By Eve de Coning

The study posed the questions whether there is transnational organized crime and other criminal activity in the fishing industry and, if so, what the vulnerabilities of the fishing industry are to transnational organized crime or other criminal activity. The research took the form of a six-month desk review of available literature, supplemented by ad hoc consultations and a two-day expert consultation held in Vienna, Austria. Importantly the study did not set out to tarnish the fishing industry. Rather, the study sought to determine whether criminal activities take place within the fishing industry to the detriment of law-abiding fishers, the legitimate fishing industry, local fishing communities, and the general public alike. The study considered the involvement of the fishing industry or the use of fishing vessels in trafficking in persons (Chapter 2); smuggling of migrants (Chapter 3); illicit traffic in drugs (Chapter 4); and other forms of crime such as marine living resource crime, corruption, and piracy and other security related crimes (Chapter 5).

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011. 144p.

By Emma Witbooi, Kamal-Deen Ali and Mas Achmad Santosa

Organised crime in the fisheries sector is an often-overlooked barrier to securing a sustainable ocean economy, despite threatening coastal states’ food security, fostering human rights abuses and diverting government revenue to the shadow blue economy. This Blue Paper spotlights the problem and draws from current promising practices for addressing organised crime in the fisheries sector to present practical opportunities for action—globally, regionally and nationally. One of the key challenges in this space is the development of a joint understanding of the problem at hand—shedding light on the pervasive impact of this shadow industry. We feel this Blue Paper provides a solid foundation of experience and best practice that can be used to develop solutions to be implemented immediately in conjunction with sustainable fisheries management strategies.

Washington, DC: World Resource Institute, 2022. 38p.

By Roderic Broadhurst, Brigitte Bouhours, and John Bacon-Shone

Between 2003 and 2009, the International Violence Against Women Survey (IVAWS) has been conducted in 12 developed and developing countries. The IVAWS is a comprehensive instrument that measures women’s experiences of physical and sexual violence by men, including intimate partners, victims’ help-seeking behaviour and the response of.... was conducted in Hong Kong and, for this reason, no trends in violence over time are available; however, because the IVAWS uses standardised questions and data collection methods, results can be compared with those of the other countries that participated in the survey. The report shows rates of victimisation for seven types of physical..... who the perpetrator was, particularly whether it was an intimate partner, a relative, a friend or acquaintance, or a stranger. Women who had recent incident, such as whether they had reported the assault to the police or victim support services. Drawing on socio-demographic and behavioual information on both respondents and their partners, the report examines the predictors of violent victimisation by partners and non-partners.

Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong; Canberra: Australian National University, 2012. 110p.

By Summer Walker, Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano.

Through stark images and charts, this report gives a graphic illustration of how the global illicit economy has boomed in the past 20 years and how it poses a serious threat to security, development and justice. With so many major challenges in our world today, it may seem that tackling transnational organized crime is a lower priority than addressing climate change, pandemics, inequality or migration. But organized crime is a common denominator to all of these challenges: it enables them, and it profits from them. As a result, organized crime is a driver of unsustainable development. This report is impressionistic. It is designed to show the inter-relationships and interdependence between global mega-trends and the trajectories of organized crime since 2000, the year the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) was adopted. It is written from the perspective of civil society, drawing on consultations with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s secretariat, its Network of Experts, and recipients of the Global Initiative Resilience Fund, including nine consultations held in five regions. It is based on data that is in the public domain that has been gathered through research and analysis. We hope this report can bring fresh approaches and different perspectives to intergovernmental processes. Furthermore, we hope it can stimulate new thinking and be a catalytic resource for more effective responses to organized crime. We appreciate the opportunities available for us to do this, for example through the review mechanism of the UNTOC Conference of Parties as well as the UN Crime Congress. As this report shows, organized crime is harming so many aspects of life on our planet. Left unchecked, the shadows of the future look even more sinister. We need to change the trajectory. We hope this report can raise awareness and provoke debate. Most importantly, we hope that it can stimulate action to strengthen local resilience and lead to a global strategy against organized crime.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 118p.

