By The Anti-Defamation League, Center on Extremism

Extremists are using online crowdfunding platforms like GiveSendGo and GoFundMe to raise millions of dollars for their ideologically driven activities. Through crowdfunding, extremists have generated at least $6,246,072 from 324 campaigns between 2016 and mid-2022. Extremist campaigns found on these platforms espouse hateful rhetoric including antisemitism, white supremacy, QAnon conspiracies and anti-LGBTQ+ extremism, as well as rhetoric from antisemitic sects of Black Hebrew Israelites. Crowdfunding campaigns have been used by extremists to fund direct actions and attacks on their perceived enemies or marginalized communities; legal defenses for extremists who face consequences for these actions; propaganda efforts and other expenses.

New York: ADL, 2023. 42p.

By Marc-Andre Argentino; Jessica Davis; Tore Refslund Hamming

This workbook teaches researchers, analysts and practitioners how different sorts of terrorist and violent extremist actors utilise financial technologies and cryptocurrencies to finance their operations. The process of terrorist adoption of financial technologies is spelled out for various organisations and can assist analysts to estimate whether and when a group or terrorist actor would embrace a financial technology or cryptocurrency. The workbook also includes terms that may be used to search information holdings for terrorist adoption of cryptocurrencies or financial technologies, offering early warning of terrorist adoption. • Most terrorist organisations, cells and individuals gradually embrace new technology, tactics, strategies and processes. Finance is more confined by external constraints than other areas of potential innovation and adaptation, hence few organisations or entities actually innovate in finance. • Most terrorist actors are bound by financial and economic institutions, making terrorist financing difficult to innovate. Structures control them. Thus, terrorist finance patterns and approaches are better regarded as adaptation and learning rather than innovation. • When economic and financial systems evolve, most terrorists adapt to new financing methods. Terrorists employ financial technologies and cryptocurrencies when they are convenient and widely used. Until then, motivated individuals or cells can innovate, but groups or more established cells or organisations seldom adopt new financing methods early.

London: National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center; and International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. 2023. 44p.

By J.M. Berger

The Turner Diaries, the infamous racist dystopian novel by neo-Nazi William Luther Pierce, has inspired more than 200 murders since its publication in 1978, including the single deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, the Oklahoma City bombing. The book is arguably the most important single work of white nationalist propaganda in the English language, but it is not a singular artifact. The Turner Diaries is part of a genre of racist dystopian propaganda dating back to the U.S. Civil War. This paper will document the books that directly and indirectly inspired Turner and examine the extensive violence that the novel has inspired. By comparing and contrasting The Turner Diaries to its less-remembered predecessors, this paper analyses the reasons for the novel’s lasting impact, including its focus on rational choices over identity choices, its simplification of white nationalist ideology, its repeated calls to action, and the powerfully persuasive nature of dystopian narratives, which can be understood as a secular analogue for religious apocalyptic texts.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 50p.

By Sarah L. Carthy, Colm B. Doody, Katie Cox, Denis O'Hora, Kiran M. Sarma

In the field of terrorism research, the violent radicalisation of individuals towards perpetrating acts of terror has been the subject of academic enquiry for some time. One core focus by social scientists has been the role of narratives in this process. Narratives have the ability to present a socially constructed version of reality which serves the interest of the narrator(s). In the context of terrorism, by depicting violence as a viable antidote to individual vulnerabilities, the narratives purported for propagandistic purposes have the potential to thwart perceptions of instrumentality (a key characteristic of violent radicalisation). In order to prevent this from happening, researchers and counter-terrorism practitioners have increasingly sought to explore the potential for counter-narratives; targeted interventions that challenge the rationalisation(s) of violence purported in dominant narratives which, in turn, reconstructs the story. However, there is overwhelming consensus in both government and academic spheres that the concept of the counter-narrative is underdeveloped and, to date, there has been no synthesis of its effectiveness at targeting violent radicalisation-related outcomes.

The objective of this review was to provide a synthesis of the effectiveness of counter-narratives in reducing the risk of violent radicalisation.

