By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Before February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian organized crime formed the strongest criminal ecosystem in Europe. Having developed along similar lines in the 1990s, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups and networks controlled a lucrative transnational smuggling highway between Russia and Western Europe that carried gold, timber, tobacco, coal, counterfeit/untaxed goods, humans and drugs. At the more politically connected end of the spectrum, corrupt officials and criminal bosses from both countries exploited Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russian gas to siphon off millions of dollars, while Ukraine’s oligarch class exerted a strong grip over the country’s economic, political and information spheres.

Kyiv made serious efforts to tackle organized crime and corruption after the 2014 Maidan Revolution but results were mixed, especially in the case of judicial reform; meanwhile, the conflict in the Donbas region helped bolster an array of illicit economies and criminal actors. For organized crime, business was generally good.

The Russian invasion has inflicted a profound shock to this ecosystem. With the war, collaboration between Russian and Ukrainian organized crime interests became impossible due to the political situation (which led many criminals to break such ties) and the pragmatic challenge of smuggling across what was now a violently contested and dynamic front line. Many Ukrainian crime bosses chose to leave the country, as did many oligarchs, including several accused of pro-Russian sympathies. Martial law and the curfew also initially constrained criminal activity. According to senior sources in the Ukrainian police, incidents of armed robberies declined by a factor of between three and four, and the homicide rate dropped to almost zero at the beginning of the war (although this may partly reflect the impact of the war on reporting in the early days of the war). It may be that the impact of the invasion also whittled out some less robust and resilient organized crime groups: according to data from the general prosecutor’s office, the number of organized crime groups under investigation decreased from 499 in 2021 to 395 in 2022 (although this decline alternatively could reflect dimished investigative capacity).

This report explores the changing dynamics in the political economy of Ukrainian organized crime up till December 2022 and maps how the criminal landscape has adapted to the new situation. Given the complexity of the impact of the war in Ukraine on organized crime in both parties to the conflict, the GI-TOC is producing two reports. This report concentrates on developments within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders – with the exception of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ (LDNR) in the Donbas region, which broke away from Kyiv in 2014 with Russian backing and assistance, and Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed the same year. The impact of the conflict on organized crime in these areas and on Russian organized crime more generally will be discussed in a separate report, which will assess trends in sanctions busting and money laundering, changes in trafficking flows east of Ukraine and how Russian organized crime groups have responded to the conflict.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

By Julia Stanyard | Thierry Vircoulon | Julian Rademeyer

Russia has rapidly increased its engagement in Africa in recent years, both politically and economically, as it seeks to expand its influence on the continent. However, Russia’s activities in Africa are subject to controversy. Our new report sheds light on the Wagner Group, a private military company rapidly becoming the most effective form of Russian engagement in Africa.

The group comprises a network of political influence operations and economic entities such as mining companies. It has been accused of using whatever means necessary to achieve its aims, including criminal activity. The US government recently designated Wagner as a ‘transnational criminal organization,’ allowing for broader sanctions against Wagner and its enablers.

The report argues that the Wagner Group is unique as an organization in the breadth, scale, and boldness of its activities. However, the study also shows that Wagner did not emerge in a vacuum: The group’s activities and characteristics reflect broader trends in the evolution of Russia’s oligarchs and organized crime groups, their respective relationships with the Russian state, and their activities in Africa.

By focusing on case studies in several African countries, the report helps to shed light on the complex dynamics between Russia, its oligarchs, and its criminal networks and how they interact with African governments, businesses, and populations. This report draws on research conducted since July 2022, as well as other sources from across the continent, providing a comprehensive overview of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. The report provides important insights into the evolving relationship between Russia and Africa and how this is shaping politics and economics on the continent, serving as a resource for journalists, policymakers, and researchers seeking to understand the complex dynamics of Russian engagement in Africa.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023.92p.

By Center for Strategic and International Studies; By Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Rubi Bledsoe & Andrea Michelle Cerén

In 2020, Western and Central Europe comprised 21 percent of the global demand of cocaine. The drug is now the second most consumed illicit drug on the entire continent behind cannabis. Europe has become an attractive destination for drug traffickers seeking higher profits and lower risks. This is due to higher market prices and lesser legal penalties for possession and consumption than in the United States. While a kilogram of cocaine is priced at around $28,000 in the United States, the same kilogram is priced at around $40,000 in places like France and Spain—and a staggering $219,454 in Estonia. Furthermore, European interdiction efforts in Europe and the Caribbean territories do not match U.S. disruption efforts in the Western Hemisphere. Available data suggests the European Union spends only $3-4 billion on supply-side reduction in comparison to $17.4 billion for the United States. According to European officials, this allows border security forces to interdict only around 10–12 percent of the total flow of cocaine into the continent. Without a multipronged approach to curb Europe’s cocaine demand through higher legal penalities and transatlantic interdiction efforts, the cocaine market there will continue to boom—and with it, drug violence and health threats.

