By M. Lankester, C. Coles, A. Trotter, S. Scott, J. Downs, H. Dickson, A. Wickersham

The association between academic achievement and youth offending has yet to be clearly quantified. This meta-analysis aims to provide a robust estimate of the longitudinal association between academic achievement and subsequent youth offending. We searched PsycINFO, ERIC, British Education Index, and Web of Science from inception to 2 April 2024 using a comprehensive search strategy. We identified eligible studies reporting on the association between academic achievement and subsequent youth offending, as measured using self-report or administrative records up to the age of 25 years. Correlation coefficients and odds ratios were pooled in a meta-analysis. Effect modifiers were investigated in a sub-group analysis, and other findings were narratively synthesised. PROSPERO record: CRD42023402103. Seventeen studies were included, of which eight were pooled in a meta-analysis. The findings showed a small but statistically significant association between lower academic achievement and youth offending (pooled Fisher z= −0.21, 95% CI [−0.29,−0.12], I 2=98.4%). Subgroup analysis and narrative synthesis yielded mixed findings on the possible role of measurement timing and offence types. Lower academic achievement was associated with subsequent youth offending, underlining the need for a child-first approach to early prevention and intervention strategies in educational and forensic settings.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:457–476

By Brandon C. Welsh

Early developmental crime prevention is an important component of an overall strategy to reduce crime. Key features include a commitment to prevention in the first instance—intervening before a delinquent act has been committed and before a child has contact with the justice system—and a larger focus on improving the life chances of at-risk children and families, extending well beyond delinquency or criminal offending. The main aim of this article is to set out an agenda for action— a manifesto of sorts—to advance developmental crime prevention, with a special focus on the early stages of the life-course. Structured as a ten-point plan and organized around three core areas (policy directions, research priorities, and outreach), the agenda is designed to bring attention to what I view as the most important and pressing matters confronting early developmental crime prevention today. The good news is that the groundwork has been started on many fronts, with some successes and a great deal of promise. David Farrington’s research and scholarly contributions fgure prominently in this work, and this article also serves as a remembrance of David Farrington (1944–2024) and a way to celebrate his enduring life-work to help build a safer, more just society.

Journal of Developmental and Life-Course Criminology (2024) 10:457–476 

By Kyle Johnson, Felipe Botero, Mariana Botero, Andrés Aponte and Lina Asprilla

Governance by illegal armed groups and criminal actors has increasingly been identified as a serious problem for communities and states in Latin America. This is particularly true in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro’s government has implemented a policy known as “Paz Total” (“Total Peace”), which aims to negotiate with all illegal armed groups and numerous criminal organisations in the country. Contrary to initial expectations, the development of simultaneous negotiations has not progressed as quickly or effectively as anticipated, leading to the unintended consequence of increasing the capacity of armed and criminal groups to govern the territories involved in the Total Peace Process (TPP). This has prompted some think tanks, opinion leaders and experts to argue that the policy is strengthening both rebels and criminals, including enhancing their ability to govern the territories, neighbourhoods and communities where they operate. This paper explores the argument and demonstrates that this trajectory is not generic: it depends on the armed and criminal actors, the specific areas and the populations involved. Through case studies from three regions (Buenaventura, Arauca and Tumaco) where armed and criminal actors of different natures operate (including Los Shottas and Los Espartanos in Buenaventura, the Frente Domingo Laín (Domingo Laín Front) in Arauca and the Segunda Marquetalia (Second Marquetalia) in Tumaco), we provide evidence that governance models and territorial control vary significantly. These variations occur within distinct hybrid political order contexts. By examining the differences in governance between these three cases, as well as how governance has evolved over time, the paper highlights an understudied aspect of criminal and rebel governance. This comparison explores not only which aspects of life are governed, but also how they are governed. The research concludes with several key findings: criminals and rebels exercise control over different dimensions of life in their areas of influence, a capacity that has been amplified during the implementation of the TPP; ceasefires have facilitated this process; hybrid political orders have contributed to this trajectory; and the timing and sequencing of the peace process are crucial. The paper stresses the importance of considering the on-the-ground effects of initiating negotiations with the rebel and criminal actors who control these territories. By incorporating violence reduction and confidence-building measures into the incipient peace process, the research highlights potential perverse effects that need to be anticipated and mitigated. Additionally, it highlights the importance of breaking the links between criminal and rebel groups and local armed forces or state institutions to undermine criminal and rebel governance. Finally, it suggests that zones of dispute and strategic competition between illegal armed organisations should be treated differently from zones of hegemonic control in terms of public policy

SOC ACE Research Paper 34.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham , 2025. 67p.

By Maloney, William, Marcela Melendez, and Raul Morales

The report titled “Organized Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean” underscores how these issues exacerbate the region's already fragile economic landscape. Latin America and the Caribbean are projected to grow by 2.1 percent in 2025 and 2.4 percent in 2026, positioning it as the slowest-growing region globally.

