By Heather Harris, Brandon Martin, and Sean Cremin

  In 2005, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) was given a rehabilitative mission, which included providing programs to reduce recidivism by addressing the needs of imprisoned people. This report examines how effectively the agency has delivered on this mission by describing the education, employment, and rehabilitative programs available to people released from prison between 2015 and 2019, assessing program participation, and mapping underlying trends in recidivism outcomes. Based on information that has not been available before, we offer context for the role of prison programs in people’s lives by describing pathways into prison, investigating factors that affect program participation, and setting the stage to trace post-prison pathways. Each of these elements highlights aspects of people’s lives before, during, and after prison that determine which programs are available to and appropriate for them. Introduction After the California Department of Corrections was rebranded the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2005, a panel of experts was convened in 2006 to help CDCR realize its new rehabilitative mission. The panel recommended expanding program offerings and targeting programs to those with assessed need, with the aim of reducing recidivism by building social, job, and educational skills. Ten years later, two oversight agencies questioned whether CDCR had achieved these aims. The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) and the state auditor found that people who needed in-prison programs often did not receive them. Even when they did, the programs did not achieve their aims, which include building life skills, changing during- and post-prison behavior, and reducing reoffending (Taylor 2017; Howle 2019). Both agencies recommended an independent evaluation of prison programs, which CDCR enlisted PPIC to conduct. About 1 in 1000 people living in California in any year were released from prison during that year; 64 percent of over 37,000 people released in 2019 had participated in at least one prison program. People entered prison with significant needs that reflect their pathways into prison. On average, people read at the eighth-grade level and had sixth-grade math skills. Over two-thirds needed substance use disorder treatment. More than four in ten needed cognitive behavior interventions and employment programs. Program capacity expanded dramatically between 2015 and 2019. Participation rates increased across all program areas—doubling or tripling for some—but remained below an ambitious goal of 70 percent. Programs faced challenges with accurate targeting. At most, 43 percent of people who initially tested into an education program and 21 percent of people with an assessed substance use need participated. Recidivism rates are lower than before these reforms but remain high. Over half of those with prior prison histories and 43 percent of first-timers were rearrested for felonies. Likewise, 28 percent and 21 percent, respectively, were reconvicted for felonies within two years. Though we do not attempt to connect recidivism to program participation, stubbornly high recidivism rates indicate the need to enhance prison programs to improve reentry pathways.  

 San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2024. 49p.

By John K. Roman, Gregory Haugan, Benjamin Schapiro and Sofia Rodriguez

  What are the effects of drug-related arrests on New York City neighborhoods? Effects of criminal justice actions (including incarceration, arrest, misdemeanor conviction, and/or community supervision) extend beyond individuals and families to include the well-being of local communities. Collateral, unintended consequences of drug arrests include negative education and socioemotional outcomes for children whose parents have been incarcerated, shocks to local crime dynamics that impact levels of violence, and even effects on property values. Local economies and drug arrests affect each other in ways that are difficult to disentangle. Drug arrests tend to cluster in particular places and those clusters may persist over long time periods. Places where drug arrests cluster may be more amenable to drug trafficking and less amenable to legal economic activity, and illegal drug activity may lead places to become less viable economically. Interactions between the micro economy and drug trade are not easily understood. Statistical models built with administrative data may lead to biased estimates. One solution is to employ statistical techniques to separate the effects of system-level shocks associated with drug arrests (e.g., policy changes, supply shocks), from the effects of local factors that may be tied up with local property values or general levels of violence (e.g., migration or gentrification). Data from system shocks may provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of drug activity on the microeconomy. Using data from New York City's Open Data Portal and other administrative data sets, researchers from NORC at the University of Chicago measured the collateral consequences of arrests for drug law violations. The spatial patterns of drug arrests over time were examined to test for a disproportionate impact on communities of color and economically disadvantaged communities. Annual drug arrests in individual census tracts were predicted by examining drug arrests in the rest of the city that year and weighting them by the share of all homicides in the city that occurred in the census tract in the baseline (i.e., pre-analysis) period. This is a variation on an instrumental variables approach known as a Bartik Instrument and is referred to as a “Bartik Shock.” Results suggest that arrests for drug-law violations in a neighborhood reduce property tax assessments and the effect takes up to three years to manifest. The delay may be due to the time it takes for changes in drug arrests to affect perceptions of safety. On the other hand, drug arrests could have more immediate effects on perceptions of safety but delays in the administrative process of assessing property values could account for a lag in values. Researchers also tested whether the effects of drug arrests vary according to a community’s socioeconomic status and racial composition. The results suggest that negative effects of drug arrests in the third year after the tax assessment are greatest in areas in the bottom quartile for median income. Effects of arrests on property values were also greater in communities of color, particularly driven by census tracts in the upper quartile for their share of the city's Hispanic population. The general goal of the analysis was to determine whether more drug arrests in a neighborhood are associated with changes in a community's economic well-being. The results indicate that, on average, a one percent increase in drug arrests is associated with a two percent decline in assessed property values, and the effect is lagged: drug arrests this year tend to affect property tax assessments three years from now.    

