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Addressing Illicit Financial Flows in East and Southern Africa

By Michael McLaggan

Prominent throughout the world, illicit financial flows (IFFs) not only undermine the ability of states to collect revenue, but they also pose challenges to governance and the rule of law and provide avenues for the funding of further illicit activity. Although a global occurrence, IFFs may manifest differently at the regional level, making a uniform approach difficult. This calls for a model that is more inclusive of different types of flows than traditional understandings of IFFs, which tend to focus on financial flows within the formal system. In regions such as East and southern Africa, where informality is much higher than in the developed nations of the ‘global north’, the greater focus on formal systems does not find the same degree of applicability. This is not to downplay the necessity of observing and countering formal financial flows of an illicit nature but rather to emphasise the need to pay greater attention to informal and trade flows, which are prolific in less developed regions. This paper draws on extensive research by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) – in particular, the Observatory of Illicit Economies in East and Southern Africa – in addition to research by other international organisations, to analyse whether the ‘IFFs pyramid’ proposed by the GI-TOC (Reitano, 2022) is applicable to and useful for researchers seeking to understanding illicit financial flows in various settings around the world but especially in regions where greater levels of informality exists, such as East and southern Africa. The paper finds that the pervasive informality of markets in the East and southern African region, and their abuse by criminal actors, means that greater attention to IFFs is necessary in this sphere. Common also is the use of illicitly acquired, or otherwise illicitly traded commodities, in barter (that is, goods for goods) markets. Identified as particularly relevant is the pernicious influence of state-embedded actors, who often play substantial roles in the facilitation of IFFs and act as obstacles to policies to address them. Furthermore, vested interests of criminal actors in keeping certain industries and markets informal serve as barriers to formalisation and highlight the greater need to pay attention to informal financial flows especially. The due consideration to trade and informal flows is what makes the IFFs pyramid a useful model for understanding these flows in both global and regional settings. At the very least, the pyramid model highlights the need for holistic approaches and policy reform when considering IFFs in less developed regions.  

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024, 33pg

Opioid Market Trends in Afghanistan Poppy Cultivation, Policy and Practice Under the New Regime

By Prem Mahadevan, Maria Khoruk, Alla Mohammad Mohmandzai and Ruggero Scaturro

How will the new Taliban regime change Afghanistan’s illicit drug landscape in the coming years? Are the Taliban genuinely committed to combating the flow of narcotics within and outside Afghanistan, as signalled by the ban on opium cultivation issued by the Taliban leadership in April 2022?

Based on field research coordinated by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) in the Afghan provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar, this paper analyses the changes to the Afghan drug economy since the Taliban’s return to power on 15 August 2021, documenting the adaptation of local actors engaged in the opium economy to the events that had a profound impact on their lives. Historical analysis supplements the field research findings and aids our understanding of the shifting conditions of the illicit drug economy in Afghanistan. Given the institutional weakness of Afghan statehood after nearly five decades of civil war, the GI-TOC’s approach represents a collation of provincial and district-level assessments rather than a comprehensive country-wide assessment.

This research paper outlines the complexities of local conditions and reveals a regime fragmented among varied interests and power structures, seeking to reconcile the profitability of the drugs trade with the strive for legitimacy.

University of Birmingham, Research Paper No. 27. 2023, 31pg

Organized Vehicle Crime in Europe Barriers to Prevent Vehicle Theft and Online Distribution of Stolen Vehicles and Vehicle Parts

By Atanas Rusev, et al.

Organized property crime is considered to be a significant criminal market affecting virtually all members states of the European Union. Organized property crime is reportedly being committed by highly mobile organized crime groups (MOCG). These groups have been engaging in various forms of property crime, such as motor vehicle theft throughout Europe. At European level, ongoing initiatives are supporting member states in the fight against organized property crime. Nonetheless, to date still little is known on the logistical processes of motor vehicle theft across EU member states and in Europe as a whole. Within this context, this project aims at enhancing the knowledge of organized property crime in the form of motor vehicle crime, which includes motor vehicle theft and the sale of stolen vehicle parts.

Vehicle Crime Barrier, 2023, 46p.

