By Jamie Bergin

Despite challenges in defining and measuring illicit financial flows (IFFs), academic and policy circles have increasingly recognised their negative effects on development, including by reducing domestic resource mobilisation and distorting markets, but also by facilitating predicate crimes that wreak wider harms. Evidence indicates that IFFs similarly undermine recent levels of economic growth and security in the region of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute. , U4 Help Desk,2025. 58p

By Thomas Young

Financial fraud is on the rise nationally. Across all 50 states and D.C., the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime report tracked 859,532 fraud claims in 2024. These claims resulted in $16.6 billion in financial loss, up 33% from 2023. A separate source, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Consumer Sentinel Network, reported 2.6 million fraud cases in 2024, of which 38% involved losing money. According to this source, citizens reported losing $12 billion to fraud, up $2 billion from 2023. This study seeks to answer the pressing question: What is the extent of financial fraud in Colorado and its impact on the lives of everyday Coloradans and the overall health of the state’s economy?

According to the Colorado Department of Public Safety, reported fraud cases summed to 75,119 from 2022 through 2024. Financial fraud is also costly, with the FTC reporting the total financial loss of financial fraud at $211 million statewide in 2024, up 314% since 2020. The FBI reported $244 million in losses from online (formally referred to as cyber-enabled) crime in Colorado, up 142% since 2020. These are just the reported figures. Unreported loss from financial fraud is higher.

The FBI reports that among all states Colorado ranks 34th best in total losses from online crime; 44th best in online crime per 100,000 citizens; 33rd best for complaints filed by individuals 60+; and 34th best for cryptocurrency losses by state. The FTC Consumer Sentinel Network figures on fraud, identity theft, and telemarketing suggests Colorado is doing slightly better than the FBI’s statistics. Colorado has the 32nd lowest rate of fraud and the 24th lowest rate of identity theft by their metrics.

In Colorado and across the nation, fraudulent financial activity is becoming increasingly sophisticated, encompassing a broad array of schemes such as identity theft, phishing, wire fraud, investment scams, and elder financial abuse. As the digital economy expands and cybercriminal tactics evolve, Coloradans face heightened risks from fraud schemes that attempt to exploit personal vulnerabilities, holes in financial systems, social media platforms, payment technologies, and personal data security. Fraudulent activities result not only in direct financial losses for individuals, businesses, and financial institutions, but they also have ripple effects throughout the state’s economy—affecting prices, consumer behavior, public safety expenditures, and overall economic productivity. 

This report presents evidence of the economic consequences of financial fraud, covering both the direct and indirect costs of fraudulent activity by examining incident data, economic modeling, and a fraud case study. By analyzing trends in fraud—including the types, methods, and demographic factors associated with its presence—it aims to provide policymakers, businesses, and consumers with actionable insights into the economic stakes of financial fraud.

Key Findings

• For the state of Colorado, CSI estimates in 2025 the losses from financial fraud include—

•  An estimated $375 million in direct, reported losses

• An estimated $2.5 billion in unreported losses

• The state’s General Fund will lose an estimated $88 million in tax revenue this year due to financial fraud.

• CSI estimates reported fraud alone will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

  • A $954 million reduction in state GDP

  • A $932 million reduction in statewide personal income

  • A loss of approximately 6,628 jobs

• Estimates on the reporting of financial fraud suggest formal reporting of financial fraud may be quite low, with one estimate putting the figure at 14%. This means that most financial fraud does not get reported to government authorities.

• CSI estimates all financial fraud, reported and unreported, will have the following impact on Colorado’s economy in 2025:

• A $5.1 billion reduction in state GDP ($856 per person)

• A $3.9 billion reduction in statewide personal income ($655 per person)

• A loss of approximately 16,374 jobs (0.5% of nonfarm jobs)

• Financial fraud has wide-ranging economic implications. The impact is felt across consumer spending, interest rates, available loanable funds, capital investment, government spending and taxing, profit, and community trust.

• Colorado’s incidence of financial fraud is around the middle of the states at 18th highest, at 1,260 reported incidents per 100,000 residents, lower than 17th ranked California at 1,291 and 19th ranked Mississippi at 1,221. The states with the highest incidence of financial fraud are Florida and Georgia with rates that are 72% and 67% higher than Colorado’s. 