New York, NY: Research and Evaluation Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York. 2024. 29p.

By Gina Moreno, Richard A. Espinobarros, Sheyla A. Delgado, and Jeffrey A. Butts

  Arrest rates vary across the neighborhoods of New York City in ways that reveal racial and ethnic disparity. Researchers at the John Jay College Research and Evaluation Center (JohnJayREC)investigated the extent of disparities after controlling for differences in neighborhood demographics and crime rates as measured by 911 “calls for service.” The research team focused on two high-volume offenses: assault and larceny. Researchers created five neighborhood subgroups based on the proportion of Black and Hispanic residents in each neighborhood (quintiles from low to high). Next, they examined the percentage of arrests in each area that involved Black or Hispanic suspects. Neighborhoods with more Black and Hispanic residents reported more Black and Hispanic arrestees. However, the percentage of Black and Hispanic arrests relative to the percentage of Black and Hispanic residents (i.e., the “arrest to resident ratio”) was often disproportionate, particularly for larceny. Disparities could stem from a neighborhood’s crime reporting rate and the intensity of law enforcement efforts to investigate crime incidents and make arrests. Simple differences in race and ethnicity are not de facto evidence of police bias, of course, but monitoring disparity measures could help public officials guard the equity of justice policies and practices.

 New York, NY: Research and Evaluation Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York.2024. 15p.

by Beau Kilmer, Michelle Priest, Rajeev Ramchand, Rhianna C. Rogers, Ben Senator, Keytin Palmer

Psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin mushrooms and LSD, have long been touted as holding promise for treating various mental health conditions, and the past decade has seen another round of enthusiasm for this hope. Although the clinical research and associated media reports on these substances continue to grow, what receives less attention is the changing policy landscape for some psychedelics in the United States. Despite the federal prohibition on supply and possession — outside approved clinical research, the Food and Drug Administration's Expanded Access program, and some religious exemptions — some state and local governments are loosening their approaches to some psychedelics. In fact, some states are implementing or considering approaches that legalize some forms of supply to adults for any reason. It seems likely that more jurisdictions will consider and implement alternative policies to prohibiting the nonclinical supply of some psychedelics, possibly including retail sales. The primary goal of this mixed-methods report is to present new data and analysis to help inform policymakers participating in these discussions in the United States, but much of this report should also be useful to decisionmakers in other countries. These insights should also be useful to anyone who is interested in learning more about these substances and the public policy issues surrounding them.

Key Findings

• Unlike people who use cannabis and many other drugs, infrequent users of psychedelics account for most of the total days of use.

• The total number of use days for psychedelics — a proxy for the size of the market — is two orders of magnitude smaller than it is for cannabis.

• Within the class of drugs generally classified as psychedelics, psilocybin has the highest past-year and past-month prevalence rates among U.S. adults. Of those ages 18 and older, 3.1 percent — or approximately 8 million people — used psilocybin in 2023.

• Among those reporting the use of psilocybin in the past year, nearly half reported microdosing the last time they used it.

• Scientific literature is limited in its understanding of the consequences of using psychedelics and preventing and mitigating adverse events.

• Most of the policy changes at the state and local levels focus on supporting research and deprioritizing the enforcement of certain laws about psychedelics, but a few states have legalized some forms of supply and others are considering it.

• There are many supply policy options between prohibition and legalizing production and sales by for-profit companies.

• The role of price as a regulatory tool may matter less for psychedelics compared with many other drugs.