Organized Vehicle Crime in Europe: Six Country Case Studies on Organized Vehicle Crime and Potential Barriers to Prevent the Facilitation of Online Distribution of Stolen Vehicles and Vehicle Parts

By: Atanas Rusev, Tihomir Bezlov, Flamma Terenghi

Organized property crime is a pervasive issue across all EU Member States, demanding immediate and collective action. V-BAR specifically targets one aspect of organized property crime: motor vehicle crime, encompassing theft and the illicit trade of stolen vehicle parts. Despite a decline in vehicle theft, the overall prevalence of motor vehicle crime remains alarmingly high. This comprehensive report outlines V-BAR’s objectives in enhancing operational cooperation between EU law enforcement authorities and private partners to combat the menace posed by mobile organized crime groups involved in vehicle theft. Additionally, the report delves into an extensive investigation of motor vehicle theft trends within six EU countries, namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, France, and The Netherlands, providing valuable insights for combating this form of criminal activity.

CrimRxiv. https://doi.org/10.21428/cb6ab371.af77f1d4 2023.

On the Trail of Illicit Gold Proceeds: Strengthening the Fight Against Illegal Mining Finances: The Case of Ecuador

By Organization of American States , Department against Transnational Organized Crime

The illegal gold trade is a growing and significant challenge in Ecuador. The spread of illegal gold mining activity has brought surges of violence and instability to remote areas while attracting organized crime, at the local and international level, and triggering an increase in money laundering and contraband. Concern regarding the disruptive and harmful impact of illegal gold mining, as well as the government’s desire to develop and expand Ecuador’s mining sector away from its reliance on small-scale and artisanal operations, have also led to a renewed focus on the challenges posed by illegal mining. There is reason to believe that the illegal gold trade and its associated criminal networks are less entrenched and developed in Ecuador than in neighboring Peru and Colombia. However, there are significant challenges facing the government as it works to combat illegal mining activity, which is increasingly accelerated by illicit cross-border contraband flows and unique vulnerabilities to money laundering activity.

Washington, DC: OAS, 2021. 46p.

Fighting Fakes, Contraband and Illicit Trade: Spotlight on The Philippines

By Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

The Philippines, with its strategic location in the heart of Southeast Asia and its dynamic economy, is one of the fastest-growing economies in Southeast Asia, and a leader in the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). However, the country’s position as a vital maritime gateway in the region, coupled with its robust economic activities, has rendered it susceptible to a spectrum of illicit practices. From counterfeit goods flooding local markets to the underground movement of smuggled products, the illegal wildlife trade, and the intricate networks of money laundering, the Philippines faces significant challenges in its ongoing battle against these illicit activities

New York: The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2023. 48p.

Information Manipulation and Organized Crime: Examining the Nexus

By Tena Prelec

Information manipulation has been a growing concern in recent years, particularly in relation to the disinformation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes. However, the role of non-state actors, such as organized crime (OC) groups, in information manipulation has been largely overlooked. This research aims to fill this gap by examining the various ways in which OC groups manipulate information to achieve their objectives and those of actors connected to them. Drawing on Nicholas Barnes’ concept of ‘political criminality’ (2017), this study examines the varying degrees of proximity between criminal actors and the state, which is essential in exploring the complex interplay between OC and information manipulation. Empirical data was collected from several geographies, with a particular focus on Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania. The research highlights several dimensions of interest, including: the changing opportunities that technology gives to OC groups to shape facts and narratives; media ownership by organised crime groups and criminal actors; and the ways in which this interplay is situated within the global political economy of offshore finance – including the wider networks of enablers these actors rely on. By shedding light on these aspects, the research seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the threat posed by the misuse of information, situates it within the literatures on non-state actors and transnational kleptocracy, and puts forward a framework for analysis that can be tested in future work.

Birmingham, UK: SOC ACE Research Paper 22. University of Birmingham 2023. 44p,

El Salvador’s (Perpetual) State of Emergency: How Bukele’s Government Overpowered Gangs

By Alex Papadovassilakis, et al

El Salvador’s gangs are in disarray.

For decades, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and two factions of the 18th Street (Barrio 18) dominated the small Central American nation’s criminal landscape. The gangs embedded themselves in poor communities, terrorizing urban dwellers with extortion and murders. Successive governments tried and failed to dismantle the gangs with aggressive security policies, known as mano dura (iron fist).

In March 2022, the government of El Salvador President Nayib Bukele enacted a state of emergency (régimen de excepción) in response to a brutal gang massacre that left 87 dead. Buoyed by emergency powers, security forces tore through the gangs, arresting tens of thousands of suspected gang members and collaborators. Those who escaped arrest went underground or into exile. In a flash, the MS13 and Barrio 18 all but vanished from the streets of El Salvador.