Washington, DC: CSIS, 2023.

Edited by Tzanetakis, Meropi and South, Nigel

The ebook edition of this title is Open Access and freely available to read online. Transnational illicit markets have been transformed by the digital revolution. They take advantage of encryption technologies, smartphones, social media applications and cryptocurrencies that protect the digital traces of buyers and sellers, posing new challenges to drug control policies and public health alike. Digital Transformations of Illicit Drug Markets: Reconfiguration and Continuity considers how the digital revolution has changed the selling and buying of illicit substances through increased convenience and anonymisation. Providing a uniquely interdisciplinary perspective, chapters show how the digital transformation of illicit drug markets combines a reconfiguration of how sellers and buyers interact in new markets. Emphasising that illicit digital markets are embedded in societal structures and power relations in general, contributors also recognise the importance of critical perspectives on inequalities between the Global North and South as well as issues of gender. Digital Transformations of Illicit Drug Markets: Reconfiguration and Continuity challenges the field of criminology to recognise the limits of its traditional knowledge and move beyond the preoccupations that restrict crime to certain fixed spaces in order to develop new explanations.

Bingley: Emerald, 2023. 198p.

Edited by Gian Ege, Andreas Schloenhardt ,Christian Schwarzenegger and Monika Stempkowski

Debates about decriminalising or even legalising certain narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances have gained much momentum in recent years. On the surface, it appears that more and more jurisdictions are exploring the introduction of measures to permit, albeit in very controlled ways, the use of some narcotic drugs, if only for medical purposes. Others further agree that the so-called ‘war on drugs’ has failed to produce any meaningful success and that new ways to prevent the abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances need to be explored. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions continue to impose near-complete bans on the production, manufacturing, trade, transport, supply, sale, and possession of illicit drugs. National authorities, along with international organisations, point out that any move to decriminalise narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is inconsistent with international law.

Berlin: Carl Grossman Verlag 2023. 250p.

By Véronique Irwin; Ke Wang; Jiashan Cui; and Alexandra Thompson

This report is the 25th in a series of annual publications produced jointly by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Institute of Education Sciences, Department of Education. It provides official estimates of school crime and safety from a variety of data sources, including national surveys of students, teachers, principals, and post-secondary institutions. The report presents data on different types of student victimization, measures of school conditions, and student perceptions about their personal safety at school. Indicator 2: Incidence of Victimization at School and Away From School includes data from BJS’s National Crime Victimization Survey. Each of the 23 indicators is presented separately, and all indicators can be found in the Condition of Education at NCES.

Highlights:

• For students ages 12–18, the rate of nonfatal criminal victimization (including theft and violent victimization) at school in 2019 was not significantly different than the rate in 2010. From 2019 to 2021, the rate at school decreased from 30 to 7 victimizations per 1,000 students.

• Lower percentages of public school teachers in 2020–21 than in 2011–12 reported being threatened with injury by a student from their school (6 vs. 10 percent) and being physically attacked by a student from their school (4 vs. 6 percent).

• Higher percentages of public schools in 2019–20 than in 2009–10 reported problems with student cyberbullying (16 vs. 8 percent) at least once a week.

• Lower percentages of students in grades 9–12 in 2019 than in 2009 reported the following issues: having been in a physical fight on school property in the previous 12 months (8 vs. 11 percent); carrying a weapon on school property during the previous 30 days (3 vs. 6 percent); and using alcohol on at least 1 day during the previous 30 days (29 vs. 42 percent).

