By Brandon Cheng, Carmen C.W. Lim, Juliane Pariz Teixeira , Matthew J. Gullo , Gary C.K. Chan , Jason P. Connor

Background and aims: Social media use is now a significant part of modern daily life. Little is known about how social media impacts young peoples’ drinking behaviours and drinking-related consequences. This cohort study aims to explore the prospective relationship between social media use and future drinking. Methods: 1473 alcohol naïve young people, who at Wave 5 (aged 12–13 years) reported no lifetime alcohol use, were included (social media use, peer alcohol use, and covariates were also reported at Wave 5). At Wave 8 (aged 17–18 years), participants reported alcohol use outcomes, including age of drinking initiation, past month and past week risky consumption (>10 drinks/week), and problem drinking (alcohol-related troubles, injuries, and fights). Results: After controlling for factors known to be associated with alcohol use in young people and applying a conservative significance level (α =.01), results revealed that children who engaged in almost daily social media use at ages 12–13 later reported a younger age of drinking onset (β = − 0.56, 95 % CI = − 0.74, − 0.39, p <.001) and greater problem drinking (β = 0.48, 95 % CI = 0.13, 0.83, p =.008) at ages 17–18, compared to those who never used social media at ages 12–13. Early social media use was not associated with odds of subsequent pastmonth alcohol use or risky alcohol consumption. Conclusion: Young peoples’ social media use was associated with future drinking behaviours, prompting the need for preventative measures to acknowledge the salient impacts of social media.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence
Volume 265, 1 December 2024, 112478

By Susan Olzak

This study examines the effect of violent and nonviolent tactics in gaining support for social movements using information on protests by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The theoretical dispute over whether violence benefits or harms a movement remains unsettled, and the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Violence increases media attention and generates recognition of a movement and its goals, but violence also raises fears of instability and risks disapproval. This article aims to bring coherence to this debate by arguing that while violence can benefit a movement by emphasizing the contrast between peaceful and violent protesters, the costs associated with the use of violence ought to diminish support for a movement. The analysis that uses a hybrid model to analyze panel data from two national surveys finds evidence that both peaceful and violent BLM protests are associated with higher support for BLM, but they do not change individuals’ support over time.

Mobilization: An International Quarterly (2024) 29 (3): 287–307.

By Maureen A. Eger https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9023-7316 and Susan Olzak 

While radical right parties championing anti-immigrant platforms have made electoral gains throughout Europe, anti-immigrant sentiment—a key indicator of radical right support—has not dramatically increased during this same period. In this article, we seek to help make sense of this paradox by incorporating a contextual factor missing from previous studies: levels of anti-immigrant violence. Our key argument is that higher levels of collective violence targeting immigrants raise the salience of the immigrant/native boundary, which activates both positive and negative views of immigrants and makes these attitudes more cognitively accessible and politically relevant. This argument implies that exposure to violence against immigrants should strengthen existing prejudice (or empathy) toward immigrants and engender feelings of affinity (or antipathy) for radical right parties. Analyses of the German portion of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014 − 2019) and the Anti-Refugee Violence in Germany (ARVIG 2014 − 2017) datasets reveal a powerful interaction effect: exposure to higher levels of collective violence increased the probability of feeling closest to radical right parties among those who held neutral, negative, and extremely negative views of immigrants. However, these events were not associated with radical right sympathies among those holding pro-immigrant attitudes. We conclude that when violence against immigrants resonates with public opinion on immigrants, it opens new political opportunities for radical right parties. These findings should inform future research on the politicization of international migration, especially studies investigating how anti-immigrant attitudes translate into political outcomes.

