By Gloria Laycock

This guide is about embedding POP in your organisation. It is written primarily for senior officers and managers and is intended to complement a sister guide on problem-solving in practice. This guide is not a step-by-step manual - there is no single road to or recipe for implementing POP. Instead, what follows is a review of what is known about implementing and sustaining POP, with recommended resources provided at the end. The guide has three parts. The first part outlines the core features of POP. The second part makes the business case for POP as an operating model for contemporary policing. The third part discusses three conditions conducive to the successful implementation of POP – leadership, understanding and infrastructure – and provides examples of good and poor practice. The guide ends with a self-assessment tool to help you determine your organisation’s readiness for and progress in implementing POP.

London. College of Policing. 2020. 26p.

Michael S. Scott

In the last three decades, several concepts have been advanced to structure efforts to improve policing. Among them have been team policing, neighborhood policing, community policing, problem-oriented policing, and, most recently, quality-of-life policing. With much overlap, each concept, as reflected in its name, emphasizes a different need, relegating other commonly advocated reforms to a secondary role, shaped to support that need. This volume traces the efforts to implement problem-oriented policing.

The emphasis in problem-oriented policing is on directing attention to the broad range of problems the community expects the police to handle–the problems that constitute the business of the police–and on how police can be more effective in dealing with them. A layperson may think this focus elementary on first being introduced to it. Indeed, laypeople probably assume that police continually focus on the problems they are expected to handle. But within policing, this focus constitutes a radical shift in perspective.

Problem-oriented policing recognizes, at the outset, that police are expected to deal with an incredibly broad range of diverse community problems–not simply crime. It recognizes that the ultimate goal of the police is not simply to enforce the law, but to deal with problems effectively–ideally, by preventing them from occurring in the first place. It therefore plunges the police into an in-depth study of the specific problems they confront. It invites consideration of a wide range of alternatives, in addition to criminal law, for responding to each specific problem. Thus, problem-oriented policing draws the police away from the traditional preoccupation with creating an efficient organization; from the heavy investment in standard, generic operating procedures for responding to calls and preventing crime; and from heavy dependence on criminal law as the primary means for getting their job done. It looks to increased knowledge and thinking about the specific problems police confront as the driving force in fashioning police services.

This publication was supported through Grant #98CKWXK052 from the Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions expressed herein are the author's and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice. October 2000. 46p.

By John S. Hollywood, Keith Gierlack, Pauline Moore, Thomas Goode, Henry H. Willis, Devon Hill, Rahim Ali, Annie Brothers, Ryan Bauer, Jonathan Tran

Attacks on soft targets and crowded places (ST-CPs) represent a significant challenge. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires research and development to assess methods for reducing the propensity and loss of life from these types of attacks. In response, researchers from the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center conducted a comprehensive landscape assessment of the threat to ST-CPs and corresponding security measures. This assessment integrated literature reviews, attack plot analyses, grant data reviews, and security cost modeling to identify both needs for improvement and recommended research and investment priorities for addressing those needs.

The number of attack plots is broadly aligned with regional population counts. The most-common motivations for ST-CP attacks have been personal, followed by terrorist and extremist motivations. Education and private buildings (workplaces) are the most–frequently targeted types of ST-CPs. Attacks on ST-CPs that have large, accessible crowds, such as houses of worship, shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and nightclubs, had the highest average lethality.

To defend ST-CPs, a layered approach has security measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or mitigated. Prevention measures stop attacks before they reach execution; however, the public needs to know what warning signs to look for and how to report them, and threat assessment teams need to assess tips and follow up appropriately. Access control systems, such as locks, secured windows, and secured entryways, have been effective and efficient. Bystanders and security have both stopped attacks; groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective.

Key Findings

The conditions that a would-be attacker must fulfill to successfully execute a high-fatality attack are collectively the attack chain; interrupting that chain can prevent or reduce casualties

• An attacker must carry out many steps to complete a high-fatality attack. The attacker must become fully committed, plan, acquire weapons and skills, and make other preparations without being detected and reported by others. Once on scene, the attacker must get through the site's security layers and engage a crowd without being stopped quickly.

• A system-based, or layered, approach helps security measures work together to improve the chances that an attack will be stopped or mitigated at any of these steps, guarding against single points of failure.

