By Ian Tennant and Prem Mahadevan

Summary This briefing note summarises the GI-TOC’s research and experiences in engaging with and supporting civil society responses to organised crime. This is provided in the context of the ongoing threats and shrinking space for civil society, and a need for policymakers and officials to understand civil society’s role, value and potential. It is hoped that this briefing note can provide researchers and officials with a background briefing that could enable improved policy responses aimed at supporting civil society as part of whole-of-society efforts to prevent and counter organised crime.

Briefing Note 27

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2024. 10p.

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Summary As a global challenge, organised crime is increasingly threatening the safety and security of citizens. Despite the real-world impact, there is an apparent disconnection between international human rights laws and policies, and responses to transnational organized crime. Even though the regulatory frameworks may have different objectives and scopes, human rights and responses to organised crime are not concepts at odds. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive or comprehensive account of all human rights issues deriving from the workings of organised crime, this briefing note identifies four areas that justify greater attention to the fundamental rights of natural persons, and convergence in the human rights and crime agendas. It draws on a review of Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s research and programming, and the author’s own experience as a lawyer working on organised crime issues for the past five years.

Briefing Note 29

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) , 2024. 10[p.

By Reynell Badill and Víctor M. Mijares

Why do criminal groups decide to adopt political discourses? We argue that an armed group's discursive politicisation (the public declaration of political motivations) is more likely when the state declares the organisation to be an existential threat, militarises the fight against it (securitisation), and when the leaders of the armed group have had political training. This discourse aims to reduce the state's military actions against them and gain civilian support. This argument is demonstrated through a qualitative comparative analysis of six Latin American cases: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and Los Rastrojos (Colombia), Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Peru), Primeiro Comando da Capital (Brazil), Tren de Aragua (Venezuela), and Cartel de Sinaloa (Mexico). Three of them adopted a political discourse, and the others did not. We provide an analytical framework for criminal actors who do not necessarily fit into insurgent, paramilitary or simple criminal group typology.

October 2021Global Crime 22(4):312-335

By The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)

Cocaine, cannabis resin and pharmaceutical opioids are the internationally trafficked drugs most seized in the Sahel. In terms of quantity, cannabis herb is actually the most commonly seized drug in the Sahel countries, but it seems to be produced locally and trafficked mostly for local consumption. Cannabis is also the principal substance for which people seek treatment in the region. The geographical location of West Africa renders it a natural stopover point for cocaine produced in South America en route to Europe, one of the largest consumer markets for cocaine after North America. In a context of increasing cocaine production in South America and increasing demand for the drug in Europe, flows of cocaine trafficked through West Africa have intensified. The re-emergence of large cocaine seizures since 2019 suggests a surge in large shipments of the drug to the coastal countries of West Africa, with 9.5 tons being seized in Cabo Verde. Although the majority of the cocaine reaching West Africa typically continues northwards towards North Africa and Europe via maritime routes along the African coast, an increasing number of significant cocaine seizures involving Sahel countries has provided evidence of large-scale cocaine trafficking through the region. From an average of 13 kg per year in the period 2015–2020, the quantity of cocaine seized in the Sahel countries increased to 41 kg in 2021 and 1,466 kg in 2022, with the bulk reported by Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. Annual estimates were not available for 2023, but at the time of writing over 2.3 tons of cocaine had already been seized in Mauritania in 2023.

