By Ellicott C. Matthay, Ariana N. Gobaud, Charles C. Branas, Katherine M. Keyes, Brita Roy, Magdalena Cerdá

  BACKGROUND: Firearm violence remains a leading cause of death and injury in the United States. Prior research supports that alcohol exposures, including individual-level alcohol use and alcohol control policies, are modifiable risk factors for firearm violence, yet additional research is needed to support prevention efforts. OBJECTIVES: This scoping review aims to update a prior 2016 systematic review on the links between alcohol exposure and firearm violence to examine whether current studies indicate causal links between alcohol use, alcohol interventions, and firearm violence-related outcomes. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA: Following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses Extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) guidelines, a comprehensive search of published studies was conducted, replicating the search strategy of the prior review but focusing on studies published since 2015. The review included published studies of humans, conducted in general populations of any age, gender, or racial/ethnic group, that examined the relationship between an alcohol-related exposure and an outcome involving firearm violence or risks for firearm violence. Excluded were small studies restricted to special populations, forensic or other technical studies, non-original research articles such as reviews, and studies that relied solely on descriptive statistics or did not adjust for confounders. SOURCES OF EVIDENCE: The review included published studies indexed in PubMed, Web of Science, and Scopus. Eligible articles were published on or after January 1, 2015. The latest search was conducted on December 15, 2023. CHARTING METHODS: Using a structured data collection instrument, data were extracted on the characteristics of each study, including the dimension of alcohol exposure, the dimension of firearm violence, study population, study design, statistical analysis, source of funding, main findings, and whether effect measure modification was assessed and, if so, along what dimensions. Two authors independently conducted title/abstract screening, full-text screening, and data extraction until achieving 95% agreement, with discrepancies resolved through discussion. RESULTS: The search yielded 797 studies. Of these, 754 were excluded and 43 met the final inclusion criteria. Studies addressed a range of alcohol exposures and firearm violence-related outcomes, primarily with crosssectional study designs; 40% considered effect measure modification by any population characteristic. Findings from the 21 studies examining the relationship of individual-level alcohol use or alcohol use disorder (AUD) with firearm ownership, access, unsafe storage, or carrying indicated a strong and consistent positive association. Seven studies examined associations of individual-level alcohol use or AUD with firearm injury or death; these also indicated a pattern of positive associations, but the magnitude and precision of the estimates varied. Eight studies examined the impact of neighborhood proximity or density of alcohol outlets and found mixed results that were context- and study design-dependent. Two studies linked prior alcohol-related offenses to increased risk of firearm suicide and perpetration of violent firearm crimes among a large cohort of people who purchased handguns, and two studies linked policies prohibiting firearm access among individuals with a history of alcohol-related offenses to reductions in firearm homicide and suicide. Finally, four studies examined alcohol control policies and found that greater restrictiveness was generally associated with reductions in firearm homicide or firearm suicide. CONCLUSIONS: Findings from this scoping review continue to support a causal relationship between alcohol exposures and firearm violence that extends beyond acute alcohol use to include AUD and alcohol-related policies. Policies controlling the availability of alcohol and prohibiting firearm access among individuals with alcohol-related offense histories show promise for the prevention of firearm violence. Additional research examining differential impacts by population subgroup, alcohol use among perpetrators of firearm violence, policies restricting alcohol outlet density, and randomized or quasi-experimental study designs with longitudinal follow-up would further support inferences to inform prevention efforts.

Alcohol Research: Current Reviews,  2025;45(1):01, 29p.

ByJoe Whittaker, Elizabeth Pearson, Ashley A Mattheis, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, Maura Conway

Drawing from interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers, this article provides an empirical analysis of these researchers’ experiences with institutional ethics processes. Discussed are the harms that these researchers face in the course of their work, including trolling, doxing, and mental and emotional trauma arising from exposure to terrorist content, which highlight the need for an emphasis on researcher welfare. We find that researcher welfare is a neglected aspect of ethics review processes however, with most interviewees not required to gain ethics approval for their research resulting in very little attention to researcher welfare issues. Interviewees were frustrated with ethics processes, indicating that committees oftentimes lacked the requisite knowledge to make informed ethical decisions. Highlighted by interviewees too was a concern that greater emphasis on researcher welfare could result in blockages to their ‘risky’ research, creating a ‘Catch 22’: interviewees would like more emphasis on their (and colleagues’) welfare and provision of concomitant supports, but feel that increased oversight would make gaining ethics approval for their research more difficult, or even impossible. We offer suggestions for breaking the impasse, including more interactions between ethics committees and researchers; development of tailored guidelines; and more case studies reflecting on ethics processes.

