By M. H. Cochran (Author), Colin Heston (Introduction)

Michael H. Cochran’s Germany Not Guilty in 1914, published in 1931, stands as a provocative and revisionist challenge to the dominant narrative of German culpability for the outbreak of World War I. Written in response to Bernadotte Schmitt’s influential The Coming of the War, Cochran’s book offers a meticulous critique of the “war guilt” thesis enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles, which placed sole responsibility for the war on Germany. With a foreword by Harry Elmer Barnes and later commentary by Henry Adams, the book is deeply embedded in the interwar historiographical debates that questioned the moral and political foundations of postwar peace settlements.

Published during a period of growing disillusionment with the Versailles Treaty and rising revisionist sentiment in the United States and Europe, Cochran’s work was part of a broader intellectual movement that sought to rehabilitate Germany’s image and challenge the punitive postwar order. While not universally accepted, the book found an audience among scholars and political thinkers who viewed the war guilt clause as unjust and historically flawed. Its reception was mixed—praised for its rigor and boldness, but criticized for its perceived apologetics and selective use of evidence.

In 2025, Germany Not Guilty in 1914 remains relevant not only as a historical artifact but as a lens through which to examine the politics of blame, the construction of historical narratives, and the enduring consequences of diplomatic failure. The evolution from “guilt” to “responsibility” reflects broader changes in how societies understand conflict, justice, and reconciliation. As international law and historical memory continue to intersect—especially in debates over reparations, war crimes, and collective trauma—Cochran’s challenge to the Versailles narrative invites reflection on how history is written, who writes it, and to what ends.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. p.166.

By Harry Elmer Barnes (Author), Colin Heston (Introduction)

Harry Elmer Barnes’s In Quest of Truth and Justice stands as a provocative and enduring challenge to the way history is written, remembered, and weaponized. Published in 1928, the book is a cornerstone of historical revisionism, particularly in its reassessment of the causes and culpability of World War I. Barnes argued that the dominant narrative—one that placed sole blame on Germany—was not only historically inaccurate but also morally unjust. He believed that truth and justice in historical scholarship required a fearless confrontation with political orthodoxy and propaganda, especially when such narratives served the interests of victors and power structures.
Barnes’s work was not merely an academic exercise; it was a moral crusade against what he saw as the corruption of historical truth by political expediency. He insisted that historians must act as independent arbiters of fact, not as servants of state ideology. His critique of the Treaty of Versailles and the war guilt clause was rooted in a broader concern: that distorted history could perpetuate injustice, fuel future conflicts, and undermine democratic accountability.
This ethos—of challenging dominant narratives and seeking justice through historical clarity—finds powerful echoes in today’s global conflicts, particularly in Ukraine and Gaza. Both crises are steeped in competing historical claims, contested identities, and politicized narratives that shape international responses and public opinion.
In both Ukraine and Gaza, Barnes’s legacy invites us to ask uncomfortable questions: Who controls the narrative? Whose history is being told, and whose is being silenced? Are we pursuing truth and justice, or merely reinforcing the power structures of the present?
Ultimately, In Quest of Truth and Justice is not just a historical text—it is a call to intellectual courage. In an age of polarized media, geopolitical propaganda, and moral ambiguity, Barnes’s work reminds us that history is not a weapon to be wielded by the powerful, but a mirror in which societies must confront their own truths. As we grapple with the complexities of Ukraine and Gaza, his message remains urgent: justice begins with honest history.

By Munroe Smith. Introduction by Colin Heston.

When Munroe Smith, the American jurist and scholar of comparative constitutional law, published Militarism and Statecraft in the early twentieth century, the world stood at a threshold. The balance of power in Europe was faltering, national ambitions clashed violently with the ideals of peace and progress, and the question of whether nations could master the destructive temptations of militarism was no longer abstract. It was a pressing reality. Smith’s concern was not simply with armies and weapons, but with the deeper political psychology that drives nations toward war. He sought to expose how the logic of militarism—discipline, hierarchy, and force—could infiltrate civil government, undermining the very statecraft that was supposed to serve reason, justice, and stability.

