By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison

This article explores the construction – or reconstruction – of brokerage channels by violent actors in Mexico. It focuses on the construction of the Autodefensas de Michoacán (Self Defense Groups of Michoacán) and studies the process that put illegal armed leaders in active dialogue with the Mexican federal government, but also how they became brokers capable of controlling access to strategic political resources, economic markets, and the connections that tie local citizens and the central state. Through the concept of political inter-mediation, I investigate how coercion, as a skill and resource, has become central to governance in Mexico; and how this leads to consolidating intermediaries that participate in reproducing local, violent political order. This article shall contribute to the understanding of brokerage in contexts of violence, and shed new light on the political logic fueling the dynamics of violence in Mexico’s war on drugs. Keywords: drug cartels, brokerage, Mexico, war on drugs, state, violence.   

European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, No. 112 (July-December 2021), pp. 137-158  

By María Calderón 

When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by coopting government employees.

Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2024  6p.   

By María Calderón 

Mexican cartels represent a multifaceted and complex problem with significant implications for Mexico and the United States. These criminal organizations have long been a U.S. national security concern, which has become more severe with an increase of lethal drugs smuggled into the U.S., impacting millions of lives in North America. There are debates between governments and organizations on the most impactful way to combat these illicit groups. These have included the question of whether designating Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) would debilitate transnational criminal organizations and reduce the amount of drugs entering the United States. An FTO is a legal designation the United States government uses to identify foreign organizations that engage in premeditated, politically motivated acts of terrorism against noncombatant targets. Designating a group as an FTO carries legal and financial implications aimed at protecting national security. In the past, when Mexican cartels have harmed American citizens, members of Congress and other experts have been quick to propose an FTO designation for these organizations. However, designating a group as an FTO requires completing a specific and multi-faceted legal process and meeting certain criteria. The potential designation of Mexican cartels as FTOs is complex and contentious as it involves considering various implications, including security concerns, legal issues, and human rights impacts. This paper aims to explain the stages of an FTO designation and the roles of the various government stakeholders involved. Clarifying the complexities and technicalities of this process may prove beneficial when engaging in debates and weighing the potential impact of an eventual FTO designation for Mexican cartels.

Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2024. 16p.

By Garan Ho/mqvist 

Crime is an increasingly worrying social phenomenon in the developing world in general and in Latin America in particular. As shown in Figure 1~, the crime rate (measured by homicide lOO 000, as reported to the UN crime surveys by national police authorities) has virtually exploded since the mid-1980s in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe. Latin America stands out as an exceptional case. Annually in Latin America, approximately 140,000 people are murdered (Londono & Guerrero 1999:27). Using other sources does not change this picture. Figure 2 confirms the exceptional position of Latin America, where the source in mortality statistics is collected from national health authorities instead of the police. Indicators of crime other than homicide are less reliable for international comparison, but estimates point in the direction of Latin America being way above the average for any other region of the world (Bourguignon 1999, Table 1). It has been estimated that 28 million Latin American families are victims of theft or robbery every year (Londono & Guerrero 1999:3). Crime and violence are now viewed as a development issue of importance, which was probably not the case two decades ago. Development agencies such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have quite recently initiated ambitious research projects on crime and violence. Projects directed to the judicial system or police authorities have increased their share in the project portfolio of multilateral as well as bilateral development cooperation agencies. More importantly, crime is becoming a major concern in the daily lives of an increasing number of citizens in the developing world, manifesting itself in national political agendas, in higher crime-related expenditures, and, not the least, in human suffering. There are several reasons to regard crime as a social phenomenon with strong and complex ties to the development process in general. In Latin America, crime is a potential threat to what most people would regard as encouraging development trends, especially after ''the lost decade" of the 1980s, in terms of democratization and resumed growth. The following examples may illustrate how continuous progress in these areas is being made more difficult by the increasing crime levels: 

 Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Vol. XXX: 2 2000,pp. 23-53

By: Dr. Arshad M. Khan

If there is a mass shooting and anyone is asked where, the answer is likely to be the United States. The reason of course is the easy availability of guns, even guns that fire like machine guns. The Second Amendment allows the 'right to bear arms' -- to prevent tyranny say the proponents. Yet, the world has moved beyond guns for the tyranny we face today is a tyranny not of guns but of the mind.