• Meaningful policy discussions should include Indigenous Peoples who are community authorize role of supervision and facilitators when considering changes tied to speak on these matters.

• Policymakers need to be thoughtful about th psychedelics policies.

• It is critical to improve the data infrastructure on psychedelics to better support policy analyses.

• Now is the time for U.S. federal policymakers to decide whether they want psilocybin and other psychedelic substances to follow in the  in the footsteps of the for-profit cannabis model.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 161p.

A comparative study and recommendations on programmes for perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence

By  Sandra Jovanović Belotić and Berta Vall and  Kieran McCartan, 

  Programmes for perpetrators are an important element of preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence. They help to ensure that perpetrators take responsibility for their acts of violence and, ultimately, do not re-offend. The objective of these programmes is to enhance the safety and well-being of victims by addressing and ending violent behaviour, and by changing the behaviour of individuals committing domestic and sexual violence against women. Most violence against women is perpetrated by men, as research shows.1 Unless otherwise indicated, the term “perpetrators” used in this study refers to male perpetrators. It is also important to emphasise that this study employs language based on a person-centred approach, which distinguishes the person from their behaviour. In order to harmonise the terminology of this report, the terms “perpetrators of domestic violence” and “perpetrators of sexual violence” are used in the context of the two types of programmes for perpetrators covered in this research. The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) embeds preventive and intervention programmes for perpetrators in the framework of a comprehensive strategy to prevent violence against women. It obliges parties to the convention to set up and support programmes for perpetrators, whose primary focus must be to ensure the safety and support of victims.2 Article 16 of the Istanbul Convention provides specific obligations regarding the setting up or support for preventive intervention and treatment programmes. Article 16 - Preventive intervention and treatment programmes . Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to set up or support programs aimed at teaching perpetrators of domestic violence to adopt non-violent behaviour in interpersonal relationships with a view to preventing further violence and changing violent behavioural patterns.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to set up or support treatment programmes aimed at preventing perpetrators, in particular sex offenders, from re-offending.  In taking the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, parties shall ensure that the support and safety of victims, as well as the human rights of victims, are of primary concern and that, where appropriate, these programmes are set up and implemented in close coordination with specialist support services for victims. The Explanatory Report to the Istanbul Convention underlines that parties should establish their own programmes or support existing ones. The decision on how they should be run rests with the parties or programme providers, although the Explanatory Report outlines core elements for programme safety. Prior to the Istanbul Convention, minimum standards for working with perpetrators had been developed in a Council of Europe study entitled “Combating violence against women: minimum standards for support services.” Furthermore, the Council of Europe has provided an overview of the practices in relation to programmes for perpetrators, including guidance in the form of checklists for the establishment of programmes for perpetrators of domestic violence and sexual violence.

  In addition, the European Network for the Work with Perpetrators of Domestic Violence (WWP EN) provides guidance for the safe and effective work with perpetrators. In 2023, the network published its “European Standards for Perpetrator Programmes,” outlining key elements for setting up programmes for perpetrators based on a victim-centred approach. In practice, however, challenges remain in aligning existing programmes with the above principles. In monitoring the implementation of the Istanbul Convention, the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) identified shortcomings in ensuring sufficient availability of programmes that are based on a victim-centred and gender-sensitive approach and that work in close co-operation with specialist support services.The research conducted by the European Network for the Work with Perpetrators also pinpointed common challenges that countries and service providers encounter when establishing and designing programmes for perpetrators that aim to respond to the provisions of the Istanbul Convention.These challenges relate specifically to the principle of victim-safety orientation in work with perpetrators, the provision of risk assessment and management, and to their level of integration of a gender perspective. This comparative study provides an overview of existing models and approaches for programmes for perpetrators and their results, responding to the need for such analysis stated in the Declaration on the Prevention of Domestic, Sexual, and Gender-Based Violence (Dublin Declaration) adopted by 38 member states of the Council of Europe in September 2022.9 The signatories to this declaration further specified the need to “identify promising practices and develop guidelines for the operation of perpetrator programmes to ensure baseline quality standards in line with the principles of the Istanbul Convention, notably a victim-centred approach that focuses on ensuring victims’ safety and support and full respect for their human rights.” Corresponding to the above, this study offers guidance for the establishment of safe and effective programmes for perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence, as required under Article 16 of the Istanbul Convention. It draws on promising practices and common challenges encountered in the design and implementation of these programmes. Using qualitative and quantitative research methods, the study’s aim is to provide clear and practical recommendations for the safe and effective implementation of programmes for perpetrators of domestic and sexual violence for use by policy-makers, service providers and practitioners.  