New Media & Society Online First, February 28, 2025

By Irfan Idris and Kusumasari Ayuningtyas

The ideological influence of Jemaah Islamiyah continues to be a threat to security even after its disbandment in June 2024. Some of its former members may align with other extremist groups, while others may seek to operate as lone-wolf terrorists. The possibility of JI’s former members transitioning into lone wolf actors stems from the enduring power of its ideology and indoctrination process.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025, 3p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

The concept of asabiyya – group solidarity – originally articulated by Ibn Khaldun, has been hijacked by extremist groups in Southeast Asia to create division and promote radical ideologies. Reclaiming asabiya is crucial, redefining it as a tool for social cohesion and unity by drawing on cultural values that foster mutual respect and collective responsibility. Regional cooperation and digital counter-narratives are essential in countering extremism and fostering long-term peace in the region.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By Annelies Pauwels and Merlina Herbach

This policy brief examines the methods of firearms acquisition by right-wing extremists (RWEs) in Europe between 2019 and 2024. Based on a dataset of 118 cases, it reveals that RWEs resort to diverse legal and illegal acquisition strategies, including the use of illicit markets, legal possession, theft from military and law enforcement sources, and private manufacture, particularly 3D printing. The policy brief further discusses current EU countermeasures and their effectiveness in addressing RWE-specific acquisition methods. It identifies gaps in existing policies and enforcement, particularly regarding background checks in issuing and reviewing weapon licences, screening of military and law enforcement personnel, and regulation of emerging technologies like 3D printing. The authors call for further research to increase the understanding of the RWE-firearms nexus and to develop more targeted prevention strategies.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2024, 30p.

By:Robin Joy and Monica Weeber

Domestic violence is a national and Vermont public health crisis. The Vermont Department of Health estimates that up to 16% of adult Vermonters have experienced either fear, control, or violence at the hands of an intimate partner. In Vermont, a victim may seek a Relief from Abuse Order (RFA) in the Family Division of Superior Court. As part of the process, the victim may also request that a defendant relinquish their firearms. This study examines general case processing statistics for RFAs, how often firearm relinquishment is requested, and if granted, who is the designated holder of the weapons. The report also documents the processes related to serving orders and storing and returning weapons. Methods Researchers worked with the Vermont Judiciary to create an extract of RFA cases to answer quantitative questions. They also conducted interviews with court personnel, police officers, and licensed firearms dealers. Findings • Bennington County has the highest rate of disposed RFA dockets per 1,000 of the population. Chittenden County has the lowest. • Seventy percent of denied temporary orders are not pursued to final orders. • Fifty-eight percent of all requested temporary orders are granted. • Most RFAs (59%) are between parties who are current or former household members. • Women are overrepresented as plaintiffs (74%) as compared to the general population. Men are overrepresented as defendants (75.8%). • The Judiciary does not record in the case management system whether a request to relinquish was made by the plaintiff. • The rate of relinquishment orders mirrors the estimated firearm ownership rates. • Essex and Orange Counties had the highest rate of firearm relinquishment orders. • Bennington and Rutland Counties has the lowest rate of firearm relinquishment orders. • Temporary RFAs with a relinquishment order are more likely to continue to a final hearing. Recommendations This is the first report on RFA and firearm relinquishment data in Vermont and the first report outlining the relinquishment and storage process. Based on the information CRG has developed suggestions for practice, policy, and further research 

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2024. 22p.

By Thomas Wojciechowski

This study sought to examine the relationship between neighborhood disorder and perceptions of gun access. Further, this study focused on determining whether or not antisocial peer affiliation mediates this relationship.MethodsThe Pathways to Desistance data were analyzed. This is an 11-wave longitudinal study following 1,354 justice-involved youth across seven years post-adjudication. Generalized structural equation modeling was used to assess direct and indirect relationships of interest.ResultsGreater levels of neighborhood disorder were associated with increased perceptions of access to guns in the community. Affiliation with antisocial peers significantly mediated this relationship, accounting for about 15% of this relationship.ConclusionsAffiliation with antisocial peers may be greater in disordered neighborhoods and they may facilitate access to guns for youth living in such communities. Mentoring programs for youth living in disordered communities may have some capacity for attenuating this relationship.