By Sara Bianca Taverriti

Irregular migrants face particular challenges in interacting with law enforcement authorities to report a crime, as they fear detection and deportation. This fear, together with their generally precarious situation, makes them particularly vulnerable to crime. This report aims to explain the existing legislation, policy and practices impacting on migrants’ ability to access the Criminal Justice System in Italy, as either victims or witnesses, without running the risk of self-incrimination or deportation. In particular, the report focuses on ‘firewall’ practices – that is, measures that encourage reporting of crime by migrants with irregular status by neutralising the risk and the fear of deportation and expulsion as a consequence of reporting crime. This report is intended to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of these measures, in order to assess their effectiveness in facilitating safe reporting of crime by irregular migrants. Finally, the report will consider the potential of policy reforms in the area of safe reporting, including by considering the potential for implementation in Italy of local measures known as ‘sanctuary policies’. This research contributes to a project on safe reporting of crime for victims and witnesses with irregular migration status in Europe and the United States undertaken by the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford.1 As well as Italy, this project examines the United States, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium. The ultimate aim of the project is to promote learning of best practices and knowledge-exchange on this topic between countries. It also aims to evaluate the legal and political replicability of ‘firewall’ policies across different countries, and in particular the legal replicability of US experiences (for example, that of ‘sanctuary cities’) in European contexts.

Bristol, UK: COMPAS, Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity, 2019. 46p.

By Markus González Beilfuss

According to the European Union (EU) Victims-Directive, victims of crime have the right to be informed, supported and protected, as well as to participate in criminal proceedings. EU Member States retain notable scope for action to transpose these rights into their national legislation, but with the entry into force of this Directive in October 2012, victims' protection entitlements improved significantly within thre remit of EU Law. However, foreign victims with irregular migration status are still in a vulnerable position. Indeed, they are included in the Directive in a particular way. On the one hand, Member States have to take the necessary measures to ensure that the rights set out in the Directive are not conditional on the victim's residence status. According to Art. 1.1, the rights delineated shall apply to all victims in a non-discriminatory manner, including with respect to their residence status. Nevertheless, on the other hand the Directive does not address the conditions of the residence of crime victims in the territory of the Member States. As mentioned in the preamble of the Directive (Recital 10), ‘reporting a crime and participating in criminal proceedings do not create any rights regarding the residence status of the victim’. Victims of crime with irregular migration status fall under the scope of the EU's Return-Directive. As with any third-country nationals staying irregularly in their territories, Member States shall issue them with a return decision. As stated in Art. 6.4 of the Return-Directive, ‘compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons’ allow Member States to grant at any moment a residence permit or the right to stay to any person with irregular migration status. However, EU law does not directly grant these victims of crime the right to stay if they report the case to the police or the criminal justice system. The outcome of the existing legal framework can be particularly harmful for these crime victims, who are exposed to retaliation and can fear deportation if they report the crime to the police. But it also impacts upon the whole criminal justice system, which may lose crucial actors for the prosecution of crime. In the last decade, EU and international law have started to bring in some exceptions to this inconsistent and harmful legal system. According to Directive 2004/81/EC, victims of human trafficking have access to a so-called ‘reflection period’ that allows them to recover and escape from the influence of traffickers. During this period, it is not possible to enforce deportation orders of third-country national victims, and once the reflection period is finished, victims may under certain circumstances access a residence permit.

Oxford, UK: COMPAS, Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity, 2019. 33p.

By Myrna Dawson

“She was Toronto’s homicide No. 70 of 2019. We only found out after her husband died of COVID-19 in jail.” The above headline appeared in the Toronto Star on April 19, 2021. No. 70 was 75-year-old Zohra Derouiche who had been fatally stabbed in her Scarborough home on Dec. 10, 2019. Her husband was charged with second degree murder when Zohra died 10 days after the stabbing. Until April 19, 2021, almost 1.5 years later, the public did not know about her death. The Toronto police did not release any information at the time of the stabbing. They did not issue a press release when she died or when her husband was charged. There was no coverage of her femicide. Her name was never made public. No one knew what she looked like because no photo of her in life was ever published. The Toronto Star only learned about the case because her 85-year-old husband died in custody in March 2021 after contracting COVID-19. His death will now be the subject of a coroner’s investigation. It is not clear if any investigation will ever occur into Zohra’s death. The Toronto police provided no specific reason for their failure to report Zohra’s death. It is likely that both sexism and ageism played a role. This research paper is about women like Zohra – older women who are killed mostly by men, but also by acquaintances and strangers, and sometimes by those in professional caregiving roles.

Ottawa: Office of the Federal Ombudsman for Victims of Crime, 2021. 54p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Homicide represents the most extreme form of violence against women, a lethal act on a continuum of gender-based discrimination and abuse. As this research shows, gender-related killings of women and girls remain a grave problem across regions, in countries rich and poor. While the vast majority of homicide victims are men, killed by strangers, women are far more likely to die at the hands of someone they know. Women killed by intimate partners or family members account for 58 per cent of all female homicide victims reported globally last year, and little progress has been made in preventing such murders. Targeted responses are clearly needed..

Vienna: UNODC, 2018. 64p.