Washington, DC: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), Institute of Education Sciences, and Department of Education , 2023,

By Matthew L Williams; Pete Burnap, Amir Javed, Han Liu, Sefa Ozalp

Hate crimes have risen up the hierarchy of individual and social harms, following the revelation of record high police figures and policy responses from national and devolved governments. The highest number of hate crimes in history was recorded by the police in England and Wales in 2017/18. The 94,098 hate offences represented a 17 per cent increase on the previous year and a 123 per cent increase on 2012/13. Although the Crime Survey for England and Wales has recorded a consistent decrease in total hate crime victimization (combining race, religion, sexual orientation, disability and transgender), estimations for race and religion-based hate crimes in isolation show an increase from a 112,000 annual average (April 13–March 15) to a 117,000 annual average (April 15–March 17) (ONS, 2017). This increase does not take into account the likely rise in hate victimization in the aftermath of the 2017 terror attacks in London and Manchester. Despite improvements in hate crime reporting and recording, the consensus is that a significant ‘dark figure’ remains. There continues a policy and practice needed to improve the intelligence about hate crimes, and in particular to better understand the role community tensions and events play in patterns of perpetration. The HMICFRS (2018) inspection on police responses to hate crimes evidence that forces remain largely ill-prepared to handle the dramatic increases in racially and religiously

The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 60, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 93–117

By Paul Moran, Manuela Jarrett, George Vamvakas, Sarah Roberts, Barbara Barrett, Colin Campbell, Mizan Khondoker, Julie Trebilcock, Tim Weaver, Julian Walker, Mike Crawford & Andrew Forrester

The Offender Personality Disorder (OPD) Pathway programme is a jointly commissioned initiative between NHS England and Improvement and HM Prison & Probation Service aimed at supporting and managing offenders with complex mental health needs. The aim is to provide a network of psychologically informed services for high-risk high-harm offenders guided by detailed case formulation. The aim of this evaluation was to identify how the Pathway was being experienced by offenders within Pathway services and the staff involved in managing them since its implementation, to statistically compare outcomes between individuals referred to OPD services and those not referred, and to identify whether there was evidence of cost-effectiveness of the Pathway and how different elements of the Pathway contribute to cost-effectiveness. It should be noted that the aim of this evaluation was to look at the OPD Pathway as a whole, and was not to identify the contribution of the various OPD Pathway interventions.

Ministry of Justice Analytical Series 2022 . London: Ministry of Justice, 2022. 39p.

By Raminta Daniulaityte, Kaylin Sweeney , Seol Ki, Bradley N. Doebbeling and Natasha Mendoza

Background: Worsening of the overdose crisis in the USA has been linked to the continuing proliferation of non-pharmaceutical fentanyl (NPF). The recent wave of NPF spread in the USA has been fueled by an increased presence of counterfeit pills that contain NPF. This qualitative study aims to characterize the motivation and practices of counterfeit NPF pill initiation and use among individuals using illicit opioids in Arizona. Methods: Between October 2020 and May 2021, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 individuals meeting the following eligibility criteria: (1) 18 years or older; (2) residence in Arizona; and (3) use of illicit opioids in the past 30 days and/or opioid use disorder treatment in the past 12 months. Participants were recruited through referrals by a harm reduction organization, craigslist ads, and referrals by other participants. Interviews were conducted virtually via Zoom. Qualitative interviews were transcribed and analyzed thematically using NVivo. Results: Out of 22 participants, 64% were male, and 45% were ethnic minorities. Age ranged between 25 and 51 years old. Participants noted significant recent increases in the availability of counterfeit NPF pills (“blues,” “dirty oxys”) that were most commonly used by smoking. The majority indicated frst trying NPF pills in the past year, and the frst use often occurred in situations of reduced access to heroin or pharmaceutical opioids. Participant decisions to switch over to more frequent NPF pill use or to maintain some levels of heroin use were shaped by local drug availability trends and personal experiences with NPF efects. They were also infuenced by conficting views of social acceptability of pharmaceutical-like drugs, perceived harms of NPF in terms of overdose risks and increased difculty of quitting, and perceived benefts of switching to the non-injection route of opioid administration (e.g., from injecting heroin to smoking NPF pills). Conclusion: Our fndings highlight the need for the implementation of novel policy, treatment, and harm reduction approaches to address the growing unpredictability of drug supply and NPF pill-specifc risks, attitudes, and behaviors.