The region grapples with alarmingly high levels of lethal violence linked to organized crime. Victimization rates are three times higher than the global average, with homicide rates standing at eight times the global average.

The report outlines several factors contributing to the rise in organized crime, including escalating global demand for illegal goods, government crackdowns that have reconfigured criminal networks, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which allowed these groups to solidify their power in areas where state presence is weak.

“Organized crime is rapidly proliferating across the region, transcending domestic borders and becoming a pervasive threat. This is no longer an isolated issue; it demands a regional and global dialogue to elevate solutions and mobilize our collective expertise and resources,” said Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Vice President for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

This proliferation has clear development consequences. The report outlines how it threatens public safety, stifles economic growth and erodes the integrity of public institutions. The uncertainty surrounding property rights, rampant extortion, and pervasive insecurity inflate transaction costs for businesses, undermining competitiveness. Moreover, the diversion of public security resources from essential services like health and education burden countries already facing high debt and fiscal challenges.

“Fighting organized crime is not merely a law enforcement issue; it’s a development priority. It undermines governance, distorts investment, and exacerbates inequality. We must address this issue head-on to prevent it from becoming a permanent drag on growth,” said William Maloney, Chief Economist for Latin America and the Caribbean at the World Bank.

To address these challenges, the report calls for a robust agenda to enhance state capacity against organized crime, including police reform, improved prison systems, and strengthened judicial processes. Well-equipped institutions are key to achieving growth and development in the region.

Economic policies also play a crucial role in combating organized crime, promoting growth and job-creating reforms while providing youth with options through improved education and training. These initiatives raise the opportunity cost of crime, reducing its labor supply.

Finally, the report stresses the need for long-term research to inform government actions, as the absence of regular, comparable surveys hampers the development of effective policies

Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025. 92p.

By Earthsight

Introduction The EU banned wood products from Russia and Belarus soon after the illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.1 The move recognised the importance of the forestry sector to the economies of the 1 Article 3i Paragraph 1 of Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as inserted via COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) 2022/576 of 8 April 2022, states that “it shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, goods which generate significant revenues for Russia thereby enabling its actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as listed in Annex XXI into the Union if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia”. When initially passed in April 2022, Annex XXI included HS Code 44: Wood and articles of wood, as well as HS Codes 4705 Key Findings • An undercover investigation by Earthsight has revealed widespread laundering of Russian and Belarusian timber into the EU in breach of sanctions put in place in response to Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. ‘Blood timber’ with a retail value of over €1.5bn is estimated to have entered the EU since sanctions took effect in July 2022. Twenty container-loads continue to arrive every day. • The Russian military profits directly from timber sales, and Russia is among the largest producers of wood in the world. The EU sanctioned wood imports from Russia and its ally Belarus in recognition of the industry’s importance to their economies, and in response to appeals by civil society. • Earthsight has spent nine months investigating clandestine trade in the most valuable sanctioned product – birch plywood. Now, we reveal the actors at every stage of the supply chain, from the manufacturing giants in Russia, through the firms laundering their products in China, Kazakhstan and Turkey, to their customers in the EU. • Earthsight found evidence that goods from seven of Russia’s 10 biggest birch ply manufacturers are still being sold in the EU. These include two firms whose largest shareholders are billionaire oligarchs who met with Putin on the day Russia invaded Ukraine. One of these, Alexei Mordashov, is also on the EU’s sanctions list, while the other, Vladimir Yevtushenkov, controls Russia’s largest logging firm. Our evidence also implicates Belarusian state-owned birch ply producers. • Sanctioned plywood is making its way into a wide range of products, including kitchens, flooring, furniture and toys. Birch ply suppliers in China, Kazakhstan and Turkey claimed to Earthsight undercover investigators to be laundering sanctioned Russian wood into the EU. Buyers of birch ply from the same firms, records show, include Walltopia, the world’s largest manufacturer of artificial climbing walls. Though we have no proof these European buyers are breaching sanctions or are aware of the risk of the plywood they buy being of Russian origin, other EU firms we met with undercover were all too aware of the provenance of the birch ply in their supply chains. • Illegal, blood-stained birch plywood has entered every EU member state, our research suggests. The biggest importers at present are Poland, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Estonia and Greece. • Efforts to enforce sanctions on timber have been ill-coordinated and ineffective, with smugglers easily able to adapt and continue trading. The EU Commission and member states must take urgent, coordinated action to halt this trade, and Poland, by far the largest importer of blood-stained birch, must use its current Presidency of the EU to lead the charge

London: Earthsight, 2025. 25p.