At the time of its writing, Smith was addressing the dangers of an era when Prussian militarism, the rivalries of empires, and the failure of diplomacy threatened the international order. His work can be read as both analysis and warning: a sober reflection on how the pursuit of military superiority can distort the priorities of states, drawing them away from long-term peace toward short-term domination. For Smith, the central challenge was not only to prepare adequately for defense but also to ensure that the military ethos did not overwhelm civil society and political judgment.

The value of these reflections is not confined to Smith’s age. In 2025, more than a century later, the tension between militarism and statecraft persists, albeit in new forms. The end of the Cold War did not usher in an era of lasting peace, but rather revealed the fragility of international institutions and the persistence of rival nationalisms. Today, the global order is marked by renewed great-power competition, particularly between the United States and China, alongside Russia’s continuing assertiveness in Europe. The conflicts in Ukraine, the South China Sea, and the Middle East remind us that the balance of deterrence and diplomacy remains unstable.

Moreover, the rise of advanced technologies—autonomous weapons systems, cyberwarfare, artificial intelligence in military planning, and the militarization of outer space—has created new arenas where Smith’s questions echo with urgency. If he warned against the creeping influence of military logic on the political state, how much more should we be concerned when the logic of algorithms and machine efficiency begins to shape the most consequential decisions of war and peace? The issue is no longer only about armies marching across borders but about invisible lines of code and satellites in orbit—yet the fundamental danger is the same: that the tools of defense become ends in themselves, driving state policy rather than serving it.

Smith also recognized that militarism poses a danger to the vitality of democratic institutions. In times of insecurity, citizens may surrender too readily to centralized authority, trading liberties for promises of safety. In 2025, as societies grapple with disinformation campaigns, rising authoritarianism, and deep political polarization, Smith’s warning acquires a renewed resonance. The militarization of politics—whether through expanded security states, the rhetoric of perpetual conflict, or the invocation of national emergency—remains a challenge to civic freedom.

What Smith offers, therefore, is not a simple rejection of military power but a call for balance. Statecraft requires prudence, restraint, and a recognition of the limits of force. True security, he suggests, cannot rest on militarism alone, for unchecked military logic corrodes the very foundations of peace. In 2025, as nations navigate the double-edged sword of military innovation and the uncertainty of a multipolar world, his insights invite us to reflect on the perennial dilemma: how can we cultivate security without letting the instruments of war dominate our political imagination?

To read Militarism and Statecraft today is to encounter a voice from another century that speaks to our own. It reminds us that the dilemmas of power, security, and diplomacy are not new, even as the technologies and actors change. Smith’s work urges us to see beyond immediate crises and to measure the costs of militarism not only in battles fought, but in the subtle ways it reshapes our societies, our freedoms, and our possibilities for peace. If the twenty-first century is to avoid the mistakes of the twentieth, it will be by heeding the balance that Smith demanded: a statecraft that governs militarism, rather than a militarism that governs the state.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 151p.

By H. G. Wells. Introduction by Colin Heston

In the wake of the Great War, H.G. Wells’s What Is Coming? A European Forecast emerges not merely as a speculative treatise but as a profound intellectual reckoning with the forces that have shaped—and will continue to shape—the modern world. Written in 1916, at a time when the outcome of the war remained uncertain and its consequences unfathomable, Wells offers a sweeping analysis of the social, political, and economic transformations that the conflict has set in motion. His introduction to the future is not a prophecy in the mystical sense, but a reasoned extrapolation grounded in scientific thinking, historical precedent, and a deep understanding of human nature. Wells does not seek to predict events with precision; rather, he aims to illuminate the trajectories of thought, governance, and collective behavior that will define the post-war era.