Harm Reduction Journal (2022) 19:52

By Özlem Dündar

There are many reasons for crime, including biological, psychological, economic, and social. The reasons for the crime may vary by the types of crime. While some types of crimes are mostly committed for economic reasons, many factors other than economic factors can be predominantly influential in committing some types of crimes. It is essential to investigate the economic causes of crime types. Because, there may be economic reasons on the basis of crimes stemming from psychological and sociological reasons. In this study context, the economic reasons for theft crime which is mostly committed for economic reasons, were investigated by the System Generalized Moments Method (GMM) for selected countries (25 OECD countries) that are members of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation. While determining the OECD member countries, the data set of all the variables (unemployment, Gini coefficient as an indicator of income inequality, consumer price index as an indicator of inflation, social expenditures, and population) included in the analysis was examined, and a standard analysis period (2013-2018) was determined according to these data. Thus, the effect of these variables on theft crime was investigated for the period 2013-2018. In the literature, economic variables were mostly used in the studies on the subject, but there were not many studies investigating the effect of the social expenditure variable on theft crime. For this reason, it is considered that the study will contribute to the literature. According to the system GMM analysis results, while unemployment, inflation rate (consumer price index), and the Gini coefficient positively affect theft crime, social expenditures and population variables show no effect.

Unpublished paper, 2022. 23p.

By Kelly M. Babchishin, Leslie-Anne Keown, and Kimberly P. Mularczyk

Employment is a key factor that helps reduce reoffending rates among individuals with criminal records. The current study examined the economic outcomes of 11,158 federal offenders (Mage in 2014 = 47 years) admitted to Correctional Service of Canada institutions between January 4th, 1999 and December 31st 2001 (medianadmission year = 2000) who were released in the community for an average of 14 years. The purpose of the current study was to better understand the economic outcomes of Canadian federal offenders. More than half of the cohort of released offenders filed their taxes (5,835 of 11,158). The current study suggests that individuals with criminal records face considerable barriers when seeking employment in Canada, with only half of the individuals released from federal institutions finding employment after an average of 14 years. Individuals released from federal correctional institutions participated in the labour market less, made substantially less employment income, received more social assistance payments, and filed taxes less than the general Canadian population. After an average of 14 years post release, most individuals were underemployed with a median income of $0. Of those who reported employment, the average reported income was $14,000. This is less than half of what Canadians in the general population earn through employment. We also found that barriers to finding gainful employment following incarceration disproportionately impacted women, Indigenous, and older individuals, with these groups fairing even poorer than men, non-Indigenous, and younger individuals with criminal records. The current study suggests that more should be done to assist individuals with a criminal record secure gainful employment.

RESEARCH REPORT: 2021-R002 . Ottawa:; Public Safety Canada, 2021. 37p.

By Ireland Bellsmith, Olivia Goertzen, Kia Neilsen and Olivia Stinson

Poverty is both a source and a consequence of injustice. The following is a brief review of some of the many issues at the intersection between poverty and the justice system, and more generally, poverty and access to justice. It is based on a review of the literature as well as some of the prior work by the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, an institute of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme Network based in Vancouver, BC. In their first report, the National Advisory Council on Poverty (NACP) defined poverty as the deprivation of resources and the lack of power required to attain basic living standards and to facilitate social integration and inclusion, thus clearly linking poverty to social exclusion or marginalization. Although the Council agreed with that broad definition of poverty, initially used in Opportunity for All – Canada’s First Poverty Reduction Strategy, it also acknowledged that a more comprehensive definition would further emphasize the feelings of social disconnect and disempowerment that commonly characterize poverty. Poverty limits people’s access to justice and their ability to resolve conflicts and deal with everyday legal problems. It is a very disempowering and alienating experience. The resulting inability to successfully resolve legal problems is itself contributing to people’s inability to attain or maintain basic living standards. The justice system instead of empowering poor people and allowing them to fight for their rights is too often a source for them of frustration, disillusionment, and disempowerment, as well as a direct reflection of prevailing social inequality and exclusion. The experience of the justice system for marginalized victims of crime and individuals struggling with poverty is also problematic and is also contributing to and dictated by poverty. Yet, poverty is linked to higher rates of victimization and the consequences of victimization are often direr for people experiencing poverty and marginalization. Finally, the experience of people facing criminal charges or being convicted of a crime is also affected by their social and economic status. The likelihood of a criminal conviction and the consequences of a criminal conviction are directly influenced by the means of the defendants and the means and social capital of those who are convicted. The lack of support for convicted offenders, compounding their ostracization, is a further source of inequality and contributes to further entrenching them and their family in poverty and exclusion. This report presents an overview of recent research and general information gathered from persuasive articles, publications, and research studies on the topic of poverty in Canada and its implications and influence on access to justice. By evaluating different areas of justice and legal proceedings, we seek to identify emerging themes in research and analyze effective practices and those that appear to fall short. Thus far, evident themes between poverty and access to justice include unsatisfactory victim experience, conditions leading to incarceration despite the availability of alternatives, lack of legal awareness within communities, and problematic disempowerment. While current practices and legislation have sought to address these obstacles inherent to the Canadian justice system, we suggest that the circumstances of poverty continue to impede equal access to justice in a number of ways and recommend that further research be conducted to evaluate best practices.