• Prevention measures are perhaps the most-important factors in interrupting the attack chain because they can and have halted many plots before they reached execution. Reports of warning signs have been key. However, the public must know what to look for and how, and authorities need threat assessment teams and training to assess tips and follow up appropriately.

• Access and entry-control systems, including locks, secured windows, and secured entry spaces, have been effective and efficient in protecting against attackers.

• Both bystanders and on-scene security have been effective in stopping attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters have been highly effective in ending attacks.

  Recommendations

• Seek methods for deterring and dissuading would-be attackers from becoming committed to plots.

• Develop indicators and training to detect suspicious seeking of weapons and ammunition.

• Develop enhancements to "see something, say something" campaigns.

• Develop and evaluate campaigns to reduce hoax threats of violence.

• Develop rules and processes for assessment, monitoring, and follow-up with reported threats, including processes for initial wellness checks.

• Evaluate the effectiveness of site security technologies in stopping simulated attacks.

• Study the social costs of security measures more.

• Develop a model strategy for open and nonsecure spaces, such as parks, parking lots, shopping malls, and restaurants.

• Improve command and control, leadership, and coordination during attack responses.

• Study alternatives to traditional voice radio communications during attack responses.

• Continuously track and analyze mass-attack plots.

• Determine whether some ordinary criminal shootings should be treated as mass attacks on ST-CPs.

• Seek ways to reduce the mass psychological impacts of attacks.

• Support detailed tracking of grant spending related to ST-CP security.

• Fund enhanced public education and training on what to report and how and on how to respond to an active attacker.

• Provide funding to cross-organizational threat assessment teams, security teams, and managers, and provide training on how to report on and how to respond during an incident.

• Fund access control systems.

• Fund medical supplies and training to match updated medical standards.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 168p.

By Eugenia C. South,  John MacDonald,  Vincent Reina,

Importance  The root causes of violent crime in Black urban neighborhoods are structural, including residential racial segregation and concentrated poverty. Previous work suggests that simple and scalable place-based environmental interventions can overcome the legacies of neighborhood disinvestment and have implications for health broadly and crime specifically. Objective  To assess whether structural repairs to the homes of low-income owners are associated with a reduction in nearby crime. Design, Setting, and Participants  This cross-sectional study using difference-in-differences analysis included data from the City of Philadelphia Basic Systems Repair Program (BSRP) from January 1, 2006, through April 30, 2013. The unit of analysis was block faces (single street segments between 2 consecutive intersecting streets) with or without homes that received the BSRP intervention. The blocks of homes that received BSRP services were compared with the blocks of eligible homes that were still on the waiting list. Data were analyzed from December 1, 2019, to February 28, 2021. Exposures  The BSRP intervention includes a grant of up to $20 000 provided to low-income owners for structural repairs to electrical, plumbing, heating, and roofing damage. Eligible homeowners must meet income guidelines, which are set by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development and vary yearly. Main Outcomes and Measures  The main outcome was police-reported crime across 7 major categories of violent and nonviolent crimes (homicide, assault, burglary, theft, robbery, disorderly conduct, and public drunkenness). Results  A total of 13 632 houses on 6732 block faces received the BSRP intervention. Owners of these homes had a mean (range) age of 56.5 (18-98) years, were predominantly Black (10 952 [78.6%]) or Latino (1658 [11.9%]) individuals, and had a mean monthly income of $993. These census tracts compared with those without BSRP intervention had a substantially larger Black population (49.5% vs 12.2%; |D| = 0.406) and higher unemployment rate (17.3% vs 9.3%; |D| = 0.357). The main regression analysis demonstrated that the addition to a block face of a property that received a BSRP intervention was associated with a 21.9% decrease in the expected count of total crime (incidence rate ratio [IRR], 0.78; 95% CI, 0.76-0.80; P<.001), 19.0% decrease in assault (IRR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.79-0.84; P<.001), 22.6% decrease in robbery (IRR, 0.77; 95% CI, 0.75-0.80; P<.001), and 21.9% decrease in homicide (IRR, 0.78; 95% CI, 0.71-0.86; P<.001). When restricting the analysis to blocks with properties that had ever received a BSRP intervention, a total crime reduction of 25.4% was observed for each additional property (IRR, 0.75; 95% CI, 0.73-0.77; P<.001). A significant dose-dependent decrease in total crime was found such that the magnitude of association increased with higher numbers of homes participating in the BSRP on a block. Conclusions and Relevance  This study found that the BSRP intervention was associated with a modest but significant reduction in crime. These findings suggest that intentional and targeted financial investment in structural, scalable, and sustainable place-based interventions in neighborhoods that are still experiencing the lasting consequences of structural racism and segregation is a vital step toward achieving health equity.