Modern Diplomacy Oct 07, 2017

By Jane Shim, and Alison Leal Parker

  Drug laws are being reformed across the United States to move away from the harsh punitive approaches of the war on drugs, but federal immigration law continues to treat drug offenses, including decades-old offenses, as grounds for deportation of immigrants. Those harmed, authorized and unauthorized immigrants alike, often have deep connections to the country, where they have formed families, attained education, and built their lives. “Disrupt and Vilify” analyzes new federal government data from 2002 to 2020, finding the US has deported 500,000 people whose most serious offense was drug-related. Of these, 240,000 were deported between 2013 and 2020, amounting to about one of every five deportations of immigrants with a criminal conviction for that period. A conviction for even minor drug offenses—for example, drug possession (including marijuana)—can carry devastating immigration consequences that far outstrip the criminal sentence imposed. Some would not be criminal offenses if committed today or involve conduct that is now legal under state law. There are significant racial disparities in the imposition of immigration penalties. One out of five noncitizens facing deportation on criminal grounds is Black. Human Rights Watch and the Drug Policy Alliance call on the US Congress to reform federal law to ensure that immigrants with criminal convictions, including drug offenses, are not subject to “one-size-fits-all” deportations. Instead, immigration judges should have the discretion to make individualized decisions. Congress should impose a statute of limitations on deportations for past offenses. Drug policy reforms should prioritize evidence-based policies rooted in public health and human rights to address the root causes of the overdose crisis and problematic drug use, and not continue the vilification of immigrants.  

 New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 97p.

By Mohamed Osman, and Laetitia Bader  

  Since conflict broke out in Sudan’s capital Khartoum in April 2023, between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), both sides, particularly the RSF, have committed widespread sexual violence against women and girls, which are war crimes. Both warring parties, in violation of international humanitarian law, have attacked local responders, and obstructed aid, doubly victimizing survivors. Based on 42 interviews conducted between September 2023 and February 2024 with service providers to survivors of sexual violence, including healthcare workers, within and outside of the local responders, as well as aid workers, “Khartoum is not Safe for Women!” documents conflict-related sexual violence in Khartoum and its sister cities of Bahri and Omdurman, since April 2023. Service providers described how the warring parties have subjected women and girls, aged 9 through 60 to rape, gang rape, as well as forced and child marriages. Men and boys have also been victims of sexual violence. Despite the serious harm to the health of survivors described in the report, it finds that the actions of both warring parties have prevented survivors from accessing critical and comprehensive emergency health care. SAF has restricted humanitarian supplies imposing a de facto blockade on drugs entering RSF-controlled areas of Khartoum since October 2023, in violation of international humanitarian law. The RSF has pillaged medical supplies and occupied medical facilities. Both warring parties have intimidated and arbitrarily arrested doctors, nurses, and volunteers because of their work. The United Nations and African Union should deploy a civilian protection mission to Sudan tasked with monitoring human rights abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence and willful aid obstruction, and ensure that those responsible for rape and attacks on healthcare and local responders are held to account.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 100p.

By Patricia Gossman  

The 26-page report, “Double Betrayal: Abuses against Afghan Policewomen Past and Present,” documents threats from Taliban authorities since August 2021 that have forced many former policewomen to go into hiding out of fear of being identified. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Taliban authorities have threatened Afghan women who had served in the police under the previous government. As Taliban forces carried out hundreds of revenge killings of those who had served in the former government’s security forces, many former policewomen went into hiding out of fear of being identified. Several have been killed, either by relatives who opposed their work as “shameful” or under unclear circumstances. The Taliban have not conducted credible investigations into these murders. While employed by the former government, many policewomen experienced sexual harassment and assault by their male supervisors. They described abuses including rape as well as demands from superiors for sex in exchange for promotion or avoiding dismissal. The widespread nature of these abuses was well-known since at least 2013, including among countries supporting the ngovernment, but police officers responsible for abuse were not held accountable. Women reported mental health effects from this abuse and their fear of the Taliban, but have been unable to find or afford psychosocial support. Human Rights Watch calls on the Taliban to cease all threats and abuse of policewomen and others who worked for the former government. The US and other countries that supported programs to train and hire women in the police should ensure that those seeking protection are deemed eligible on the same level as other vulnerable categories. The US, UK, Canada, and the European Union and its member states should increase Afghan refugee resettlement places, prioritizing women at risk.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 34p.