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform , 2022. 38p

By Youngmin Yi

The prevalence, consequences, and unequal distribution of parental and own incarceration in the United States are well documented. However, much of our knowledge of the reach of the carceral state into family life is focused on incarceration of a parent, romantic partner, or child, to the exclusion of other important relationships. Using data from the Family History of Incarceration Study, a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults (N=2,029), this study introduces novel descriptive measures that provide a more comprehensive picture of the demography and racially unequal distribution of family incarceration: degree, generational extension, and permeation. This analysis shows that Black adults in the United States are not only more likely to have experienced family incarceration but are also more likely to have had more family members incarcerated (5.3 members vs. ≤2.8 members for adults of other racial/ethnic groups) and to have had family members from more generations ever incarcerated (1.7 generations vs. ≤1.1 generations for those of other groups). Further, the stability of these estimates across model specifications underscores the importance of interrogating long-standing approaches to the analysis of linkages between race, the criminal legal system, and family life and the investigation of racialized systems and social inequality more broadly

Demography (2023) 60(1):15–40

By R. Nishino and T. Kitade  

 TRAFFIC conducted online surveys to track changes after voluntary ivory bans were introduced from November 2019 on Yahoo Shopping and Yahoo Auction, Japan’s largest platforms for online ivory trade, following similar voluntary bans already implemented by Rakuten-Ichiba, Rakuma and Mercari. The trading practices of a major auction house, Mainchi Auction, and trends in illegal ivory exports were also examined to understand better the domestic ivory market in Japan. The COVID-19 pandemic has made it difficult to assess physical markets. RESULTS: Effective measures by companies The number of shops selling ivory on Yahoo Shopping and Rakuten-Ichiba as B2C (business to consumer) trade and the volume of ivory trade on Yahoo Auction, a mixture of B2C and C2C (consumer to consumer) trade, have reduced by almost 100% and more than 99%, respectively as a result of the platform-wide voluntary ivory ban. There was no observable shift in either B2C or C2C trade to other platforms after the introduction of the ivory ban on Yahoo’s platforms. Monitoring of ivory bans by companies such as Mercari and Rakuma was seen to have been effective 

TRAFFIC, Japan Office, Tokyo, Japan., 2020. 30p.

By Amanda J. Aubel, Angela Bruns, Xiaoya Zhang, Shani Buggs & Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz

Living near an incident of firearm violence can negatively impact youth, regardless of whether the violence is experienced firsthand. Inequities in household and neighborhood resources may affect the prevalence and consequences of exposure across racial/ethnic groups. Findings. Using data from the Future of Families and Child Wellbeing Study and the Gun Violence Archive, we estimate that approximately 1 in 4 adolescents in large US cities lived within 800 m (0.5 miles) of a past-year firearm homicide during 2014–17. Exposure risk decreased as household income and neighborhood collective efficacy increased, though stark racial/ethnic inequities remained. Across racial/ethnic groups, adolescents in poor households in moderate or high collective efficacy neighborhoods had a similar risk of past-year firearm homicide exposure as middle-to-high income adolescents in low collective efficacy neighborhoods. Conclusions. Empowering communities to build and leverage social ties may be as impactful for reducing firearm violence exposure as income supports. Comprehensive violence prevention efforts should include systems-level strategies that jointly strengthen family and community resources.

Injury Epidemiology volume 10, Article number: 24 (2023)

By John R. Hipp and Seth A. Williams

This review takes stock of recent advances, as well as enduring and emerging challenges, in the area of spatial criminology. Although the notions of place and space are fundamentally intertwined, spatial criminology is distinct in its attempt to measure and theorize explicitly spatial processes and relationships. This review highlights three key themes. First, the use of increasingly smaller geographic units in recent research creates an even greater need to account for spatial behavior of persons when studying the location of crime. Second, although the explosion of spatially precise data in recent years presents exciting possibilities, we argue that theory is falling behind in guiding us in analyzing these new forms of data, and explicitly inductive approaches should be considered to complement existing deductive strategies. Third, an important direction for spatial criminology in the next decade is considering the extent to which micro- and mesolevel processes operate invariantly across different macro contexts.