STrasbourg: Council of Europe, 2024. 49p.  

By Fiona Vera-Gray, Clare McGlynn, Ibad Kureshi, Kate Butterby

  This article examines the ways in which mainstream pornography positions sexual violence as a normative sexual script by analysing the video titles found on the landing pages of the three most popular pornography websites in the United Kingdom. The study draws on the largest research sample of online pornographic content to date and is unique in its focus on the content immediately advertised to a new user. We found that one in eight titles shown to first-time users on the first page of mainstream porn sites describe sexual activity that constitutes sexual violence. Our findings raise serious questions about the extent of criminal material easily and freely available on mainstream pornography websites and the efficacy of current regulatory mechanisms.  

  The British Journal of Criminology, 2021, 61, 1243–1260  

By Hannah Feeney,  Rebecca Pfeffer; et al.

  Research has associated the impacts of COVID-19 with an increased rate of gender-based violence (GBV), including sexual assault/abuse, intimate partner violence (IPV), and sex trafficking (Nix and Richards, 2021; Piquero et al., 2021; UNODC, 2021; Wood et al., 2022). Research has also indicated that the nature of violence experienced during the pandemic was more severe (Jetelina et al., 2021). Under typical circumstances, survivors of GBV may experience a wide range of impacts as a result of their victimization, including negative physical, psychological, and psychosocial outcomes (Aldrich and Kallivayalil 2013; Black et al. 2011; Farley et al., 2004; Kilpatrick et al., 2007; Yuan, Koss, and Stone 2006). These effects of GBV can be immediate (e.g., lack of physical security, increased stress), long-lasting (e.g., increased risk of depression, anxiety), and cumulative across the lifespan (Yuan et al., 2006). . The COVID-19 pandemic may have amplified these impacts for victims1. Many of the factors that place individuals at increased risk for or exacerbate the impacts of GBV have also been documented as impacts of the pandemic, including housing instability, job loss or changes in job security, economic strain, new childcare responsibilities, lack of social support, and increased substance use, among others (Prime, Wade & Browne, 2020). For survivors of GBV navigating these amplified impacts, the presence of and services available through community-based victim service providers (VSPs) were and continue to be essential. At the same, pandemic altered normal social functioning in ways that significantly disrupted VSPs and the systems with which they interact and on which they rely. VSPs faced the competing needs of higher demand for services and a heightened call to follow public health guidelines to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Physical distancing, limitations on the number of people allowed in an enclosed space, and closures to infrastructure critical to service delivery (e.g., schools, courts, public transportation) in some areas impacted providers’ ability to meet victims’ needs. Although these efforts are effective in preventing the transmission of COVID-19, they create unique challenges for those supporting individuals experiencing or recovering from victimization. The resulting adaptations that VSPs made were immediate and necessary but also inspired innovation and modernization in service delivery, some of which was long-lasting and even overdue. This unique combination of circumstances presents a critical opportunity to understand the impacts of such service modernization on victims and VSPs, as well as the value of established practice models. The purpose of this study was to understand the impact of COVID-19 on service provision for victims of GBV in eight U.S. counties that vary in geography, urbanicity, and sociopolitical settings. This study includes a sample of eight county-level sites from four states, with one rural and one urban county from the western (Washington), southern (Texas), midwestern (Illinois), and northeastern (Massachusetts) regions of the United States. This study was guided by three main research questions: (1) How did local legal, policy, and cultural frameworks impact victim  service provision during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how can policymakers better support VSPs in future crises? (2) How did the COVID-19 pandemic change VSP service delivery models and practices, and to what extent have those changes been successful or sustained in the long term? And (3) Were there patterns in the ways that victim services were impacted by COVID-19 based on victim or service provider characteristics, such as type of victims served, region, or number of staff?

Research Triangle Park, NJ: RTI International, 2023. 96p.  