By Dorothy Kronick 

Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after the counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years before this policy change, lethal violence trends were similar; afterward, outcomes diverged: violence increased more along the trafficking route than elsewhere. Together with qualitative accounts, these findings illuminate the conditions under which profits fuel violence in illegal markets. 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1499-1523 ª The Author(s) 2020 

By Juan Camilo Castillo and Dorothy Kronick

Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers’ profits and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These results help explain empirical patterns of violence in the drug war, which is less studied than interstate or civil war but often as deadly 

American Political Science Review (2020) 114, 3, 874–887 

By Max Smeets

This report is based on chapter one of Max Smeets’ book titled “Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security,” forthcoming with Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishers. Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government's crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies. This report discusses significant milestones in the development of ransomware, and what turned them into a significant threat to human and national security. It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups. 

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2024. 18p.

By Merve Betül Gökçe, Murat Güray Kirdar:

This study investigates the impact of the Syrian civil war and refugee status on the risk of physical intimate partner violence (IPV) among Syrian women in Jordan, the country with the second-highest refugee-to-native ratio worldwide. We analyze data from the 2017-18 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey, which includes a nationally representative sample of Syrian refugees. Using the information on the timing of first violence after marriage within a discrete-time duration analysis, we examine the hazard rates of IPV exposure across different periods: prewar Syria, postwar Syria, and refugee status. Our findings demonstrate that war and refugee status increase the risk of IPV, and these findings persist for women who were married before the civil war. Additionally, the rise in IPV after the refugees' arrival in Jordan diminishes over time. The study identifies the economic strain resulting from lower household wealth and refugee husbands' employment losses as a driver of the rise in IPV. Moreover, our innovative approach utilizing GPS locations of refugee households to calculate refugee density reveals that greater social isolation, indicated by reduced proximity to other refugees, significantly exacerbates the risk of IPV among these women. In addition, we explore whether the civil war and refugee status alter marriage patterns, which could contribute to the observed effects on IPV. Both the civil war and forced migration lower the marriage age and increase the incidence of non-cousin marriages at the expense of cousin marriages—both of which are associated with a higher risk of IPV.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 61p.  

By Michele Riccardi & Peter Reuter

Two images dominate the discussion of money laundering. Investigative journalists and politicians stress the variety and sophistication of methods that have been used to launder the money of corrupt officials and white-collar offenders. The research literature, largely dependent on criminal cases, emphasizes how unsophisticated and routine are the laundering methods used by drug dealers and other illegal market participants. The discrepancy may reflect the incapacity of police to detect sophisticated money laundering but it may also represent the reality; that different groups of offenders choose different methods. This paper presents a theoretical framework to explain how offenders choose to launder their criminal earnings. Specifically, it asks: what determines the sophistication of the method chosen? Among the variables that we suggest influence the choice are: (a) the type of predicate crime and of crime proceeds, (b) the type of offender (age, education, social status), (c) his/her motivations, (d) the AML environment and the level of AML controls. The paper provides arguments from criminological and economic theory for how these variables might play a role. Without claiming that individual cases can test the theory, we offer some case narratives to suggest the plausibility of the factors that we propose.

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Volume 30, pages 333–358, (2024)