Published in Injury, 2024 Aug;55(8):111701, 20p. 

By Piotr Bąkowski

Faced with a persistent terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an increasingly ambitious role in counter-terrorism. While primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation, as well as financial support, to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, awareness of the connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond Union borders. EU spending on counter-terrorism has increased over the years, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security and justice, such as Europol, eu-LISA and Eurojust. The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted in recent years focus, among other things, on harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, sharing information and data, protecting borders, countering terrorist financing and regulating firearms. However, implementing and evaluating the various measures is a challenging task. The European Parliament has played an active role not only in shaping legislation, but also in evaluating existing tools and gaps through the work accomplished by its Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR) in 2018. In line with the Parliament's recommendations, as well as the priorities set by the European Commission and its counter-terrorism agenda presented in December 2020, EU counter-terrorism action has focused on doing more to anticipate threats, counter radicalisation, and reduce vulnerabilities by making critical infrastructures more resilient and improving the protection of public spaces. The EU will also continue to address the online dimension of various forms of extremism, in line with the regulations on dissemination of terrorist content online and on the provision of digital services in the EU. This briefing updates an earlier one, entitled Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy, published in 2023.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2025. 12p.

By Alana Ford

An examination of the threat of disinformation and cognitive warfare in the Indo-Pacific, the brief unpacks how these tactics are reshaping national security and undermining democratic institutions. Drawing on global examples, it highlights the implications for regional stability and democratic resilience.

The briefing paper outlines Australia’s multipronged approach, including legislative reforms, international partnerships, and public education efforts, offering practical insights to counter these evolving security threats and safeguard democratic values across the Indo-Pacific.

Key messages

Disinformation and cognitive warfare are evolving security threats that undermine democratic institutions, polarise societies, and manipulate public trust at a global scale.

The digital revolution has amplified the speed, precision, and scale of disinformation campaigns.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates how cognitive warfare is deployed to legitimize unlawful acts of aggression and manipulate international narratives.

Democracies in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, face heightened risks of disinformation and cognitive warfare due to their open information environments and the region’s complex geopolitical dynamics.

Effective countermeasures require coordinated domestic and international efforts, leveraging regulation and multilateral partnerships like AUKUS and the Quad.

Australia: Perth USAsia Centre, 2025.

By Alexander Palmer, Skyeler Jackson, and Daniel Byman

Despite the recent attack in New Orleans, longer-term trends suggest that jihadist terrorism in the United States is not resurgent. The number of jihadist plots and attacks in the United States has been low since the territorial defeat of ISIS. The average lethality of jihadist terrorist attacks has also fallen since the peak of the caliphate. International groups such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda have filled more of an inspirational role rather than directly orchestrating attacks on the United States. Although formal links between attackers and plotters in the United States appear to be rare, this has not prevented individuals from carrying out lethal “lone wolf” attacks. Overall, jihadist terrorism in the United States does not merit additional resources at this time; however, international terrorism organizations continue to merit counterterrorism efforts.

Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) , 2025. 12p.

By  Michael Osman, Monika Roszkowska, Murat Yildiz, Robert Muggah, et al.

