By of Justice Assistance

Co-occurrence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance use disorder (SUD) are very common, so it is crucial that SUD treatment providers incorporate initial PTSD screening and ongoing PTSD symptom monitoring. Doing so will allow for early intervention opportunities and better long-term outcomes. PTSD and SUDs often occur together, and an individual with diagnosed PTSD-SUD faces several associated long-term health risks. As a result, SUD treatment providers should consider PTSD screening at the beginning of treatment programs as well as ongoing PTSD symptom monitoring. Screening and monitoring for PTSD-SUD will allow for early intervention using strategies that are tailored for a dual diagnosis. Lifetime PTSD is a common psychiatric diagnosis (occurring in approximately 6.1 percent of adults), with even higher rates among rural, low-income communities. PTSD alone is associated with several adverse health outcomes, but individuals with PTSD also are likely to suffer from other disorders, including substance use disorders (SUDs). Individuals with both PTSD and an SUD (PTSD-SUD) report more severe long-term functional impairments than individuals with only one of these diagnoses. In addition, SUD recovery rates are much lower in people with PTSD than in those without.

Washington, DC: BJA, 2023. 6p.

By Jonathan Klick and John MacDonald

Objectives This study examines the impact of alcohol consumption in a Major League Baseball (MLB) stadium on area level counts of crime. The modal practice at MLB stadiums is to stop selling alcoholic beverages after the seventh inning. Baseball is not a timed game, so the duration between the last call for alcohol at the end of the seventh inning and the end of the game varies considerably, providing a unique natural experiment to estimate the relationship between alcohol consumption and crime near a stadium on game days. Methods Crime data were obtained from Philadelphia for the period 2006–2015 and geocoded to the area around the MLB stadium as well as popular sports bars. We rely on difference-in-differences regression models to estimate the change in crime on home game days around the stadium as the game time extends into extra innings to other areas of the city and around sports bars in Philadelphia relative to days when the baseball team plays away from home. Results When there are extra innings and more game-time after the seventh inning alcohol sales stoppage crime declines signifcantly around the stadium. The crime reduction beneft of the last call alcohol policy is undone when a complex of sports bars opens in the stadium parking lot in 2012. The results suggest that alcohol consumption during baseball games is a contributor to crime. Conclusions The fndings provide further support for environmental theories of crime that note the congregation of people in places with excessive alcohol consumption is a generator of violent crime in cities. The consumption of alcohol in MLB stadiums appears to increase crime.

Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2021) 37:813–834

Aaron Chalfin, Benjamin Hansen and Rachel Ryley

For nearly every crime there is a victim. However, the vast majority of studies in the economics of crime have focused the causal determinants of criminality. We present novel evidence on the causal determinants of victimization, focusing on legal access to alcohol. The social costs of alcohol use and abuse are sizable and well-documented. We find criminal victimization — for both violent and property crimes — increases noticeably at age 21. Effects are not present at other birthdays and do not appear to be driven by a “birthday celebration effect.” The effects are particularly large for sexual assaults, especially those that occur in non-residential locations. Our results suggest prior research which has focused on criminality has understated the true social costs associated with increased access to alcohol.

Journal of Human Resources. Vol. 58, Issue 6. 1 Nov 2023

By A. Bukten , I. Skjærvø , M.R. Stavseth

Introduction: Despite a high prevalence of opioid use disorder (OUD) among people in prison, there is little knowledge of how many receive the recommended opioid agonist treatment (OAT) and what characterizes those who receive OAT and those who do not when it comes to mental health comorbidities. We aimed to describe people with OUD in Norwegian prisons over a ten-year period and their OAT status, and to investigate comorbidity of mental health disorders stratified by gender.

Methods: Data from the PriSUD study, including all people (≥19 years old) imprisoned in Norway between 2010 and 2019, linked to national patient registry data, including ICD-10 codes. We calculated the prevalence (1-year and 10-year) of OUD and OAT, and mental health comorbidity stratified on OAT-status and gender.

Results: Among the cohort (n=51,148), 7 282 (14.2%) were diagnosed with OUD during the period of observation. Of those, 4 689 (64.4%) received OAT. People with OUD had high levels of comorbidity, including other drug use disorders (92.4% OAT, 90.3% non-OAT), alcohol use disorder (32.1% OAT, 44.4% non-OAT) and any other mental health disorders (61.6% OAT, 68.2% non-OAT). The proportion receiving OAT among people with OUD increased markedly during the ten years of observation; from 35.7% in 2010–70.9% in 2019.