International Migration ReviewVolume 57, Issue 2, June 2023, Pages 746-777

By Susan Olzak

Influential studies of right-wing extremist violence offer evidence that such violence is motivated by grievances intensified by a perceived loss in status or by economic dislocations. This article moves away from an emphasis on grievances by turning to theories of ethno-nationalism and group conflict. Ethno-nationalism is in part driven by attitudes of dominant groups favoring ethnic exclusion, whereas group threat theories explain that ethnic diversity increases the salience of ethnic boundaries and fuels a collective response to group threat. Such threats encourage violence to contain this threat and restore dominance. Exclusionary attitudes and support for expanded gun rights in America further legitimize a culture of ethno-nationalism that encourages violent acts. I test these arguments with data from the Pew Research Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Extremist Crime Database on right-wing violence. The state-level and county-level results support the claim that rising ethnic diversity raises the rate and volume of right-wing violence significantly. State-level results also find that rising memberships in the National Rifle Association increase the rate of right-wing violence significantly.

Sociological Science 10(2):197-226, March 20, 2023

By C. Jarrett Dieterle

When it comes to having alcoholic beverages delivered to our doors, America is in a very different place today than it was 24 months ago. As COVID-19 spread across the world, markets were forced to adapt to the delivery economy model that has dominated throughout the pandemic. Although the sale of most goods could readily be converted from brick-and-mortar purchases to doorstep shipping, alcohol was a notable exception. Many states still prohibited liquor stores, grocery stores and alcohol producers from delivering alcohol locally to consumers’ homes, and nearly every state prohibited restaurants and bars from selling alcohol “to-go” or via delivery. And while wineries were able to ship their bottles to customers in most states, distilleries and breweries were largely barred from the direct-to-consumer (DtC) shipping market. The COVID-19 effect on alcohol delivery and shipping has been both broad and deep. As of last fall, the vast majority of states had passed at least some type of alcohol delivery reform, if not multiple reforms. In fact, many states are still actively considering alcohol delivery legislation or planning to do so in the years ahead. As alcohol delivery has taken off, pushback has emerged. Although much of the pushback can be attributed to protectionist impulses by industry stakeholders, some of the concern stems from health and safety concerns like underage drinking as well as driving under the influence. As more lawmakers across the country consider the future of alcohol delivery in their states, it is important to understand these concerns and engage in data-driven investigations of their legitimacy.

R STREET SHORTS NO. 113 April 2022, 5p.

By Lisel Petis

Law enforcement agencies across the country, regardless of state or jurisdiction population size, are facing challenges on a daily basis, including exhaustion and frustration from dealing with “frequent flyers” and “repeat callers;” continued stress and pressure caused by agency staffing shortages and negative public sentiment; and increased rates of community mental health and substance abuse issues leading to potentially dangerous outcomes. In response, some conservative areas have found a way to better support their local law enforcement and the communities they serve through pre-arrest diversion programs. Pre-arrest diversion models—such as Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD), co-responder and community responder—have become some of the most successful trends in criminal justice. These programs already exist across the nation and have proven efficient and effective in diverting low-level offenders from the criminal justice system. By looking at the execution of LEAD in Laramie County, Wyo., Behavioral Health Connect (BHCON) in El Paso County, Colo. and Community Assistance and Life Liaison (CALL) in St. Petersburg, Fla., other jurisdictions can understand how pre-arrest diversion reduces calls for service, saves police officers’ time and decreases jail populations. Furthermore, these districts serve as an example that allows us to explore how to successfully implement a diversion program and navigate potential challenges.

Key Points: 1. Conservative jurisdictions are turning to novel prearrest diversion models to help with staffing shortages, court backlogs and “frequent flyers” who are often suffering from mental health or addiction issues. 2. Pre-arrest diversion models—such as LEAD, corresponder or community responder—prioritizes police time, court resources and jail space for serious offenses and violent crimes while also repairing law enforcement’s relationship with the community, connecting individuals with services and reducing recidivism. 3. Communities can better support their local law enforcement and overcome concerns of logistics, safety and funding when implementing their own diversion programs.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 252 March 2022, 12p