By Sjoukje van Deuren, Marianne F. H. Hirsch Ballin, Edward R. Kleemans & Arjan A. J. Blokland

The Dutch criminal law system is based on individual liability, yet part of the crime and violence Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG) members commit is collective in nature. This study examines the criminal law approach towards collective criminal behavior of OMCG members. The study analyzes police files and court judgements of criminal law cases that were filed against members of Dutch OMCGs. Additionally, interviews were carried out with public prosecutors involved in these criminal cases. The results show that it is often difficult to legally address OMCGs as criminal organizations or weigh the mere symbolic contribution of fellow club members to crime, such as the use of the OMCGs’ violent reputation. Furthermore, the results suggest that in order to circumvent legal difficulties in addressing group symbolism and OMCGs as collectives via criminal law, the Dutch Public Prosecution Office has recently opted for a stronger interplay between criminal and civil law, targeting both individual OMCG members and the structural aspects of OMCGs. Future research is needed to establish which (interplays between) legal instruments are most effective in responding to collective criminal behavior.

Trends in Organized Crime (2025) 28:79–99

By Frederike Ambagtsheer

The human organ trade is proliferating globally. However, far fewer cases have been prosecuted than would be expected based on estimates of the crime. Research exploring the challenges to investigating and prosecuting organ trafficking cases is practically non-existent. Also no studies exist that explain these challenges utilizing a criminal justice framework. This article aims to explain the legal, institutional and environmental factors that affected the investigation and prosecution of two organ trafficking cases: the Netcare case, exposed in South Africa and the Medicus case, exposed in Kosovo. It analyzes these factors through a comparative, mixed-method design, utilizing a theoretical criminal justice framework. Both cases constituted globally operating criminal networks involving brokers and transplant professionals that colluded in organizing illegal transplants. Both cases contained human trafficking elements, however only the Medicus case was prosecuted as a human trafficking case. Legal uncertainty, a lack of institutional readiness and cross-border collaboration issues hampered investigation and prosecution of the Netcare case. The Medicus case also reported problems during cross-border collaboration, as well as a corrupt environment and institutional barriers, which impeded a successful case outcome. Recommendations to improve enforcement of organ trafficking include improving identification of suspicious transplant activity, streng

Trends in Organized Crime (2025) 28:51–78

By Olivia Allison David Lewis

Russia’s siege and destruction of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol from February to May 2022 turned the city into an international symbol of the brutality and destruction of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Now Russia is attempting to turn Mariupol into a showcase Russian city to legitimise its occupation of Ukrainian territory. A huge reconstruction programme is underway in the city and Russia plans to make Mariupol the centre of a new transport network, which will ensure the resupply of Russian forces on the frontline and in Crimea. This research paper investigates this Russian programme of investment in Mariupol, which has been accompanied by the illicit seizure of thousands of Ukrainian homes, businesses and assets. There have been widespread allegations of corruption, fraud and profiteering, and new Russian business networks are emerging that benefit from Russia’s wartime economy. These economic practices in many cases constitute criminal activities and may be potential war crimes. Key points • Business seizures: Russian political and corporate interests and their proxies have seized control of thousands of Ukrainian businesses, properties and assets without compensation. • Dispossession: Many Mariupol residents have lost their homes, not only in the war, but also through an illegal programme of nationalisation, and a reconstruction programme that favours local vested interests and Russian incomers. • Profiteering and corruption: Powerful Moscow-based networks are controlling much of the reconstruction programme. Well-connected companies are benefiting from Russian spending that involves the widespread use of illicit finance and corrupt practices. • International trade: Mariupol port is at the centre of an illicit international trade in Ukrainian grain, clay and other materials. • Strategic implications: The new transport networks around Mariupol have important strategic implications, consolidating Russian control. Major Russian corporations are involved in building rail, road and maritime links. Policy implications • Rethinking strategy towards the occupation: A renewed Ukrainian and international strategy could also use political, diplomatic and economic instruments, including targeted sanctions, to raise the cost of Russia’s occupation and to challenge its long-term hold on the territory. • Sanctions: Current sanctions policy by the EU, the UK, the US and other countries towards the occupied territories is often incomplete and poorly coordinated. A more coherent approach would be more effective, particularly one that seeks to raise costs on individuals and companies leading and benefitting from the Russian occupation. EU, UK, US and other sanctions authorities could consider better coordinating their sanctions towards the occupied territories to ensure maximum impact. • Restitution: Many people from the occupied territories have lost their businesses, homes and savings. The Ukrainian government and international donors could develop mechanisms to find ways to compensate them directly for losses of homes or businesses, potentially funded with the profits from frozen Russian assets.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 35.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE), 2025. 64p.

By Huma Haider

Organised crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organised crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organised crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organised crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. 1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organised crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilise. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ to a criminal group and to achieve complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthening of criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organised crime groups that extends beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilise was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organised crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognised as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2023. 88p.

