By Sara Bianca Taverriti

Irregular migrants face particular challenges in interacting with law enforcement authorities to report a crime, as they fear detection and deportation. This fear, together with their generally precarious situation, makes them particularly vulnerable to crime. This report aims to explain the existing legislation, policy and practices impacting on migrants’ ability to access the Criminal Justice System in Italy, as either victims or witnesses, without running the risk of self-incrimination or deportation. In particular, the report focuses on ‘firewall’ practices – that is, measures that encourage reporting of crime by migrants with irregular status by neutralising the risk and the fear of deportation and expulsion as a consequence of reporting crime. This report is intended to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of these measures, in order to assess their effectiveness in facilitating safe reporting of crime by irregular migrants. Finally, the report will consider the potential of policy reforms in the area of safe reporting, including by considering the potential for implementation in Italy of local measures known as ‘sanctuary policies’. This research contributes to a project on safe reporting of crime for victims and witnesses with irregular migration status in Europe and the United States undertaken by the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford.1 As well as Italy, this project examines the United States, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium. The ultimate aim of the project is to promote learning of best practices and knowledge-exchange on this topic between countries. It also aims to evaluate the legal and political replicability of ‘firewall’ policies across different countries, and in particular the legal replicability of US experiences (for example, that of ‘sanctuary cities’) in European contexts.

Bristol, UK: COMPAS, Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity, 2019. 46p.

By Markus González Beilfuss

According to the European Union (EU) Victims-Directive, victims of crime have the right to be informed, supported and protected, as well as to participate in criminal proceedings. EU Member States retain notable scope for action to transpose these rights into their national legislation, but with the entry into force of this Directive in October 2012, victims' protection entitlements improved significantly within thre remit of EU Law. However, foreign victims with irregular migration status are still in a vulnerable position. Indeed, they are included in the Directive in a particular way. On the one hand, Member States have to take the necessary measures to ensure that the rights set out in the Directive are not conditional on the victim's residence status. According to Art. 1.1, the rights delineated shall apply to all victims in a non-discriminatory manner, including with respect to their residence status. Nevertheless, on the other hand the Directive does not address the conditions of the residence of crime victims in the territory of the Member States. As mentioned in the preamble of the Directive (Recital 10), ‘reporting a crime and participating in criminal proceedings do not create any rights regarding the residence status of the victim’. Victims of crime with irregular migration status fall under the scope of the EU's Return-Directive. As with any third-country nationals staying irregularly in their territories, Member States shall issue them with a return decision. As stated in Art. 6.4 of the Return-Directive, ‘compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons’ allow Member States to grant at any moment a residence permit or the right to stay to any person with irregular migration status. However, EU law does not directly grant these victims of crime the right to stay if they report the case to the police or the criminal justice system. The outcome of the existing legal framework can be particularly harmful for these crime victims, who are exposed to retaliation and can fear deportation if they report the crime to the police. But it also impacts upon the whole criminal justice system, which may lose crucial actors for the prosecution of crime. In the last decade, EU and international law have started to bring in some exceptions to this inconsistent and harmful legal system. According to Directive 2004/81/EC, victims of human trafficking have access to a so-called ‘reflection period’ that allows them to recover and escape from the influence of traffickers. During this period, it is not possible to enforce deportation orders of third-country national victims, and once the reflection period is finished, victims may under certain circumstances access a residence permit.

Oxford, UK: COMPAS, Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity, 2019. 33p.