Greenwood Village,  CO: Common Sense Institute 2025. 24p.

By Hai V. Nguyen, Shweta Mital, Shawn Bugden, Pharm; et al

Importance British Columbia, Canada, was the first and only jurisdiction globally to implement a province-wide safer supply policy, which offered pharmaceutical grade opioids to individuals at risk of opioid overdose, followed by the decriminalization of drug possession. Supporters of the safer supply policy argue that this policy could save lives by offering pharmaceutical-grade opioids to people who use toxic street drugs. Similarly, proponents of decriminalization suggest that decriminalizing drug possession could reduce drug overdoses by reducing stigma associated with drug use and enabling persons who use drugs to seek addictions treatment. However, critics of both policies believe that providing safer opioids and removing penalties for drug possession may worsen the crisis. Currently, there is limited evidence on the health impacts of these policies.

Objective To assess the association of British Columbia’s adoption of the safer supply policy and subsequent decriminalization of drug possession with opioid overdose hospitalizations and deaths.

Design, Setting, and Participants This observational cohort study used synthetic difference-in-differences analysis with quarterly province-level data to compare prepolicy and postpolicy changes in British Columbia with those in other Canadian provinces that did not implement these policies. The study period spanned from quarter 1 of 2016 to quarter 4 of 2023.

Exposure Safer opioid supply policy implemented in March 2020 and decriminalization of drug possession implemented in January 2023.

Main Outcomes and Measures Opioid-poisoning hospitalizations and apparent opioid-related toxicity deaths, measured as number per 100 000 population.

Results The safer supply policy alone was associated with an increase of 1.66 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.41-2.92; P = .009) or 33%. The addition of drug possession decriminalization was associated with a further increase of 1.27 opioid hospitalizations per 100 000 population (95% CI, 0.05-2.50; P = .046) for an overall 58% increase compared with the period before the safer supply policy was in effect. There was insufficient evidence to conclusively attribute an increase in opioid overdose deaths to these policy changes.

Conclusions and Relevance This cohort study found that neither the safer supply policy nor the subsequent decriminalization of drug possession appeared to alleviate the opioid crisis. Instead, both were associated with an increase in opioid overdose hospitalizations. The observed increase in opioid hospitalizations, without a corresponding increase in opioid deaths, may reflect greater willingness to seek medical assistance because decriminalization could reduce the stigma associated with drug use. However, it is also possible that reduced stigma and removal of criminal penalties facilitated the diversion of safer opioids, contributing to increased hospitalizations.

By David Powell; Mireille Jacobson

IMPORTANCE Illicit opioids, particularly illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF), are major contributors to overdose deaths in the US. Understanding the prevalence and characteristics of illicit opioid use is crucial for addressing the opioid crisis. OBJECTIVE To estimate the prevalence of illicit opioid use, including IMF, and initial opioid exposure among those reporting illicit opioid use. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This cross-sectional study was conducted using an online survey with targeted demographic quotas from June 10, 2024, to June 17, 2024. A total of 1515 participants aged 18 years and older from the US completed the survey. The analysis was conducted between June 30, 2024, and February 13, 2025. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was self-reported illicit opioid use within the past 12 months. Secondary outcomes included initial exposure to opioids and perceived likelihood of overdose. Logistic regression was used to analyze associations with demographic and geographic factors. RESULTS A total of 1515 respondents completed the survey, including 770 female individuals (50.8%), 20 American Indian or Alaska Native (1.3%), 101 Asian or Pacific Islander (6.7%), 215 Black (14.2%), 1087 White (81.7%), and 24 multiracial (1.6%); 186 (12.3%) were aged 18 to 24, 242 (16.0%) 25 to 34, 327 (21.6%) 35 to 44, 280 (18.5%) 45 to 54, 281 (18.5%) 55 to 64, 139 (9.2%) 65 to 74, and 60 (4.0%) 75 to 84 years. Among this sample, 166 (10.96%; 95% CI, 9.38%-12.52%) reported nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, including 114 (7.52%; 95% CI, 6.20%-8.85%) of the 1515 respondents reporting IMF use. Among those reporting nonprescription opioid use within the past 12 months, 65 (39.16%; 95% CI, 31.73%-46.58%) reported that their first opioid use involved opioids prescribed to them, whereas 60 (36.14%; 95% CI, 28.84%-43.45%) reported that their first use involved prescription opioids not prescribed to them. Only 41 (24.70%; 95% CI, 18.14%-31.26%) answered that their first exposure involved illicit opioids. Seventy-one (4.69%; 95% CI, 3.62%-5.75%) of all respondents reported that it was very likely they would have an overdose due to opioid use. This rate increased to 33.33% (95% CI, 24.68%-41.99%) among those who had used IMF within the past 12 months. Illicit opioid use was higher among men, Black respondents, and younger age groups. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The findings of this cross-sectional study indicate a higher prevalence of illicit opioid use than previously reported, highlighting the need for more timely and accurate data to inform policy and intervention strategies.