By Matthew R. Redhead

Over the past decade, Western countries have faced an apparently rising tide of hostile activities perpetrated by state actors and their partners, many of which sit in the “grey” or “liminal” zone between peace and war, using hybrid or unusual methods as vectors of attack (Kilcullen, 2020). This body of activities has become known by a variety of terms, such as “state threats”, “hostile state activity” and “hostile activity by states”. However, much of the current discourse around state threats has been poorly and loosely defined, and has tended to focus more on the topic’s military than civilian aspects. Much research has also failed to ask a variety of basic questions about why the issue of state threats is so important now, both as a phenomenon, and also as a subject of policymaking for Western governments. Many of the activities that fall under the broad umbrella of state threats are well-known covert and clandestine activities such as espionage, sabotage and subversion. There are natural questions of how novel or significant state threats truly are, and indeed, how much Western governments care about them as a result. This research seeks to address these concerns, looking to provide firmer definitional boundaries, and, within them, to explore the scale, scope and character of modern state threats, especially – but not exclusively – from a Western perspective. The research notes that besides the apparent explosion in the volume and range of hostile activities, there is much that is “new” about them, from the combination of traditional intelligence tradecraft with new technologies, attempts to innovate, a willingness to take greater risks, and a growing willingness to contract out violent and/or dangerous clandestine and covert activities to both licit and illicit non-state actors – especially organised crime groups. It is also clear that many hostile activities take advantage of new vulnerabilities in society that have never existed before, such as the ubiquity of social media and societal reliance on technology. Overall, the research shows how state threats have become more important as tools of policy due to “geopolitical climate change”. Perceived changes in global power balances and receding agreement on international norms of behaviour are permitting and encouraging more states – non-aligned and Western, as well as authoritarian opponents of the West – to use hostile acts that mostly fall short of war to achieve their political ends. Although current evidence suggests that the results of these kinds of activities are mixed at best, their relative cheapness and apparent lack of political risk are likely to make them an attractive form of coercive statecraft in the medium term. While this might be bearable for highly resilient states in the short term, this is unlikely to be the case for less stable societies, and if sustained over the long term, could even have more severe effects on open societies that have robust protections in place.   

SOC ACE Research Paper 32. University of Birmingham. 2025. 223p.

By Christopher Blattman

International drug trafficking dominates the conversation on organized crime, but equally common and serious are urban systems of organized crime—criminal groups focused not on exports or transshipment, but on dominating local markets, neighborhoods, and politics. When policymakers do pay attention to this problem, they consistently make the same mistake—believing there are best practices. But systems of organized crime are not all alike. There is no one blueprint or general solution, and so following the latest fad is unlikely to deliver the desired result. Instead of trying to copy the quasi-mythological success of a Giuliani or Bukele, policymakers need to understand what kind of organized crime problem they have, what capabilities their city possesses, and what tools are appropriate to the circumstances. This paper looks in-depth at how organized crime is organized in three cities: Chicago, Medellín, and San Salvador. It also considers New York, Bogotá, and Port-au-Prince. I argue that the primary driver of their organization and incentives is their source of criminal revenues. A second major driver of behavior is the degree of criminal political organization, which broadly-speaking takes three forms: atomized individuals, fragmented groups, and competing confederations. These forms are not just the product of their revenues, but are also the result of decades of competition with the state and one another. What policy tools will work hinges on this diagnosis. I look at the evidence for a range of standard policies—from crackdowns to street outreach—and explain why we can expect them to have wildly different impacts depending on the context

Prepared for 2024 IMF & IDB Conference Crime in Latin America , 2024. 48p.

By The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Criminal networks are increasingly seeking to gain control over extraction sites, trade routes, and refining infrastructure.

According to a new report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), these groups have become deeply embedded in gold supply chains, drawn by the sector’s high profitability and rising gold prices.

‘Serious global threat’

Organized crime has become so involved in the gold supply that it now constitutes a “serious global threat”, with illegal networks constantly adapting in order to enable and hide their operations.

Exploiting advances in transportation, finance, and communications, many of these groups have a foothold in regular businesses, enabling them to both launder proceeds and move illegal gold with relative ease.

Apart from heightened violence, corruption and environmental degradation, crime gangs also expose vulnerable populations to exploitation, the UN highlights, increasing the risk of sexual exploitation, forced labour, and displacement.

Bypassing regulations

While legal mining operations are regulated to minimise environmental harm, illegal mining bypasses these safeguards entirely.

By clearing forests to access mineral deposits, illicit operations directly contribute to environmental destruction, degrading fragile ecosystems and accelerating biodiversity loss – particularly when such activities occur within protected areas.

One of the most severe environmental impacts of illegal gold mining is the use of hazardous or banned chemicals by criminal organisations.

Opportunities

Although the majority of gold mining sites are located in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia, most gold refineries are concentrated in Europe, Asia, and North America. As a result, the precious metal often crosses multiple borders before it even reaches a refining centre.

This transnational movement creates opportunities for both criminal exploitation and law enforcement intervention.

Criminal groups frequently introduce illegally sourced gold into the supply chain by exploiting weak oversight, inconsistent documentation, and regulatory loopholes along trade routes.