Annual Review of Criminology, 3(1), 2020.

By Marco De Nadai, Yanyan Xu, Emmanuel Letouzé, Marta C. González & Bruno Lepri

Nowadays, 23% of the world population lives in multi-million cities. In these metropolises, criminal activity is much higher and violent than in either small cities or rural areas. Thus, understanding what factors infuence urban crime in big cities is a pressing need. Seminal studies analyse crime records through historical panel data or analysis of historical patterns combined with ecological factor and exploratory mapping. More recently, machine learning methods have provided informed crime prediction over time. However, previous studies have focused on a single city at a time, considering only a limited number of factors (such as socio-economic characteristics) and often at large in a single city. Hence, our understanding of the factors influencing crime across cultures and cities is very limited. Here we propose a Bayesian model to explore how violent and property crimes are related not only to socio-economic factors but also to the built environment (e.g. land use) and mobility characteristics of neighbourhoods. To that end, we analyse crime at small areas and integrate multiple open data sources with mobile phone traces to compare how the different factors correlate with crime in diverse cities, namely Boston, Bogotá, Los Angeles and Chicago. We fnd that the combined use of socio-economic conditions, mobility information and physical characteristics of the neighbourhood effectively explain the emergence of crime, and improve the performance of the traditional approaches. However, we show that the socio-ecological factors of neighbourhoods relate to crime very differently from one city to another. Thus there is clearly no “one fits all” model.

Scientific Reports volume 10, Article number: 13871 (2020).

Police-reported crime data (hereafter “crime”) is routinely used as a psychosocial stressor in public health research, yet few studies have jointly examined (a) differences in crime exposure based on participant race and ethnicity, (b) differences in measures of crime exposure, and (c) considerations for how exposure to police is captured in police-recorded crime data. We estimate neighborhood exposure to crime and discuss the implications of structural differences in exposure to crime and police based on race and ethnicity. Methods. Using GPS coordinates from 1188 participants in the Newborn Epigenetics Study, we estimated gestational exposure to crime provided by the Durham, North Carolina, Police Department within (a) 800 m and (b) the Census block group of residence. We controlled for non-overlapping spatial boundaries in crime, Census, residential, and police data to report crime spatial (crime per km2) and population (crime per 1000 people per km2) density. Results. We demonstrate dramatic disparities in exposure to crime based on participant race and ethnicity and highlight variability in these disparities based on the type of crime and crime measurement method chosen. Conclusions Public health researchers should give thoughtful consideration when using police-reported crime data to measure and model exposure to crime in the United States, as police-reported data encompasses joint exposure to police and crime in the neighborhood setting.

BMC Public Health (2021) 21:1078

By Julia Yansura and Lakshmi Kumar

In this report, Global Financial Integrity (GFI) presents an analysis of narcotics-related illicit financial flows between the United States and the major narcotics production and transit countries of Mexico and Colombia. The report was commissioned by the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission as part of its mandate to evaluate US drug policies and programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, assess current efforts to reduce the illicit drug supply and address the harms associated with trafficking and drug abuse. A variety of strategies can and have been used to address drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere, from manual and aerial crop eradication, to interdiction, illicit crop substitution and other alternate development approaches. While existing strategies have resulted in temporary disruptions to narcotics cultivation and trafficking, they have not been successful in addressing these issues in a comprehensive, lasting manner. At the same time, history has shown that many of these policies have had unintended consequences and caused harm to people, their communities and the environment in very profound ways. Financial strategies from the anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) toolkit offer a different lens to view and address the problem of drug trafficking. In this report, GFI argues that AML/CFT is underutilized in current US and regional counter-narcotics efforts and needs to be reprioritized. Effectively responding to the challenges of drug trafficking and transnational organized crime will require a multi-pronged, multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary effort that includes AML/CFT, as well as a more comprehensive approach to drug policies that encompasses human rights, public health and development.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity , 2020. 67p.

By PwC

What are the biggest external frauds on the rise, what should you be aware of and how can you mitigate against them? We are delighted to share the key results of PwC’s Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2022. External threats are on the rise. Preventing fraud and other economic crimes is a complex challenge, complicated even further by today’s volatile risk landscape. As organisations act quickly to navigate change, bad actors look to exploit the potentially widening cracks in fraud defenses.

London: PwC, 2022. 15p.