JAMA Health Forum; 2025

By Jonathan P. Caulkins, Bishu Giri

Illegally manufactured fentanyl (IMF) kills enormous numbers of people in the U.S. and Canada. Since the emergence of modern heroin markets in the late 1960s, supply control has been associated with meaningful reductions in opioid use and harms in at least six cases worldwide. However, countering supply effectively depends on understanding what the dominant drug-trafficking routes are. New data on fentanyl seizures presented here largely reinforce previous understanding that most IMF enters the U.S. from the south. These data call into question tariffs and other policies and policy justifications that treat the threat from the northern border as comparably severe.

U.S. counties bordering Mexico and Canada show significantly higher rates of large fentanyl seizures, compared with counties that do not border our foreign neighbors—where “large” is defined as over a kilogram of powder or more than 1,000 pills, quantities indicative of wholesale trafficking. The 80 counties along the land borders recorded 2,461 large seizures between 2013 and 2024, averaging about 31 per county, while the other 3,064 counties documented 12,358 seizures, averaging only 4 per county. By weight, of all the fentanyl in those big land-border seizures in 2013–24, about 99% of the pills and 97% of the powder were found along the border with Mexico; by comparison, large seizures along the Canadian border are relatively rare. If we look at the recent years—2023 and 2024—distributions remain the same. San Diego County, California, leads in powder-form large fentanyl seizures; and Pima County, Arizona, records the highest volume of pill-form large fentanyl seizures.Drugs seized could be in transit to other places, or they might be intended for local consumption. Therefore, it is useful to contrast a county’s share of large seizures with its share of the population, which serves as a proxy for the size of the local market. Counties along the Mexican border account for only 2.35% of the U.S. population; but in 2023–24, they hosted about 40% of the nationwide quantity of fentanyl appearing in large seizures, for both powder and pills. By contrast, counties in the lower 48 states that border Canada account for 3.1% of the U.S. population but only 1.2% of the powder and just 0.5% of the pills obtained in large seizures.

To determine which counties look like import or transit centers, we developed a Disproportionality Index (DI), which compares a county’s proportion of large seizures against its proportion of the national population. On that scale, 1.0 means that seizures are proportionate to local population; below 1.0 indicates less than expected; and over 1.0 indicates more seizures than expected. Because of random fluctuations, a county can be a bit above or below 1.0, but we consider DIs above 2.5 noteworthy.

The counties with the highest DIs for 2023–24 were along the U.S.–Mexican border. For example, Imperial County, California, had a DI of 111 for fentanyl pills and 100 for powder. In contrast, in the county along the Canadian border with the greatest number of large seizures (Wayne County, Michigan, home of Detroit), the DIs were 0.5 for pills and 1.9 for powder, yielding an average DI of less than 2.0.

Only three other counties or collections of counties along the Canadian border had an average DI greater than 1. One (Okanagan County, Washington) stemmed from drugs seized from a Mexican-led organized-crime group that was supplying populations near the Canadian border. Another cluster (Juneau and Ketchikan) was suggestive of Alaska markets possibly being supplied from Canada. The third (Whatcom County, Washington) was locally significant (DI of 2.2 for powder) but small overall (Whatcom County accounted for just 0.15% of total powder seized).