By Ruben Timmerman, Arjen Leerkes, and Richard Staring

Across Europe, irregular migrants experience considerable difficulty obtaining basic access to justice, protection, and services across a wide range of areas. The structural exclusion of irregular migrants from the integration strategies of European Union (EU) Member States serves in many situations to limit the full exercise of their basic rights, including in particular the right of an individual to safely report to the police if they have been a victim of or witness to crime.1 In recent years, however, efforts have been made to ensure that irregular migrants within Europe are guaranteed equal access to justice and basic rights should they fall victim to crime. Perhaps most notably, Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime (hereinafter, Victims’ Directive), which entered into force in 2015, sets out to ensure that the rights of all victims of crime are protected, regardless of nationality or residence status.2 Among other things, the EU Victims’ Directive signifies—at least on paper—the inclusion of irregular migrants within the wider purview of victims’ rights. However, there remain significant challenges and barriers to access to justice and rights for irregular migrant victims of crime within Europe, and there is much work still to be done in effectively realising the vision set out by the EU Victims’ Directive. In particular, it has long been observed by human rights observers, scholars, and practitioners in the field of migration that irregular migrants are often hesitant or unwilling to contact or interact with law enforcement authorities to report crime, either as victims or as witnesses, out of fear of arrest or deportation.3 As a result, these irregular migrants are unable to exercise their basic rights to necessary services, protection, and justice, and are often more vulnerable to perpetrators who are able to exploit their reluctance to report crime. Moreover, the lack of opportunity for irregular migrants to safely report crime results in a lack of crucial intelligence about criminal activity for law enforcement, and significantly reduces authorities’ insight into crime and public safety issues in their communities. As a result of these challenges, both in the United States and across Europe innovative and diverse initiatives have been developed—particularly at the local level—to promote ‘safe reporting’ of crime among irregular migrants, and in turn to ensure greater access to justice for victims.4 In particular, many localities have developed what are commonly referred to as ‘firewall policies’.

Oxford, UK; COMPAS, Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity, 2019. 46p.

Edited by Carol Hagemann-White, Liz Kelly and Thomas Meysen

This book offers insights and perspectives from a study of “Cultural Encounters in Intervention Against Violence” (CEINAV) in four EU-countries. Seeking a deeper understanding of the underpinnings of intervention practices in Germany, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, the team explored variations in institutional structures and traditions of law, policing, and social welfare. Theories of structural inequality and ethics are discussed and translated into practice.

Leverkusen-Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019. 320p.

Edited by Veronika Bezinsky, Andrada Filip, Luma Kamel, Claire Laurent, Saide Mobayed, Kathryn Platzer, Michael Platzer

FEMICIDE Volume 6: Violence Against Girls contains the speeches delivered at these side events, at which high-ranking officials and experts on GBV presented comprehensive ways of reducing the risk of such violence, increasing the quality of protection for girl victims, and ending the impunity for perpetrators. It also includes the most recent and most effective prevention and mitigation strategies on gender-based violence against underage girls. In this volume of FEMICIDE we pay particular attention to girl refugees, displaced girls and migrant children, and the specific forms of violence and abuse occurring in the context of their flight. The refugee and migration flows in 2015 and 2016 have often been accompanied by abuses of the rights of children, and girls in particular. In such extreme situations as armed conflict, natural disasters, and other emergencies, girls are especially vulnerable to forced marriage, sexual exploitation, trafficking, psychological and physical intimidation, during all stages of their displacement. As girls are the most vulnerable of the vulnerable and are less likely to seek protection and a remedy, this publication focuses specifically on transnational aspects of violence against children, which are often neglected.

Vienna: Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) Vienna Liaison Office, 2016. 78p.

Edited by Helen Hemblade

Although violence against and murder of older women is a widespread phenomenon across the world, it receives little targeted attention. The simple fact that women get older than men, and as a result must live alone longer, makes them more vulnerable to exploitation, fraud, robbery and even physical abuse. As such, the abuse and femicide of older women is one of the most widespread unpunished crimes, affecting women of all backgrounds, cultures and countries. In many societies, elderly widows are physically and mentally abused, robbed of their right to inherit their assets - eventually losing their societal status. Due to poor education and no independent income, they are financially insecure and dependent on their children or relatives. FEMICIDE Volume VIII aims to analyse the ways in which women, over the age of 55, are psychologically and physically mistreated all around the globe, often resulting in death.

Vienna: Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) Vienna Liaison Office. 2017. 80p.