However, the geographical concentration of refineries offers a strategic point for disruption, the UNODC report noted.

Focusing regulatory efforts on these key hubs could significantly reduce the flow of illicit gold into the global market, the report concluded.

A global push for renewable energy technologies like electric cars and wind turbines brings benefits for the environment and economic opportunities for countries along the supply chain. But it also increases the demand for minerals needed to power and operate these products, which brings serious risks from crime and corruption. Renewable energy technologies rely on so-called critical energy transition minerals (CETMs) for batteries, magnets and other components. Production and processing of these minerals – which include copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earth elements – is concentrated in a few countries. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has highlighted that demand is expected to continue to grow in the coming years and decades, as countries strive to meet the Paris Agreement targets and achieve net zero emissions by 2050. These factors combine with complex supply chain dynamics to make the sector vulnerable to political instability, trade restrictions, or criminal interference. If demand outpaces supply, the resulting pressure can create fertile ground for criminal actors to infiltrate, exploit, and distort supply chains. Criminal actors may seize control of extraction sites, trade routes, or refining infrastructure, using corruption, violence and/or coercion to bypass regulations, evade taxation, and manipulate access to resources. Profits can then accrue to just a few powerful actors, who can determine who has access to the minerals. This control can, over time, exacerbate global inequalities and further destabilize a market already under pressure. These crimes can cause harm on multiple levels. Local populations suffer damage to their ecosystems, countries are hit by lost revenues and weakened governance, and the global supply chain is destabilized. Criminal interference can delay access to essential minerals, undermine responsible sourcing, and ultimately slow the energy transition, while also deterring responsible investment and hindering sustainable development.

Vienna: Research and Trend Analysis Branch United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime , 2025. 78p.

By Min Xie, Preeti Chauhan, Michael Rempel, and Jeremy Travis

This study relies on data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and presents trends from 1996 to 2022 in crime victimization, rates at which victims report crimes to the police, confidence in the police, and victims’ use of services in New York City. This is one of two studies falling under the umbrella of the Crossroads Project. Its goal is to trace New York City’s trends in crime victimization, enforcement, incarceration, and racial disparities from the 1990s to the early 2020s in the hopes that empirical data over a long timeframe might provide a much-needed perspective capable of informing future policy. Both of the two resulting reports and a joint executive summary may be found at the project landing page. How was the NCVS used in the present study? Although the NCVS is typically used to assess victimization patterns for the nation as a whole, the data can be used to study New York City victimization trends. This is because the New York City’s population base is greater than 5 million and there are fewer concerns regarding identification of victims within the data and unstable estimates (too small of a population may provide volatile estimates). A small body of research has used the NCVS data for local crime analysis including for Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Houston (Rezey & Lauritsen, 2023; Xie, Ortiz Solis, & Chauhan, 2024). Other research has examined New York City data (Langan & Durose, 2009; Xie, Ortiz Solis, & Chauhan, 2024) but the analyses was more limited in the scope and did not extend to 2022. Our study examines the NCVS data in New York City from 1996 to 2022 by nonfatal violence and property crimes. We also assess whether these crimes were reported to the police and, if not, what proportion were not reported because the victims believed the police would not help (a proxy for public confidence in the police). Next, we examine what proportion of victims of violence used victim services, regardless of whether the crime was reported to the police or not. Lastly, we compare New York City to the nation as a whole and to other cities with a population over one million. The analyses are also conducted by race/ethnicity with the caution that the sample size may be too small for reliable estimates. This is the first study to unpack New York City victimization data in this way. Table 1 presents the average number of interviews conducted in New York City annually from 1996 to 2022, compared to the number of interviews for the United States and other cities with populations exceeding one million. The sample size decreases when the data is disaggregated by race/ethnicity, which is a limitation of the NCVS as smaller sample sizes result in larger standard errors of estimates, reducing the results’ precision. To further assist with this issue, a data point in this report for a specific year is a three-year moving average. Three-year moving averages produce more reliable estimates because the annual count of violent incidents in a single city tends to be small. The three-year average violence rate in 1997 is the average violence rate from 1996 to 1998, and so on.

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice, at John Jay College, 2025. 18p.

By Stephen Koppel, Min Xie, Michael Rempel, Olive Lu, Jeremy Travis, & Preeti Chauhan

New York City’s response to crime and violence stands at a pivotal moment. After decades of declining crime and a shrinking criminal legal system, recent years have brought major criminal legal reforms, a global pandemic, and renewed debate about safety, fairness, and enforcement.

To help move the conversation forward, the goal of the Crossroads Project was to ground essential policy discussions in objective data concerning the pendulum swings that describe New York City’s trajectory from the 1990s to the present.