Pennsylvania: JAMA Network Open, 2021. 12p.

By Jason L. Payne , Anthony Morgan and Alex R. Piquero

Confronted by rapidly growing infection rates, hospitalizations and deaths, governments around the world have introduced stringent containment measures to help reduce the spread of COVID-19. This public health response has had an unprecedented impact on people’s daily lives which, unsurprisingly, has also had widely observed implications in terms of crime and public safety. Drawing upon theories from environmental criminology, this study examines officially recorded property crime rates between March and June 2020 as reported for the state of Queensland, Australia. We use ARIMA modeling techniques to compute 6-month-ahead forecasts of property damage, shop theft, residential burglary, fraud, and motor vehicle theft rates and then compare these forecasts (and their 95% confidence intervals) with the observed data for March through to June. We conclude that, with the exception of fraud, all property offence categories declined significantly. For some offence types (shop stealing, other theft offences, and residential burglary), the decrease commenced as early as March. For other offence types, the decline was lagged and did not occur until April or May. Non-residential burglary was the only offence type to significantly increase, which it did in March, only to then decline significantly thereafter. These trends, while broadly consistent across the state’s 77 local government areas still varied in meaningful ways and we discuss possible explanations and implications.

Crime Science. (2021) 10:7 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40163-020-00136-3

By Tamara D. Herold, Ph.D. Robin S. Engel, Ph.D. Nicholas Corsaro, Ph.D. Stacey L. Clouse

The gang and gun violence reduction project implemented in Las Vegas consisted of three components: hot spots deployment, focused deterrence, and place network investigations (PNI). This report focuses on a program review and process evaluation of the PNI initiative. The PNI strategy, also known as PIVOT (Place-based Investigations of Violent Offender Territories), is grounded in crime science theory and research, which consistently finds that crime is highly concentrated, and patterns of crime concentration generally persist in the same locations over time despite repeated police intervention (Andresen, & Malleson, 2011; Braga, Andresen, & Lawton, 2017; Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, & Yang, 2004, Wilcox & Eck, 2011). The strategy was designed and first implemented in Cincinnati, Ohio. It is based on the assumption that historical, or persistent, hot spots are the result of deeply entrenched crime place networks used by active offender groups. The PNI strategy requires police investigations to uncover crime place networks, and a local PNI Investigative Board to focus existing city/county resources to alter crime-facilitating place dynamics (Madensen et al., 2017). In early 2018, the LVMPD Command Staff, in consultation with the Director of Crime Analysis, selected a pilot project site within the bureau’s Northeast Area Command (NEAC) for PNI implementation. A specific condominium complex, small strip mall that housed a convenience store, and nearby multi-family unit housing was selected to serve as the primary focus of the intervention. The NEAC Captain assigned her FLEX (Flexible Deployment) team to implement the PNI strategy and serve as the primary investigative unit. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) / University of Cincinnati (UC) Center for Police Research and Policy arranged to provide technical assistance and training to LVMPD’s PNI investigative unit. An introductory training for investigators and internal/external partners was conducted in April 2018. On-going training and assistance were provided on a bi-weekly basis in the form of on-site meetings or telecommunication with strategy experts and police personnel involved in Cincinnati’s PNI implementation from May 1, 2018, until the end of the evaluation period (April 30, 2019). In order to better understand the process and influence of the pilot PNI program in Las Vegas, officials from LVMPD partnered with researchers from the Center for Police Research and Policy, along with academic partners from the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to conduct a program review and process evaluation of the PNI initiative. Using bi-weekly investigative activity summaries and LVMPD reported crime incident data, this study addresses the following specific research questions: 1) What types of activities were conducted by the LVMPD PNI investigative unit in the targeted violent hot spot? Given that PNI is a recently developed strategy, LVMPD and other agencies interested in adopting the PNI strategy could benefit from systematic documentation of investigative and enforcement activities conducted by investigative units 2) What successes and obstacles were experienced by those responsible for implementing the PNI strategy in Las Vegas? For the purpose of this evaluation, 11 specific implementation dimensions (or general steps) were identified based on the process used to conduct previous place network investigations in Cincinnati, Ohio. The current assessment attempts to describe the general degree of program fidelity achieved by the LVMPD during PNI strategy implementation. 3) What was the impact of the LVMPD PNI strategy on gun-related crime in the targeted area? While the analysis presented within this evaluation is mostly exploratory in nature, given the relatively short intervention period and low overall crime numbers, it offers insight into how the PNI strategy, as implemented by the LVMPD, could impact violent crime targeted areas.