By Tamsin Bradley

Growing awareness of femicide has not universally translated into effective policy and programming. Though legislation relating to gender-based violence and/or femicide exists in many countries, both persist. A combined social, cultural, political and economic approach situates femicide prevention and responses at various levels, including changes in individual behaviour. Using the term ‘femicide’ more frequently at international forums is crucial not only to focus attention on the gendered nature of violence but also to act as a call for action. Situational studies reveal that political will to end femicide differs from country to country. Femicide together with the patriarchal norms and misogyny that precipitate it are not just extra-EU problems. Rather, they are of global concern, demanding a global response; in non-EU countries this response is often dependent on donor funding. We now know more than ever what works to reverse patterns of violence. These patterns can be broken by developing the capacity of women’s organisations and strengthening global feminist movements that work with national and local activist networks. Additionally, engaging men and boys in this process of transformation is vital if we are to address violence against women and girls and ultimately end femicide.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2021. 22p.

By Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Since 2015, South Africa has witnessed the emergence of a new kind of criminality in the form of organized groups targeting the construction sector under the banner of ‘radical economic transformation’. Dubbed the ‘construction mafia’ in the media, these people have organized themselves into groups known as ‘local business forums’ and invaded construction sites across the country, demanding money or a stake in development projects in what can arguably be described as systemic extortion. While no country is immune to systemic extortion from criminal groups, the extent and impact of the activity depend on the abilities of state governance to address extortion economies as they arise. In South Africa, the activities of the so-called construction mafia have been fuelled by the weak response from the state, allowing them to expand their activities. In 2019, at least 183 infrastructure and construction projects worth more that R63 billion had been affected by these disruptions across the country. Since then, invasions have continued at construction sites across South Africa. In this context, this report by the GI-TOC focuses on understanding how these groups, widely referred to as the construction mafia, operate, their involvement in systemic extortion, and the long-term implications for the construction industry in South Africa and the country as a whole.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 51p.

By Jeremy McDermott, James Bargent, Douwe den Held, and Maria Fernanda Ramírez

Over the past few years, the cocaine trade has enjoyed an unprecedented boom, fuelled by soaring production. In 2018, the combined production for Colombia, Bolivia and Peru – the three main producers of cocaine – was more than double that of 2013 (Figure 1). While the rate of growth has slowed of late, there is still no sign of it hitting a peak. Coverage of this phenomenon has largely focused on the United States and its seemingly endless ‘war on drugs’. However, smarter traffickers have long preferred Europe, which has far more potential for growth than the more saturated US market, and higher profits. Cocaine to Europe has increased over the years, to the point where it is now beginning to rival that entering the US mainland. ‘For 2019 and the first months of 2020, the thinking was that the flow of drugs entering or passing through Europe was between 500 and 800 tonnes. We base these numbers in part on the notion that we are seizing 10% to 20% of the total,’ said one senior European police official and cocaine expert, who was not authorized to speak on the record. A significant percentage of that flow is in transit to other parts of the world. Traffickers are pushing eastwards from the more established markets in western Europe towards Russia and Asia – and feeding every country in between.

Washington DC: InSight Crime; Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 78p.

By Fabian Zhilla Besfort and Besford Lamallar

This study focuses on the organized crime activities in Albania, as well as those conducted by Albanian criminal networks in the region and beyond. The study analyses organized crime activities such as trafficking in persons, illicit drugs and arms, smuggling of migrants, extortion, contract killings, organized cybercrime and money laundering.

Tirana: Open Society Foundation for Albania, 2015. 124p.

By Walter Kemp

While the Western Balkans is often portrayed as a hotspot of illicit activity, the region is a relatively small market for organized crime. The big money is made elsewhere. This report shows why and how groups from the Western Balkans have become engaged in organized crime abroad, particularly in South Africa, Turkey, Australia as well as in some countries of Latin America and Western Europe. The report shows that criminal groups from the Western Balkans operating abroad are modern, dynamic and entrepreneurial. They have demonstrated an ability to adapt and innovate and use technology to their advantage: for example, using encrypted forms of communication; exploring new routes and means of trafficking, such as ‘narco-jets’; and laundering their money through cryptocurrencies, offshore havens and into their home countries. The report suggests that there is not a ‘Balkan Cartel’ per se, although groups from the region sometimes work with each other, and there are also instances of multi-ethnic groups. The report calls for more effective law enforcement cooperation, tracking and seizing of assets, and the sharing of information, not least since perpetrators tend to use multiple identities. It also stresses the need to reduce demand for the goods and services provided by criminal groups from the Western Balkans.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020. 100p.