But though battered and bruised, a surprising number of gang members remain at large. The country’s prisons, once incubators for the gangs, have never been so full.

This six-part investigation looks at how the Bukele government’s crackdown succeeded in overpowering the MS13 and Barrio 18. We assess what remains of the gangs in El Salvador, and contemplate whether these structures could one day return or mutate.

Washington, DC; Medellin, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023.56p.

The Moskitia: The Honduran Jungle Drowning in Cocaine

By: Bryan Avelar, Juan José Martínez

Moskitia is dying. And it is organized crime that is killing it.

First came the drugs, as traffickers turned the region’s coasts and forests into a cocaine corridor. Then came the traffickers themselves, financing invaders that are clear-cutting thousands of hectares of forest and fencing off vast tracts of land with barbed wire and armed guards.

The region’s Indigenous Miskito people have been left trapped in desperate poverty, and are caught between the traffickers and an indifferent state. But some are now preparing to fight back.

Washington, DC, Columbia: InSight Crime, 2023. 64p..

South Africa Illicit Copper Economy

By Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Our new report focuses on the pervasive issue of copper theft in South Africa. This socio-economic challenge has severe consequences on the country's already strained infrastructure, affecting the capacity and operations of state-owned entities and municipalities.

Our 2022 South Africa Strategic Organized Crime Risk Assessment revealed that the nation's critical infrastructure is 'at a tipping point after years of chronic mismanagement and rampant theft,' noting the role of copper theft as an exacerbating factor. In light of this alarming situation, our latest report delves into the repercussions of copper theft on South Africa's infrastructure and its links to organized crime networks.

This comprehensive study examines the value chain and market dynamics for stolen copper, a familiar yet often overlooked area where criminal enterprises have become deeply entrenched. With a focus on solutions, the report outlines measures taken to combat copper theft and explores possible future strategies for addressing this growing concern.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

2023 West Africa Organised Crime Resilience Framework: Assessing threats and resilience - Foundational report

By Lyes Tagziria and Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo

West Africa is one of the world’s most vibrant and diverse regions; home to over 400 million people, around 1 200 languages and many different religious and ethnic identities. The region’s economic growth since the turn of the century has been impressive, resulting in a significant reduction in absolute levels of poverty. Nevertheless, with rampant insecurity at the hands of violent extremists, armed groups and criminal bandits, political instability, limited economic opportunities for the region’s burgeoning youth population and the worsening impact of climate change, West Africa faces many complex challenges.

With over 20 000 conflict fatalities across the region in 2022 alone, violence in West Africa, especially in the Sahel region, is at unprecedented levels. According to the ACLED Conflict Severity Index, three countries in West Africa – Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria – have extreme or high levels of conflict. Illicit economies play an important role in sustaining instability across the region.

The security and well-being of citizens across the ECOWAS region is affected not only by violent conflict, but by myriad, interwoven factors from economic prosperity to political representation, justice and security, social cohesion, freedom and much more. In this context the concept of human security, as opposed to the narrower concept of state security, has increasingly become the focus of policymakers across West Africa.

As set out in the ECOWAS Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs), ‘the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats that affect individuals’ lives, whether this is through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political or economic factors’.

A key component of this human-centric approach to security, focused on reducing harm to the people of West Africa, is prevention. This requires comprehensive, accurate and timely data on existing and future threats and is therefore one of the main rationales behind the work of the ECOWAS Commission, through both the Early Warning Directorate and the ENACT Organized Crime Index. While the objectives of the index are manifold, its principal aim is to build an evidence base to underpin responses to organized crime.

The 2021 ENACT Organized Crime Index identified the West Africa region as having the second-highest level of criminality on the African continent, with human trafficking, drugs and the illicit trade in non-renewable resources forming the most prevalent criminal markets. The region placed in second once again in the latest iteration of the index, the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index.

In 2023, West Africa overtook Southern Africa as the region with the highest resilience score on the continent, pointing to comparatively high levels of resilience even in areas affected by significant criminal markets. The index highlighted legislative frameworks, civil society actors and the region’s international collaboration in the fight against organized crime as relative regional strengths. Overall levels of resilience, however, both objectively and within the global context, are weak.