By Steven Dudley, María Fernanda Ramírez, Anastasia Austin and Gavin Voss

This report aims to better understand the criminal dynamics in Durán. Located in the southwest coastal province of Guayas, Durán is a municipality, or cantón, as they are known in Ecuador, of over 300,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom live in the city bearing the same name.1 It has long been known as a commercial hub and small industrial center. But it is also home to a chaotic mix of shrimp farms, poorly-planned residential developments and favela-like land invasions, and unzoned areas of factories and warehouses that produce and store goods, many of which leave Guayaquil’s various maritime ports en route to all corners of the world. More recently, Durán has become a violent epicenter of criminal activity. Criminal groups use the municipality as a staging area for cocaine exiting on cargo ships through Guayaquil’s ports, while also peddling drugs on a local level. Systemic corruption, underdevelopment, and extreme poverty have facilitated this rise in criminality. More than half of Durán’s residents do not have running water or plumbing. The municipality is bereft of schools and a public university. And recent efforts to revive Durán have waned amid local and national neglect and a series of economic crises. To many residents, Durán is but a ciudad dormitorio (sleeping quarters): They work, shop, and relax in neighboring Samborondón and Guayaquil, returning to Durán to spend the night. Part of what keeps them away these days is insecurity: Durán’s homicide rate reached 147 per 100,000 in 2023 — its highest recorded rate — as crime has metastasized. Once a bustling railroad depot and industrial hub, Durán is now the poster child for the country’s rapid decline into the criminal abyss. Major Findings • Many social, economic, and political factors have converged to make Durán a violent criminal hub. Rapid, uncontained population growth, coupled with widespread corruption and malfeasance, has left a good portion of the municipality bereft of basic services such as potable water and a working sewage system. Unplanned, informal, and criminal urban development has scarred the area and jaded its residents, who have few civil society and religious organizations upon which they can channel their grievances and even fewer political options. And, like so many other parts of the country, the municipality lacks security, judicial, and regulatory forces that can effectively prosecute high-impact criminal activities. • Durán has two primary criminal organizations: the Chone Killers and the Latin Kings. These two engage in an increasingly violent battle for the municipality’s territory and its criminal economies, which include local and international drug trafficking activities. Their ties to transnational criminal networks, however, appear to be sporadic and opportunistic, rather than systemic and long-lasting. Perhaps more alarming is their penetration of the municipal government, where at least one of these groups secured public works contracts, as well as control of key government institutions that preside over everything from land tenure issues to traffic tickets. • Land trafficking is at the core of Durán’s criminal ecosystem. The illegal seizure and development of urban and rural land, often with the direct participation of corrupt officials, offers a deep well of potential profit, ranging from the sale of property to the administration of various public services. Illegal settlements also serve as staging areas for various criminal activities, including transnational drug trafficking, retail drug sales, as well as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. Legalizing illegal settlements brings with it lucrative government contracts and the opportunity for corrupt officials to profit from kickbacks and criminal actors to launder their dirty money. It also leads to violence, including against public officials. • Ecuador’s growing role in transnational drug trafficking has significantly impacted Durán’s criminal, political, and economic landscape. By serving larger national drug trafficking networks, local gangs have gained access to substantial financial resources. Drawing from this new revenue stream, gang leaders have acquired legitimate businesses such as laundromats, hair salons, and construction companies. This interplay of criminal, economic, and political capital has also changed the political landscape, offering local gangs an entry point into the municipal government via campaign contributions, as evidenced by their systematic penetration into key government posts and public works contracts. • Durán’s gangs have a complex and varied relationship with the local communities where they operate. While some gangs exploit residents, the most sophisticated gang leaders offer them protection and other social and economic services, filling the void left by absent, corrupt, or inept state institutions, and providing a semblance of security and opportunity. This calculated approach engenders support that allows them to operate in relative safety, as well as use the community infrastructure and draw employees from a vast pool of recruits. • Homicide trends in Durán largely follow patterns seen in Ecuador over the last several years, including the type of victim, weapons employed, and the place where the murders occur. And, in some ways, Durán is a reflection of the extreme swings in violence in cities along the country’s coast. But Durán’s record 2023 homicide spike was more extreme, in part due to local events, like the murders of key criminal power brokers and the rise of a wayward, volatile new leader. These factors point to gang violence as the primary driver of homicides in the municipality   

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 74p.

By Paulo J Murillo-Sandoval1, Steven E Sesnie2, Manuel Eduardo Ordoñez Armas3, Nicholas Magliocca4, Beth Tellman5, Jennifer A Devine6, Erik Nielsen7 and Kendra McSweeney8,*

We assess how much of Central America is likely to be agriculturally suitable for cultivating coca (Erythroxylum spp), the main ingredient in cocaine. Since 2017, organized criminal groups (not smallholders) have been establishing coca plantations in Central America for cocaine production. This has broken South America's long monopoly on coca leaf production for the global cocaine trade and raised concerns about future expansion in the isthmus. Yet it is not clear how much of Central America has suitable biophysical characteristics for a crop domesticated in, and long associated with the Andean region. We combine geo-located data from coca cultivation locations in Colombia with reported coca sites in Central America to model the soil, climate, and topography of Central American landscapes that might be suitable for coca production under standard management practices. We find that 47% of northern Central America (Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize) has biophysical characteristics that appear highly suitable for coca-growing, while most of southern Central America does not. Biophysical factors, then, are unlikely to constrain coca's spread in northern Central America. Whether or not the crop is more widely planted will depend on complex and multi-scalar social, economic, and political factors. Among them is whether Central American countries and their allies will continue to prioritize militarized approaches to the drug trade through coca eradication and drug interdiction, which are likely to induce further expansion, not contain it. Novel approaches to the drug trade will be required to avert this outcome.