Cannabis resin is the second most seized drug in the Sahel countries after cannabis herb, with 24.8 tons seized in the period 2021–2022. Representing over 52.6 per cent of the total quantity of cannabis resin seized in West and Central Africa in the same period, this illustrates the importance of the Sahel route for cannabis resin trafficking. According to data from the Sahel countries, the cannabis resin trafficked in the region generally originates in Morocco, where an increase in cannabis resin production has been reported, reaching an estimated 901 tons in 2022. It is typically destined for countries in Western Europe and North Africa. Aside from the direct trafficking route between Spain and Morocco, cannabis resin is typically trafficked overland from Morocco to Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Chad, then onwards to Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Since 2020, the Sahel countries have reported that cannabis resin is being transported by sea via an alternative maritime route, mostly from Morocco down the coast of West Africa to ports on the Gulf of Guinea, in Benin and Togo in particular, before being transported north to the Niger and then on to North Africa. The reconfiguration of the cannabis resin trafficking routes in West Africa is likely to have an effect on the drug distribution networks operating between North Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. For example, Moroccan drug traffickers are likely to become less reliant on Malian organized crime groups, while traffickers in the Gulf of Guinea are likely to be increasingly exposed to cannabis resin, enabling them to diversify their trade and the markets to which they have access. Between 2011 and 2021, the annual prevalence of opioid use (including opiates) increased from 0.33 to 1.24 per cent in Africa. The non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids appears to have grown considerably, from just two countries (the Niger and Togo) citing tramadol as the principal drug of concern by people entering drug treatment in 2017, to five countries (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, the Niger and Sierra Leone) in 2019. Indeed, the non-medical use of tramadol remains a threat in North, West and Central Africa in particular. Tramadol is the most used opioid for non-medical purposes in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Moreover, in 2022, Tramadol was the second most common drug for which female patients sought treatment in Mali and Mauritania etc.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 40p.

By Peggy C. Giordano; Monica A. Longmore; Wendy D. Manning; Jennifer E. Copp

The research described in this report sought to address social and individual-level mechanisms that drive successful and sustained criminal desistance through a mixed-method project that included analyses based on the existing six waves of the Toledo Adolescent Relationships Study (TARS) over an 18-year time span. The researchers’ goal was to more fully inform criminal justice policy priorities and help design more effective criminal recidivism intervention efforts. The researchers proposed conducting desistance narratives with a subset of male and female respondents who had evidenced a pattern of sustained criminal desistance, and contrasting those respondents with individuals who have persisted in criminal activity as well as others with patterns of intermittent criminal activity. The report details the researchers’ methodology, and notes that their goal was to incorporate insights from the narratives as well as contemporary theorizing to systematically distinguish individuals who persisted, desisted, and were intermittently involved in criminal activity. The three guiding research aims were: to identify individual-level factors linked to sustained desistance; to examine social network influences on desistance processes; and to determine gender similarities and differences in desistance processes. The report provides a discussion of outcomes and findings, and a listing of artifacts that resulted from the project.

Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University, 2023. 27p.

By Morgyn Young

Recently, Louisiana classified Simple Burglary of an Inhabited Dwelling, when a person is present during the commission of the crime, as a crime of violence. The overwhelming majority in both the House and the Senate voted to deem the crime a crime of violence. Yet, LA. REV. STAT. § 14:60 (Simple Burglary of an Inhabited Dwelling) does not contain an inherently violent element. In this note, the Author takes a deep dive into the Louisiana Code to uncover the foundation needed to classify a crime as a crime of violence. In doing so, it becomes apparent that Louisiana has begun to stray away from a traditional notion of violence. Many of the amendments, including La. Rev. Stat. § 14:60, do not follow conventional notions of violence in that they do not have a nexus to physical injury. This expansion has reached the point where there is no longer a list of attributes that can be used to determine a crime of violence.

Throughout the article, the Author uses Simple Burglary of an Inhabited Dwelling when a person is present as an example to further portray the idea that the Legislature does not follow the crime of violence definition listed in the code, nor is there a readily apparent framework utilized when deeming crimes "violent." To begin, the Author explores how the definition of a crime of violence has grown outside the bounds of the traditional definition of violence by comparing differing "violence" definitions, both past and present. The Author notes that the definition of violence is constantly evolving. However, the Legislature has expanded far past the modern definition. The Author furthers the analysis by examining the different crimes the Legislature has deemed violent compared to La. Rev. Stat. 14:40. Through the study, it becomes clear that the Legislature, as a whole, cannot define violence effectively, nor does the enumerated list under a crime of violence reveal a consistent determination. As in, the Legislature has not plausibly categorized violent crimes. In further explanation, when singling out just the property crimes listed as a crime of violence, there is not a consistent attribute between the crimes listed to determine what escalated each crime to a crime of violence. The Author ends the analysis by attempting to define the elements of La. Rev. Stat. § 14:2, which proves to be quite challenging as the Louisiana Supreme Court has not provided much insight into the framework of classifying a crime. The elements of importance consist of physical force, substantial risk, and the ordinary case of an offense. The Author continues by comparing Louisiana's definition of a crime of violence to the United States Code's definition. The Author points out the resemblance between the two statutes, yet verbiage contained in 18 U.S.C § 16 was deemed unconstitutional. Using both statutes, multiple cases, and burglary statistics the Author further proves the idea that simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, when a person is present, should not be classified as a crime of violence. As the crime does not entail physical force to the victim, an intent to harm a person, nor is the risk of harm to the victim substantial. Additionally, the offense cannot be correlated with the existing property crimes labeled a crime of violence, and the offense cannot be classified a crime of violence under the definition provided in La. Rev. Stat. § 14:2. Ultimately, this demonstrates the Legislature's sway from a traditional definition of violence and the legislature acting without limitation in classifying crimes as violent. This never-ending expansion or overreaching fuels an ineffective judicial system, ultimately affecting every citizen in some shape or form.