By Meredith Dank

This document reports on efforts to understand what five U.S. regions that have demonstrated innovation to identify and respond to labor trafficking cases, and identifies the critical role of federal, state, and municipal departments of labor (DOLs) and other regulatory agencies on improving the local and state response to labor trafficking. Guiding research questions were: if there were patterns in the characteristics of labor trafficking cases that were identified by law enforcement at the state and local level; how the identification and investigation of labor trafficking cases differed from that of sex trafficking in regards to case characteristics, collaboration within and among agencies, case resolutions, and case outcomes; and what were the features of successful labor trafficking investigations. The document discusses study participants, study objectives and design, and key findings. The authors also provide recommendations for DOLs, other civil labor regulatory agencies, and non-DOL members of the anti-trafficking community.

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International,  2023. 9p.

By  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)   

Racism in the police can include discriminatory racial profiling practices through to excessive use of force. Incidents like these highlight deeper systemic issues that need addressing. Many in society are affected by racism in policing, not only the individuals or communities targeted. Lack of trust in policing can fuel social exclusion and damages the foundations of a fair and equal society, however promising practices are developing to address these issues. This is the first EU-wide report on racism in policing. FRA’s findings identify gaps in regulatory frameworks and propose concrete steps for action.

EU countries should ensure that their police forces comply with anti-racism provisions in EU and international law. Member States should collect data on racist incidents. They should enable whistleblowers to report misconduct without negative consequences and ensure independent oversight. Police forces should be more diverse to represent the communities they serve. They should receive more guidance to prevent racism in their work. Through this report, FRA supports EU countries to make a decisive effort in tackling racism in policing.

   Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, 116p.

By Council for Court Excellence

  Across the United States, jurisdictions as diverse as New York City and the states of Colorado and Nebraska are eliminating or severely restricting the use of solitary confinement – often referred to as “restrictive housing” or “segregated housing” – in correctional facilities. These changes are being driven by evidence showing both that solitary confinement is ineffective as a correctional management practice, and that it is harmful to the individuals placed in segregation. Here in Washington, D.C. (“D.C.” or “the District”), there is a growing call for the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to end the use of solitary confinement in the D.C. Jail. Additionally, D.C. is in the process of designing a new correctional facility, creating an urgency to the question of whether it will or should include units designed for solitary confinement. To inform these conversations, the Council for Court Excellence (“CCE”) sought information on the use of the various forms of solitary confinement by DOC through D.C. Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. This brief provides relevant background and context for these incarceration related issues and summaries of the information that DOC did and did not provide in response to the DC-FOIA requests. After more than two years of negotiation related to the DC-FOIA requests, DOC ultimately provided very limited information regarding its use of disciplinary or administrative segregation of people in the D.C. Jail. The data that was provided was incomplete and raised a number of concerns. For example, the average length of stay in segregated housing in Fiscal Year 2021 was 49 days – over three times longer than the United Nations considers the maximum time a person should be held in solitary confinement. And 29 people that year were released directly to the community from segregation; this has been shown to have detrimental impacts, such as homelessness, joblessness, and a greater likelihood of recidivism, as those released may not have had access to programming to help them get the housing, treatment and other services they need. Additionally, many of our requests remained unanswered, leaving much still unknown. For example, CCE was not provided responses related to the use of restraints on people in the jail; the races and ages of people in solitary – both disciplinary and administrative restrictive housing/segregation; the number of pregnant people in segregation; or the number of people in segregation who tried to or succeeded in hurting themselves or completing suicide. In the limited places where DOC did provide relevant numbers for Fiscal Year 2021, they did not provide the comparable data for 2019 and 2020 that was also requested. The findings are detailed in a later section of this brief.  

Washington, DC: The Council, 2024.13p.  

By Jeffrey Grogger, Ria Ivandić, Tom Kirchmaier

Research Questions

Can social media reach isolated domestic abuse victims? Secondly, does providing victims with more information and a safer means of contacting police change their likelihood of domestic abuse reporting?

Data

This research is based on high-frequency and confidential administrative data on the population of domestic abuse calls during the period of the Covid-19 pandemic but also the preceding years from two police forces—the Thames Valley Police (TVP) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).

Methods

To answer the research questions, we ran a randomized control trial (RCT) using a novel social media campaign promoting a method of reporting through Facebook and Instagram. We randomized the treatment across geographic areas in one police force and across individuals in another police force.