The index’s findings provides a statistical underpinning for the relationship between illicit markets, security and stability, demonstrating a strong negative correlation between criminality and peacefulness. In other words, the less peaceful a country, the more likely it is to be afflicted by high levels of organized crime. In other words, the less peaceful a country, the more likely it is to be afflicted by high levels of organized crime. Responding to illicit economies which pose a threat to these goals must be a central element of programming. In line with this, the Organized Crime Resilience Framework (OCRF) examines the major organized-crime threats facing the West African region, as identified by the index and the CRVAs published by the ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate.

While the index is devoted to organized crime, the CRVAs focus on conflict and human security more broadly. Drawing on both these datasets engenders a conflict-sensitive and human-security-focused assessment of organized crime in West Africa, encompassing threats and vulnerabilities, as well as potential sources of resilience.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against International Organized Crime, Ecowas Commission, 2023.

Conflict, Governance and Organized Crime: Complex Challenges for UN Stabilization Operations

By Marina Caparini

This SIPRI Report examines how organized crime is intertwined with armed conflict and hybrid governance systems in three states that currently host United Nations stabilization missions. It surveys the conflict/crime/governance nexus in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali, and how UN stabilization missions, in particular the UN Police, have engaged with the challenge of organized crime.

The report argues that improving how UN stabilization interventions engage with organized crime will require a frank assessment of the significance of organized crime in systems of governance and patronage, of the role of organized crime as a driver and enabler of armed conflict by non-state armed groups, and of the involvement of state-embedded actors in illicit markets. The complex links between conflict and governance actors and organized crime in the settings examined raise fundamental questions about the assumptions underlying peace operations. The report concludes with a set of recommendations on how to move to more realistic analyses and bases for peace operations.

Solna: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022. 57p.

Negotiating with Criminal Groups: IFIT Guidance Note for Good-Faith Promoters

By Mark Freeman and Barney Afako

Co-authored by Mark Freeman and Barney Afako, the publication offers simplified technical guidance directed to any good-faith promoter of formal negotiation with one or more violent criminal groups when the proposed endgame of the negotiation is to reduce or end the criminal violence in question. In doing so, the paper draws on key ideas developed in IFIT’s ground-breaking report, Negotiating with Violent Criminal Groups: Lessons and Guidelines from Global Practice (Freeman & Velbab-Brown, 2021), which covers the most diverse set of negotiations with criminal groups ever examined in one place.

The first part of Freeman and Afako's practice note examines threshold questions a good-faith promoter would be wise to consider before outwardly exploring or proposing any negotiation involving a criminal group; the second part discusses internal and external actions a good-faith promoter ought to contemplate as part of any initial phase of formal engagement or negotiation with members of a criminal group.

Barcelona: Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) , 2024. 3p.

Understanding the Role of Women in Organized Crime

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

This report offers empirical evidence and case studies from across the OSCE area on how women are recruited into organized crime groups, their roles within them, and how and why they exit these groups. It demonstrates that the role of women in organized crime is nuanced. Evidence shows that while women are often exploited and victimized by organized crime groups, they can also be important actors. Yet persistent gender stereotypes mean that women’s agency in organized crime is often not recognized by criminal justice practitioners. Failing to recognize women’s agency in organized crime impedes the understanding in participating States of the complexity of the organized crime landscape, and hampers their ability to combat transnational organized crime or support women to leave organized crime groups.

Vienna: OSCE, 2023. 72p.

Non-Fatal Shooting Crosswalk Study: FINAL REPORT

By Alaina De Biasi Edmund F. McGarrell Scott E. Wolfe

Historically, crime in the United States has been measured by the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In this system, local, county, state, Tribal and federal law enforcement agencies submit summary crime data on incidents and arrests to the UCR system. Crime patterns and trends can then be analyzed and tracked at local, state, and national levels. 

United States, Michigan Justice Statistics Center, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. 2023. 33pg

What the data says about gun deaths in the U.S.

By John Gramlich

More Americans died of gun-related injuries in 2020 than in any other year on record, according to recently published statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). That included a record number of gun murders, as well as a nearrecord number of gun suicides. Despite the increase in such fatalities, the rate of gun deaths – a statistic that accounts for the nation’s growing population – remains below the levels of earlier years.

United States, Pew Research Center. 2022. 7pg.