Unpublished paper, 2024. 27p.

By The U.S.National Institute of Justice

In NIJ’s new publication Desistance From Crime: Implications for Research, Policy, and Practice, experts explore these and other critical questions surrounding the process of individuals ceasing engagement in criminal activities, referred to as “desistance.” They discuss how to conceptualize and measure desistance and offer innovative ways of using desistance-focused approaches in criminal justice practice, policy, and research.

This collection of work takes important steps in describing how a desistance framework can move the field forward across key decision points in the criminal justice system. As a result, the field will be better positioned to meet the needs of stakeholders, improve individual outcomes, and effectively reduce crime and promote public safety for communities across the United States.

Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2021. 234p.

By Mathijs Kros, Tjeerd W. Piersma & Karin A. Beijersbergen

This paper investigates criminal career characteristics and trajectories of domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers in the Netherlands. We used longitudinal data which includes the criminal cases from 1997 until 2020 for all people of 12 years or older. We studied all 89,062 offenders that had at least one criminal case in the period between 2002 and 2004. Semiparametric group trajectory models were used to cluster these offenders into groups with similar criminal careers. Our results suggest that in order to predict who will follow the career path of a life-course persistent offender, it is important to distinguish between specific groups of offenders. Life-course persistent offenders are found amongst domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers, but not amongst offenders of other types of crime. Furthermore, the size of the group of life-course persistent offenders varies between the domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers and is largest for domestic burglars. Other criminal career characteristics, such as age of onset, age of termination, duration, and specialisation, are also compared between offender groups.

J Dev Life Course Criminology 9, 379–403 (2023).

By Georg Heiler, Tuan Pham, Jan Korbel, Johannes Wachs & Stefan Thurner

We use a comprehensive longitudinal dataset on criminal acts over 6 years in a European country to study specialization in criminal careers. We present a method to cluster crime categories by their relative co-occurrence within criminal careers, deriving a natural, data-based taxonomy of criminal specialization. Defining specialists as active criminals who stay within one category of offending behavior, we study their socio-demographic attributes, geographic range, and positions in their collaboration networks relative to their generalist counterparts. Compared to generalists, specialists tend to be older, are more likely to be women, operate within a smaller geographic range, and collaborate in smaller, more tightly-knit local networks. We observe that specialists are more intensely embedded in criminal networks, suggesting a potential source of self-reinforcing dynamics in criminal careers.

Scientific Reports 13, 17160 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-43552-6

By Christopher Wildeman

This article provides a critical overview in five stages of roughly 50 years of research on the intergenerational transmission of criminal justice contact. In the first stage, I document that research on the intergenerational transmission of crime and criminal justice contact focused primarily on crime until the mid-1990s, at which point research rapidly shifted in the direction of criminal justice contact (specifically, incarceration). In the second stage, I document that research on the intergenerational transmission of crime and the intergenerational transmission of criminal justice contact tended to use the same measures—i.e., self-reported and administrative indicators of criminal justice contact with minimal information on criminal activity—but discussed them in different ways. In the third stage, I review research on the broader effects of incarceration to highlight mechanisms through which parental criminal justice contact may independently influence children’s criminal activity. In the fourth stage, I review research on the intergenerational transmission of criminal justice contact. In the final stage, I conclude by calling for new data collection efforts that provide high-quality measures of both crime and criminal justice contact of both parents and children