By Patrick Meehan and Jonathan Goodhand

This research paper advances a conceptual framework for analysing the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime in borderland and frontier regions. We challenge two dominant policy narratives around paramilitaries: first, the idea that these organisations are symptomatic of state breakdown and flourish in marginal spaces suffering from ‘governance deficits’. Second, the idea that paramilitaries can primarily be understood as apolitical, predatory and self-enriching actors, driven by economic motives, and operating outside formal political systems. In critiquing these narratives, we develop an alternative approach that studies how paramilitaries become embedded in enduring systems of rule in borderlands shaped by protracted conflict and illicit economies. At the centre of our approach is the concept of ‘coercive brokerage’ which provides a lens for exploring how paramilitaries play a crucial role in shaping power relations by mediating between different scales, jurisdictions and policy domains. Brokerage can be defined as the capacity to mediate the transmission of power across divides – or synapses – between different networks or power structures, and facilitates connections outside formal institutions. In conflict-affected frontier spaces, the use of violence – actual or threatened – enables brokers to fulfil their connective function and creates a privileged space for distinct forms of ‘coercive brokerage’. Coercive brokers have an ambiguous relationship with the state; they derive power from mediating the state’s influence, rather than acting as state proxies. By fulfilling these roles as intermediaries, coercive brokers become embedded in political and market systems in frontier regions and beyond. As we argue below, over time, coercive brokers become important political actors who deal with collective action problems by cementing alliances and political coalitions that connect political centres with frontier regions, and who pursue political interests and agendas. Not all paramilitaries become coercive brokers who end up assuming significant political roles. We aim to explore why some paramilitary figures and groups become powerful coercive brokers and others do not. We also examine why coercive brokerage seems to be a particular feature of frontier and borderland contexts. And finally, we aim to better understand variation in the dynamics of coercive brokerage – at the national and subnational levels. This paper is the first of a three-part series exploring the nexus between paramilitaries, illicit economies and organised crime. This first paper conceptualises coercive brokerage and outlines how this concept advances the growing body of recent literature on militias and paramilitaries. The second paper then works with the concept of coercive brokerage to present comparative analysis of the paramilitary-organised crime nexus in three contexts: Afghanistan, Colombia and Myanmar. These case studies draw upon data and analysis generated by a four-year Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) project, Drugs & (Dis)order (https://drugs-and-disorder.org/). The third paper outlines a set of policy implications based on the key findings from across the case studies.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 26. University of Birmingham. 2023. 35p.

By Marcela Neves Bezerra and Mitja Kovac

Modern Brazil is plagued by social and economic inequalities, endemic violence, crime, and weak rule of law. Once these narratives become dependent on each other, all aspects must be worked on to change the scenario experienced in the country, of insecurity, fear and lack of opportunities. This paper argues that unprecedented increase in social injustice in Brazil is not the result of short-term measures, but the materialization of a history marked by economic and social inequalities that extend from the colonial period to the present moment and faulty criminal policies that intensified in the mid-1990's. Moreover, current massive incarceration, overcrowding of prisons combined with the lack of human living conditions is turning Brazil into a gigantic, perpetual school of crime. Investment in education that has a direct effect on the decrease of crime rate, must be aligned with the structuring of a new, less repressive and more inclusive punitive policy, to induce criminals not to recur to crime. Paper suggests that essential development in Brazil is possible only if the efficient legal institutions, rule of law, and criminal sanctioning based on principles of social justice are available to all citizens.

School of Economics and Business University of Ljubljana, 2020,

By Anina Schwarzenbach and Michael Jensen

Prior research suggests that members of terrorist groups prioritize forming network ties based on trust to improve their organizational and operational security. The homophily principle, which postulates that individuals tend to form relationships based on shared characteristics, can be a key mechanism through which people identify trustworthy associates. Next to homophily, the mechanism of establishing interconnected relationships through transitivity is also well-known to serve this purpose and shape community structures in social networks. We analyze the community structures of the Islamist co-offending network in the United States, which is highly violent, to assess whether homophily and transitivity determine which extremists form co-offending ties. We rely on a new database on the individual attributes and the co-offending relationships of 494 Islamist offenders radicalized in the United States between 1993 and 2020. Using community detection algorithms, we show that the US Islamist co-offending network is highly clustered, modular, and includes many small but only a few large communities. Furthermore, results from exponential random graph modeling show that transitive relationships as well as spatial proximity, ideological affiliation, and shared socio-cultural characteristics drive co-offending among US Islamist extremists. Overall, these findings demonstrate that the processes of homophily and transitivity shape violent social networks.