Efforts to counter drug flows need to be grounded in data. The analysis here contradicts views—such as those used to justify certain tariffs—that treat the flows across the southern and northern borders as being comparably important.[1]

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2025. 15p.

By Ainsley L. Mitchum, Sam Stevens, and Bayliss J. Camp

The present study builds upon prior work by Marowitz (1996) by examining the crash and recidivism risk of alcohol-focused versus drug-involved driving under the influence (DUI) offenders. Although drug-involved DUI offenders remain a relatively small proportion of all DUI offenders, this proportion is rising, as is the proportion of impaired-driving fatal crashes involving drugs. Using a cohort of offenders arrested during calendar years 2014 through 2017, comparisons were drawn for the one-year periods pre- and post-arrest. Drug-involved offenders tended to have more problematic driving histories in the year prior to their index offense, as compared to alcohol-focused offenders. Even taking account of these differences in pre-arrest behavior, drug-involved offenders continued to have more problematic driving in the year subsequent to their index offense: they were twice as likely to be involved in a crash, and approximately 30% more likely to recidivate. A particularly powerful predictor of recidivism was whether or not a pre-conviction administrative per se (APS) license suspension – only available in instances where an offender is above the per se blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit, or refuses a chemical test – was imposed. Offenders convicted of a DUI offense, but against whom no APS license action was initiated, were more than three times as likely to recidivate compared to offenders against whom an APS action was taken.

Sacramento: California Office of Traffic Safety; 2025. 78p.

By U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

Summary:

This Commission Spotlight examines how China-linked scam centers are fueling corruption and violence in Southeast Asia, paving the way for greater Chinese influence in the region, and directly harming Americans in the process. Its findings are based on the Commission’s March 2025 hearing on “Crossroads of Competition: China in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands”; fact-finding trips to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia; and open source research.

Key Findings:

Chinese criminal networks operate industrial-scale scam centers across Southeast Asia that steal tens of billions of dollars annually from people around the world—a massive criminal enterprise that rivals the global drug trade in scale and sophistication.

The Chinese criminals behind scam centers have built ties—some overt, some deniable—to the Chinese government by embracing patriotic rhetoric, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and promoting pro-Beijing propaganda overseas. As a result, Chinese crime syndicates have expanded across Southeast Asia with, at a minimum, implicit backing from elements of the Chinese government.

The spread of China-linked scam compounds in Southeast Asia is fueling corruption and violence, promoting human trafficking, undermining the ability of governments in the region to control what happens in their territory, and promoting human trafficking.

China is exploiting the problem of scam compounds to increase its leverage over Southeast Asian governments, conduct intelligence and influence operations, and expand its security footprint in the region.

Beijing has selectively cracked down on scam centers that target Chinese victims, leading Chinese criminal organizations to conclude that they can make greater profits with lower risk by targeting citizens of wealthy countries such as the United States.

Americans are now among the top global targets of China-linked scam centers, with an estimated $5 billion lost to online scams in 2024 alone—a 42 percent increase over the previous year.

Washington, DC:

U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION

2025. 12p.

Organized Crime and National Security in Spain:

Challenges and Responses

Edited by Andrés de Castro

This book offers an analysis of how organized crime operates in Spain and the security apparatus designed to contain it. Organized crime is currently one of the most serious security threats facing democratic societies. Despite its intense presence and the responses that states have articulated in recent decades, little attention has been paid to the measurement of the effectiveness of the means adopted to combat it. Thus, this volume delves into this issue and performs an analysis of the police dimension of the response to organized crime in Spain. Firstly, this volume describes the international phenomenon of organized crime and its evolution in Spain, and continues by analyzing the profile and the characteristics of the different police forces and their resources and capabilities. This book then discusses the consequences of the measures at international level, European Union level, and local level, in relation to other police forces. Finally, the volume addresses the legal and public policy efforts that Spanish Law Enforcement Agencies have made in supervising or regulating their own police forces, which is necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of the consequences on the presence and strength of organized crime in the structures, strategies and decisions that Spain adopted over the last decades. As a result, this book builds on and updates the previous work by international scholars and proposes an interesting methodology that can contribute to the advancement of security studies.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 265p.