Several Caribbean countries are registering an intensification of organized crime and rising incidence of lethal violence. A combination of risk factors including surging drug production in South America, the proliferation and competition of transnational and local gangs, and high availability and use of firearms have contributed to soaring homicide rates. Countries such as Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago currently register among the highest murder rates globally. Faced with exceedingly high levels of collective and interpersonal violence, some Caribbean governments, for example that of Jamaica have declared states of emergencies to fight violent crime while simultaneously ramping up regional efforts to curb the trafficking of firearms and ammunition. There is a growing consensus among the heads of government of CARICOM countries that the crime and violence situation could deteriorate further still. The perpetrators of collective violence in the Caribbean vary, though most are connected to a diverse array of criminal markets across the region. The determination of what constitutes  a “gang ” differs across the Caribbean. The capacity of these groups vary: there is no dominant configuration of criminal groups and criminal relationships across all locations in the region. Highly organized criminal networks and street gangs are involved in multiple transnational criminal markets spanning South and Central America, North America, and Western Europe. Larger, more sophisticated gangs alternately collude and compete with state actors and a host of non-state intermediaries to procure firearms and transport, transship, and traffic in cocaine, cannabis, and to a lesser extent heroin and amphetamines. For the most part, smaller street gangs are more domestically oriented; some are politically connected and secure government contracts to provide resources and services that are historically underserved by the state. In addition to providing social welfare, these organizations often impose protection rackets within the areas they operate. These protection rackets allow these neighborhood gangs to engage in criminal activities ranging from selling drugs, trafficking in firearms, human smuggling, and contract killing to managing lottery scams, extortion, and racketeering. A small number of the region’s gangs are more organized and have expanded their criminal networks to facilitate transnational crimes,   including the transportation and protection of drug shipments as well as firearms trafficking, human smuggling, and cyber-related crimes. In larger countries in the Caribbean such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, aggressive state-led anti-gang measures have accelerated the fragmentation or “splintering” of gangs, further heightening inter- and intra-factional violence and demand for firearms and ammunition. While the overall number and membership of Caribbean gangs appears to have expanded, a relatively small number of them are involved in transnational trafficking of drugs, firearms, and other contraband. Only a handful of the hundreds of gangs active in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago appear to be directly implicated in cross-border crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and cannabis or smuggling of weapons. In many cases, well-connected gang leaders, including former inmates of US prisons, facilitate shipments by leveraging their networks from Colombia and Venezuela to North America and Western Europe. Meanwhile, local gang members may be subcontracted for “protecting” transshipment of drugs, sourcing firearms abroad (primarily from the US), and organizing local distribution and retail. However, most gangs in the Caribbean  are inward-facing and connected to local political economies ranging from disrupting elections and securing government contracts to local drug dealing, prostitution, scams, and extortion. Rather than facilitate international drug shipments or human trafficking rings, gangs throughout the region are typically parochial and focused instead on protecting their territory. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 62p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  

 Although more than 9,300 people died in violent incidents in the Sahel countries in 2022, the single greatest source of violent incidents is not related to clashes between armed groups and pro-governmental forces. Several mutually reinforcing factors have contributed to the growth of both insurgency and banditry, including intercommunal tensions, violence between farmers and herders, violent religious extremism and competition over scarce resources such as water and arable land. Environmental factors such as climate change may also be having an impact on conflicts in the Sahel. All the groups involved require firearms and ammunition, and as their numbers multiply so too do business opportunities for arms traffickers in the Sahel countries. While there is evidence of long-range firearms trafficking to the Sahel, including by air from France and from Turkey via Nigeria, it appears that the vast majority of firearms trafficked in the region are procured within Africa. Since 2019, Libya has become a source of supply for newly manufactured weapons. Apparently, newly produced AK-pattern assault rifles, sourced from Libya, are available on the black market in Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka regions of northern Mali.  Evidence shows that the diversion of weapons from national armed forces – whether through capture on the battlefield, theft from armouries, or purchase from corrupt elements in the military – is a primary source of firearms in the Sahel countries today. The AK-type models that make up a large share of the assault rifles in the Sahel are durable and often still effective in combat decades after their manufacture. Rebels who participated in the 1990 Tuareg rebellions in Mali and the Niger, as well as previous uprisings, retained many of their arms, which were either held in caches or in the possession of individuals. As well as remaining in the region, weapons trafficked in the Sahel also make their way to the coastal countries of West Africa and have been used in terrorist attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. To enable communities to defend themselves against extremist groups, some States in the region have armed militias or other non-state actors, whose weapons are even more likely to be diverted than those entrusted to official national security structures.  

Vienna: UNODC, 2022. 24p.

By Iftekharul Bashar

In 2024, Bangladesh faces a growing threat of radicalism fuelled by political instability, security vacuums, and weakened counterterrorism infrastructure. Unless the interim government adopts a zero-tolerance policy and strengthens law enforcement and intelligence efforts, extremist groups may gain further ground, leading to long-term instability. COMMENTARY Bangladesh is facing an increasing threat of radicalism and terrorism. The political violence and instability of 2024 have worsened the situation, with extremist elements exploiting the security vacuum created by the regime change. Weakened law enforcement and intelligence agencies, along with the rise of armed groups and radical ideologies, pose a serious threat to the country’s stability. Bangladesh risks long-term insecurity with broader regional implications without swift and decisive action.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU , 2024. 4p.