Environ. Res. Lett. 19 (2024) 104068  

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Understanding the changing dynamics of heroin and methamphetamine flows from Afghanistan, through southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, continues to be important, particularly in light of the Taliban’s drug ban in Afghanistan and the harmful effects drugs have on the populations along the route. In order to improve information sharing and to help build connections between countries and International Organisations and to strengthen regional co-operation, UNODC held an Expert Working Group in Maputo, Mozambique during 10th-11th October 2023. Topics discussed at the EWG included an update on the current drug situation in Afghanistan, the opiate and methamphetamine flows from southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, regional drug seizures, the nature of organized crime groups and a summary of the drug demand situation in the region. The findings of the EWG are published in this report. This EWG report covers the flow and distribution of heroin along the Southern Route, highlighting key trends and vulnerabilities. Exploration of the routes utilized for drug trafficking sheds light on movements from Afghanistan into Eastern and Southern Africa, within Africa, and towards other destination countries. Moreover, an overview of the demand for illicit drugs in the region offers insights into the societal impact and challenges faced by communities. Insight into the fragmented groups and the critical role played by brokers, as well as the strong presence of criminal networks, provides valuable context on the organized crime landscape. Furthermore, the EWG discussed the regional cooperation efforts aimed at addressing drug trafficking challenges and promoting collective action underscores the importance of collaborative approaches in responding to the drug trade in the region. An examination of the policy and law enforcement responses implemented by affected countries provides valuable insights into national efforts to address the supply and demand dynamics. Analysis of the various modus operandi and trafficking methods employed by organized crime groups, including poly drug trafficking and links to other crime types, enhances understanding of the operational tactics used in the region. Finally, recommendations for policy interventions and follow-up actions aim to enhance counter-trafficking efforts and promote regional security and stability. Through a comprehensive examination of these topics, this report seeks to provide valuable insights and inform stakeholders on the complexities of drug trafficking along the Southern Route, with the ultimate goal of fostering effective strategies and initiatives to combat illicit drug trade in the region.   

 Vienna:  UNODC  2024. 36p.

By Marie Lynam, David Keatley, Garth Maker, John Coumbaros

Little is known about the prevalence of incapacitating substances present in drug-facilitated sexual assaults (DFSA). Presented here is a literature review conducted to provide background information, such as symptoms, exacerbations, and drug interactions, on drugs typically implicated in DFSA, namely gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD), ketamine, diazepam, oxycodone, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Literature found through Scopus and Pubmed was reviewed to determine the current prevalence of these substances in DFSA with a focus on Australian data. The global literature revealed that there is a wide variety of substances used in DFSA and the prevalence varies by country. For example, it was found that in Northern Ireland, opioids were most prevalent whereas in France, benzodiazepines were most prevalent. In Australia, the review revealed a lack of contemporary data with the most recent report in Victoria using data collected during 2011–2013. The literature also revealed there can be an important difference between self-reported substance use and substances discovered via toxicological analysis. This can be due to the challenges of biological detection, reliability of self-reporting, and the possibility of a substance being introduced to a person’s food or drink without their knowledge. This review highlights the need for the collection and analysis of current data about DFSA reports and the drugs detected, and due to the constantly evolving picture of both licit and illicit drug use, an assessment of the role of prescription medications in DFSA due to drug-drug interactions as well as potential to incapacitate is warranted.  