Visions of Global Environmental Justice:

Comunidades Negras and the War on Drugs in Colombia

By Alexander Huezo

Focusing on the lived experiences of Afro-Colombians processing and resisting violence against their ecological communities, Visions of Global Environmental Justice employs accounts of the supernatural narratively and analytically to frame a contemporary struggle for environmental justice. The book applies Achille Mbembe’s theorization of necropolitics to the environmental racism of the US War on Drugs in Colombia, specifically the aerial eradication of coca in the comunidades negras of the Pacific Coast. Through critical examination and deconstruction of transnational mythmaking and local oral tradition, Visions of Global Environmental Justice illustrates that non/humans rendered expendable by US-driven drug (necro)politics are indispensable to both the conceptualization and the realization of environmental justice globally. Far from being a study singularly focused on the symptoms of environmental issues, this book creatively guides us toward a broader understanding of environmental racism and justice across geographic scales and non/human agencies.

Oakland, CA; University of California Press, 2025

Edited by Tony Roberts and Admire Mare

Media coverage and scholarly research on digital surveillance has focused primarily on the USA and Europe. Everyone knows about Cambridge Analytica’s social media surveillance; Edward Snowden’s revelations of the West’s mass internet and phone surveillance; and Pegasus Spyware’s mobile phone surveillance of activists, journalists, judges, and presidents across the world. Comparatively little is known about the millions of dollars now being spent on digital technologies for use in the illegal and illegitimate surveillance of citizens in Africa. In this open-access third volume of Bloomsbury’s Digital Africa series, a broad range of African and European scholars and practitioners map the development, procurement and (mis)use of the ever-expanding suite of digital surveillance and policing technologies across the continent. Drawing on the empirically rich, theoretically sophisticated research of the African Digital Rights Network, this book examines how public and private actors in Africa use spyware, mobile phone extraction, biometric and face recognition systems, and other technologies for smart-city and other social, and social-control, applications. Eight chapters examine eight African countries, and each of these begins with a thorough political history of the nature of surveillance there under colonial and post-liberation political settlements. This enables new analyses of the socio-cultural, political, and economic drivers and characteristics of contemporary digital surveillance in each country, all of which ultimately leads to concrete policy recommendations at local, national, and international levels. For its empirical richness and breadth, as well as its theoretical sophistication, Digital Surveillance in Africa is essential reading for anyone interested in contemporary African studies, and it is of keen interest to anyone concerned with how digital surveillance affects everyday lives across the world. The ebook editions of this book are available open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence on bloomsburycollections.com.

London: Zed Books, 2025. 240p.

By Lisa Flowers

The digitalisation of courtrooms brings both opportunities and challenges to the judicial process, shaping our understandings of trials and their participants in a myriad of, at times, unexpected ways, and transforming how we participate in, attend, engage with, and consume trials. While digital tools offer potential benefits, they can also impact core aspects of judicial integrity, such as the conduct of legal proceedings and participants’ experiences, as well as introducing additional layers of complexity – sometimes problematic – in how trials are portrayed in popular culture. By exploring these developments, the book highlights the importance of a thoughtful approach to digital integration – one that carefully considers its implications for procedural fairness, public trust, and the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. The author examines the social construction of courts in the digital age, arguing that digitalisation is not merely transforming the tools of justice but also redefining the very essence of the justice experience and reshaping our perceptions of trials and their participants. The work will be a valuable resource for scholars and students in the social sciences, law and all those interested in digitalisation and society.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 166p.

By Women's Aid Child First

Nineteen More Child Homicides is the third report published by Women’s Aid in the past three decades as part of Women’s Aid Child First campaign. This report tells the stories of children who have been killed by a parent who is a perpetrator of domestic abuse through child contact (formally or informally arranged). Nearly a decade on from the publication of Nineteen Child Homicides, this report documents a further 19 children’s lives that have been lost as a result of unsafe contact arrangements. These findings illustrate the need for a culture shift at all levels to domestic abuse from professionals involved in child contact arrangements, whether informal and formal. 