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2020. 3:217–4

By Volkan Topalli, Timothy Dickinson, and Scott Jacques

Active offender research relies on the collection of data from noninstitutionalized criminals and has made significant contributions to our understanding of the etiology of serious crime. This review covers its history as well as its methodological, scientific, and ethical pitfalls and advantages. Because study subjects are currently and freely engaging in crime at the time of data collection, their memories, attitudes, and feelings about their criminality and specific criminal events are rich, detailed, and accurate. Contemporary approaches to active offender research employ systematized formats for data collection and analysis that improve the validity of findings and help illuminate the foreground of crime. Although active offender research has traditionally relied on qualitative techniques, we outline the potential for it to make contributions via mixed methods, experiments, and emerging computational and technological approaches, such as virtual reality simulation studies and agent-based modeling.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2020. 3:189–215

By Peng Chen and Justin Kurland

“Strike Hard” is an enhanced law-enforcement strategy in China that aims to suppress crime, but measurement of the crime-reducing effect and potential changes in the spatiotemporal concentration of crime associated with “Strike Hard” remains unknown. This paper seeks to examine the impact, if any, of “Strike Hard” on the spatiotemporal clustering of burglary incidents. Two and half years of residential burglary incidents from Chaoyang, Beijing is used to examine repeat and near-repeat burglary incidents before, during, and after the “Strike Hard” intervention and a new technique that enables the comparison of repeat and near repeat patterns across di erent temporal periods is introduced to achieve this. The results demonstrate the intervention disrupted the repeat pattern during the “Strike Hard” period reducing the observed ratio of single-day repeat burglaries by 155%; however, these same single-day repeat burglary events increased by 41% after the cessation of the intervention. Findings with respect to near repeats are less remarkable with nominal evidence to support that the intervention produced a significant decrease, but coupled with other results, suggest that spatiotemporal displacement may have been an undesired by-product of “Strike Hard”. This study from a non-Western setting provides further evidence of the generalizability of findings related to repeat and near-repeat patterns of burglary and further highlights the limited preventative effects that the “Strike Hard” enhanced law enforcement campaign had on burglary

ISPRS Int. J. Geo-Inf. 2020, 9, 150

By Michael Zoorob, Daniel T. O'Brien

Crime is highly concentrated at places that lack capable place managers (i.e., landlords and their delegates). In response, numerous cities have instituted problem property interventions that pressure landowners to better manage properties suffering from decay, nuisance, or crime. This approach is distinctive in that it both targets a place and incentivizes those legally responsible to improve its management, yet little is known about the efficacy of such interventions. We assess the short- and long-term impacts of such interventions in Boston, Massachusetts, using matched difference-in-difference analyses. Problem property interventions reduced crime and disorder relative to comparable matched properties. They also led to property investment and landowner turnover, suggesting strengthened place management. In addition, drops in crime and disorder were observed at other properties on the same street, although not at other properties with the same owner throughout the city. This study, therefore, provides evidence that problem property interventions compel landowners to better manage the targeted property and that these effects have a diffusion of benefits on surrounding properties. The effect on place management, however, was limited to the target property and did not reliably generalize to the landowner's other holdings. This study reveals nuance in the ways that problem property interventions can benefit communities.

Criminology, Volume62, Issue1 February 2024 Pages 64-89

By Nick Petersen, Ojmarrh Mitchell, Shi Yan

In recent years, there has been a rise in so-called “progressive prosecutors” focused on criminal justice reforms. Although there has been considerable debate about the relationship between progressive prosecution policies and crime rates, there has been surprisingly little empirical research on the topic. Building on the limited extant research, we examined whether the inauguration of progressive prosecutors in the nation's 100 most populous counties impacted crime rates during a 21-year period (2000 to 2020). After developing an original database of progressive prosecutors in the 100 largest counties, we used heterogeneous difference-in-differences regressions to examine the influence of progressive prosecutors on crime rates. Results show that the inauguration of progressive prosecutors led to statistically higher index property (∼7%) and total crime rates (driven by rising property crimes), and these effects were strongest since 2013—a period with an increasing number of progressive prosecutors. However, violent crime rates generally were not higher after a progressive prosecutor assumed control.