Conclusion. People with OUD, both receiving OAT and not, had substantially more mental health comorbidities than the non-OUD population. Understanding how the prison population changes over time especially in terms of mental health needs related to OUD, is important for correctional health service planning.

Drug and Alcohol Dependence. Volume 250, 1 September 2023, 110896

By Jon E. Zibbell , Arnie Aldridge, Megan Grabenauer , David Heller , Sarah Duhart Clarke, , DeMia Pressley, Hope Smiley McDonald

Summary Background The overdose epidemic in the United States (US) continues to generate unprecedented levels of mortality. There is urgent need for a national data system capable of yielding high-quality, timely, and actionable information on existing and emerging drugs. Public health researchers have started using law enforcement forensic laboratory data to obtain surveillance information on illicit drugs. This study is the first to use drug reports from the entire US to examine correlations between a changing drug supply and increasing opioid-involved overdose deaths (OOD) on a national scale. Methods This study is observational and investigates associations between law enforcement drug reports and OOD for the US from 2014 to 2019. OOD data are from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Vital Statistics System restricted-use multiple cause of death files. The US Drug Enforcement Administration’s National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS) contains forensic laboratory–tested drug exhibit information for the entire US (NFLIS-Drug). Counts of forensic laboratory reports and OOD were aggregated for each state by month, quarter, and year. A two-way fixed effects model was used to estimate contemporaneous and lagged associations. Findings Between 2014 and 2019 in the US, 249,522 OOD were reported, with the annual number nearly doubling from 28,723 to 50,179. OOD involving illicitly manufactured fentanyls (IMF) also increased substantially during this period, from 19.4% to 72.9%. In addition, 3,817,438 forensic laboratory reports in the US that were reported to NFLIS-Drug contained an opioid, stimulant, or benzodiazepine. Reports of fentanyl and fentanyl-related compounds (FFRC) had the strongest association with OOD. Each additional FFRC exhibit was associated with a 2.97% (95% CI: 1.7%, 4.1%) increase in OOD per 100,000 persons per quarter. Interpretation Adding to the emerging consensus, protracted growth in IMF supply was more strongly associated with OOD than all other illicit drugs reported to NFLIS-Drug over the study time period. Findings demonstrate NFLIS-Drug data usefulness for research that require proxy indicators for the illicit drugs supply. A concerted effort between public health and public safety to make NFLIS-Drug more timely could strengthen its utility as a national, public health, drug surveillance system.

The Lancet Regional Health - Americas. Volume 25, September 2023, 100569

By Paul J. Larkin

The raw, agricultural form of cannabis is not capable of being approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—regardless of whether Congress or the U.S. Attorney General reschedules it downward from Schedule I. Rescheduling cannabis would not allow the drug to be distributed under federal law unless the FDA finds that it is a safe, effective, and uniform drug. The FDA could not do so under existing law, and the Attorney General cannot waive the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s requirements. Congress could do so by statute—but any such law would put at risk the health of users and nonusers in order to satisfy the desires of a minority for a transient high.

Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2023. 57p.

By the United States Government Accountability Office; Triana McNeil

Since 1999, more than 800,000 people have died from a drug overdose in the United States, with over 86,000 occurring during the 12-month period ending in July 2020, according to the most recent provisional data available from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health Statistics. In recent years, some states have enacted Good Samaritan and Naloxone Access laws to help reduce overdose deaths and respond to opioid overdoses. The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 included a provision for GAO to review these laws. This report addresses the following: (1) the efforts ONDCP has taken to collect and disseminate information on Good Samaritan and Naloxone Access laws, (2) the extent to which states, territories, and D.C. have these laws and the characteristics of them, and (3) what research indicates concerning the effects of Good Samaritan laws. To answer these questions, GAO collected and reviewed ONDCP documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO also reviewed and analyzed selected characteristics of jurisdictions’ Good Samaritan and Naloxone Access laws. Further, GAO conducted a literature review of empirical studies published from 2010 through May 2020 that examined the effects of Good Samaritan laws. GAO provided a draft of this report to ONDCP for comments. ONDCP provided technical comments which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2021. 57p.