In What Is Coming?, Wells does not offer comfort or certainty. He offers clarity, urgency, and a challenge. The future, he insists, will not be shaped by treaties or conferences alone, but by the moral and intellectual evolution of individuals and societies. The war has torn away the veils of tradition and exposed the raw materials of a new world. Whether that world will be built with wisdom or squandered in renewed conflict depends on the choices made in its aftermath. Wells invites his readers to think boldly, act generously, and prepare not just for peace, but for the responsibilities that peace entails.

Read-Me.Org Inc. New York-Philadelphia-Australia. 2025. 177p.

by A. G. R U S S E L.L

● Focus on Race and Colour: The document explores the social and economic implications of racial differentiation, particularly within the British Colonial Empire, emphasizing the practical importance of these issues over physical differences.

● Historical Context: It discusses the historical development of racial issues, including the impact of European expansion and the Industrial Revolution on race relations.

● Colonial Exploitation: The text highlights the economic exploitation of colonies, particularly in Africa, and the profits made by European companies at the expense of native labor.

● Educational Challenges: The document addresses the educational disparities faced by colonized peoples and critiques the Western educational system for its failure to adequately serve these populations.

London. Gollancz. 1944. 273p.

By C. James Watson , Genevra L. Stone, Daniel L. Overbeek1, Takuyo Chiba & Michele M. Burns

The rules of fair play in sport generally prohibit the use of performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)

oversees global antidoping regulations and testing for elite athletes participating in Olympic sports. Efforts to enforce anti doping policies are complicated by the diverse and evolving compounds and strate gies employed by athletes to gain a competitive edge. Now between the uniquely proximate 2021 Tokyo and 2022 Beijing Olympic Games, we discuss WADA’s efforts to prevent PED use during the modern Olympic Games. Then, we review the major PED classes with a focus on pathophysiology, complexities of antidoping testing, and relevant toxicitiies. Providers from diverse practice environments are likely to care for patients using PEDs for a vari ety of reasons and levels of sport; these providers should be aware of common PED classes and their risks.

Journal of Internal Medicine, Volume291, Issue2, 2022

By Abby Chin

At the Olympic Games Rio de Janeiro 2016, world champion and Russian swimmer Yulia Efimova walked into the Olympics Aquatics Stadium not to cheers, but to the sound of boos.2 The crowd, and many athletes, condemned Efimova as a drug-using outcast who should not be allowed to compete in the Games. At the Rio Olympic Games, Efimova was one of seven swimmers from the Russian Federation who were formerly banned from the competition due to previously failed drug tests and the “World Anti-Doping Agency’s investigation into state-sponsored doping.”3 However, after an intense arbitration process, Efimova and her teammates were approved for competition. Efimova’s doping dispute began in 2013 when she received her first positive drug test and served a sixteen-month suspension.4 Next, in 2016, she tested positive for meldonium—the substance at issue for the alleged Russian state-sponsored doping.5 However, because meldonium did not officially become a banned substance until January 2016, many athletes claimed that, although they were no longer actively taking it, they were still testing positive because traces of meldonium were left in their system.6 This left a question about who would decide an athlete’s future competition eligibility after a positive test. While many different agencies were involved, Efimova’s positive drug test came from the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA). A positive test usually leads to a suspension, which athletes can appeal through the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS). However, because the positive test results occurred in an Olympic year—and with the was scrutiny of the entire Russian Olympic Federation—the International Olympic Committee (IOC) would also influence the outcome of the doping investigation.7 In its press release, the IOC stated athletes who had served prior suspensions unrelated to meldonium would be banned.8 If meldonium was the athlete’s first offense, it was up to the individual federations governing each sport to decide the fate of each individual athlete.9 However, the IOC decision conflicted with CAS precedent, which allowed athletes to return to competition with a clean slate after serving their entire suspension for a positive drug test.10 As a result, there was confusion and uncertainty as to whether these Olympic athletes could compete.11 Efimova appealed to the CAS, requesting to be reinstated to compete as she had already served her suspension. The CAS, believing it was inappropriate to ban athletes like Efimova for having already served suspension, granted the appeal.12 Efimova was able to compete in Rio despite the backlash of many other competitors and nations.13 Whether Efimova deserved the backlash, it became clear there was a significant problem with the uncertainty and lack of knowledge as to the appropriate process for punishing athletes who tested positive. Through the different rulings of the three major governing bodies involved, Efimova was placed under rigid scrutiny, in part because people did not understand the disciplinary process, her right to an appeal, and her right to receive relief from her sanction. This Note will examine the effect of the governing bodies, specifically during an Olympic year, on athletes involved in doping disputes and suggest a more streamlined arbitration process for the governing bodies to use when determining the eligibility of athletes in doping disputes. Currently, the arbitration process lacks transparency and efficiency because of the arbitrator selection process, the costs associated with bringing a dispute in front of an appeals panel, and the mandatory nature of arbitration in international sports. Hence, to create more just dispute outcomes, the arbitration process should become more informal, and athletes should be given the option for a final appeal. Section II of this Note discusses the different governing bodies and their processes for dealing with doping disputes. Section III demonstrates how the different governing bodies work around each other when handling disputes. This section also analyzes the positive and negative impacts of the way in which governing bodies work together. Section IV explores Efimova’s doping dispute in depth to provide an example of the arbitration process. Section V specifically describes the current concerns with the CAS arbitration process and ultimately offers a possible solution for a better-streamlined dispute process, such as modifying the current arbitration and arbitrator selection proceedings or allowing for an appeal from a CAS arbitrator decision.