Racial Isolation, School Police, and the “School-To-Prison Pipeline”: An Empirical Perspective on the Enduring Salience of “Tipping Points”

By Michael Heise

Two broad trends inform public K-12 education’s current trajectory. One involves persisting (and recently increasing) school racial isolation which helps account for an array of costs borne by students, schools, and communities. A second trend, involving a dramatically increasing police presence in schools, is evidenced by a rising school resource officer (“SRO/police”) presence in schools. Increases in the magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence correspond with increases in the school’s propensity to engage law enforcement agencies in student disciplinary matters which, in turn, help fuel a growing school-to-prison pipeline problem. While these two broad trends propel two distinct research literatures, these research literatures do not meaningfully engage with one another. Empirical research is largely silent on the degree to which, if at all, variation in a school’s racial isolation level influences how its SRO/police presence interacts with the school’s propensity to report student discipline issues to law enforcement agencies. This Article examines whether variation in school racial isolation levels informs whether a school’s SRO/police presence influences the school’s law enforcement reporting rates. Results from this study imply that any such influence is confined to schools where non-white student enrollment ranges from 11% to 50%. The research literature on tipping points provides one helpful interpretative lens to better understand why this specific school racial isolation band systematically differs from others when it comes to SRO/police presence’s influence on a school’s propensity to report student discipline matters to law enforcement agencies.

Buffalo Law Review Vol. 71, No. 2 (2023)

Project Safe Neighborhoods: Saginaw Violent Gang and Gun Crime Reduction Program

By Yongjae (David) Nam, Travis Carter, Scott Wolfe, Allison Rojek, Spencer G. Lawson

The City of Saginaw (MI) was financially crippled by the lengthy national recession and steady
deterioration of the domestic automobile industry. Once home to five automobile production
plants, four of those sites now sit uninhabited. Several other major manufacturers have closed
plants or drastically reduced the number of employees. These losses dramatically increased
unemployment and devastated the city’s tax base. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
unemployment in Saginaw peaked in July 2009, standing at 23.5%. The 2018 American Community
Survey indicates that the unemployment rate for Saginaw was 14.9%. This rate is higher compared
to a national unemployment rate of 5.9% and a rate of 6.5% for Michigan. The 2010 Census reports
that Saginaw’s median household income was $29,809 and per capita income was a mere $16,153,
both nearly half the state of Michigan and U.S. averages. About 33.6% of the total population lives
below the poverty line, more than double the state of Michigan average (14.2%) and nearly triple
the U.S. average (12.3%). Census reports show the population of Saginaw decreased by nearly
13,000 people (20.7%) from 2000 to 2018 (from 61,799 to 48,997 people). Saginaw’s population
decline, deteriorating property values, shrinking income tax collections, and drastically reduced
state revenue sharing continue to severely impact the city’s ability to provide basic public services,
creating quality of life issues and high violent crime rates. Despite a high incidence of crime, poor
economic conditions forced the city to make the inevitable decision to reduce the size of its police
department from 160 police officers in 1997 to its current level of 54 officers (66.3% decrease).
From 2016 to 2018, 42 homicides were committed in Saginaw. Most were committed with a
firearm, and more than three-fourths were drug and/or gang-related. Additionally, there were
another 138 victims of non-fatal shootings. In 2018, Saginaw’s violent crime rate per 100,000
residents (1,621) was more than four times the national average (381) and more than three times
Michigan’s average (449). In addition, Saginaw’s homicide rate (22.8) was over four times both the
national average (5.0) and Michigan’s average (5.5). Moreover, data reveal that Saginaw's overall
crime rates are 64% higher than Michigan’s average and are 34% higher than the nation's average.
The Saginaw Violent Gang and Gun Crime Reduction Program (hereafter, Saginaw PSN) was
aimed at addressing these problems. Table 1 provides an overview of the goals, objectives, and
outcomes of the Saginaw PSN program

East Lansing, MI: School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University., 2022. 53p.

Michigan State Police Traffic Enforcement: An Assessment of Policies, Training, and Operations

By Thomas Christoff, Benjamin Carleton, Margarita Parker, Kaitlin Moloney, Alexa Blondin, and Bill Taylor