Forensic Science International: Synergy 9 (2024) 100545  

By Saurabh Thakur, Monika Roszkowska

General Findings. Organized Criminal Networks (OCNs) operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean are predominantly hierarchical in their organizational structure with individuals or a network of individuals at the helm of operations. The geographical location, proximity to two major drug-producing regions in Asia, and the vast shoreline have aided the transit of illicit drugs in the Maldives and Sri Lanka through the Southern Route. The transnational drug smuggling in the region is mostly transactional, carried out through a series of patron-client networks. Other modes include freelancing and family and community-based networks. . The involvement of the local population is driven by both push and pull factors, including profit motive, patronage, protection, poverty, addiction, street masculinity, involvement of family members, peer influence, and social media influence. Corruption within law enforcement and legal institutions was listed as a key problem in both countries. The broken chain of custody and complicity of government officials in illicit activities have affected the prosecution rates in both countries. The socio-cultural factors (i.e. ethnic, national, or family ties) form the basis for building trust and loyalty within the organized drug trafficking networks, establishing working relationships and promotions within networks. Emerging routes in Maldives and Sri Lanka seem to deviate towards the lesser-patrolled areas in the southern part of the Indian Ocean as the criminal networks continue to adapt to the enhanced maritime enforcement measures in the region. 8 The ability of new elements to enter the market can depend on various factors, including existing power dynamics between various local gangs, local political connections, law enforcement efforts, the adaptability of new entrants, and institutional corruption. However, an increase in the trafficking of synthetic drugs and a rise in local consumption were reported as factors that are likely to impact these existing market dynamics. The maritime route holds the largest share in illicit drug trafficking in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, especially larger consignments, but there has been a noticeable rise in the share of the air routes and postal methods post-COVID-19 restrictions.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024 44p.

By Nicholas R. Magliocca , Diana S. Summers , Kevin M. Curtin , Kendra McSweeney, Ashleigh N. Price

Cocaine traffickers, or ‘narco-traffickers’, successfully exploit the heterogeneous landscapes of Central America for transnational smuggling. Narco-traffickers successfully adapt to disruptions from counterdrug interdiction efforts by spatially adjusting smuggling routes to evade detection, and by doing so bring collateral damages, such as deforestation, corruption, and violence, to new areas. This study is novel for its integration of landscape suitability analysis with criminological theory to understand the locations of these spatial adaptations by narco-traffickers as intentional, logical, and predictable choices based on the socio-environmental characteristics of Central America’s landscapes. Multi-level, mixed effects negative binomial regression models predict the suitability of landscapes for cocaine trafficking across 17 departments (the unit of analysis) in Costa Rica, El Sal vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama from 2007 to 2018. Informed by long-term research in the region, independent variables included proximity to roads, country borders, international ports, indigenous territories, population density, and protected areas. The year of peak interdiction (measured by kg of cocaine seized) in each department was used to analyze spatial shifts in landscape suitability before and after maximum counterdrug interdiction pressure. We find that areas with lower population density and closer proximity to international borders became more suitable following peak interdiction—i.e, they are more likely to be sought out by traffickers seeking to avoid further disruptions from counter-narcotic efforts. Additionally, indigenous territories were disproportionately exploited as cocaine trafficking routes following significant interdiction activities by law enforcement. While interdiction may reduce the suitability of targeted locations, it can also unintentionally increase the attractiveness of other locations. Our study pushes criminological theory through its application to a unique space/time context, and it advances land system science by considering landscape suitability for logistical rather than productive uses. Policy implications are clear. Since interdiction resources are limited relative to the overall amount of trafficking activity, knowing which landscape features are viewed as  suitable by traffickers can in the short term guide interdiction deployment strategies, and in the longer term build strategies to mitigate associated harms from trafficking where they are most likely  

Landscape and Urban Planning Volume 221, May 2022, 104359

By Bryce Westlake, Russell Brewer, Kellie Toole, Tom Daly, Thomas Swearingen, Scott Fletcher, Franco Ucci and Katie Logos

Transitioning to cloud-based infrastructure (CBI) for processing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) collected during police investigations could address resource challenges agencies currently face. While CBI provides quantifiable scalability and budgetary and interagency collaborative advantages, potential risks associated with data security, data sovereignty, and various legal and regulatory concerns may make agencies hesitant to make this transition. However, this paper demonstrates how a ‘shared responsibility model’ approach to cloud security can minimize risks, allowing investigators to take advantage of CBI benefits. In partnership with Oracle Corporation, we demonstrate how this could be implemented and continually monitored for new vulnerabilities within a CSAM context over time.   

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 699. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024.