By The UNODC Global Programme on Criminal Network Disruption and the Global Maritime Crime Programme (Border Management Branch).

The Republic of Yemen has been embroiled in a violent conflict since September 2014 when Houthi forces took military control of the capital city Sana’a and displaced the government of interim President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Yemen’s protracted conflict has claimed at least 377.000 lives, most of them civilians, and plunged Yemen, already the poorest country of the Arabian Peninsula, into a complex humanitarian catastrophe. The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), originally were a revivalist Zaidi Shia religious movement formed in the Sa’dah governorate in the 1990s under the leadership of prominent cleric Hussein al-Houthi. Critical of Yemen’s long-term President Ali Abdullah Saleh (in office from 1990 to 2012), an order for the arrest of their leader led to a low-level insurgency resulting in the killing of Hussein al-Houthi by government forces in September 2004. Following his death, the political leadership of the movement passed on to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The Houthis reportedly formed close political and military ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Lebanese movement Hezbollah and continued to challenge Saleh, exploiting the frustration of large parts of the Yemeni population with his government. They succeeded in capturing parts of the mountainous north of the country before a popular uprising linked to the Arab Spring swept the old regime from power in February 2011. In the wake of this regime change, which brought Hadi to power, the Houthis increased their presence in Sana’a and formed alliances with other groups, while simultaneously clashing with tribesmen loyal to other political movements, in particular those of the Sunni Islamist Al-Islah party (“The Yemeni Congregation of Reform Party”), a Yemeni affiliate of the Muslim brotherhood. Following the ouster of President Hadi and his subsequent flight to Aden, the Houthis consolidated their dominance over large parts of northern Yemen and significantly strengthened their military power through absorbing parts of the country’s armed

forces. In March 2015, fearing a further deterioration of the security situation, a group of nine Arab countries led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia deployed military forces as part of Operation “Decisive Storm” with the aim to restore the authority of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Meanwhile in the coastal province of Hadramawt, militants of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exploited the political vacuum and seized control of the local capital of Mukalla in April 2015, which they held for more than one year before being forced out by military forces backed by the United Arab Emirates.4 While the Coalition reversed some of the Houthi advances, the Houthis managed to consolidate their positions in the mountainous north of the country. The period from 2016/2017 onwards, saw a significant increase in the military capabilities of the Houthis, which included the launch of ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs)5 against targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the deployment of anti-ship missiles and waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED)6 against ships flying the flag of Coalition states in the Red Sea. While these attacks have done relatively little material damage, they allowed the Houthis to some extent to counterbalance the superiority of the Coalition forces and to project power beyond the immediate battlefield. (continued)

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 30p.

By Yannick Deepen and Sabine Kurtenbach

Non-state armed actors (NSAAs) come in a variety of shapes and sizes, including warlordled groups, insurgencies, militias, and organised-crime syndicates to name just the most prominent examples hereof. In war or lower-level armed conflict, as well as violence-prone contexts, these groups pose acute problems for peacebuilding, democratic governance, and sustainable development. They control resources and territories, as well as compete, cooperate, or align with political and economic elites both within and beyond the state to promote the unstable status quo that serves their interests. Various challenges arise when dealing with NSAAs. Prevailing strategies vary between repression, co-optation, and submission to the rule of law. This analysis maps cross-regional trends regarding NSAAs based on available datasets. On this basis we develop a typology for NSAAs and a conceptual frame for their transformation. We then apply this to three paradigmatic case studies – Colombia, Mali, the Philippines – and formulate recommendations for the designing of improved strategies vis-à-vis development cooperation and other external actors.

GIGA Working Papers, No. 337,

By Omar Ashour

How did ISIS – a widely hated, massively outnumbered and ludicrously outgunned organisation – manage to occupy over 120 cities, towns and villages from the Southern Philippines to Western Libya? Seeking to understand ISIS’s combat effectiveness, Omar Ashour analyses the military and tactical innovations of ISIS and their predecessors in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt. He shows how their capacity to mix conventional military tactics with innovative guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism strategies allowed ISIS to expand and endure beyond expectations.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021.