Bristol:  Women’s Aid, June 2025   62p.

By Jorge Ruiz Reyes, Derek Congram, Renée A. Sirbu, Luciano Floridi

The disappearances of individuals are complex phenomena, spanning different regions and temporal periods. Evolving from different legal, social, and forensic disciplines, existing research has signaled the reasons for and contexts in which people disappear or go missing, as well as the development of investigative tools that assist, in fatal cases, in their identification. However, a different type of applied research, which we have labelled as data-based disappearance analysis (DDA), can offer statistical techniques to support the search for missing persons. In this paper, we review the literature on DDA, paying close attention to the evolution of this methodology and its contextual relevance. We highlight three applications by which DDA may support the search for missing persons: statistical inference, geospatial tools, and machine learning models and artificial intelligence. We demonstrate significant results using these applications, the potential misuses and ethical concerns, and draw lessons from their use. Lastly, we make recommendations to help researchers and practitioners support the search for missing persons.

Unpublished paper 2024

By Kerry L. Papps 

The effects on criminal behaviour of raising the minimum wage for those aged 25 and over in the United Kingdom are analysed, using data on police stop and search activities. A 1% increase in the minimum wage raises the fraction of people stopped by the police by 2.96%, the fraction of people caught with an incriminating item by 1.43%, and the fraction of people arrested as a consequence by 1.27%. This effect is almost entirely driven by drug searches made outside business hours, suggesting that the minimum wage raises crime principally by raising disposable income – and drug consumption – among workers. 

IZA DP No. 17989  Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2025. 27p.

By Ian Tennant, Simone Haysom, Tiphaine Chapeau

In October 2024, Brazil, France, and Peru tabled a resolution at the 12th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) for a new intergovernmental process to take stock of how the convention addresses crimes that affect the environment. In addition, the resolution called for possible gaps to be identified in the current international legal framework to prevent and combat these crimes, and to discuss whether any additional protocol should be developed. The work of the new intergovernmental expert group (IEG) will therefore become a key focus of multilateral discussions on environmental crimes in the future. The first meeting of this group will take place in Vienna from 30 June to 2 July 2025, and may be followed by a second meeting in early 2026, ahead of the 15th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the United Arab Emirates in April. The group will be expected to report on its work at the 13th UNTOC COP in October 2026. This new process is the culmination of a long-brewing movement towards addressing environmental crimes beyond what can be controlled through CITES. For example, it builds on progress made at France’s initiative to push forward resolutions on environmental crime that are within the scope of existing UN instruments. In 2022, Resolution 31/1 of the UN Commission of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) called for views on a potential new protocol on wildlife trafficking to be collected, following a campaign led by the Global Initiative to End Wildlife Crime consortium, which had high-profile government support from countries such as Angola, Kenya, Peru and Gabon, but for which consensus could not be reached as part of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/311 on wildlife trafficking. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has published several analyses of what it calls the ‘patchwork’ of existing legislation, and documented member states’ views on the topic through questionnaires coming out of the latest CCPCJ and UNTOC resolutions. Calls for discussions on updating the international legal framework on environmental crimes, including potentially a new protocol, date back even further. For example, a joint paper by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and the World Wildlife Fund was launched at the 13th UN Crime Congress in Doha in 2015, and the UN system itself has adopted calls for further action since 2014, primarily with regard to the illegal wildlife trade. Environmental criminal markets have changed considerably since, increasing the need for the urgent updating of the existing multilateral response. Crimes that affect the environment are deeply globalized and require diverse action across value chains, including in transit countries, to be successfully combatted. Moreover, incentives for actions and consequences for inaction are grossly skewed across the globe, and preventive and remedial measures, convictions and recovery of proceeds from these crimes often lag behind. Despite some progress – notably on trafficking in wildlife, and especially in some iconic species – it has not been enough. It has never been clearer that more internationally coordinated action and globally funded and resourced responses are needed.

Geneva: ECO-SOLVE Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 30p.