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume16, Issue3 September 2020. 37p.

By Julie Emmelkamp, Jessica J. Asscher, Inge B. Wissink, Geert Jan J.M. Stams

Juveniles who become radicalized pose a great threat for society. Although research on radicalization is accumulating, a quantitative review of risk factors for youth radicalization is lacking. Therefore, a series of metaanalyses were conducted on k = 30 studies (247 effect sizes) to examine risk factors for radicalization in youth, yielding significant effects for 15 out of 17 risk domains, ranging in magnitude from r = 0.080 to r = 0.482. Medium positive effects were found for activism, perceived in-group superiority and perceived distance to other people, while small effects were found for gender, personality, delinquency and aggression, lower educational level, negative peers, in-group identification, perceived discrimination, perceived group threat, perceived procedural injustice, perceived illegitimacy of authorities, and other, whereas the effect for poverty was very small. Moderator analyses showed that the risks of negative parenting and societal disconnection were smaller for right-wing radicalization than for religious or unspecified radicalization. The risks of personality and perceived group threat were greater for willingness to carry out extremist acts and extremist behavior than for attitude towards radicalization. Further, when the percentage of ethnic minorities in the sample increased, the risks of personality, negative parenting, and societal disconnection for radicalization were larger.

Aggression and Violent Behavior, 55, [101489].

By Sara Zeiger and Joseph Gyte

In the age of selfies, snaps, likes and shares, the internet and social media have transformed the way in which people communicate. In early 2019, global internet penetration reached 57%, or 4.4 billion users, and the overall number of mobile social media users reached 42%, or 3.2 billion people.1 This means that people are able to share ideas, communicate and interact more rapidly than ever before, including with audiences on the other side of the world. Terrorist groups have certainly leveraged these new mechanisms and platforms for communicating amongst themselves and to potential recruits. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) has been known for producing sleek videos circulated on YouTube and Twitter, and has mastered new and emerging technologies and social media platforms, such as Telegram; all to promote its messages and recruit new members in cyberspace. This chapter focuses on the prevention of radicalization on social media and the internet in this digital age. It first reviews the relevant methods and approaches that terrorists employ to spread their propaganda and recruit online. Subsequently, it looks at some of the more common and emerging prevention and preparedness strategies which address the online space. Besides reviewing the theoretical foundations to prevent radicalization on social media and the internet, this chapter will also draw upon specific examples, predominantly from three regions: Europe, Southeast Asia and East Africa, to illustrate what some countries are doing to tackle the problem of online radicalization.

From: International Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, 2023. 38p.

By Arthur Bradley and Deeba Shadnia: Tech Against Extremism

This paper analyzes the use of terrorist and violent extremist (TVE) operated websites and platforms on the Domain Name System (DNS), as part of a multi-platform approach within terrorist exploitation of the internet. In particular, this paper situates the resurgent exploitation of internet infrastructure within the context of improved content moderation by tech companies, and a growing trend of terrorist and violent extremist dispersion across more niche online platforms, where the audience reach of these actors is limited. This paper considers how terrorist and violent extremist actors could respond to industry improvements in content removal policies on websites and self-operated platforms on the surface web, including potential migration to decentralized web hosting technologies and the dark web. It argues that counter-terrorism practitioners, researchers, governments, and the tech sector should pay more attention to terrorist and violent extremist operated websites and platforms, after several years of focusing on the exploitation of social media and messaging platforms used by the wider general public.

Washington, DC: Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2022. 26p.

Michael Wolfowicz, Gian Maria Campedelli, Amber Seaward and Paul Gill

While countries differ significantly in how they handle terrorism, in the west, criminal justice systems tend to treat terrorism similar to other crime, with police, prosecutors, judges and courts, and penal systems carrying out similar functions of investigations, apprehension, charging, convicting, and overseeing punishments respectively. While there is a robust literature on deterrent effects for crime, there is a dearth of research when it comes to terrorism. This despite evidence of significant overlaps between crime and terrorism. We address this gap in the literature with a unique dataset covering terrorism offending, arrests, charges, convictions, and sentencing over 16 years in 28 EU-member states. Applying a dynamic panel data model, we find that the probability of apprehension and punishment has an inverse relationship with terrorism offending. Conversely, the rate of charged individuals is associated with a small increase in the terrorism offending rate. The results for sentence length are less clear, with either negligible, or small iatrogenic effects. The results demonstrate that the overlap between crime and terrorism may extend to general deterrence. These findings should be informative for both the research agenda and policy discussion.