Cincinnati: UC Center for Police Research and Policy University of Cincinnati 2020. 35p.

By Anthony A. Braga, Rod K. Brunson, and Kevin M. Drakulich

The police need public support and cooperation to be effective in controlling crime and holding offenders accountable. In many disadvantaged communities of color, poor relationships between the police and residents undermine effective policing. Weak police–minority community relationships are rooted in a long history of discriminatory practices and contemporary proactive policing strategies that are overly aggressive and associated with racial disparities. There are no simple solutions to address the complex rift between the police and the minority communities that they serve. The available evidence suggests that there are policies and practices that could improve police–minority community relations and enhance police effectiveness. Police departments should conduct more sophisticated analysis of crime problems to ensure that crime-control programs are not indiscriminate and unfocused, engage residents in their crime reduction efforts by revitalizing community policing, ensure procedurally just police contacts with citizens, and implement problem-solving strategies to prevent crimes beyond surveillance and enforcement actions.

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2019. 45:535–55

By Bernadette C. Hohl, Michelle C. Kondo, Sandhya Kajeepeta, John M. MacDonald, Katherine P. Theall, Marc A. Zimmerman, and Charles C. Branas

Violence is a leading cause of death and disability in the United States and abroad, with far-reaching consequences for individuals and communities. Interventions that address environmental and social contexts have the potential for greater populationwide effects, yet research has been slow to identify and rigorously evaluate these types of interventions to reduce violence. Several urban communities across the US are conducting experimental and quasi-experimental community-based research to examine the effect of place-based interventions on violence. Using examples from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Flint, Michigan; Youngstown, Ohio; and New Orleans, Louisiana, we describe how place-based interventions that remediate vacant land and abandoned buildings work to reduce violence. These examples support the potential for place-based interventions to create far-reaching and sustainable improvements in the health and safety of communities that experience significant disadvantage. These interventions warrant the attention of community stakeholders, funders, and policy makers.

Health Affairs 38, NO. 10 (2019): 1687–1694

By David Weisburd George Mason University, Hebrew University Taryn Zastrow

Recent data in New York City suggest that violent crime is on the rise. However, over the last three decades, there has been a more than 70% decline in index crimes as reported by the FBI. This led to a growing perception, especially among critics of policing, that crime in NYC had become a marginal problem, or at least that it had declined to levels such that there was no need to place too much emphasis on crime control. Combined with concerns about police abuses and claims of disparities in policing in minority and disadvantaged communities, this fueled calls for defunding the police. In this report, we focus on the high-crime hot spots where 25% and 50% of NYC crimes were committed. The crime numbers on those streets suggest that, despite the encouraging overall crime decline over the past few decades, many city streets continue to have very high crime levels that need to be addressed by police and other agents of the city government. Our report looks beyond general crime statistics to the hot spots of crime where much crime in a city is concentrated. Looking at NYPD crime reports for 2010, 2015, and 2020, we find that about 1% of streets in NYC produce about 25% of crime, and about 5% of streets produce about 50% of crime. This is consistent across the three years, showing that a very small proportion of streets in the city are responsible for a significant proportion of the crime problem. Mapping crime in NYC, we found that high-crime streets are spread throughout the city, though concentrated in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Brooklyn. In turn, we observed a good deal of street-by-street variability, with the highest-crime streets often adjacent to streets with little or no crime. This means that it is misleading to classify whole neighborhoods as crime hot spots, since the majority of streets—even in higher-crime areas—are not. This is an important lesson for police and ordinary citizens who mistakenly see very large areas as crime-ridden. We also found a good deal of stability in the locations of crime hot spots. Nearly all the streets that were hot spots as we have defined them in 2010 were also hot spots in 2020.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 202. 30p.