Edited by Helena Gabriel and Helen Hemblade

This volume again compiles strategies, best practices and innovative approaches, serves as a platform for, and provides practical support to anybody who wishes to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish VAW and gender-related killings of women and girls, i.e. femicide. The second section on cyber crimes includes an interview with Neil Walsh of UNODC, articles on online harassment of women journalists and cyber crimes against women in India, among others.

UN Studies Association (UNSA), 2019. 84p.

By Myrna Dawson, Danielle Sutton, Angelika Zecha, Ciara Boyd, Anna Johnson, and Abigail Mitchell

This report contains critical information that builds on the earlier and ongoing work on femicide in Canada and internationally by highlighting current and emerging trends and issues that require further investigation and monitoring in the coming years.

Guelph Ontario: Canadian Femicide Observatory for Justice and Accountability, 201p. 77p.

By European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)

Sound and comparable data on gender-related killings of women and girls is essential to understanding the prevalence of femicide. This data gathering must be based on a commonly acknowledged definition of femicide and recognised units of measurement and indicators, as well as a typology of femicide. This report gives a comprehensive overview of definitions, data collection systems, methodologies and variables in gathering data on femicide. It outlines whether and how different global and national actors are moving towards: a legal definition of femicide; construction of indicators / measurement framework, based on common (agreed) variables to identify femicide. The aims are to establish a framework for the measurement of femicide at EU level by using variables that might lead to a common definition, and the operationalisation of variables for statistical purposes. This common battery of variables should guide methods for data collection, ensure the gathering of reliable data and result in data comparability across the EU. This report provides the broader context for definitions and variables based on an overview of definitions at both international and Member State levels.

Vilnius, Lithuania: European Institute for Gender Equality, 2021. 63p.

By Tamsin Bradley

Growing awareness of femicide has not universally translated into effective policy and programming. Though legislation relating to gender-based violence and/or femicide exists in many countries, both persist. A combined social, cultural, political and economic approach situates femicide prevention and responses at various levels, including changes in individual behaviour. Using the term ‘femicide’ more frequently at international forums is crucial not only to focus attention on the gendered nature of violence but also to act as a call for action. Situational studies reveal that political will to end femicide differs from country to country. Femicide together with the patriarchal norms and misogyny that precipitate it are not just extra-EU problems. Rather, they are of global concern, demanding a global response; in non-EU countries this response is often dependent on donor funding. We now know more than ever what works to reverse patterns of violence. These patterns can be broken by developing the capacity of women’s organisations and strengthening global feminist movements that work with national and local activist networks. Additionally, engaging men and boys in this process of transformation is vital if we are to address violence against women and girls and ultimately end femicide.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2021. 22p.

By Consuelo Corradi

Femicide is a violation of the basic human rights to life, liberty and personal security, as well as an obstacle to social and economic development. The term indicates the act of intentionally killing a female person, either woman or girl, because of her gender, and it is the end-result of combined risk factors existing at the level of the individual, interpersonal relations, community and society. This crime displays three prominent characteristics: women are disproportionately killed by men; victims have previously experienced non-lethal violence; the rate at which women are killed tends to remain steady over time. Estimates indicate that 87 000 women were intentionally killed in 2017, but the exact number is unknown and suspected to be higher. The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the situation and reduced access to services. Femicide’s classification differs according to context, but most significantly includes: killing by an intimate partner or family member; honour, dowry and witch-hunting deaths; femicide-suicide; pre- and post-natal excess female mortality; infanticide; and deliberate neglect, rooted in a preference for sons over daughters. Collecting accurate data is a strategic goal and necessary to facilitate the design of effective policies.

Brussels: European Parliament, 2021. 35p.

By Jeremy McDermott, James Bargent, Douwe den Held, and Maria Fernanda Ramírez

Over the past few years, the cocaine trade has enjoyed an unprecedented boom, fuelled by soaring production. In 2018, the combined production for Colombia, Bolivia and Peru – the three main producers of cocaine – was more than double that of 2013 (Figure 1). While the rate of growth has slowed of late, there is still no sign of it hitting a peak. Coverage of this phenomenon has largely focused on the United States and its seemingly endless ‘war on drugs’. However, smarter traffickers have long preferred Europe, which has far more potential for growth than the more saturated US market, and higher profits. Cocaine to Europe has increased over the years, to the point where it is now beginning to rival that entering the US mainland. ‘For 2019 and the first months of 2020, the thinking was that the flow of drugs entering or passing through Europe was between 500 and 800 tonnes. We base these numbers in part on the notion that we are seizing 10% to 20% of the total,’ said one senior European police official and cocaine expert, who was not authorized to speak on the record. A significant percentage of that flow is in transit to other parts of the world. Traffickers are pushing eastwards from the more established markets in western Europe towards Russia and Asia – and feeding every country in between.