By Jack A. Blum; Michael Levi; R. T. Naylor; and Phil Williams

While there has been a general trend towards enacting money-laundering laws that provide for the lifting of financial secrecy in appropriate cases, such secrecy remains a barrier in many jurisdictions, including some of those that have come to be known as 'financial havens'. The advances in technology and communication have made the three F's - finding, freezing and forfeiting of criminally derived income and assets all the more difficult. This publication discusses these issues and other related problems in depth. The law enforcement success stories presented convey a sense of imaginative ways in which financial havens are used. The cases also highlight the advantages, from the point of view of criminals, of collusion with bank employees and the use of professional launderers.

Vienna: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 1998, 117p.

By Tom Naylor, with the assistance of Deane Taylor and Roksana Bahramitah

For obvious reasons, the primary functions of traditional law enforcement and the criminal justice system are investigation, prosecution, and punishment of persons deemed responsible for proscribed acts. The main purpose of criminological research, whether conducted by law enforcement or academics, has been to assist those functions, directly or indirectly. To be sure, there is much research that focuses on crimes as events rather than on the criminals who cause those events. But mostly, research has been devoted to studying the social conditions that facilitate the commission of offences. It has paid much less attention to understanding the methodology by which and institutional context through which particular actions take place. The resulting deficiencies are particularly marked with respect to profit-driven offences. The type of information collected by police or prosecutors for the purposes of a particular criminal proceeding may be quite different from the type of information necessary in understanding the nature of on-going criminal markets or the modus operandi of the underworld economy as a whole. Nor is academic criminology much more helpful – generally speaking, crimes are used to define categories of offenders rather than being a subject of (more technocratic) interest in and of themselves. These shortfalls also afflict the categorization of acts. The practice of dividing criminal code offences into three broad categories – crimes against persons, crimes against property, and trafficking – provides little useful information with respect to context or process. More specifically, due to lack of systematic definition and subsequent overlap, umbrella terms such as economic, commercial, and white-collar crime are frequently used interchangeably, even by socalled “experts in the field.” The fact that some of these terms refer to acts and others to persons doesn’t seem to matter (e.g., respectively, commercial vs. white-collar crime). It is no surprise that the specified offences covered by these are similarly confusing and impractical. For example, means (e.g., telephone pitches and computerized communications) and ends (e.g., fraudulent transfers of wealth) are oftentimes confounded. All this creates problems that go beyond simple lack of terminological neatness. Without knowing just what a problem or objective is, it seems rather difficult, to say the least, to design a strategy or policy to deal with it.

Ottawa: Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada, 2002. 51p.

By Annette Hübschle-Finch

A multi-sectoral regime of protection including international treaties, conservation and security measures, demand reduction campaigns and quasi-military interventions has been established to protect rhinos. Despite these efforts, the poaching of rhinos and trafficking of rhino horn continue unabated. This dissertation asks why the illegal market in rhinoceros horn is so resilience in spite of the myriad measures employed to disrupt it. A theoretical approach grounded in the sociology of markets is applied to explain the structure and functioning of the illegal market. The project follows flows of rhino horn from the source in southern Africa to illegal markets in Southeast Asia.

Kohn, Germany: International Max Planck Research School on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy, 2016. 424p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

This report shows that the total value of illicit heroin and opium trafficked from Afghanistan to Western Europe through the Balkans amounts to some $28 billion every year. Sixty-five per cent of this total ($18 billion) is generated in Western and Central Europe. The four largest European markets for heroin - France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy - account for nearly half of the gross profits, as the major heroin benefits are made by traffickers on the retail markets. The report shows that the total value generated by Afghan heroin and opium trafficked in Europe and through the Balkan route is one third bigger than the entire GDP of Afghanistan itself, which, in 2014, amounted to some $21 billion. Other findings indicate that the negative economic impact of heroin and opium are actually greater in Europe and the Balkan route countries than in Afghanistan itself. The report also shows the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey as the two countries which interject the greater percentage of heroin and opium destined for Europe. Iran seizes about 30 per cent of the 155 tons of heroin and opium entering its territory every year, while Turkey seizes 17 per cent. All other countries in Europe interject an average of 6 per cent of heroin in their territory. Data show that the impact of illicit profits in the national licit economy across countries is significant, with heroin and opium traffickers gaining between 0.2 to 2 per cent of their country's GDP. For some countries this share is bigger than the public expenditures dedicated to drug policies - if all drugs, and not only heroin and opium, are considered. The large amounts of money generated through this illicit activity can distort the licit national economies in the region.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2015. 92p.