PREPRINT - 2023. 16p.

By Yael Litmanovitz, David Weisburd, Badi Hasisi, and Michael Wolfowicz

Perhaps one of the most pressing issues facing the world today is that of the threat of radicalization and terrorism. Whilst terrorism affects almost every country in the world to some extent, the threat of terrorism has increased exponentially in democratic and semi-democratic countries (especially the OECD). The most current figures state that OECD countries experienced a 650% increase in terrorism related deaths between 2014 and 2015, with many of the attacks having been linked to or inspired by the Islamic State (ISIS) (GTI, 2016). The last year has been witness to many high-profile attack in Europe, namely in Paris and Brussels. There have also been a significant number of attacks which were foiled by intelligence and security services (Europol, 2016; MFA, 2016). Terrorism affects us in many ways, not only causing death and destruction but also having negative impacts on health (Holman et-al, 2008; Deboutte, 2016), economy (Eldor & Melnik, 2004), society (Waxman, 2011) and politics (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman, 1993; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Williams et-al, 2013). Economically, there has been a steady increase in the cost of terrorism over the last decade. For example, terrorism has significant effects on markets and tourism in countries affected by it (Sandler & Enders, 2008; Thompson, 2011; Baker, 2014). The GTI (2016) estimates that in 2015 alone the cost of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion, up from US$52.9 billion in 2014 (GTI, 2015). Certainly, the impacts of terrorism are far reaching and in a sense, difficult to quantify (GTI, 2014).

Oslo: Campbell Collaboration, 2017. 23p.

By Ritzmann, Alexander

From the document: "This study demonstrates that several violence-oriented right-wing extremist (VRWE) individuals and groups in Europe and the U.S. engage in or maintain ties with organized crime (OC). Many of the identified cases have a transnational dimension, for example, through cross border activities like the acquisition of illegal drugs for distribution or parallel memberships in VRWE and transnational OC groups. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, VRWE-affiliated football hooligan groups, white supremacist prison gangs and a range of other VRWE individuals and groups are part of such transnational networks which are particularly visible in Austria, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the United States. The linkages between VRWE and OC are multifaceted and vary in intensity, ranging from mere operational contacts to supply illegal materials to a full-scale transformation of VRWE structures into OC structures that follow an RWE ideology."

Washington DC. Counter Extremism Project. 2023. 139p.

By Alex Schmid

From the introduction: The need for a Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness needs little explanation in the light of the fact that the dominant approach of counterterrorism, based largely on heavy-handed military action, has been such a failure - especially in the Middle East. The traditional military instrument of deterrence has not worked against enemies who have, in most cases, no fixed territorial basis while claiming to love death more than life. The decapitation of terrorist organizations by killing their leaders in drone strikes has created martyrs rather than broken their organization’s will to fight. The collateral damage of military strikes has often turned family members, friends and other witnesses near and far into avengers. For many societies, the “cure” of militarized counterterrorism has been worse than the “disease” of terrorism.

Netherlands. The Hauge.ICCT Press. 2021.

By Alex P. Schmid

From the Introduction: While “terrorism” is one of the most widely used terms in adversarial political discourse, there is still no international consensus about its exact meaning.1 The discussion about the definition of terrorism has been going on for more than half a century and has led to a large number of publications (see bibliography at the end). The purpose of this article is to revisit and review some conceptual approaches in academia, government and international organisations to enable the reader to familiarise her-/himself with the current state of affairs, building on, and expanding, some of the author’s previous conceptual work.

Netherlands. The Hague. ICCT. March 2023. 50p.