Introduction to the Crossroads Project The premise of this project is simple: In determining its response to crime and violence, New York City stands at a crossroads. After years of declining rates of crime, enforcement activities, and incarceration, New York City has experienced volatility in many of these same criminal justice measures. New realities have prompted calls for a more punitive response to crime which, in turn, are countered by advocates urging continued support for a reform agenda. Today’s choices on the path forward will have long-term consequences for the well-being of the City’s residents and communities, and for New Yorkers’ aspirations for safety, justice, and equity. To inform current policies, this report, along with another focusing on victimization, seeks to widen our perspective by drawing attention to the pendulum swings that describe the City’s longer history. These swings feature a multi-decade pattern of declining crime, enforcement activities, and incarceration from the 1990s until 2020, followed by upticks and reversals in the vacillating 2020s. The juxtaposition of this more extended view of history against present-day debates about the best path forward underscores the power of the metaphor: We are at a crossroads. The driving premise of the Crossroads project is that we have an opportunity to learn from past responses to crime—including disproportionate harm experienced by communities of color—to craft more effective policies in the future. To help move the conversation forward, our immediate purpose is to ground discussions in objective data concerning New York City’s history up to the present. We expand on two earlier analyses, 1 adding more metrics and extending the tracking period through at least 2023. In addition, an accompanying report draws on the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to document victimization trends in the City, the proportion of victimization reported to the police, and changes in victims’ confidence in police and use of services.2 Notably, that report finds that during the study period (1996 to 2022), more than half of all crimes were never reported to the police, with reporting rates declining over time—particularly for household property crime— and finds an increasing perception that police would not help if called. By contrast, the present report focuses solely on criminal complaints that are reported to the police and processed by the criminal legal system and thus may offer a more limited view of overall victimization. An executive summary available at the project landing page integrates key findings from both reports. The full report on crime victimization trends is available at this same landing page. Tied to this research, the Crossroads Convening, a two-day public event held at John Jay College in May of 2025, provides New Yorkers with an opportunity to look both backward and forward, reflecting on past trends and advancing a much-needed dialogue about the future steps New York City’s criminal legal system might take We seek to answer seven questions about the changing criminal legal landscape since 1990. 1. Crime: How have crime rates changed, encompassing the most serious violent crimes and shooting incidents, and misdemeanor crime complaints (Chapter 2)? 2. Law Enforcement: How have police enforcement activities changed, encompassing pedestrian street stops, minor summonses, felony and misdemeanor arrests, and drug arrests (Chapter 3)? 3. Decision-Making in the Courts: How have key decisions and case outcomes changed, encompassing prosecutors’ decision of whether to file arrests with the court in the first place, judges’ bail decisions, case dispositions (e.g., conviction rates), and the use of alternatives to incarceration (Chapter 4)? 4. Incarceration and Community Corrections: How have local jail, state prison, probation, and parole admissions and daily population numbers changed (Chapter 5)? 5. Recidivism After Disposition: How have recidivism rates changed for people immediately released into the community following a non-carceral case disposition (Chapter 6)? 6. Racial Disparities: Amid the overall trends, to what extent (if at all) have racial and ethnic disparities in people’s criminal legal system involvement declined (Chapter 7)? 7. The Early 2020s: Zooming in from this report’s longer-term analysis, what trends or fluctuations have taken place specifically in the early 2020s (covered in all chapters)? Answers to this last question will set the stage for a discussion of the criminal legal system we want, moving forward. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes major themes and takeaways

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice, at John Jay College, 2025. 40p.

By Ben Mathews, Kelsey Hegarty, Harriet MacMillan, et al.

Objectives: To estimate the prevalence in Australia of intimate partner violence, each intimate partner violence type, and multitype intimate partner violence, overall and by gender, age group, and sexual orientation. Study design: National survey; Composite Abuse Scale (Revised)— Short Form administered in mobile telephone interviews, as a component of the Australian Child Maltreatment Study. Setting: Australia, 9 April – 11 October 2021. Participants: 8503 people aged 16 years or older: 3500 aged 16–24 years and about 1000 each aged 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, or 65 years or older. Main outcome measures: Proportions of participants who had ever been in an intimate partner relationship since the age of 16 years (overall, and by gender, age group, and sexual orientation) who reported ever experiencing intimate partner physical, sexual, or psychological violence. Results: Survey data were available for 8503 eligible participants (14% of eligible persons contacted), of whom 7022 had been in intimate relationships. The prevalence of experiencing any intimate partner violence was 44.8% (95% confidence interval [CI], 43.3–46.2%); physical violence was reported by 29.1% (95% CI, 27.7–30.4%) of participants, sexual violence by 11.7% (95% CI, 10.8–12.7%), and psychological violence by 41.2% (95% CI, 39.8–42.6%). The prevalence of experiencing intimate partner violence was significantly higher among women (48.4%; 95% CI, 46.3–50.4%) than men (40.4%; 95% CI, 38.3–42.5%); the prevalence of physical, sexual, and psychological violence were also higher for women. The proportion of participants of diverse genders who reported experiencing intimate partner violence was high (62 of 88 participants; 69%; 95% CI, 55–83%). The proportion of nonheterosexual participants who reported experiencing intimate partner violence (70.2%; 95% CI, 65.7–74.7%) was larger than for those of heterosexual orientation (43.1%; 95% CI, 41.6–44.6%). More women (33.7%; 95% CI, 31.7–35.6%) than men (22.7%; 95% CI, 20.9–24.5%) reported multitype intimate partner violence. Larger proportions of participants aged 25–44 years (51.4%; 95% CI, 48.9–53.9%) or 16–24 years (48.4%, 95% CI, 46.1–50.6%) reported experiencing intimate partner violence than of participants aged 45 years or older (39.9%; 95% CI, 37.9–41.9%). Conclusions: Intimate partner violence is widespread in Australia. Women are significantly more likely than men to experience any intimate partner violence, each type of violence, and multitype intimate partner violence. A comprehensive national prevention policy is needed, and clinicians should be helped with recognising and responding to intimate partner violence.