Policy implications

Despite concerns that the election of progressive prosecutors leads to “surging” levels of violence, these findings suggest that progressive-oriented prosecutorial reforms led to relatively higher rates of property crime but had limited impact on rates of violent crime. In fact, in absolute terms, crime rates fell in jurisdictions with traditional and progressive prosecutors. Yet, relative property crime rates were greater after the inauguration of progressive prosecutors. Given that prior research shows progressive prosecutors reduce mass incarceration and racial inequalities, our findings indicate that higher property crime rates may be the price for these advancements.

Criminology & Public Policy Version of Record online: 18 April 2024

By Craig S Wright

Cybercrime has become a pervasive and complex issue in today’s interconnected world, posing significant threats to individuals, businesses, and governments. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the diverse aspects related to cybercrime, including its historical context, demographic and geographic dimensions, environmental influences, and preventive strategies. This review provides a holistic overview of the multifaceted dimensions of cybercrime. By understanding its historical context, demographic and geographic aspects, environmental influences, and preventive strategies, policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and researchers can work collaboratively to combat cyber threats effectively. Such a comprehensive approach will help create a safer digital environment and protect individuals, organizations, and societies from the adverse impacts of cybercrime. Moreover, through ongoing research and collaboration, it is possible to develop innovative solutions and adapt to the evolving landscape of cyber threats, ensuring a secure and resilient digital future.

Unpublished paper, 2023. 54p.

By Folahanmi Aina and John Sunday Ojo

Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) use social media platforms to promote extremist content and coordinate agendas.  The use of digital platforms to disseminate information and coordinate activities by VEOs in Nigeria has grown considerably in recent years. This report analyses the adoption of social media before and after attacks by Boko Haram, Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru. In the post-attack environment, Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru use platforms to claim responsibility and display their strengths against the state’s security forces. By demonstrating their capacity to attack state security forces, the three groups aim to erode the public’s confidence in the state military’s capacity to safeguard national security. The key findings of this report are as follows: Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru previously leveraged popular social media platforms, including YouTube, Facebook, Telegram and Instagram. These platforms were used to promote propaganda and create awareness regarding upcoming attacks. However, all three groups have now had their use of these platforms restricted or banned. ISWAP has switched to using WhatsApp as a secure platform for communication before, during and after attacks. Rocket.Chat and Telegram have also been instrumental in ISWAP’s information dissemination. Boko Haram uses Telegram to share its activities in the pre-attack and post-attack environments. Ansaru has yet to appear on social media platforms due to its underground activities, which are hard to monitor. The recent acquisition of high-speed satellite internet has enhanced ISWAP’s communication with its audience and enabled coordinated attacks. Combating the exploitation of social media platform by VEOs requires a multidimensional approach. Effective collaboration with technology companies becomes imperative to identify extremist content. Building technological infrastructure for the state requires synergistic collaboration with the military and intelligence agencies to enable the removal of extremism from social media platforms. Devising multilingual and specialised algorithms to detect coded extremism messages and audio-visual content is essential for effective counter-extremism digital architecture. Investing in current technology through research and algorithm development must be prioritised to identify violent extremist content in Nigeria and beyond.

London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 2023. 30p.

By Suzanne Newcombe, Sarah Harvey, Jane Cooper, Ruby Forrester, Jo Banks and Shanon Shah

The word ‘cultic’ is applied to a diverse range of online activity. This label is not always intended to convey a negative judgement; for example, individual influencers, music groups and brands aspire to a ‘cult following’. However, the use of the words ‘cult’ or ‘cultic’ is usually intended by the speaker as a judgement to draw attention to something that may have some elements typically associated with religion (for example, idealisation of a particular individual, a specific worldview and/or ritual practices) as well as the potential to cause harm and violence. This report proposes three ideal-typical groupings of online cultic activity that can glorify and inspire violent extremisms: ‘Cultic’ Religious Groups, ‘Online Cultic Milieus’ and ‘Cultic Fandoms’. This is not an exhaustive description of online activity that has been termed ‘cultic’ in popular culture, but it provides a good starting point for further analysis. This report argues that the understanding of ‘cults’ and online activity needs to be carefully nuanced; the complexities of online and offline activities that might result in violent extremism need to be analysed and risk assessed at the level of both group/social movement and individual. It is important to understand that there are a range of ways individuals interact with these cultic online environments that may or may not represent warning signs or pathways into violent extremism. A holistic understanding of both the nature of the cultic online milieu and an individual’s engagement with that environment is warranted before making assumptions about the nature of any individual’s engagement.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), July 2023.