PLoS ONE 19(6): 2024, 31p.

By Parliament of Australia. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee

This examination of right-wing extremists in Australia looks at the movements, motivations and international links of local groups, particularly in online spaces. The report makes recommendations focusing on social media platform regulation, law enforcement access to encrypted communications and the creation of a national hate crimes database.

The inquiry, prompted by growing concern regarding right-wing extremism globally and its impact on Australian society, sought digito define, understand and limit the harm of right-wing extremist movements. Along with the historical and ideological background, it considers modern pathways to radicalisation with a focus on the significant role of online platforms. The report considers existing measures in place to counter violent extremism and makes six recommendations to curtail the spread and limit the harm of extremist groups.

Recommendations

The Australian Government should regularly assess the effectiveness of deradicalisation and countering violent extremism programs, incorporating insights from experts, practitioners, and research organisations, both domestically and internationally.

Develop a national framework to guide engagement with young people, aiming to help them identify and reject harmful ideologies while fostering positive social connections.

Research how extremist actors, particularly those targeting young people, use online platforms, including social media and gaming platforms, to spread propaganda and recruit members.

The Office of the eSafety Commissioner should collaborate with stakeholders to develop guidelines for transparent and independent measures to ensure social media platforms are effectively removing harmful extremist content.

Consider legislation allowing law enforcement and intelligence agencies, with a warrant obtained through proper judicial process, to access encrypted communications when there is a credible national security threat.

Establish a national hate crimes database to aid in the development of effective prevention and support programs.

Canberra: Parliament of Australia. The Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee 2024. 223p.

Edited by Virginia Mantouvalou and Jonathan Wolff

In developing her conception of structural injustice, Iris Marion Young made a strict distinction between large-scale collective injustice that results from the normal functions of a society, and the more familiar concepts of individual wrong and deliberate state repression. Her ideas have attracted considerable attention in political philosophy, but legal theorists have been slower to consider the relation between structural injustice and legal analysis. While some forms of vulnerability to structural injustice can be the unintended consequences of legal rules, the law also has potential instruments to alleviate some forms of structural injustice. Structural Injustice and the Law presents theoretical approaches and concrete examples to show how the concept of structural injustice can aid legal analysis, and how legal reform can, in practice, reduce or even eliminate some forms of structural injustice. A group of outstanding law and political philosophy scholars discuss a comprehensive range of interdisciplinary topics, including the notion of domination, equality and human rights law, legal status, sweatshop labour, labour law, criminal justice, domestic homicide reviews, begging, homelessness, regulatory public bodies and the films of Ken Loach. Drawn together, they build an invaluable resource for legal theorists exploring how to make use of the concept of structural injustice, and for political philosophers looking for a nuanced account of the law’s role both in creating and mitigating structural injustice.

London: UCL Press, 2024. 334p.

Edited by Matthias J. Becker, Laura Ascone, Karolina Placzynta and Chloé Vincent

The normalisation of hate speech, including antisemitic rhetoric, poses a significant threat to social cohesion and democracy. While global efforts have been made to counter contemporary antisemitism, there is an urgent need to understand its online manifestations. Hate speech spreads easily across the internet, facilitated by anonymity and reinforced by algorithms that favour engaging--even if offensive--content. It often takes coded forms, making detection challenging. Antisemitism in Online Communication addresses these issues by analysing explicit and implicit antisemitic statements in mainstream online discourse. Drawing from disciplines such as corpus linguistics, computational linguistics, semiotics, history, and philosophy, this edited collection examines over 100,000 user comments from three language communities. Contributors explore various facets of online antisemitism, including its intersectionality with misogyny and its dissemination through memes and social networks. Through case studies, they examine the reproduction, support, and rejection of antisemitic tropes, alongside quantitative assessments of comment structures in online discussions. Additionally, the volume delves into the capabilities of content moderation tools and deep-learning models for automated hate speech detection. This multidisciplinary approach provides a comprehensive understanding of contemporary antisemitism in digital spaces, recognising the importance of addressing its insidious spread from multiple angles.

Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. 2024.262p.

By Sophie Gillfeather-Spetere, Amy Watson

Designed for use by policymakers, practitioners, and advocates, this guide synthesizes findings from 20+ reports to outline key actions for consistent and effective policy responses supporting children and young people experiencing violence. It includes four principles that outline ways of working to underpin reform and eight priority areas for action. The report finds that policies and service systems are failing to meet the needs of children and young people, particularly those with a disability, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children, those from culturally and linguistically diverse families, and LGBTQ+. The guide calls for significant policy and practice reforms that center children's and young people’s voices, acknowledge the profound and diverse impact of violence on their lives, and move away from a reactive system to one that prioritizes primary prevention.

 Four principles to underpin reform

1. There is no single experience of being a child or young person. When working to support the safety and wellbeing of children and young people we must use an intersectional approach.

2. Policy and service systems need to be rights-focused to avoid causing further harm.

3. Policy and system change needs to be supported by an authorising environment with supportive leadership, adequate resourcing, child-focused and DFSV-informed policies and procedures, and education and training.

4. The strengths, resilience, and resistance of children and young people should be recognized and incorporated into trauma-informed, strengths-based system responses.

Eight priority areas for action

1. Recognize the profound and diverse impacts of domestic, family, and sexual violence on children and young people.

2. Centre the voices, strengths, and needs of children and young people.

3. Prioritise primary prevention centring children and young people’s wellbeing and safety.

4. Acknowledge and act on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ knowledge of what is best for their children.

5. Design and deliver holistic child-centred systems, policies, and supports.

6. Collaborate across systems to respond holistically to children and young people’s needs.

7. Invest in skill development in trauma- and domestic, family, and sexual violence-informed care across systems and services.

8. Share knowledge across services working with disability; domestic, family, and sexual violence; and children and young people.

Sydney: ANROWS- Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety,  2024. 84p.

By New York City Racial Justice Commission

In March 2021, Mayor de Blasio announced the formation of the Racial Justice Commission and appointed 11 Commissioners, including Chair Jennifer Jones Austin and Vice Chair Henry Garrido, to focus on racial justice and reconciliation, with a mandate to identify and root out structural racism. The Racial Justice Commission (RJC) has the formal powers of a charter revision commission, including the ability to propose changes to the NYC Charter. The NYC Charter is the foundation of how our City functions and governs, and it has a direct impact on the way we live and work. The Commission set out to examine the NYC Charter to identify barriers to power, access, and opportunity for Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Asian, Pacific Islander, Middle Eastern and all People of Color (BIPOC*) in New York City and put forward ballot proposals aimed at removing those barriers and advancing racial equity. New Yorkers will vote on these proposed changes in November 2022. The Commission operates independently from the Mayor’s Office and other agencies. As a charter revision commission, the Racial Justice Commission was tasked with reviewing the entire City Charter and proposing amendments, or changes, to be considered by voters and voted upon in a general election. A charter revision commission can choose to make proposals that change the entire charter, or a specific section. Given this authority, and the unique opportunity posed by the transformative potential of this moment in history, the Racial Justice Commission decided to focus on identifying and proposing structural changes in the NYC Charter that will advance racial justice and equity and begin to dismantle structural racism for all New Yorkers. The Commission began by defining a vision for racial equity, one where the worth, talents, and contributions of all people in society are valued and recognized, and where race is not a determinant of economic, political, social, or psychological outcomes, as it neither confers privilege nor denies opportunities.

PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

Charter revision commissions can perform research, speak with experts and community leaders, conduct public meetings and public input sessions as they collect information and ideas, and make decisions about what proposed charter changes to recommend. Engaging New Yorkers in the process undertaken by the Racial Justice Commission was critical. While most charter revision commissions seek input and specific proposals from the public, the Racial Justice Commission knew it would be important to also recognize the deep pain of racial trauma and the history of injustices suffered. So, the Commission heard from New Yorkers not only on their ideas, but also on their experiences—the challenges faced, systemic barriers in place, and the personal and community impact these injustices have had. The Commission employed a wide range of engagement tools in order to reach the broadest range of New Yorkers as possible, with an emphasis on reaching Black, Indigenous, Latinx, Asian, Pacific Islander, Middle Eastern New Yorkers and all People of Color (BIPOC*) who are not as effectively reached through traditional government engagement vehicles. The Commission held public input sessions in every borough and online; received input online from over 1,250 New Yorkers; heard from thought leaders and experts from a range of fields, backgrounds, and expertise; spread the word to over 1,000 New Yorkers through presentations to community boards and civic groups; and conducted targeted interviews and focus groups with critical stakeholders working in racial equity and racial justice.

New York: NYC Racial Justice Commission, 2022. 147p.

By The Program on Extremism

Hamas has operated for decades in the US through fundraising, influence operations, and strategic adaptation, using charities and neutral rhetoric to conceal its true objectives. On college campuses, Hamas-linked networks have exploited academic freedom to further their agenda, a strategy that is the latest iteration of plans conceived as far back as the early 1990s. Groups like Samidoun and actors linked to the Iranian regime have cooperated with US-based Hamas networks, conducting similar influence and fundraising operations. 

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 23p.

By Tim Lyman, Frank R. Baumgartner, and Glenn L. Pierce

Out of 6,512 homicides from 1976 through 2014, we review the outcomes of 1,822 capitallycharged homicide cases across eight judicial districts in Louisiana. In most cases, capital charges were reduced; but in 385 cases, the state sought death to the final stage of the prosecution. In 107 cases, a death sentence was imposed. We analyze these outcomes, looking at legally relevant factors, as well as legally irrelevant ones, in determining final capital charges and death sentences. Legally relevant factors include the number of victims as well as various statutory aggravating circumstances (e.g., victims under 12 or over 64, simultaneous felony circumstances, the type of weapon, the relationship between the victim and offender). Legally irrelevant factors include the judicial district and the race and gender of the offenders and victims, respectively. Many legally relevant factors have powerful impacts: the number of victims, certain felony circumstances, child victims, elderly victims are all associated with higher rates of final capital charging or death sentencing. But we also show that factors which appear legally irrelevant in theory have have powerful effects; rates of capital prosecution and death sentencing are substantially different based on the race of victim and the combined races of the offenders and the victims, for example. We found only modest differences across the eight judicial districts we studied, but especially significant differences in rates of final capital charges and death sentences in cases that involved white victims, particularly white females. No demographic combination was as likely to see a final capital charge or a death sentence as those cases with a black male offender and a white female victim, which were more than five times as likely to lead to a final capital charge or a death sentence, compared to the much more frequent crimes involving black offenders and black victims. These findings come after a review of the bivariate relations as well as a series of multivariate logistic regressions. The Louisiana death penalty system is heavily weighted by a tendency to seek the harshest penalties in those cases with white female victims. Our powerful and consistent findings of racial and gender-based disparities hold in a multivariate analysis and are inconsistent with the equal protection of the law or any common understanding of equality or justice.

SUL Rev., 2021

By Henrice Altink

This book analyzes textual representations of Jamaican slave women in three contexts--motherhood, intimate relationships, and work--in both pro- and antislavery writings. Altink examines how British abolitionists and pro-slavery activists represented the slave women to their audiences and explains not only the purposes that these representations served, but also their effects on slave women’s lives.

London; New York: Routledge, 2005.272p.

By Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed,  Radicalisation Awareness Network

Humour has become a central weapon of extremist movements to subvert open societies and to lower the threshold towards violence. Especially within the context of a recent wave of far-right terrorist attacks, we witness “playful” ways in communicating racist ideologies. As far-right extremists strategically merge with online cultures, their approach changes fundamentally. This trend has been especially facilitated by the so-called alt-right and has spread globally. This predominantly online movement set new standards to rebrand extremist positions in an ironic guise, blurring the lines between mischief and potentially radicalising messaging. The result is a nihilistic form of humour that is directed against ethnic and sexual minorities and deemed to inspire violent fantasies — and eventually action. This paper scrutinises how humour functions as a potential factor in terms of influencing far-right extremist violence. In doing so, we trace the strategic dissemination of far-right narratives and discuss how extremists conceal their misanthropic messages in order to deny ill intention or purposeful harm. These recent developments pose major challenges for practitioners: As a new generation of violent extremists emerges from digital subcultures without a clear organisational centre, prevention strategies need to renew focus and cope with the intangible nature of online cultures.  

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 18p.

By  Jacob Davey, Jakob Guhl, and Carl Miller

As Ofcom prepared for its duties as the UK’s incoming social media regulator, it commissioned ISD to produce two reports to better understand the risk of UK users encountering online terrorists, incitement to violence, and hate content across a range of digital services. This report provides an overview of public English-language messages collected from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan across the month of August 2022 which we class as ‘plausibly hateful’. This is where at least one of the reasonable interpretations of the message is that it seeks to dehumanize, demonize, express contempt or disgust for, exclude, harass, threaten, or incite violence against an individual or community based on a protected characteristic. Protected characteristics are understood to be race, national origin, disability, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, sex, or gender identity.

Amman | Berlin | London | Paris | Washington DC: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. 2023. 34p.

By Anne Craanen, Charley Gleeson and Anna Meier

This report investigates the rise of online anti-trans activism following two prominent attacks involving LGBTQ+ communities, namely the October 2022 attack on a gay bar in Bratislava, Slovakia, and the March 2023 shooting at a school in Nashville, Tennessee perpetrated by a trans man.

We use a postcolonial approach, through which we find that the transphobia espoused online following the attacks was predominantly transmisogynistic, a consequence of the colonial logics around gender which assign the monopoly of violence to white cisgender men. The main themes identified were the erasure of trans identities, particularly transmasculinity, the overlap between transmisogyny and other forms of discrimination, and the demonization of trans people. 

The most important conclusion from our research is for everyone – technology companies, policymakers and other stakeholders – to take transphobia and transmisogyny seriously. Too often transmisogyny is seen as a side problem, or as a complement to another set of more radical ideas, including but not limited to white nationalism or anti-government sentiment. It can often be the case that transphobia, alongside misogyny, hate speech, or other forms of discrimination, is seen as “harmful but lawful” or described as “borderline content”, thereby not in need of online moderation. While simply removing such material from platforms may be neither appropriate nor advisable in all cases, there are other forms of content moderation that platforms can consider, depending on how online transphobia manifests itself. 

In the conclusion of our work, we provide practical recommendations to technology companies of all sizes for tackling transphobia more effectively. Key among these are the importance of knowledge-sharing between platforms and subject matter experts, defining transphobia and transmisogyny in platforms’ terms of service, and employing content moderation practices such as disinformation tags and algorithmic deprioritization. 

Recommendations for technology companies:

1. Increase online monitoring following attacks that are directly relevant to the LGBTQ+  community as transphobic content is likely to increase, including material that violates terms of service, incites violence or is otherwise illegal. 

2. Collaborate with experts to comprehend and classify transphobic rhetoric, and produce a taxonomy alongside subject-matter specialists, technology representatives, civil society, and government partners.

3. Consider diverse moderation methods, removing illegal content and also using alternatives to removal such as fact-checking and algorithmic adjustments to mitigate exposure to transphobic channels and content.

4. Define transphobia in terms of service to guide users as to what is allowed on platforms and enable user reporting. 

5. Design clear reporting and appeal mechanisms for moderated content, including online transphobia, to protect digital and human rights.

” London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), May 2024.2024. 26p.