By United States. Government Accountability Office

From the document: "Prior to and during the events of January 6, 2021, federal, state, and local entities were responsible for identifying and sharing information on potential threats to inform security measures and ensure the safety of the U.S. Capitol. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review the January 6, 2021 attack. This is the seventh in a series of reports and addresses (1) how federal agencies identified threats related to the events of January 6, 2021; (2) the extent to which federal agencies took steps to process and share threat information prior to the events of January 6, 2021; and (3) how federal agencies identified threat information for the events of January 6, 2021 compared to other large demonstrations in Washington, D.C. [...] In the January 2023 report, GAO made 10 recommendations to five agencies to, for example, assess internal control deficiencies related to processing or sharing information. The agencies concurred with the recommendations."

Washington DC. nited States. Government Accountability Office. 2023. 122p.

By United States. White House Office

From the document: "The United States has made significant progress toward achieving the President's affirmative vision for a digitally-enabled future, but emerging trends are creating both new opportunities for further advancement and new challenges to overcome. Malicious actors threaten our progress toward a digital ecosystem that is inclusive, equitable, promotes prosperity, and aligns with our democratic values. […] Deep and enduring collaboration between stakeholders across our digital ecosystem will be the foundation upon which we make it more inherently defensible, resilient, and aligned with U.S. values. This strategy seeks to build and enhance collaboration around five pillars: (1) Defend Critical Infrastructure, (2) Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors, (3) Shape Market Forces to Drive Security and Resilience, (4) Invest in a Resilient Future, and (5) Forge International Partnerships to Pursue Shared Goals. Each effort requires unprecedented levels of collaboration across its respective stakeholder communities, including the public sector, private industry, civil society, and international allies and partners. The pillars organizing this strategy articulate a vision of shared purpose and priorities for these communities, highlight challenges they face in achieving this vision, and identify strategic objectives around which to organize their efforts. To realize the vision these pillars lay out, we will make 'two fundamental shifts' in how the United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace. In realizing these shifts, we aspire not just to improve our defenses, but to change those underlying dynamics that currently contravene our interests."

United States. White House. 2023. 39p.

By United States. Government Accountability Office

From the document: "Domestic terrorism investigations have more than doubled since 2020, according to the FBI. FBI and DHS are the main federal entities charged with preventing terrorist attacks in the U.S. FBI has lead responsibility for federal domestic terrorism investigations and domestic intelligence efforts. DHS is responsible for producing terrorist threat information in coordination with federal, state and local government agencies, and private entities. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review domestic terrorism threats, incidents, and related federal cases and charges. This report addresses, among other objectives, the extent to which the FBI and DHS I&A [Office of Intelligence and Analysis] (1) track domestic terrorism investigations and incidents, and (2) followed leading collaboration practices in their efforts to counter domestic terrorism threats."

United States. Government Accountability Office. Report Number .GAO-23-104720. 2023.

By Tapia, Daniel; Warren, Kristin; Burns, Jacqueline Gardner; Holynska, Khrystyna; Reimer, Jordan R.

From the document: "Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism is becoming an increasingly common occurrence in the United States. Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE)-related terrorism has consequences beyond loss of life: It undermines the sense of safety that targeted groups feel in their country and unravels the social fabrics of trust that are necessary for society to function. Further still, REMVE attacks can motivate other like-minded attackers to follow up with their own attacks, as was apparently the case with the May 14, 2022, mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, by a self-avowed, internet-radicalized white supremacist whose manifesto drew heavily from the March 15, 2019, Christchurch mosque mass shootings, which also inspired a mass shooting in El Paso, Texas. Two key challenges for those who observe online spaces in which radicalization occurs are the sheer volume of data and the idiosyncrasies of online communities. Website-specific language and memes are difficult to track and parse; even if emerging terms are detected, defining them can be difficult."

Rand Corp. 2023. 102p.

