality and military interventions. Through a literature review to understanding concepts – such as “war,” for example – used in public security policy agendas, the study seeks to frame the notion of political violence, mainly referring to the policies designed to combat violence in Brazil. The objective is to problematize the public security policy based on the idea of confrontation, which adopts the logic of war and the notion of “enemy”. The paper is divided into three parts. The first is a conceptual approach to violence and war, and the second is the analysis of the dynamic of deadly use of force. Finally, the third part is a contextual analysis of violence in Rio de Janeiro, its characteristics, and central actors, using official statistics on violence in the region.

Brazil: Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 2021. 22p.

By Reynell Badillo-Sarmiento & Luis Fernando Trejos-Rosero 

This article explores how organized criminal organizations exercise criminal governance over other organized and non-organized criminals using public messaging, lethal and extra-lethal violence. Drawing on extensive fieldwork, over 350 press reports, and an original database on inter-criminal lethal violence, we show, in line with recent literature on organized crime, that while these organizations use violence to build their reputation as actors willing to use force, they also provide benefits to other criminals such as financing and protection from state and competitors. This article contributes to the literature on criminal governance by elaborating on the mechanisms shown in recent work and by detailing an unexplored case study in Barranquilla (Colombia).

Colombia: Trends in Organized Crime, 2023. 27p.

By Tasha Perdue a, Robert Carlson b, Raminta Daniulaityte c, Sydney M. Silverstein b, Ricky N. Bluthenthal d, Avelardo Valdez e, Alice Cepeda

The purpose of this study is to describe opioid initiation within each of the three waves from the perspective of people who use illicit opioids, with a focus on emerging pathways into fentanyl use. We noted supply-side changes as influencing trajectories in all three waves. However, we also noted differences in the experiences of prescription opioid and heroin initiation, with these trajectories influenced by pharmacological effects, pain management, curiosity, intergenerational use, pricing, and peers. In comparison, most participants were unaware that they were initiating fentanyl, and many reported overdosing with their first use of fentanyl. We identified a trajectory into fentanyl with limited to no prior heroin use among a few participants.

Social Science & Medicine Volume 340. January 2024, 11pg

By Peter Leasure

Nearly all states, including Ohio, have laws increasing punishments for drug trafficking in or near schools, though there are long-standing concerns for how these laws function. With a novel inquiry of school leaders, the current study explores whether Ohio schools displayed signage that was viewable by the general public stating that drug traffickers could face enhanced penalties if the conduct occurred on or near school premises. The current study also sought to gauge school principal perception about the deterrence effectiveness of such signs and whether enhanced penalty laws should explicitly require that individuals know they are on or near school premises to receive a penalty enhancement. The results of this survey of Ohio school principals suggested that the vast majority of Ohio schools lack any signage seeking to notify individuals of enhanced penalties for drug trafficking or that generally seek to deter drug trafficking. The results also showed that a majority of Ohio principals believed that the Ohio Revised Code should require that individuals know they are on or near a school's premises to receive increased penalties for drug trafficking (e.g., selling drugs) on or near school premises. Policy recommendations informed by the above findings are discussed.

Drug Enforcement and Policy Center. March 2024, 11pg

Edited by Pablo Baisotti

New Global Cities in Latin America and Asia: Welcome to the Twenty-First Century proposes new visions of global cities and regions historically considered “secondary” in the international context. The arguments are not only based on material progress made by these metropolises, but also on the growing social difficulties experienced (e.g., organized crime, drug trafficking, slums, economic inequalities). The book illustrates the growth of cities according to these problems arising from the modernity of the new century, comparing Latin American and Asian cities. This book analyzes the complex relationships within cities through an interdisciplinary approach, complementing other research and challenging orthodox views on global cities. At the same time, the book provides new theoretical and methodological tools to understand the progress of “Third World” cities and the way of understanding “globality” in the 21st century by confronting the traditional views with which global cities were appreciated since the 1980s. Pablo Baisotti brings together researchers from various fields who provide new interpretative keys to certain cities in Latin America and Asia.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2022. 364p.