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 33:3 2018]

HO, BIANCA; DOYLE, KIERAN

From the document: "Pro-Palestine demonstrations involving students in the United States have nearly tripled from 1 to 26 April compared with all of March, ACLED [ [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data]] data show [...]. New York has been one of the main student protest battlegrounds since the Israel-Palestine conflict flared up in and around Gaza last October, and the arrest of more than 100 students at Columbia University in New York around 18 April heralded a new wave of campus demonstrations."

ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT. 2 MAY, 2024. 5p.

By Linda Maizels

Following the October 7 Hamas attack, some parts of the left not only blamed Israel for the aggression, but also expressed hostility toward Jewish supporters of Israel because of their assumed privilege.

• This type of animosity is not new. It began during the 1960s and 70s, especially after the Jewish State’s victories over a coalition of Arab nations in the 1967 War, and it can be linked to the ideology of some parts of the New Left, which included recurring attempts to link Israel with European colonialism and Jews with whiteness and privilege.

• Analysts of the period responded to these tactics by describing a “new antisemitism” that illustrated the parallels between hostility towards Israel’s legitimacy as a state and hostility toward the authenticity of the American Jewish community as a minority ethnic group.

• In the 1980s and 1990s, the focus of the political left trended toward promoting multiculturalism and diversity. This tolerance was not all-inclusive, however, and the animosity toward Israel demonstrated by some factions within the left was coupled with hostility toward Jews, who were seen not only as white and privileged, but also as a particularly malicious example of some of the worst elements of whiteness.

• Against the backdrop of the second intifada and the rise in violence that characterized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the opening years of the 21st century, vocal factions of the left on American college and university campuses labeled Israel a racist and illegitimate state founded through settler colonialism and fueled by apartheid.

• At the same time, Jews were denigrated both for supporting Israel and for their supposed white privilege.

• Critics claimed that these attacks on Israel, Zionism, and Jews often crossed the line into antisemitism. They also pointed out a seeming double standard in which hostile rhetoric toward Jews – whether it was connected to Israel or to whiteness – was framed as protected political speech, while hateful language towards other minority identity groups was more likely to be condemned and silenced.

• The conclusion of this analysis is that some elements of the left have deep, serious, and systemic issues, not only with Israel but also with Jews.

  Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism. 2024, 23pg