By The Council for Court Excellence

What follows is an edited transcript of a virtual public forum held on September 15, 2021, by the Council for Court Excellence (CCE) and the Office of the District of Columbia Auditor (ODCA), highlighting issues presented by the partial legalization of marijuana in the District of Columbia. This event was the last of four forums focused on timely criminal justice issues in the District. Each forum featured a panel of experts, local stakeholders and impacted individuals brought together to address barriers to effective policy, explore whether community needs are being addressed, and review options for action on each forum topic. Here we share the discussion from the fourth forum, “Confusion and Exclusion: Impacts of the Hazy State of D.C. Marijuana Legalization on People with Criminal Records,” focused on marijuana law and policy in D.C., the risks and barriers posed to people with criminal records, and the opportunities to transform our system moving forward. Participants provided thought-provoking commentary, constructive criticisms, and concrete policy proposals. The edited transcript allows readers to consider the nuances of each expert’s perspective and their real-time responses to one another’s ideas. Martin Austermuhle, a reporter and editor with WAMU 88.5 who frequently reports on the cannabis industry and local government, moderated the forum. The discussants included: • Queen Adesuyi, a policy manager at the Drug Policy Alliance; • Corey Barnette, owner and CEO of both District Growers LLC and Kinfolk Dispensary; • The Hon. David Grosso, a partner at Arent Fox LLP, previously served on the D.C. Council as an At-Large Member from 2013-2021 and was an early proponent of marijuana decriminalization; • Emily Gunston, Deputy Attorney General for Legislative Affairs and Policy for the D.C. Office of the Attorney General; and • Crystal Marshall, returning citizen and member of the Community Family Life Services Speakers Bureau. The panelists opened by discussing the history of cannabis law and policy in the District, and the jurisdictional issues presented by Congressional oversight. Each year since 2014, the House of Representatives has included a budget rider forbidding the D.C. Council from enacting any tax or regulatory structure related to recreational marijuana use, which has prevented the District from fully legalizing the sale of cannabis. D.C. is left in limbo: possession and private use of small amounts of marijuana are legal but purchasing and selling marijuana remain illegal. Plus, because the federal government controls D.C.’s pre-trial supervision, probation, parole, and supervised release, people under correctional supervision are still at risk of violating the terms for their supervision for legal use of cannabis. D.C. was one of the first jurisdictions in the United States to legalize medical marijuana use. Given the devastating impact of the “War on Drugs” on Black and Brown individuals, families, and communities, panelists noted that D.C. was at the forefront of social- and racial-justice oriented cannabis laws passed over the last 20 years. Panelists discussed the ways in which the District has prioritized Black and Brown people and communities in the medical cannabis industry including those who are patients and those who own, operate, and staff dispensaries. The discussants agreed that the racial equity goals of marijuana laws—to close wealth gaps among racial groups, to reinvest in those communities of color hit hardest by the “War on Drugs,” and to ultimately end discrimination in enforcement of drug laws more broadly—have not yet been met. Several panelists mentioned the necessity of a tax-and-regulate structure that would enable D.C. to collect proceeds from marijuana sales and, most importantly, reinvest those proceeds in social, educational, employment, and other programs to support members of historically marginalized Black and Brown communities. A particular focus of this discussion was the impact of D.C.’s perplexing marijuana laws on people in the District who have criminal records including marijuana-related charges. The panel described the personal toll that such confusion can take: it can lead those with criminal records to fear any interaction with cannabis, even interactions that are legal in D.C., because of the potential an arrest or conviction poses to their housing, employment, or immigration status. The disproportionately Black and poor District residents with criminal records are also prohibited under the current law from participating in the medical cannabis industry, depriving them of the opportunity to capitalize on economic benefits that other D.C. residents are free to pursue. Panelists also discussed the ways in which the Metropolitan Police Department’s enforcement of the complicated laws can impact crime, safety, and the economy. Participants cited cause for optimism, however, and shared their views on proposed legislation that would change the status of legal cannabis in D.C.: the MORE Act and the Cannabis Administration and Opportunity Act in Congress, and two bills proposed by Mayor Muriel Bowser and by Chairman Phil Mendelson of the D.C. Council. The panelists agreed that any new law should prioritize investment in Black and Brown communities and preserve the robust medical marijuana industry that has grown in D.C. Specific suggestions included removing the Congressional rider on the D.C. budget; establishing designated “use sites” for those in public housing or other housing that prohibits marijuana use; granting special business licenses to individuals who were directly harmed by the War on Drugs; funding industry training specifically for people with criminal records; and reframing marijuana as a medical and recreational aid, rather than a vice. The bibliography provides further reading on marijuana law and policy, local control of the District’s criminal justice system, the impacts of both on people with criminal records, and other issues discussed throughout the forum. Biographies of the discussants are also included at the end of this report. Finally, a full video of the panel can be found at: https://youtu.be/uFV6SNeuHv0. The transcript in this report has been lightly edited for length and clarity