By Julia Kupper and Reid Meloy

This pilot study examines the correlation of online and on-the-ground behaviours of three lone-actor terrorists prior to their intended and planned attacks on soft targets in North America and Europe: the Pittsburgh synagogue shooter, the Buffalo supermarket shooter and the Bratislava bar shooter. The activities were examined with the definition of the proximal warning indicator energy burst from the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), originally defined as an acceleration in frequency or variety of preparatory behaviours related to the target. An extensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of primary and secondary sources was conducted, including raw data from different tech platforms (Gab, Discord and Twitter–now X) and open-source materials, such as criminal complaints, superseding indictments and court trial transcripts. Preliminary findings of this small sample suggest an inverse relationship between the online and offline behaviours across all three perpetrators. The average point of time between the decision to attack and the actual attack was five months, with an elevation of digital activities in the three months leading up to the incident, along with some indications of offline planning. In the week prior to the event, social media activity decreased–specifically on the day before the acts of violence with two subjects going completely dark–while terrestrial preparations increased. On the actual day of the incident, all assailants accelerated their tactical on-the-ground actions and resurfaced in the online sphere to publish their final messages in the minutes or hours prior to the attack. It appears that the energy burst behaviours in the digital sphere and the offline actions can be measured in both frequency and variety. Operational implications of this negative correlation are suggested for intelligence analysts, counter-terrorism investigators and threat assessors.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2023. 36p.

By Nafees Hamid and Cristina Ariza

Question: Are those radicalised offline or online more of a threat? Which group is harder to detect, more successful in completing attacks, and more lethal when they do so? Is the pattern different for youth versus older perpetrators and for men versus women? This report investigates these questions. Database: We created a database containing 439 perpetrators involved in 245 attacks between 1 January 2014 and 1 January 2021. It includes every publicly known completed attack and an extensive sampling of thwarted attacks. Attacks were all jihadist‑linked in eight Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Type of radicalisation: In our database, radicalisation primarily happens offline; over half the individuals in our database had been radicalised via offline networks. Success and lethality: Individuals who were radicalised offline were three times more likely than individuals radicalised online to complete an attack successfully. Those radicalised offline are 18 times more lethal than individuals in the online category. Those radicalised online are almost eight times more likely to fail than to succeed. Group attacks: Individuals who were radicalised offline are almost three times more likely to attack or plot in groups than individuals radicalised online. Success of group attacks: While groups were more likely to be thwarted by the police than to succeed (regardless of how individuals had been radicalised), successful groups of people radicalised offline were more lethal than their lone actor counterparts (15%). Family and friends: Some 87% of those with radicalised friends and 74% with radicalised relatives plotted or attacked together. Foreign fighters: Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who were mostly radicalised offline, have the same success rate as non‑FTFs. But success rate increases if they have spent more than a year in a terrorist training location. Age: Online radicalisation is on the rise for young people (born from the 2000s onwards), although most individuals, including young people, are still radicalised offline. Gender: Women appear to be more likely to have been radicalised online. Bottom line: Those radicalised offline are greater in number, more successful in completing attacks and more deadly than those radicalised online.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London. 2022. 40p.

By Marcial A. G. Suarez, Luís Antônio Francisco de Souza, Carlos Henrique Aguiar Serra

This paper discusses the deadly use of violence as a public security agenda, focusing on police lethality and military interventions. Through a literature review to understanding concepts – such as “war,” for example – used in public security policy agendas, the study seeks to frame the notion of political violence, mainly referring to the policies designed to combat violence in Brazil. The objective is to problematize the public security policy based on the idea of confrontation, which adopts the logic of war and the notion of “enemy”. The paper is divided into three parts. The first is a conceptual approach to violence and war, and the second is the analysis of the dynamic of deadly use of force. Finally, the third part is a contextual analysis of violence in Rio de Janeiro, its characteristics, and central actors, using official statistics on violence in the region.

Brazil: Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 2021. 22p.