Traffic enforcement encounters represent one of the most common interactions that the public has with law enforcement, with more than 20 million people pulled over for a traffic stop in the US each year (Baumgartner et al., 2021). Police officers make at least three important decisions during a traffic stop encounter, including whether to initiate a traffic stop, whether to conduct a search of persons or the vehicle, and how the officer will sanction the driver (Schafer et al., 2006). Similarly, traffic enforcement is also one of the primary responsibilities of the Michigan State Police (MSP), with MSP having conducted 287,065 traffic stops in 2022.1 In January of 2021, MSP took proactive steps to begin a partnership with researchers from the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University (MSU) to understand whether racial/ethnic disparities exist in traffic stop behavior by MSP patrol members. As part of MSP’s partnership with MSU, MSU researchers examined data for MSP traffic stops conducted during the year 2020. Overall, MSU’s analysis found that “African-American drivers experienced significant disparities with respect to MSP traffic stops.” In addition, MSU’s analysis found that “Hispanic drivers were significantly more likely than White drivers to be searched or arrested after traffic stops.” MSU conducted a second round of traffic stop data analysis using MSP data for traffic stops conducted during 2021. In this second round, MSU added a Post-by-Post analysis, which revealed that “a small proportion of MSP posts accounted for the racial and ethnic disparities observed statewide.” The analysis also revealed disparities in traffic stops for African-American drivers in Secure Cities Partnership (SCP) locations. Upon receiving MSU’s initial findings, MSP leadership responded in January 2022 with the unveiling of a multifaceted Five-Point Plan intended to address racial disparities in traffic enforcement. The five points focused on understanding the contributors to disparities in traffic stops and exploring ways in which MSP could effectively reduce such disparities. The point most relevant to this assessment is the first one, which involves the hiring of an independent consulting firm to review MSP policies and make recommendations that will address racial disparities. MSP issued a request for proposals in March 2022 seeking an independent consulting firm to conduct this work, and the CNA Corporation (CNA) was awarded the contract to assess MSP traffic enforcement policies and program initiatives over the course of 18 months, starting in June 2022. CNA’s approach to this assessment focused on the full lifecycle of a trooper, including how MSP recruits and hires its troopers, instructs and trains its troopers, and supervises its troopers. We also considered organizational factors that are relevant to traffic enforcement and equitable policing. To assess MSP’s traffic enforcement policies and program initiatives, we used a variety of sources, including document review, targeted interviews, focus groups, ride-alongs, and quantitative data analysis. This report details the findings and recommendations of this focused assessment and consists of the following five main sections: 1. Methodology and Approach 2. Recruitment and Hiring Policies, Trainings, and Practices 3. Trooper Policies, Trainings, and Practices 4. Supervisor Policies, Trainings, and Practices 5. Organizational Processes and Initiatives   

Arlington VA: CNA, 2023. 95p.

Police Services Study - Bath Borough, Northampton County, PA 

By Pennsylvania Governor’s Center for Local Government Services  

The intent of this study is to examine policing options for Bath Borough in Northampton County, Pennsylvania. Currently, the Pennsylvania State Police provide police service to Bath Borough’s 2,808 residents. In 2018, Bath Borough elected to leave the Colonial Regional Police Department as a member municipality and rely on the State for police coverage. Bath Borough did have a stand-alone, municipal police department from 1959 to 1995 until opting to join the Colonial Regional Police Department. After five years of Pennsylvania State Police service, the Bath Borough Council wishes to evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and economics of its current police services. The study was initiated at the request of the elected officials from the Bath Borough. After a review of a comprehensive Request for Proposal for Police Services Study, the officials made their request via the submission of an official “Letter of Intent” to representatives of the Governor’s Center for Local Government Services (hereafter referred to as the GCLGS), located in the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED). The Letter of Intent officially requested that a study be conducted by the GCLGS and, furthermore, recognized that the municipality was not obligated or bound by the results of the study in any way. It is often difficult for small municipalities with limited resources to positively impact problems faced in the community, especially public safety. It has become necessary in many locations to consider ways to improve police service while stabilizing current and future costs. To this end, many smaller jurisdictions rely on outsourcing public safety duties, through contracted police service, relying on the Pennsylvania State Police or joining a regional police department. The concept of regional and/or contractual policing is one option that numerous municipalities currently participate in and one that many municipalities in Pennsylvania are now exploring. Success of regional departments often-times hinges on the cooperation and partnership fostered by each participating municipality and should not reflect on the police services provided. The last and most expensive option is to form a stand-alone, municipal police department to serve only the residents of the municipality. Presented in this study is information to help Bath Borough make a decision that is in the best interest of the community. Information collected and provided by the local officials, the GCLGS, and other government sources were used to determine the feasibility of police coverage options. Several options for police service have been explored and recommendations have been made. On behalf of the GCLGS, Chief David A. Mettin, Police Peer Consultant, would like to thank all the local government officials and the appointed employees for their excellent cooperation and assistance in completing this study of the Bath Borough.

Harrisburg: Governor's Office, 2023. 53p.