By Rohan Gunaratna

The conflicts in Israel, Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Syria will have a generational impact. The 7 October 2023 attack against Israel in Gaza and its consequences have set back the prospects of a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue and may attract a new wave of foreign fighters to embark on terrorist activities like what was seen following the military debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. What can be done to stem another rise of the terrorist fighters?

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 3p.

Edited by Katharina Karcher, Yordanka Dimcheva ,· Mireya Toribio Medina. Mia Parkes

This open access book sheds light on collective practices of remembering, imagining and anticipating in relation to recent acts of urban terrorism in Europe. Analysing a range of personal and collective responses to urban terrorism in contemporary Europe, this book shows that current debates on this issue are shaped by multiple co-existing and intersecting memories of political violence in the past. Moreover, despite public declarations of unity and solidarity, collective memories of urban terror in contemporary Europe are far from consensual - memory can be both a catalyst for and an impediment to social and political change. Drawing on case studies from a range of European countries and creative responses by survivors, artists, and poets, this interdisciplinary volume introduces readers to key methods (e.g. discourse analysis and (auto-)ethnography) and concepts (e.g. Lieux de Mémoire and ‘grassroots memorials’) for the study of the memorialization of terror attacks.

Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 317p.

By Philip J. Cook and Audrey Vil

n Durham (of which 160 died) in 1011 distinct incidents – about 200 incidents per year on average. As a result of DPD investigations, 46% of the fatal-shooting incidents resulted in at least one arrest, compared with just a 16% arrest rate for incidents in which the victim(s) survived. The arrestees were processed in the Durham courts (although a handful of cases were transferred to federal court). While most defendants were prosecuted, some had all charges dismissed for various reasons. The remaining cases -- those that have been prosecuted – represent 42% of the fatal shooting incidents and just 11% of the nonfatal shooting incidents. For all 1011 shooting incidents combined, there have been 74 with a conviction in the Durham courts, 6 that were federally indicted, and 10 that were processed as juveniles (so that we lacked access to court records). Another 62 cases were still pending as of July 2022. If we assume that all of the federal cases and the cases pending in

Durham courts eventually result in a conviction, the fraction of shooting incidents in which there was both an arrest and conviction was about 15%. Thus when there is a criminal shooting in Durham, it is unlikely (85%) that anyone will be arrested and convicted. These results are troubling, not only because the system has failed to deliver justice, but also because of the urgent need to prevent future gun violence in Durham. An increase in the arrest and conviction rates for gun violence cases would reduce future gun violence through several mechanisms: incapacitating dangerous perpetrators from engaging in subsequent violence; deterring some would-be shooters by communicating a credible threat that shooting someone will result in legal consequences; and interrupting cycles of revenge. It is also plausible that a stronger performance by the police and courts would serve to send a clear message that the authorities are determined to help improve the quality of life in violence-impacted

communities. This report is intended to provide a data-based description of gun violence and the law enforcement response since 2017. It is not intended to explain the observed patterns, or provide guidance on how performance can be improved. Our hope is that documenting outcomes of police investigations and court processing will help motivate further inquiry and action.

Durham, NC: Duke University, 2023. 31p.

By Benjamin Jongleux and Nicolas Florquin

Prior to the recent changes to the European Union (EU) Firearms Directive, and due to inconsistent national regulations, several types of readily convertible firearms could be purchased with few restrictions in a number of EU member states, modified into lethal weapons and trafficked within the region. This situation contributed to the growing criminal use of models that were easy to convert into lethal firearms. In response, the EU adopted a number of new regulatory measures from 2017 onwards and supported joint law enforcement operations that specifically targeted trafficking in converted firearms. Based on research undertaken by the Small Arms Survey, this paper reviews these EU efforts and the evolving dynamics of firearms conversion in Europe as a whole. It argues that while EU member states are moving towards greater harmonization of their national legislation, there have been significant delays in some countries, and that the interpretation of certain standards and procedures remains inconsistent. The paper also argues that improving the strategic intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking in Europe remains critical for measuring the success of these efforts and for detecting emerging threats.

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers , no 70, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium 2020. 16p