By Walter Kemp

The report “Crooked Kaleidoscope – Organized Crime in the Balkans” by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, urges countries and organizations that have invested so much economically and politically over the past 25 years to stay engaged in the region and help it avoid back-sliding. In particular, it calls for stronger measures to fight corruption, enhance justice, and go after the proceeds of crime rather than just focusing on police reform.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 44p.

By Amy Hinsley

The ornamental orchid trade is global and comprises both a large, well-established legal market and a significant but largely unknown illegal trade. Much, though not all, of this illegal trade is driven by demand from specialist collectors for rare species. The trade in wild-harvested plants can have a severe impact on biodiversity: in one documented case, intense demand for a rare species of slipper orchid saw it harvested to near extinction. Illicit sales of wild orchids have been recorded on several online platforms, including e-commerce and social-media websites, forums and private websites, and sellers encompass both hobbyists and formal businesses. Consumers range from houseplant buyers, who want to purchase attractive plants, to specialist growers with a preference for rare species. For consumers who want to avoid illegal avenues of trade, and for researchers and law enforcement who want to monitor the trade, legality can be difficult to determine. However, it can be possible if the plant’s origin, species and final destination can be identified. This brief makes a substantial contribution to our ability to identify illicit orchid trade and the platforms most likely to host it.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 23p.

By Indah Budiani and Febri Raharningrum

This report aims to address how the illegal parrot trade is conducted online, and to what extent the use of internet-based platforms has facilitated the international trade. It examines the overall structure and key figures in the parrot trade, and addresses how trade chains and interactions between different actors in the illegal market have changed with the emergence of new, virtual forms of doing business. The increased efforts of Indonesian authorities to clamp down on wildlife trade and to pursue criminal actors operating online are also covered, as well as the effect these operations have had on the strategies used by parrot traders to avoid detection. It also addresses the relationship between the illegal and legal trade in captive-bred parrots and opportunities for laundering. Drawing together these strands, the report considers both the challenges and opportunities the online parrot trade offers for effective monitoring and law-enforcement responses.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 18p.

By Carl Miller, Jack Pay, and Josh Smith

The internet is used to trade endangered species and commodities containing parts from endangered species, and more broadly hosts communities and subcultures where this trade is normalized, routine and unchallenged. This report presents a new technical process that has been trialled to identify online marketplaces and websites involved in the trade of a selection of CITES-listed animals and plants. The technology, known as the Dynamic Data Discovery Engine (or DDDE), was developed with the aim of building upon qualitative research to produce larger, more comprehensive datasets of similar activity taking place. The report contains a description of the process and the results that it produced, its strengths and weaknesses, and some thoughts on how it might be used by others hoping to reduce the extent to which the internet can be exploited by those wishing to transact endangered animals and plants. It is hoped that the process will contribute to the creation of a more comprehensive picture of online illicit wildlife trade (IWT) activity.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 28p.

By Rupert Horsley

There has been startling growth in the online illegal wildlife trade (IWT), and broad recognition of the need to apply financial and anti-money-laundering tools to the fight against environmental crime. Much illicit trade carried out over the internet requires some form of electronic payment. This paper explores how various payment methods are used in the online IWT, and the challenges and opportunities these present to law enforcement. Some inroads have been made into combating the online counterfeit trade by suppressing activities of ‘rogue’ digital payment providers that facilitate illicit trade. Opportunities to target the online IWT by monitoring digital payment transactions will emerge only if regulatory systems and technology keep pace with levels of innovation used by illegal wildlife traders to avoid detection.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 20p.