Findings

We found that while social media is an effective tool for engaging on domestic abuse topics, particularly with younger individuals, our intention-to-treat estimates between the treatment and control areas and individuals did not show any significant difference in domestic abuse reporting. One of the reasons to explain this finding was the geographically imprecise social media targeting features on Facebook.

Conclusions

Our research contributes to the scarce experimental literature on how to increase domestic abuse reporting among victims with, to the best of our knowledge, the first randomized test of the effects of a social media campaign on engagement and reporting. As police forces across the UK, but also worldwide, start using social media more to engage with the citizens they serve, these results provide interesting and valuable implications for their effectiveness and the role of technology in the future policing. Our results contribute to the understanding of how police forces can use social media to reach specific groups of people, such as younger cohorts.

Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing. Volume 8, Issue 1 , 2024.

By Arun Kundnani

Liberals have been arguing for nearly a century that racism is fundamentally an individual problem of extremist beliefs. Responding to Nazism, thinkers like gay rights pioneer Magnus Hirschfeld and anthropologist Ruth Benedict called for teaching people, especially poor people, to be less prejudiced. Here lies the origin of today 39 liberal antiracism, from diversity training to Hollywood activism. Meanwhile, a more radical antiracism flowered in the Third World. Anticolonial revolutionaries traced racism to the broad economic and political structures of modernity. Thinkers like C.L.R. James, Claudia Jones, and Frantz Fanon showed how racism was connected to colonialism and capitalism, a perspective adopted even by Martin Luther King.Today, liberal antiracism has proven powerless against structural oppression. As Arun Kundnani demonstrates, white liberals can heroically confront their own whiteness all they want, yet these structures remain.This deeply researched and swift-moving narrative history tells the story of the two antiracisms and their fates. As neoliberalism reordered the world in the last decades of the twentieth century, the case became clear: fighting racism means striking at its capitalist roots

London: Verso, 2023. 304p.

By Corina Heri

Who is a vulnerable person in human rights law? This important book assesses the treatment of vulnerability by the European Court of Human Rights, an area that has been surprisingly under explored by European human rights law to date. It explores legal-philosophical understandings of the topic, providing a theoretical framework that can be used when examining the question. Not confining itself to the abstract, however, it provides a bridge from the theoretical to the practical by undertaking a comprehensive examination of the Court's approach under art. 3 ECHR. It also pays particular attention to the concept of human dignity. Well written and compellingly argued, this is an important new book for all scholars of European human rights. 

London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. 304p.

WICKERSON, GRACE; BURTON, AUTUMN

The passage that follows includes several links embedded in the original text. From the document: "From August 2023 to March 2024, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) talked with +'85 experts' to source '20 high-demand opportunity areas for ready policy innovation' and '65 policy ideas.' In response, FAS recruited '33 authors to work on +18 policy memos' through our 'Extreme Heat Policy Sprint' from January 2024 to April 2024, 'generating an additional +100 policy recommendations' to address extreme heat. Our experts' full recommendations will be published in April 2024; this report previews key findings. In total, FAS has collected '+165 recommendations for 34 offices and/or agencies.' Key opportunity areas are described below and link out to a set of featured recommendations. The accompanying spreadsheet includes the '165 policy ideas' developed through expert engagement. [...] America is rapidly barreling towards its next hottest summer on record. While we still lack national strategy, states, counties, and cities around the country have taken up the charge of addressing extreme heat in their communities and are experimenting on the fly. [...] While state and local governments can make significant advances, national extreme heat resilience requires a 'whole of government' federal approach, as it intersects health, energy, housing, homeland and national security, international relations, and many more policy domains. The federal government plays a critical role in scaling up heat resilience interventions through research and development, regulations, standards, guidance, funding sources, and other policy levers. 'But what are the transformational policy opportunities for action?'"

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS. JUN, 2024. 34p.

UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY; UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;

From the document: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) prepared this overview to help partners defend against insider threat concerns that could materialize during the 2024 election cycle. For years, federal, state, local, and private sector partners nationwide have worked closely together to support state and local officials in safeguarding election infrastructure from cyber, physical, and insider threats. Because of these efforts, there is no evidence that malicious actors changed, altered, or deleted votes or had any impact on the outcome of elections. Over the past several years, the election infrastructure community has experienced multiple instances of election system access control compromises conducted by insider threats. While there is no evidence that malicious actors impacted election outcomes, it is important that election stakeholders at all levels are aware of the risks posed by insider threats and the steps that they can take to identify and mitigate these threats. This document outlines several recent examples of election security-related insider threats, discusses potential scenarios that could arise during the 2024 election cycle, and provides recommendations for how to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats."

UNITED STATES. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. 2024. 9p.

By C. James Watson , Genevra L. Stone, Daniel L. Overbeek1, Takuyo Chiba & Michele M. Burns

The rules of fair play in sport generally prohibit the use of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)

oversees global antidoping regulations and testing for elite athletes participating in Olympic sports. Efforts to enforce anti doping policies are complicated by the diverse and evolving compounds and strate gies employed by athletes to gain a competitive edge. Now between the uniquely proximate 2021 Tokyo and 2022 Beijing Olympic Games, we discuss WADA’s efforts to prevent PED use during the modern Olympic Games. Then, we review the major PED classes with a focus on pathophysiology, complexities of antidoping testing, and relevant toxicitiies. Providers from diverse practice environments are likely to care for patients using PEDs for a vari ety of reasons and levels of sport; these providers should be aware of common PED classes and their risks.

Journal of Internal Medicine, Volume291, Issue2, 2022

By Abby Chin

At the Olympic Games Rio de Janeiro 2016, world champion and Russian swimmer Yulia Efimova walked into the Olympics Aquatics Stadium not to cheers, but to the sound of boos.2 The crowd, and many athletes, condemned Efimova as a drug-using outcast who should not be allowed to compete in the Games. At the Rio Olympic Games, Efimova was one of seven swimmers from the Russian Federation who were formerly banned from the competition due to previously failed drug tests and the “World Anti-Doping Agency’s investigation into state-sponsored doping.”3 However, after an intense arbitration process, Efimova and her teammates were approved for competition. Efimova’s doping dispute began in 2013 when she received her first positive drug test and served a sixteen-month suspension.4 Next, in 2016, she tested positive for meldonium—the substance at issue for the alleged Russian state-sponsored doping.5 However, because meldonium did not officially become a banned substance until January 2016, many athletes claimed that, although they were no longer actively taking it, they were still testing positive because traces of meldonium were left in their system.6 This left a question about who would decide an athlete’s future competition eligibility after a positive test. While many different agencies were involved, Efimova’s positive drug test came from the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA). A positive test usually leads to a suspension, which athletes can appeal through the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS). However, because the positive test results occurred in an Olympic year—and with the was scrutiny of the entire Russian Olympic Federation—the International Olympic Committee (IOC) would also influence the outcome of the doping investigation.7 In its press release, the IOC stated athletes who had served prior suspensions unrelated to meldonium would be banned.8 If meldonium was the athlete’s first offense, it was up to the individual federations governing each sport to decide the fate of each individual athlete.9 However, the IOC decision conflicted with CAS precedent, which allowed athletes to return to competition with a clean slate after serving their entire suspension for a positive drug test.10 As a result, there was confusion and uncertainty as to whether these Olympic athletes could compete.11 Efimova appealed to the CAS, requesting to be reinstated to compete as she had already served her suspension. The CAS, believing it was inappropriate to ban athletes like Efimova for having already served suspension, granted the appeal.12 Efimova was able to compete in Rio despite the backlash of many other competitors and nations.13 Whether Efimova deserved the backlash, it became clear there was a significant problem with the uncertainty and lack of knowledge as to the appropriate process for punishing athletes who tested positive. Through the different rulings of the three major governing bodies involved, Efimova was placed under rigid scrutiny, in part because people did not understand the disciplinary process, her right to an appeal, and her right to receive relief from her sanction. This Note will examine the effect of the governing bodies, specifically during an Olympic year, on athletes involved in doping disputes and suggest a more streamlined arbitration process for the governing bodies to use when determining the eligibility of athletes in doping disputes. Currently, the arbitration process lacks transparency and efficiency because of the arbitrator selection process, the costs associated with bringing a dispute in front of an appeals panel, and the mandatory nature of arbitration in international sports. Hence, to create more just dispute outcomes, the arbitration process should become more informal, and athletes should be given the option for a final appeal. Section II of this Note discusses the different governing bodies and their processes for dealing with doping disputes. Section III demonstrates how the different governing bodies work around each other when handling disputes. This section also analyzes the positive and negative impacts of the way in which governing bodies work together. Section IV explores Efimova’s doping dispute in depth to provide an example of the arbitration process. Section V specifically describes the current concerns with the CAS arbitration process and ultimately offers a possible solution for a better-streamlined dispute process, such as modifying the current arbitration and arbitrator selection proceedings or allowing for an appeal from a CAS arbitrator decision.