Medical Journal of Australia (MJA), 2025, 9p.

By Ilias Chatzis, under the substantive guidance of Morgane Nicot, Martin Hemmi and Pascale Reinke-Schreiber

Migrant smuggling is a type of organized crime with links to other serious criminal offences, including illicit financial flows, corruption and trafficking in persons. Smuggling is an illegal service that is offered to countless people and requires a financial or material remuneration. Many migrants who do not have other viable options to move across borders, regularly depend on the services provided by smugglers to migrate. In principle, once the smuggling transaction is completed and the person arrives at the desired destination, the relationship between the smuggler and the migrant ceases without any harm being done. Too often, however, smuggled migrants and refugees suffer from various dangerous circumstances and abusive and violent treatment while under the control of smugglers. This Study considers the underlying risk factors that lead to abuse and violence during the smuggling operation and analyses whether gender influences the type of violence that is inflicted upon smuggled migrants. It also analyses the criminal justice responses to these abuses and the practical obstacles that may hamper the reporting, investigating or prosecuting of these “aggravations”. Finally, the Study provides recommendations for reducing the impunity of the people involved in such offences along the smuggling routes. UNODC, through the analysis of case law within its Knowledge Portal on Smuggling of Migrants, noted that there was little evidence of migrant smuggling being prosecuted in the countries where the smuggling venture occurred, let alone for cases where smuggling became abusive or exploitative. Yet, civil society, researchers and academia have increasingly raised their concerns over the extreme violence faced by people on the move along certain routes. To have a better understanding of the dynamics at play and the challenges to obtain justice in this context, this Study looks into two major transit regions, North Africa and Central America. It uses recently collected data from the UNODC Observatory on Migrant Smuggling that contains testimonies from frontline responders, smuggled migrants and migrant smugglers from West and North Africa. Aggravations occurring along the Central Mediterranean route also feature in the Study, as they are characteristic of the various types of abuse that migrants face before embarking on their dangerous sea crossings. It is often over those cases that courts in destination countries assess jurisdiction to prosecute smugglers and provide access to justice to the affected smuggled migrants. Practitioners were also interviewed for the Study to gain knowledge about smuggling characteristics in Central America. The present Study therefore focuses on these two regions, typically coined as transit regions for migrant smuggling operations.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021. 102p.

By Rebecca Shea

Fraud across federal programs is a significant and persistent problem. Some of this fraud is perpetrated by private companies obscuring beneficial ownership information when they compete for government contracts or apply for federal benefits. OIGs conduct oversight through audits and investigations, which include issues related to beneficial ownership. GAO was asked to review how beneficial ownership information may aid OIGs in their fraud detection and response efforts. This report describes the types of federal program fraud associated with beneficial ownership information, provides OIGs’ perspectives on using the company registry, and assesses FinCEN’s actions to communicate with OIGs. GAO reviewed relevant laws and agency documentation, interviewed officials from FinCEN and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), conducted a roundtable discussion with seven OIGs, and surveyed 72 OIGs to obtain their views on how the registry could affect their efforts to combat fraud. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that FinCEN communicate with OIGs, via CIGIE, regarding OIGs’ company registry access and use. FinCEN had no comment on the recommendation

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2025. 68p.

