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Posts in National Security Policy
Understanding and Addressing Misinformation About Science (2024)

By K. Viswanath, Tiffany E. Taylor, and Holly G. Rhodes, Editors; Committee on Understanding and Addressing Misinformation About Science; Board on Science Education; Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Our current information ecosystem makes it easier for misinformation about science to spread and harder for people to figure out what is scientifically accurate. Proactive solutions are needed to address misinformation about science, an issue of public concern given its potential to cause harm at individual, community, and societal levels. Improving access to high-quality scientific information can fill information voids that exist for topics of interest to people, reducing the likelihood of exposure to and uptake of misinformation about science. Misinformation is commonly perceived as a matter of bad actors maliciously misleading the public, but misinformation about science arises both intentionally and inadvertently and from a wide range of sources.

NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS. 2024. 409p.

Building a Whole-of-Government Strategy to Address Extreme Heat

WICKERSON, GRACE; BURTON, AUTUMN

The passage that follows includes several links embedded in the original text. From the document: "From August 2023 to March 2024, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) talked with +'85 experts' to source '20 high-demand opportunity areas for ready policy innovation' and '65 policy ideas.' In response, FAS recruited '33 authors to work on +18 policy memos' through our 'Extreme Heat Policy Sprint' from January 2024 to April 2024, 'generating an additional +100 policy recommendations' to address extreme heat. Our experts' full recommendations will be published in April 2024; this report previews key findings. In total, FAS has collected '+165 recommendations for 34 offices and/or agencies.' Key opportunity areas are described below and link out to a set of featured recommendations. The accompanying spreadsheet includes the '165 policy ideas' developed through expert engagement. [...] America is rapidly barreling towards its next hottest summer on record. While we still lack national strategy, states, counties, and cities around the country have taken up the charge of addressing extreme heat in their communities and are experimenting on the fly. [...] While state and local governments can make significant advances, national extreme heat resilience requires a 'whole of government' federal approach, as it intersects health, energy, housing, homeland and national security, international relations, and many more policy domains. The federal government plays a critical role in scaling up heat resilience interventions through research and development, regulations, standards, guidance, funding sources, and other policy levers. 'But what are the transformational policy opportunities for action?'"

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS. JUN, 2024. 34p.

2024 U.S. Federal Elections: The Insider Threat

UNITED STATES. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY; UNITED STATES. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;

From the document: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) prepared this overview to help partners defend against insider threat concerns that could materialize during the 2024 election cycle. For years, federal, state, local, and private sector partners nationwide have worked closely together to support state and local officials in safeguarding election infrastructure from cyber, physical, and insider threats. Because of these efforts, there is no evidence that malicious actors changed, altered, or deleted votes or had any impact on the outcome of elections. Over the past several years, the election infrastructure community has experienced multiple instances of election system access control compromises conducted by insider threats. While there is no evidence that malicious actors impacted election outcomes, it is important that election stakeholders at all levels are aware of the risks posed by insider threats and the steps that they can take to identify and mitigate these threats. This document outlines several recent examples of election security-related insider threats, discusses potential scenarios that could arise during the 2024 election cycle, and provides recommendations for how to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats."

UNITED STATES. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION; UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. 2024. 9p.

Pro-Palestine US Student Protests Nearly Triple in April

HO, BIANCA; DOYLE, KIERAN

From the document: "Pro-Palestine demonstrations involving students in the United States have nearly tripled from 1 to 26 April compared with all of March, ACLED [ [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data]] data show [...]. New York has been one of the main student protest battlegrounds since the Israel-Palestine conflict flared up in and around Gaza last October, and the arrest of more than 100 students at Columbia University in New York around 18 April heralded a new wave of campus demonstrations."

ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT. 2 MAY, 2024. 5p.

Overview of the Impact of GenAI and Deepfakes on Global Electoral Processes

CERVINI, ENZO MARIA LE FEVRE; CARRO, MARÍA VICTORIA

From the document: "Generative Artificial Intelligence's (GenAI) capacity to produce highly realistic images, videos, and text poses a significant challenge, as it can deceive viewers and consumers into accepting artificially generated content as authentic and genuine. This raises concerns about the dissemination of false information, disinformation, and its implications for public trust and democratic processes. Additionally, this phenomenon prompts critical ethical and legal inquiries, including issues surrounding the attribution of authority and accountability for the generated content. [...] This article delves into the impact of generative AI on recent and future political elections. We'll examine how deepfakes and other AI-generated content are used, along with their potential to sway voters. We'll also analyze the strategies various stakeholders are deploying to counter this growing phenomenon."

ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES. 22 MAR, 2024. 44p.

How National Security and Intelligence Institutions Engage with Racialized Communities

By The National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS-TAG)

  The National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS-TAG) was created in 2019 as an independent and external body. Our role is to advise the Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada, and the rest of the national security and intelligence community, on steps to infuse transparency into Canada’s national security policies, programs, and activities in a manner that will increase democratic accountability and public awareness. Throughout our consultations in the past three years, we frequently heard about the trust gap between the country’s national security institutions and Canadians, and in particular with racialized Canadians. This matters: it is essential, in a healthy liberal democracy, for everyone to trust government and its agencies designed to keep us safe. In this context, we decided to focus our third report on the issue of relations between national security and intelligence institutions and racialized communities. We believe that a broad approach to transparency is essential in general – and in particular in national security and intelligence institutions’ relations with racialized communities. At times, these relations have been marred by mistrust and suspicion, and by errors of judgement by these institutions, which impacted communities have perceived as discriminatory. We make a number of recommendations in this report on how national security and intelligence institutions can be more transparent in their engagement with racialized    communities. Engagement can help government understand specific needs, identify local voices, open and build dialogue with them, and build trust and a shared understanding of common challenges. Engagement also provides a bridging function: engagement programs work on behalf of multiple parts of the government, exchanging information with external stakeholders and bringing it back inside the government to – ideally – feed into policy and operational processes. Engagement with racialized communities needs to involve a two-way conversation. As we heard in our consultations, too often engagement involves, in practice, government officials offloading a prepared message and failing to listen to the concerns of stakeholders. Constructive engagement should instead be based on dialogue; government officials should be attuned to the questions and concerns of stakeholders, listen to them, and be prepared and willing to respond. More and better engagement with racialized communities is essential. But for such engagement to be feasible, our outreach sessions made clear that deeper structural challenges in national security and intelligence institutions must be addressed. As such, our report also offers recommendations on these broader issues, notably on how to enhance diversity and inclusion and how to make complaints mechanisms more accessible to racialized and other vulnerable groups. As digitization accelerates, the data-driven dimensions of national security continue to expand at exponential rates. As a result, the national security apparatus is becoming more dependent on algorithmic methodologies and digital tools to gather and process massive data holdings, a reality that the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated. It is clear, however, that systemic biases in Artificial Intelligence (AI) design can have perverse impacts on vulnerable individuals or groups of individuals, notably racialized communities. These biases reflect not only specific flaws in AI programs and organizations using them, but also underlying societal cleavages and inequalities which are then reinforced and potentially deepened. AI that poses a threat to racialized communities further erodes trust in national security and intelligence agencies and prohibits effective relationship building. There is growing agreement that many aspects of openness, oversight, and engagement play a vital role in ensuring accountability and effectiveness in current and future AI deployments.

Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2022. 84pg