By Haydar Karaman

All terrorist groups need finance to operate. It is a means for certain groups to accomplish their objectives; for others, it is the aims itself per se. Terrorist groups are therefore involved in different levels of organized crime. One of them is illicit drug trafficking, which has a nexus with organized crime and terrorist groups. This study aims to demonstrate a better understanding of the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) evolution into an organized criminal organization and its funding sources. From this point of view, the PKK is classified as a narco-terrorist organization with strong financial motives in this paper. As it will be analyzed on paper, its financial motivations frequently have weighed in the same level as its political motivation. It began to act as a hybrid organization through transnational offences, and it has steadily strengthened its criminal capabilities. Its members retain their deceptive political rhetoric to perform their illegal operations more easily. The organization can also be defined as a hybrid transnational organized crime group by UN standards, given the severity of its crimes and its criminal network spanning the Middle East, Turkey, and Europe    

Manas Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, 10(4), 2513-2527. 2021. 15p.

By Leonard Cole and Nancy D. Connell

Local Planning for Terror and Disaster gives voice to experts in key fields involved with local preparedness, assessing the quality of preparedness in each field, and offering directions for improvement. Introductory chapters provide overviews of terror medicine, security and communications, which are indispensable to successful preparedness, while subsequent chapters concentrate on a particular field and how responders from that field communicate and interact with others during and after an event. Thus, a chapter by a physician discusses not only the doctor's role but how that role is, or should be, coordinated with emergency medical technicians and police. Similarly, chapters by law enforcement figures also review police responsibilities and interactions with nurses, EMTs, volunteers and other relevant responders.

Developed from topics at recent Symposia on Terror Medicine and Security, Local Planning also encompasses aspects of emergency and disaster medicine, as well as techniques for diagnosis, rescue, coordination and security that are distinctive to a terrorist attack. Each chapter also includes a case study that demonstrates preparedness, or lack thereof, for a real or hypothetical event, including lessons learned, next steps, and areas for improvement in this global era which increasingly calls for preparedness at a local level.

ISBN: 978-1-118-11286-1 October 2012 Wiley-Blackwell 274 Pages

By Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman

Given that the war on terror is currently being fought the way crime typically is―after the fact―this country cannot protect its citizens from future terrorist events solely in this way. Instead, measures must be taken to actually stop terrorists before they can attack. Here, the authors argue that government anti-terrorism policy must pay much more attention to reducing opportunities for terrorist attacks by protecting vulnerable targets, controlling the tools and weapons used by terrorists, and removing the conditions of everyday life that make these attacks possible. While some of this work is being done on an ad hoc basis, there are no recognized methods to guide the work, there is limited experience on which to draw, and the government has no trained professionals to oversee the work. In this book, the authors address these deficiencies, and lay out a systematic approach for reducing opportunities for terrorism.

The current take-them-out mindset may be the main reason why reducing opportunities for terrorism has been so neglected by governments, but another important reason is that the task seems so overwhelmingly difficult. How can we possibly protect every vulnerable target or person? How can we control all the everyday tools that terrorists must use in carrying out their attacks? How can we control their weapons when we cannot even keep guns out the hands of ordinary criminals? In this book, the authors show that these tasks are indeed manageable.

Westport, Conn. Praeger. 2006. 308p.

By Paul Azan

Military history texts discuss the historical record of armed conflict in the history of humanity, its impact on people, societies, and their cultures. Some fundamental subjects of military history study are the causes of war, its social and cultural foundations, military doctrines, logistics, leadership, technology, strategy, and tactics used, and how these have developed over time. Thematic divisions of military history may include: Ancient warfare, Medieval warfare, Gunpowder warfare, Industrial warfare, and Modern warfare.

Military strategy texts present ideas for military organizations to achieve their desired strategic goals. Military strategy discusses the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and how to deceive the enemy. Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), defined military strategy as "the employment of battles to gain the end of war." B. H. Liddell Hart defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy", which places more emphasis on political aims relative to military goals. Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) is the father of Eastern military strategy and greatly influenced Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese war tactics. His book The Art of War has been very popular and has seen practical implementation in Western societies.

Cambridge. Harvard university Press. 1917. 183p.