Washington, DC: Office of the DC Auditor, 2021. 40p.

By John Woodhouse

There is no general prohibition on drinking in the street but certain offences relating to alcohol may be committed in “public places” (this generally means “any place to which the public have access, whether on payment or otherwise” (the Licensing Act 1872 and subsequent Licensing Acts)).

Councils can use public spaces protection orders to restrict the consumption of alcohol in a public space where it is associated with anti-social behaviour. It is an offence to fail to comply with a request to stop drinking or to surrender alcohol in a controlled drinking area.

The police can disperse individuals engaged in anti-social behaviour where alcohol is a factor. It is an offence to fail to comply with a direction to leave an area.

Other offences include being drunk and disorderly in a public place and being drunk in any highway or other public place. This Briefing refers to the law in England and Wales.

Research Briefing. London: UK House of Commons, 2023. 11p.

By European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol

EU Drug Market: Amphetamine describes the European amphetamine market from production and trafficking, to distribution and use. It details the processes, materials and actors involved at different stages and levels of the market. Taking a threat assessment approach, the module identifies key issues and makes recommendations for action at EU and Member State level.

Amphetamine is the most common synthetic stimulant drug available on the European drug market and it competes with cocaine and a range of new psychoactive substances for a share of the profitable European Union (EU) stimulant drug market. The prevalence of amphetamine use is higher than methamphetamine in most EU Member States, with notable exceptions, such as Czechia and Slovakia. Illicit amphetamine products mostly consist of powders or pastes, usually mixed with other ingredients, such as lactose, dextrose or caffeine, but tablets containing amphetamine are also available. The estimated annual value of the retail market for amphetamine in the EU is at least EUR 1.1 billion, with a range of EUR 0.9 billion to EUR 1.4 billion.

The demand for amphetamine in the EU is met by European production concentrated largely in the Netherlands and Belgium, where production is complex, large-scale and based on the drug precursor BMK. BMK has some limited use in industry and can be diverted from legitimate sources or smuggled into the EU, but more frequently it is made from chemicals known as designer precursors imported from China. Some of the amphetamine produced in the EU is used to produce captagon tablets, which are mainly trafficked to consumer markets in the Middle East

Lisbon, Portugal: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol, 2023. 8p.

By Stephen Whitehead, Sarah Page, Hannah Jeffery, and Fiona McCormack

Women who use drugs and alcohol have different needs than men. They face greater stigma, are more likely to carry the trauma of domestic abuse and are more likely to be caring for children. All of this taken together means that they may struggle to achieve recovery in a treatment system where they are outnumbered by men two to one.

This research set out to expand the evidence base on the needs of women who use drugs and alcohol and the ways that those needs are currently being met through a qualitative research project focused on the West Midlands, commissioned by The JABBS Foundation and the Office of the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner.

London: Centre for Justice Innovation, 2023. 45p.

By Jan van Amsterdam , Wim van den Brink

It is generally believed that the use of alcohol and cocaine alone and especially in combination elicits aggression and violent behaviour. Though there is overwhelming proof that heavy alcohol use is associated with violence, this is not the case for cocaine. Still, in the popular press and by spokesmen of the police, cocaine use is seen as a cause of violent incidents. In the current systematic review, available data from human studies on the relation between cocaine and violent behaviour is presented. In particular, we present scientific data on the acute induction of violence by cocaine alone, as well as, that by the combination of cocaine and alcohol known to be frequently used simultaneously.