Washington DC: InSight Crime; Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2021. 78p.

By Ruggero Scaturro and Walter Kemp

Despite the prevalence of trade over land, South Eastern Europe (SEE) also contains more than a hundred ports and 12 container terminals, which are important entry and exit points for trade in the Adriatic, Aegean, Black and Ionian Seas, as well as along the Danube. This report reveals that there is also a maritime Balkan route bringing drugs into SEE through key commercial seaports: cocaine from Latin America and heroin via Türkiye and the Middle East. Other commodities being smuggled along this route include weapons, waste, counterfeit goods and cigarettes. In addition, it provides a glimpse of smuggling along the Danube. The case studies, which feature nine of the region’s commercial ports, are a central element of this report. The map below shows the ports (in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia) that form the basis of the analysis in this study. These ports were chosen to provide an overview of different types of ports (based on size, ownership, location and history of seizures) and to assess their vulnerability to organized crime.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 111p.

By Walter Kemp

The report “Crooked Kaleidoscope – Organized Crime in the Balkans” by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, urges countries and organizations that have invested so much economically and politically over the past 25 years to stay engaged in the region and help it avoid back-sliding. In particular, it calls for stronger measures to fight corruption, enhance justice, and go after the proceeds of crime rather than just focusing on police reform.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017. 44p.

By Rupert Horsley

There has been startling growth in the online illegal wildlife trade (IWT), and broad recognition of the need to apply financial and anti-money-laundering tools to the fight against environmental crime. Much illicit trade carried out over the internet requires some form of electronic payment. This paper explores how various payment methods are used in the online IWT, and the challenges and opportunities these present to law enforcement. Some inroads have been made into combating the online counterfeit trade by suppressing activities of ‘rogue’ digital payment providers that facilitate illicit trade. Opportunities to target the online IWT by monitoring digital payment transactions will emerge only if regulatory systems and technology keep pace with levels of innovation used by illegal wildlife traders to avoid detection.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2018. 20p.

By Théo Clément, Simone Haysom, and Jack Pay

Pangolins are known to be among the world’s most trafficked animals, due to the use of their meat and scales in Africa and Asia. Several species of pangolins have been driven to the brink of extinction due to a massive illicit trade that not only connects pangolin range states in Asia and Africa but also Europe and the United States. This report provides large-scale evidence supporting the claim that the internet plays a major role in the trade of pangolin-derived products across various jurisdictions.

This report provides actionable recommendations for national authorities in China and elsewhere in order to curb the online trade of pangolin-derived items. The MMFU will continue to monitor pangolin-derived products markets on the indexed web and social media sites to ensure sustained awareness about this problem and its effects, and engage with the platforms identified to request action to curb the use of their service in cases where evidence of activity that appears contrary to national and international law exists. More information about the online trade of endangered species will follow as the Unit’s investigations evolve.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022. 42p.

By International Crisis Group

Coca stands at the heart of a fierce debate over Colombia’s worsening rural insecurity. The plant’s leaves are the sole raw material from which cocaine, an illegal drug that generates outlandish profits and finances armed and criminal groups, can be manufactured. Colombian President Iván Duque argues that the whole narcotic supply chain – from coca cultivation to global cocaine trafficking – is the scourge behind rising massacres, forced displacement and assassinations of community leaders in Colombia. With cultivation hitting new highs in recent years, Bogotá has vastly expanded campaigns that involve sending in the army and police to pull up or otherwise eradicate coca crops. It also threatens to restart aerial fumigation. Yet an approach based on forceful eradication of coca, which the U.S. has stoutly backed, tends to worsen rural violence, while failing to reduce drug supply. A new strategy is needed that persuades coca farmers to abandon a plant that offers a stable income and an attractive alternative to other legal crops.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 44p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? On 6 June, Mexico will stage its largest-ever election day, with 21,000 contests nationwide. Opposition forces accuse President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of planning to deepen authoritarian rule should his allies prevail in the polls. Meanwhile, criminal groups exploit electoral competition in their quest for impunity and power. Why does it matter? The country’s politics are highly polarised, and its parties are weak and opportunistic. Criminal groups can use favours and threats to gain influence over future elected officials. Entanglements between government and organised crime that have long undermined security policies help perpetuate Mexico’s high levels of violence. What should be done? Severing links between criminals and state officials will be challenging, especially given the government’s apparent reticence to act. Still, outside actors should encourage investment in independent election oversight bodies and local institutions, and a shift toward tailored and less militarised policies to curb insecurity in Mexico’s most conflict-ridden areas.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2021. 33p.