By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) are easily accessible to large numbers of people and have limited security or protective measures in place, making them vulnerable to attack. Examples include sports arenas, shopping centers, schools, transportation systems, and houses of worship. Although attacks on them are relatively rare, they result in significant loss of life and contribute to an atmosphere of fear throughout society. Researchers performed a landscape assessment of the threat to and major vulnerabilities of ST-CPs, existing security measures and initiatives, and ways to improve allocation of security resources. The researchers then developed a road map for future investments and made recommendations for improving ST-CP security and response to attacks. These recommendations include research, development, test, and evaluation priorities to improve prevention and protection, such as seeking methods of deterring and dissuading would-be attackers, more evaluation of the effectiveness of security measures, and developing a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces. In addition, they recommended funding and policy priorities focused on public education and training, providing additional resources to cross-organizational security teams and managers, and increasing funding for access control systems.

Key Findings

• The most-common motivations for attacks are personal, followed by terrorism and extremism.

• Education and private buildings are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs.

• Attacks on ST-CPs with large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, have the highest average lethality.

• Layered security strategies, in which measures work together, improve the chance that an attack will be prevented, halted, or mitigated.

• Tips from the public have prevented attacks. Public education on what to report and how, and support for threat assessment teams, would make tips more effective.

• Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient but need to be trained on and maintained.

• Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective. Training can make responses even more effective.

• Response command, control, and communications need to be improved. Alternatives to traditional, push-to-talk voice radio communications are needed.

• Security measures need more effectiveness and efficiency evaluations. The security community has growing interest in artificial intelligence (AI); evaluations of security systems with AI will be needed as these systems deploy.

Recommendations

• Find ways to deter and dissuade would-be attackers.

• Develop indicators of and education about suspicious seeking of weapons.

• Develop protocols and education for wellness checks.

• Further evaluate the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of security measures.

• Develop a model concept of operations for open and nonsecure spaces, such as shopping malls and restaurants.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Review mass-shooting events to determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on soft targets or crowded places.

• Find ways to reduce the mass psychological effects of attacks, including societal fear and secondary trauma.

• Focus on basics, such as provision and maintenance of access control equipment and public education campaigns on what to look for and how to report it.

• Strengthen the system-based, layered security framework.

• Ensure that funding and policy priorities reflect research findings.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams and managers.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide additional funding to cross-organizational security teams and managers.

• Fund and distribute updates of site security guidance documents and training.

• Fund access control systems

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 24p.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) represent a significant challenge. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from these types of attacks. In response, researchers from the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures. This assessment integrated literature reviews, attack plot analyses, grant data reviews, and security cost modeling to identify both needs for improvement and recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs.

The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and extremist motivations. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. Attacks on ST-CPs that have large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.

To defend ST-CPs, a layered approach has security measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or mitigated. Prevention measures stop attacks before they reach execution; however, the public needs to know what warning signs to look for and how to report them, and threat assessment teams need to assess tips and follow up appropriately. Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient. Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks; groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective.

Key Findings

The conditions that a would-be attacker must fulfill to successfully execute a high-fatality attack are collectively the attack chain; interrupting that chain can prevent or reduce casualties

• An attacker must carry out many steps to complete a high-fatality attack. The attacker must become fully committed, plan, acquire weapons and skills, and make other preparations without being detected and reported by others. Once on scene, the attacker must get through the site's security layers and engage a crowd without being stopped quickly.

• A system-based, or layered, approach helps security measures work together to improve the chances that an attack will be stopped or mitigated at any of these steps, guarding against single points of failure.

• Prevention measures are perhaps the most-important factors in interrupting the attack chain because they can and have halted many plots before they reached execution. Reports of warning signs have been key. However, the public must know what to look for and how, and authorities need threat assessment teams and training to assess tips and follow up appropriately.

• Access and entry-control systems, including locks, secured windows, and secured entry spaces, have been effective and efficient in protecting against attackers.

• Both bystanders and on-scene security have been effective in stopping attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective in ending attacks.

  Recommendations

• Seek methods for deterring and dissuading would-be attackers from becoming committed to plots.

• Develop indicators and training to detect suspicious seeking of weapons and ammunition.

• Develop enhancements to "see something, say something" campaigns.

• Develop and evaluate campaigns to reduce hoax threats of violence.

• Develop rules and processes for assessment, monitoring, and follow-up with reported threats, including processes for initial wellness checks.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of site security technologies in stopping simulated attacks.

• Study the social costs of security measures more.

• Develop a model strategy for open and nonsecure spaces, such as parks, parking lots, shopping malls, and restaurants.

• Improve command and control, leadership, and coordination during attack responses.

• Study alternatives to traditional voice radio communications during attack responses.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on ST-CPs.

• Seek ways to reduce the mass psychological impacts of attacks.

• Support detailed tracking of grant spending related to ST-CP security.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how and on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams, security teams, and managers, and provide training on how to report on and how to respond during an incident.

• Fund access control systems.

• Fund medical supplies and training to match updated medical standards.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 168p.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Edward Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs). Researchers conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures to identify needs for improvement, and they recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs. 

The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts, except that there were more plots in New York City and Washington, D.C. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and racial and ethnic extremist motivations. The ST-CP locations targeted have been diverse and often directly accessible. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. In general, locations in which a would-be attacker had ready access to a dense crowd on scene had the highest average lethality (close to six deaths, on average, as compared with fewer than three when there was not a dense crowd present). Not surprisingly, locations that typically have large crowds without controlled entries, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.

RAND Corporation, Mar 27, 2024, 148 pages