Results: show that there is only weak scientific evidence for the acute induction of violent behaviour by cocaine, either when used alone or in combination with alcohol. Based on these data we were also able to refute misconceptions about the relation between cocaine and violence published in the popular press and governmental reports, because it appeared that there was hardly any empirical support for this widely shared opinion. Probably, contextual factors, including cocaine use disorder and personality disorder, may better explain the assumed association between cocaine and violence.

Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine. Volume 100, November 2023, 102597

By Ashna Arora and Panka Bencsik

In the United States, law enforcement officers serve as first responders to most health crises, allowing them to connect many more individuals to treatment services than other government actors, a fact that has come into increasing focus due to the opioid epidemic. In response, police departments across the country have begun to divert individuals that possess narcotics away from arrest and towards treatment and recovery. Evidence on whether these programs are able to engender meaningful change—initially by increasing participation in substance use treatment, and eventually by reducing the likelihood of continued drug use and criminal justice involvement—remains limited. This paper aims to shed light on the potential of these programs by exploiting the eligibility criteria for and staggered rollout of narcotics arrest diversion in Chicago between 2018 and 2020 using a difference-indifference-in-differences framework. We find that the program reaches individuals with medically diagnosed substance use disorders, increases connections with substance use treatment, and reduces subsequent arrests. We conclude that Chicago’s drug diversion program is able to simultaneously reduce the reach of the criminal justice system, expand the number of individuals with substance use disorders connected with treatment, and improve public safety.

Chicago: University of Chicago, Crime Lab, 2021. 38p.

By The National Audit Office (NAO) (UK)

The distribution, sale and consumption of illegal drugs causes significant harm to individuals, families and communities. In 2021, almost 3,000 people in England died because of drug misuse and thousands more suffered complex health problems. The government also estimated that around three million people in England and Wales take illegal drugs at a cost to society of approximately £20 billion a year. The drugs trade generates significant levels of violence and is believed to be responsible for around half of all murders in England and Wales.

Tackling the problems caused by illegal drugs is complex. It involves disrupting the organised gangs which supply and distribute drugs, and providing effective treatment and recovery services to help people with addictions. The government announced a £900 million increase in funding for 2022-23 to 2024-25 and committed to long-term targets to reduce drug use and drug-related crime and deaths. The government established the cross-government Joint Combating Drugs Unit (JCDU) to co-ordinate and oversee the development and implementation of the strategy.

t is almost two years since the government introduced its latest drugs strategy and less than 18 months remain in the current funding period to March 2025. This report examines whether the government is well positioned to achieve the strategy’s 10-year ambitions. It covers:

the development of the 2021 drugs strategy, its objectives and funding

progress in implementing the strategy

the approach to achieving the strategy’s long-term outcomes

It is too early to conclude whether the 2021 strategy will reduce the harm from illegal drugs. It will take time for new funding and interventions to address a complex set of issues, and many of the indicators used to measure progress lag behind activity. This report therefore assesses whether departments are making the planned progress in implementing the strategy, and whether the JCDU has an effective approach to understanding the impact it is having and managing the risks to achieving the strategy’s aims. It does not examine the effectiveness of interventions at the local level.

Conclusions

In 2021 the government estimated that the harm caused by illegal drugs costs society £20 billion each year. Its 2021 drugs strategy, led by the cross-government Joint Combating Drugs Unit, has provided new impetus to efforts to address these harms, and committed £900 million to 2024-25.

The strategy has established new partnerships across central and local government, and local authorities are taking steps to rebuild the workforce that was lost over the past decade. But these measures alone will not address all of the barriers to achieving a long-term reduction in drug use, deaths and related crime. The issues are complex and will require a sustained long-term response.

To inform government’s response, the JCDU and relevant departments need to develop a deeper understanding of the impacts of government spending, working closely with local service providers to understand and help address the practical challenges they face. The JCDU and departments need to be realistic about what is achievable in the first three years and assess how to adapt their approach to achieve the strategy’s 10-year outcomes.

In doing so, the JCDU should seek to provide confidence to local government: that this is a long-term commitment. It must also urgently develop a plan to reduce the demand for illegal drugs. The current lack of emphasis on preventing illegal drug use means that departments risk only addressing the consequences, rather than the causes, of harm. The government will only achieve value for money if it builds on the initial momentum of the new strategy and develops a longer-term, funded plan that delivers a joined-up, holistic response.