By Peace in Our Cities

From February 25 to 27, Peace in Our Cities (PiOC) members and experts, particularly from the African continent, met in Nairobi, Kenya, for the first Regional Workshop of the PiOC network, organized in partnership with the Life & Peace Institute (LPI). This regionally-focused workshop brought together PiOC member cities and representatives for knowledge exchange and experiential learning on topics such as gender-based violence, youth, data and technology, climate change, and organized criminal violence in the unique context of Africa’s rapid urbanization and social change. The three-day workshop included discussions, training sessions, and site visits to informal settlements of Nairobi, all to explore community-specific violence prevention strategies on the most pressing topics related to urban violence in the region. Cross-cutting insights across workshop elements included: – Violence as a complex phenomenon: Participants emphasized that violence is a multi-pronged and interconnected crisis, involving issues related to governance, gender, inequality, housing, climate change, unemployment, political participation, and more. – Prevention over suppression: Participants agreed that it is not enough to take action to stop violence as it happens, but that governments and other stakeholders need to identify and address the root causes of violence through holistic and whole-ofsociety approaches. – The need to build trust between the community and law enforcement: Participants expressed the importance of creating bridges between the community and the police. Although policing cannot be seen as the sole solution to violence prevention, it is crucial that community members can see law enforcement as reliable, safe, and responsive. – Young people as agents of change: Throughout the discussions, participants remarked that young people feel alienated from political conversations and decision-making, highlighting the need to elevate young people’s voices in discussions related to violence prevention. – Data as a tool for violence prevention: Participants highlighted the importance of using data to understand the violence that affects their communities and design more effective and bettertargeted violence prevention strategies, while expressing their concerns surrounding resource constraints. – Responding to challenges with better institutions and effective governance: Participants remarked on the need to build institutions and governance practices that can answer emerging global challenges such as organized crime, changes in the international funding landscape, and climate-related threats. – Networking and strategic partnerships: different sessions throughout the workshop brought to the fore the importance of coalition building between civil society actors and partnerships with key state actors to bridge the gap between policy and practice and ensure long-term sustainability of efforts to address urban violence. The workshop provided an opportunity for PiOC members to share their approaches and explore critical linkages for continued engagement 

Peace in Our Cities, 2025. 14p.

By Vicky Bungay , Linda Dewar , Mary Schoening , Adrian Guta , Wendy Leiper , Sunny Jiao 

Outreach is an important approach to improve health and social care for women experiencing street involvement (SI) or gender-based violence (GBV). Few studies have examined outreach approaches that incorporate SI and GBV. Drawing on feminist theories and principles of community-based research, we detail an inclusive co-design approach for an outreach intervention considering these interrelated contexts. Women with lived experience, researchers, and service leaders drew on research and experiential knowledge to define outreach engagement principles: tackling GBV, personhood and relational engagement, trauma-informed engagement, and harm reduction engagement. The resulting intervention integrates these principles to enable building and sustaining relationships to facilitate care.

Violence Against Women, 2024 Jun;30(8):1760-1782.

By Tim Dekkers

As migration is increasingly seen as a matter of security, migration control and crime control seem to be merging, a process also referred to as crimmigration. To distinguish between migrants that are wanted and those who are not, new technologies are introduced regularly and existing technologies are increasingly interconnected. This could lead to what is called function creep: technology developed for a specific purpose over time being used for other purposes as well. This article aims to explore the relation between crimmigration and function creep by examining a case study of a smart camera system called Amigo-boras used by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. While originally designed to assist in enforcing migration law, recent developments allow the RNM to use Amigo-boras for crime control purposes as well. This article will uncover what the rationales behind this function creep in the use of the Amigo-Boras system are/were – both from a street-level and policy-level perspective – and how these relate to crimmigration. The data shows that concerns of cross-border crime are an important reason to use Amigo-boras for more than just migration control. As a result, a significant element of crime control is introduced in Dutch migration control, pushing the crimmigration process further.