By Dalia Ghanem 

In Algeria, state formation remains an evolving process, as evidenced by the situation in the country’s northeastern border regions. With Algerian officials in these areas permitting smuggling of petrol and certain other commodities over the border with Tunisia and smugglers weeding out security threats even as they go about their illicit trade, the two ostensibly adversarial parties complement each other. This unusual relationship furthers the intrusion of the state into citizens’ livelihoods even as it manipulates state authority.

Key Themes

• The interplay between law enforcement and smugglers calls into question much of the conventional wisdom regarding centralized authority in a modern unitary state. In Algeria, smuggling has emerged as an integral part of the (ongoing) process of state formation.

• State neglect and a shortage of jobs have kept most localities in Algeria’s northeastern “borderlands” poor and underdeveloped. As a result, smuggling has taken root, and for some families it is a career bequeathed from one generation to the next.

• Long tolerated by law enforcement officials, cross-border smuggling has over time created a parallel economy. Today, it accounts for most trade between Algeria and Tunisia.

Findings

• For Algerian borderland communities, smuggling contraband into and from Tunisia is a job prospect at once justifiable and lucrative. Smugglers themselves view the border not as the end of their country and the beginning of another, but as an artificially erected barrier that it is necessary to circumvent.

• From the perspective of local authorities, smuggling functions as a safety valve that relieves some of the economic pressure felt by the inhabitants of Algeria’s neglected eastern provinces. Moreover, smugglers enhance the security services’ efforts to keep the dreaded triple threat of drugs, weapons, and jihadis at bay.

• In the immediate sense, the tacit alliance forged between smugglers and local authorities blurs the distinction between legal and illegal and erases points along the border between Algeria and Tunisia. In the larger picture, it grants otherwise marginal actors, whether shadowy smugglers or lowly border officials, the ability to circumvent state policy in a manner both organized and sustained.

Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020. 23p.

By Manne Gerell, Joakim Sturup, Mia-Maria Magnusson, Kim Nilvall, Ardavan Khoshnood & Amir Rostami

Gun violence is a serious issue in many countries across the globe. It has been shown that there is an elevated risk for a further shooting nearby within a short time span of a shooting incident, so-called near-repeat patterning. The present study presents new evidence on near-repeat patterning in Sweden, with a focus on neighbourhoods which the police have labelled as ‘vulnerable’–deprived neighbourhoods where criminal networks have a large impact on local communities. Such neighbourhoods tend to have open drug markets, and to have high levels of gun violence. The present paper analyses the association of open drug markets and vulnerable neighbourhoods with gun violence and near-repeat patterning of gun violence in two Swedish cities. Our findings suggest that gun violence is strongly concentrated on open drug markets in vulnerable neighbourhoods, and that those locations in addition exhibit high risks for repeat shootings after an initial shooting event. We propose that the police can use this knowledge to improve practices to prevent or disrupt gun violence.
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, ISSN 1833-5330, E-ISSN 2159-5364, Vol. 16, no 3, p. 233-244

Hernan Mondani a,b,c,* , Amir Rostami  

In this study we investigate organized crime by studying the degree of criminal organization. We use population-level register data on criminal suspicions between 2011 and 2016 to analyze the territoriality of Swedish street gangs in terms of geographical mobility, their collaboration in crime through their co-offending network's clustering and community structure, and their crime versatility. Although Swedish street gangs exhibit varying degrees of geographical mobility and criminal collaboration, overall, they have limited reach along these dimensions, characterized by low clustering and limited crime specialization. Violence seems to become a necessary tool only when a gang reaches a certain degree of organization. By unbraiding criminal mobility and its association with other organizational elements such as criminal collaboration in different settings, we provide insights into the structure and dynamics of criminal organizations and contribute to a richer understanding and conceptualization of how crime is organized.

  Social Science Research 103: 2022.

Edited by Nissa Finney, James Nazroo, Laia Bécares, Dharmi Kapadia and Natalie Shlomo

This book illustrates life through the COVID-19 pandemic for ethnic minorities in Britain. Drawing from the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS), the book presents new evidence of ethnic inequalities and sheds new light on underlying racisms, opening them up to debate as crucial social concerns. Written by leading international experts in the field, this is a must-read for anyone interested in contemporary ethnic inequalities and racism from academics and policy makers to voluntary and community sector organisations.

Bristol, UK: Policy Press, 2023. 234p.