London: The National Audit Office (NAO), 2023. 56p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

From July 2021 to June 2023, the Mekong Australia Partnership on Transnational Crime and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) organized an expert briefing series to enhance debate and collaboration on issues related to organized crime in the Mekong.

The outcome of the two-year briefing series was the creation of opportunities for discussion, collaboration and learning. It brought together a committed set of stakeholders working at the local, regional and international levels to reduce the harms of organized crime and helped build new partnerships while strengthening existing ones. The series enhanced the knowledge base on organized crime in the Mekong and helped bridge the gap between research and policy.

With the support of a dynamic set of stakeholders, the series explored some of the region’s most pertinent and pressing issues and their intersections globally.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 69p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Despite minimal domestic production, gold has figured prominently in Kenya’s recent history. Many Kenyans can still vividly recall the ‘Goldenberg’ scandal of the 1990s, a gold export and foreign exchange fraud scheme that drained government coffers of a sum exceeding ten percent of Kenya’s GDP at the time.The late 1990s also saw the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in then Zaïre, followed by a devastating half-decade-long regional conflict that resulted in the loss of five million lives, mainly from war-related hunger and disease. Facing external invasion and an internal revolt, Zaïre’s successor state, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), lost control of most of the resource-rich territory in the east of the country. Since then, the smuggling of artisanally mined minerals, including gold, have fuelled an ongoing conflict that in 2022 reached an intensity not seen for a decade. Insurgent groups, pro-government militias and criminal networks all continue to benefit from the tonnes of gold smuggled out of eastern DRC each year. Kenya has long been one of the principal regional transit hubs – along with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania – for the smuggling of this conflict gold.Almost as lucrative as the smuggling of genuine gold through Kenya are the myriad scams that seek to peddle counterfeit or non-existent quantities of the precious metal to unsuspecting buyers. The targets of these scams are often foreigners travelling to Africa in search of hit-and-run riches. Gold swindles have on occasion escalated into embarrassing diplomatic rows, most notably in 2020 when both the president of Kenya and the main opposition leader were summoned to a meeting by the emir of Dubai over an Emirati company that had been victimized by Kenyan fraudsters. Dubai is by far the most popular destination for smuggled East African gold, due to its status as a tax haven as well as a key aviation hub.The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) conducted extensive interviews with a Kenyan national whose initial career in aviation logistics – specifically the charting of private jets – gradually pulled him into the gold trafficking underworld.During these interviews, this insider provided the GI-TOC with a series of unique insights based on a decade of experience in the East African illicit gold trade. These insights will be presented through several accounts of operations in which our source was involved, ranging from fictitious customs seizures to an attempt by an Israeli businessman to commandeer an aircraft, a German with ‘gold fever’, a month-long airport standoff in the UAE and a visit to an artisanal smelting facility located in the heart of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. Taken together, our source’s revelations paint a picture of an illicit economy characterized more by con artistry and double-dealing than genuine commodity trading.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 31p.

By Tihomir Bezlov | Atanas Rusev | Dardan Koçani

The war in Ukraine has spurred the largest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War. According to EU border and coastguard agency Frontex, by the end of 2022, 15 million Ukrainian citizens had fled to Europe since the beginning of the war, with roughly 3 million choosing to stay.

While the unforeseen scale of the refugee crisis meant that much of the border authorities’ efforts and resources were occupied, people smuggling networks took advantage of the situation, and the number of irregular migrants from the Middle East travelling along the Western Balkan route soared. There are many contributing factors to this trend, but migrant smuggling has indeed resurfaced as the fastest-growing market for organized crime in the Balkan region. At the start of September 2022, Frontex reported that they had documented the highest number of irregular entries since 2016, with a 75% increase compared to the same period in the previous year. Thus, in 2022, the Western Balkan route became the most active European migration route, surpassing the Central and Western Mediterranean routes.

This paper assesses the factors that contributed to the emergence of the Western Balkan route as the most critical for irregular migration to the EU during 2022, focusing in particular on the impact of the war in Ukraine on refugee flows from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and its implications for the future. It analyzes how, if anything, refugee flows from Ukraine have affected pre-existing movements of migrants from MENA countries on the Western Balkan route indirectly, exacerbating dynamics and network operations. It also estimates the overall number of irregular migrants smuggled along the Western Balkan route since 2016, describes the evolution of smuggling networks in 2022 and assesses the implications for South Eastern Europe.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2023. 3p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Odesa is a city of immense importance to Ukraine. Its port is the gateway through which most of Ukraine’s trade with the world is conducted, but it also holds a deeply symbolic place in the country’s heart – the so-called ‘Jewel of the Black Sea.’