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 33:3 2018]

By Jared Del Rosso

This book titled “Talking About Torture: How Political Discourse Shapes the Debate” by Jared Del Rosso, discusses the political aspects of torture, including the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and the debate surrounding them. The book covers topics such as the torture word, incidents of torture at places like Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, and the use of waterboarding. It also explores the political legacy ofGuantanamo and the transition from enhanced interrogation to the use of drones.

Columbia University Press, 2015, 276 pages

By David Pérez Esparza and Shane D. Johnson and Paul Gill

  Whilst most countries have experienced a crime drop in the last few decades, Mexico experienced a dramatic increase in violent crime since the mid-2000s. In this paper, we test whether the increase in violence observed in Mexico is consistent with theories of crime opportunity. In particular, we explore whether the rise in violence between 1999 and 2011 can be explained by an increase in the availability of illegal weapons (a situational explanation) that resulted from policy changes (and increases in firearms production) in the bordering U.S. Analyses are conducted to test whether changes to U.S. gun policy led to an increase in the production of guns in the U.S., particularly in southern states bordering Mexico. And, if this in turn, led to an increase in the illegal availability of weapons in Mexico, and consequently to an increase in homicide. In addition to examining country-wide trends, we test the theoretical expectation that there was a pattern of distance-decay from the U.S.-Mexican border. Our findings suggest that changes to gun policy in the U.S. did increase the supply of firearms at the Mexican border, which increased opportunities for the trafficking into Mexico. Moreover, that there was a clear association between firearm availability and homicide rates. The analyses are thus consistent with the hypothesis that variation (across space and time) in illegal firearm availability in Mexico provides a parsimonious explanation for the observed variation in state-level homicide rates. These findings are observed after accounting for factors associated with traditional explanations of violence.

London: University College London,  Department of Security and Crime Science , 2019.   55p.  

By Corey Whichard ,  David R. Schaefer , Derek A. Kreager 

   Penologists have long emphasized the importance of studying social relationships among prisoners to understand how people adapt to confinement. Imprisonment causes major shifts in one’s interpersonal relationships, as “imprisonment is a social experience that places offenders in a unique social domain that qualitatively restructures their lives” (Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson 2009:125). Exemplifying this line of thought, seminal studies of prison life from the mid-twentieth century focused on understanding the nature of inmate society, such as its function in mitigating the pains of imprisonment (Sykes 1958), the “prisonization” of new prisoners to the prison’s norms and codes (Clemmer 1940), and the extent to which prison culture is indigenous to the institution (Goffman 1961) versus a product of external forces imported into the prison context (Irwin and Cressey 1962; Jacobs 1977; for a review, see Kreager and Kruttschnitt 2018). Beyond understanding prison informal social order and its origins, several penological traditions clearly implicate social networks as an explanatory mechanism. For example, the “schools of crime” hypothesis proposes that incarceration intensifies criminality by allowing prisoners who are more deeply invested in criminal lifestyles to act as mentors to younger, less experienced peers (Clemmer 1940; Harris, Nakamura, and Bucklen 2018). Similarly, scholars have theorized that incarceration may impact health by exposing prisoners to a cramped social environment that facilitates the diffusion of illness and disease (Johnson and Raphael 2009; Massoglia 2008). In addition, solidarity among incarcerated individuals is believed to be causally related to prison order (DiIulio 1987; Skarbek 2014; Sykes 1958). Given this longstanding interest in prison interpersonal processes (social influence, contagion, cohesion, informal social control), it is surprising how rarely network methods have been applied in carceral contexts  

   Soc Networks. 2022 May ; 69: 170–179. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2019.09.005.