By Peter Schwartzstein

The greater the impact of climate change, the greater our awareness of the security challenges it’s leaving in its wake. In recent years, there has been a relative deluge of research in this space. However, while most of that work has been timely and essential and has included significant related studies, such as those on the relationship between heat and interpersonal violence, the full spectrum of climate-related security risks has not yet been adequately explored. Crime, though arguably one of the most widely felt of these fallouts, has received relatively little attention to date in the climate security literature. This brief paper is an attempt to begin redressing that shortfall. While crime, as a form of insecurity, might seem low stakes in comparison to terrorism and inter-state conflict, its sheer breadth ensures that many more people have likely suffered from it compared with more ‘macro’ forms of climate-related violence. From petty theft to not-so-petty assaults, climate change is leaving its mark on almost every category of crime. Furthermore, while existing climate impacts aggravate poverty, inequality, and the other forces that at least partly underlie lawbreaking, there is evidence to suggest that there might be much worse climate-related crime in store. After all, the messier, more disorderly world that climate change is stoking may be tremendously beneficial for criminals, especially as climate stresses shrink some states’ capacity and thereby their ability to tackle ne’er doers. At the same time, various types of crime may both undermine climate action and exacerbate climate stresses themselves. We may be overlooking a key plank of the conflict-climate nexus to our considerable collective peril. A relative dearth of research complicates attempts to articulate the extent and essence of the challenge. As with other forms of climate-related insecurity, the precise nature of climate’s contribution to crime is often hard to pin down, given the messy interplay of climate and other drivers of instability. However, through an analysis of the limited existing studies, a collation of the researcher’s own extensive fieldwork in this space, and three short case studies, each of which also draws off the researcher’s prior work, this is an attempt to get the ball rolling. Ultimately, the hope is that this short and summary briefer might serve as a springboard to—and an entry point for— future work

Washington, DC: Council on Strategic Risks, Center for Climate and Security , 2024. 9p.

By Richard Matzopoulos, Sarah Truen, and Ian Neethling,

Violence as a health priority impacts low- to middle-income countries (LMICs) disproportionately, which experience mortality rates almost 2.5 times greater than in high-income countries.

South Africa is among the LMICs most affected by violence with homicide rates six times global averages and among the world’s highest rates of gender-based violence, including rape and intimate partner violence. Several historical drivers have contributed, including colonialism, apartheid race-based social control policies, civil unrest and armed struggle, and the violent oppression of social justice movements. Some social drivers have endured, and income inequality—which still largely follows the apartheid-era race profiles and geography—has continued to be entrenched within society.

Within this milieu, certain progressive policies such as the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy and the 2020 National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide have sought to holistically address South Africa’s problem. However, uptake has been sub-optimal and violence has become so normalized that the extent of its harm to society is no longer fully recognized.

The authors in this study present evidence for the prevention of violence including examples from South Africa, and document the enormous toll of violence in terms of both its health impact on mortality and morbidity and its economic cost. In doing so, the study illustrates the costs of prevention are not prohibitive and emphasizes the urgent need to implement effective policies and interventions.

Recommendations in this study include highlighting the urgent need to provide financial and technical support for intersectoral collaboration, multilateral research cooperation, and research capacity to address violence, which in South Africa imposes a significant threat to development. Key aspects to support this agenda include: an integrated violence prevention approach to prevent violence at a societal level; and research to improve the evidence base for violence prevention and the quality of future costing studies.

New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2023. 54p.

By Li Li, Anke Hoeffler, and Teresa Artho

Background: Switzerland is a high-income country with low rates of fatal and nonfatal violence. Possibly due to these low prevalence rates, the costs of violence to Swiss society have received relatively little attention. Objective: This report aims to establish the prevalence rates of homicide and assaults (both physical and sexual) in Switzerland and assess their related tangible and intangible costs. Furthermore, it aims to estimate the economic cost of violence in Switzerland while specifically delving into the economic impact of domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). Methods: We employ a comprehensive approach to categorize violence-related costs into three categories: (1) tangible direct costs; (2) tangible indirect costs; and (3) intangible costs. Within each category, we further classify costs based on the outcome of injuries, distinguishing between fatal and nonfatal violence. To estimate these costs, we use official crime data from the Federal Statistical Office for homicide and assaults. Recognizing the issue of underreporting in physical and sexual assault offenses, victimization surveys are employed to estimate the number of unreported cases. In the absence of Swiss data on the cost of injuries, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides estimates on medical costs, work loss costs, and the value of a statistical life (VSL)/quality of life loss costs. To ensure comparability, violence types are mapped, and costs are adjusted for purchasing power parity between the US and Switzerland. We also make adjustments to reflect the relative size of medical spending between the two countries. For comparison, we use prevalence rates of physical assault from Gallup. Using the same methodology, we also estimate the costs of domestic violence and IPV. Results: Our estimates suggest that the economic cost of violence in Switzerland is about USD 66.3 billion, equivalent to 8.3 percent of the country’s GDP, according to Swiss data. However, the costs could be as high as USD 73.4 billion, representing 9.2 percent of GDP, based on the Gallup World Poll data. Further, domestic violence alone accounts for at least 4.4 percent of Swiss GDP, while IPV accounts for at least 3.2 percent. Conclusions: Despite low Swiss prevalence rates of violence, the estimated costs of said violence are high. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding our estimates due to missing Swiss data on medical and criminal justice costs, as well as the severity of injuries due to assault.

New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2023. 36p