It has also long been one of the most criminalized cities in Ukraine, both in terms of illicit flows through its port (including drugs, weapons, and contraband) and the high levels of corruption around the construction industry, law enforcement, the criminal justice system, and the customs agency. The city itself was also a stronghold of pro-Russian sentiment, even after the 2014 Maidan Revolution, which ousted President Viktor Yanukovych (who was politically close to Moscow), the conflict in the Donbas, and Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. At the same time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine dealt a severe blow to organized crime in Odesa.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2023. 48p.

By Gabriel Feltran, Isabela Vianna Pinho and Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo

Cocaine trafficking through West Africa, following the well-established route from Latin America to the European consumer market, appears to be in a phase of sharp growth. Since 2016, the majority of consignments transiting West Africa begin their journey in Brazil. The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – the largest criminal organization in Brazil – is pivotal to understanding Brazil’s newfound importance for cocaine in West Africa.

Cocaine trafficking between Brazil and West Africa stretches back at least to the 1980s, but as cultivation in Latin America continues to increase and consumption in Europe has grown, more and more cocaine is being moved along this path. In 2018, only one West African country – Senegal – was in the top 10 destinations for cocaine seized in Brazilian ports; by 2019, after a bumper year of seizures in Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone had also pushed their way onto the list. Cultivation in Latin America reached record levels in 2021, and in the following year an unprece-dented 24 tonnes were seized across West Africa.

In this report, we focus on the flow of cocaine between Brazil and West Africa, which largely supplies the lucrative European consumer market, and in particular on the role of the PCC, which straddles various illicit supply chains.

The research for this report has drawn on various data collection techniques but rests primarily on field observations of the retail trade and transit of illegal goods in South America, West Africa and Europe between 2015 and 2022. These observations, described in detail in the authors’ field notebooks, were supplemented by formal and informal interviews with those involved in the cocaine trade, from the South American borders to the retail trade spaces of Europe, allowing us to trace the journey of cocaine through the different nodes of the value chain.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023 28p.

By Saša Đorđević

Fuel smuggling is the illegal transport, sale or purchase of petroleum products such as crude oil, petrol, diesel and other refined petroleum products. It has been a persistent illicit trade in the Balkans for over three decades.

In 2022, police and customs of the seven Balkan countries seized more than 3 000 tonnes of illegal fuel, with a retail value of €4.3 million – almost four times more than the value of fuel seized in all of 2021. Fuels are goods subject to high excise and customs duties that smugglers try to avoid paying. Alternatively, smugglers seek to profit by evading embargoes on oil imports and exports. From this perspective, the Balkan countries’ public funds lost at least €1.2 million in 2022 as a result of fuel smuggling.

However, relying solely on seizure data to evaluate the illicit fuel market may lead to misleading conclusions because of law enforcement’s inherent challenge in substantiating the unlawful provenance of fuel. This discrepancy becomes more apparent when considering the estimated scale of the issue. In Bulgaria alone, for example, the projected value of illegal fuel in 2019 reached approximately €0.5 billion, resulting in significant budget losses of €250 million.

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Libyan electoral crisis, both of which involved major oil-producing countries, the UN extended measures to combat illicit petroleum exports from Libya in July 2022. The EU also imposed bans on Russian oil in December 2022 and again in February 2023, as part of its response to the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the Balkans became the focus for licit and illicit fuel manoeuvres.This report analyzes the mechanisms of fuel smuggling during times of crisis and instability in the Balkans, considering both internal and external factors that contribute to the overall landscape. It identifies lessons learned from fuel smuggling in the early 1990s and then moves to explain the evolution of this activity with reference to trafficking methods, actors and routes through to 2022. The report also identifies countries in the Balkans at particular risk from fuel smuggling, as well as hotspots that allow illicit trade, particularly on rivers and seas. The report, furthermore, assesses the typical profile of criminal actors active in fuel smuggling. The research is limited to cross-border fuel smuggling operations rather than illegal distribution within a specific country.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 34p.