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Volume 46, 2020 - Issue 9

By Christopher Inkpen, Jonathan Holt, John Bollenbacher, Heather Deforge, Lilly Yu, Pranav Athimuthu, Nicole Jasperson, Renata Zablocka, Nick Kruskamp

This report, funded by the National Institute of Justice (award #: 2020-R2-CX-0027) and prepared by RTI International, describes the results of a National Institute of Justice-funded research study that uses advanced analytical methods and novel datasets to explore the complex relationship between immigration, crime, and crime reporting at the neighborhood level. The study, which employs crime and crime reporting data from ten jurisdictions across the United States paired with a synthetic population that estimates the unauthorized immigrant population, aims to provide an in-depth analysis at the Census tract level. Analyses focus on unauthorized immigration and its correlation with drug, property, and violent crime rates, while accounting for crime reporting in traditional and emerging immigrant destinations along with sites with low foreign populations. BackgroundL  Despite persistent political discourse linking immigration and increases in crime, most academic research contradicts this notion, showing either a negative or null relationship between immigration and crime. At the individual level, first-generation immigrants tend to have lower arrest rates than native-born citizens. Yet this trend diminishes with subsequent generations, as the children of first-generation immigrants (i.e., second generation immigrants) are often arrested at similar rates to children of native-born citizens. However, few studies assess the relationship between documentation status and offending. Macro-level analyses that focus on crime and immigration in specific areas reveal that areas with higher immigrant populations often experience lower crime rates or that the prevalence of immigrants in an area is not associated with an increase in arrests. Yet these studies frequently omit distinctions in documentation status, as these data are often unavailable. Further, many macro-level analyses are conducted at the county, state, or city level, which may obscure relationships observed at local levels. This study also attempts to control for the nuances of crime reporting among immigrant populations. Immigrant neighborhoods, especially those in emerging destinations, show lower rates of crime reporting. Trust in the police and fear of deportation are potentially significant factors influencing the likelihood of underreporting crimes. highlighting the importance of community-police relations. Strong police-community relations are crucial for public safety as they foster trust and cooperation, leading to more accurate crime reporting, effective law enforcement, and safer spaces. Methodology and Data Sources This study uses a variety of data sources to analyze the relationship between the presence of unauthorized immigrants in a Census tract and corresponding crime rates. Synthetic Population Development Traditional methods for estimating the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States rely on either demographic accounting or model-based survey imputation techniques. Defined simply, demographic accounting involves subtracting the estimated number of legally present immigrants from the total foreign-born population recorded in U.S. Census Bureau surveys. These techniques may also employ logical edits to large survey datasets that use characteristics like age, education, and place of birth to infer unauthorized status. Model-based survey imputation techniques combine data from different survey datasets to estimate unauthorized status in nationally representative surveys, using statistical techniques to merge information from surveys with immigration queries and those with extensive geographic detail. This study builds on the work of model-based imputation methods by developing models that predict unauthorized status in a survey dataset and applying them to a synthetic population of the United States, based on U.S. Census Bureau survey datasets. This approach allows for granular estimates of unauthorized immigrant populations at the Census tract level. By combining data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the American Community Survey (ACS), the study developed a robust model to predict unauthorized status and produced Census tract-level estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population for 2019. Validation efforts for these estimates included comparisons with county- and state-level estimates from sources like the Migration Policy Institute and Pew Research Center along with scaling local estimates to meet state-level figures 

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2024. 53p.

By Mia-Maria Magnusson

The well-being of neighbourhoods in terms of socioeconomic conditions constitutes an important element in analyses focused on the explanation of crime trends and public safety. Recent developments in Sweden concerning gun violence and open drug scenes are worrying and the police are under a great deal of pressure to resolve the situation in many neighbourhoods, which is in turn affecting Swedish society as a whole. This study focuses on micro areas in terms of sociodemographic factors and the presence of drug markets and gun violence. The aim is to explore the relationship between these factors and what characterises areas that are experiencing the greatest difficulties. The study develops an index for the prediction of gun violence in micro areas, in this study portrayed by vector grids. The findings show an overlap between gun violence and drug markets and that micro areas in that overlap share harsh sociodemographic conditions. The study produces an index indicating the probability that a grid cell would experience gun violence. The index was then validated using recent gun incidents, and was found to have high accuracy. The resulting grids constitute a suitable target for resource allocation by police and other actors. This could facilitate a more accurate and precise focus for measures to prevent areas from becoming—or to disrupt already existing—hot spots for gun violence.

Eur J Crim Policy Res 31, 151–172 (2025)