By Sebastian Blesse a, André Diegmann

Many countries consolidate their police forces by closing down local police stations. Police stations represent an important and visible aspect of the organization of police forces. We provide novel evidence on the effect of centralizing police offices through the closure of local police stations on crime outcomes. Combining matching with a difference-in-differences specification, we find an increase in reported car theft and burglary in residential properties.and Our results are consistent with a negative shift in perceived detection risks and are driven by heterogeneous station characteristics. We can rule out alternative explanations such as incapacitation, crime displacement, and changes in police employment or strategies at the regional level. We argue that criminals are less deterred due to a lower visibility of the local police.

Journal of Public Economics. Volume 207, March 2022, 104605

By Patrick J. Carr

With the close proximity of gangs and the easy access to drugs, keeping urban neighborhoods safe from crime has long been a central concern for residents. In <em>Clean Streets, Patrick Carr draws on five years of research in a white, working-class community on Chicago’s South side to see how they tried to keep their streets safe. Carr details the singular event for this community and the resulting rise of community activism: the shootings of two local teenage girls outside of an elementary school by area gang members. As in many communities struck by similar violence, the shootings led to profound changes in the community's relationship to crime prevention. Notably, their civic activism has proved successful and, years after the shooting, community involvement remains strong.

Carr mines this story of an awakened neighborhood for unique insights, contributing a new perspective to the national debate on community policing, civic activism, and the nature of social control. <em>Clean Streets offers an important story of one community's struggle to confront crime and to keep their homes safe. Their actions can be seen as a model for how other communities can face up to similarly difficult problems.

New York: New York University Press, 2005. 209p.

By Elizabeth. Groff and Travis Taniguchi

According to the FBI, there were over 1.5 million burglaries in the U.S. in 2016, with almost 70% residential (FBI, 2017a). Combined, the victims of burglary suffered over $3.6 billion in lost property (about $2,400/burglary). Yet, only about 13% of burglaries reported to the police were cleared (FBI, 2017b). While more prevalent than violent crime, burglary rarely generates attention and headlines. Yet, the sense of violation and vulnerability typical of residential burglary victims is considerable, and so prevention would seem the best solution. The Near Repeat Phenomenon The biggest challenge facing crime prevention in policing is the need to correctly anticipate where and when crime will occur (Pease & Laycock, 1999). Hot spots policing focuses on the locations where crimes occur frequently, though knowing when they will occur can help law enforcement effectively deploy personnel. Repeat victimization occurs when the same target is victimized again. However, the “Near Repeat” (NR) phenomenon (Morgan, 2001) is when those that live near to a burglary victim are victimized soon after; in other words, when one home is burglarized, for a particular time period afterwards, homes nearby are at an elevated risk of burglary. Empirical research has clearly confirmed the existence of NR burglary patterns. The exact spatial and temporal extent of increased risk varies; however, we know the increased risk level that occurs after a burglary is temporary, suggesting police must act quickly to maximize the potential for reaping crime prevention benefits.

Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2018. 14p.

By Carol Bevis and Julia Brown Nutter

The replacement of easily accessible streets with streets of the cul-de-sac or dead end design appears to be a promising strategy for the prevention of residential crime.

Minneapolis: Minnesota Crime Prevention Center, 1978. 43p.

By Sally Harvey

This literature review summarises the findings of international studies of what works in police practice to reduce residential burglary, drawing largely on the outcomes of research in the UK, the US and Australia. Residential burglary is one of the most common crimes, of great concern to the general public as reflected in crime victim surveys, and regarded as a major problem by police forces studied in the literature. Internationally there has been an increasing adoption of proactive policing with considerable research effort aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of crime prevention approaches. As part of this evaluative effort, the question ‘what works?’ has been applied to initiatives to reduce residential burglary.

Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Justice, 2005. 114p.

By Stuart Winchester and Hilary Jackson

Residential burglary is generally regarded as a particularly serious crime both because of the financial and material losses to victims and because of the psychological upset which may follow a break-in (Maguire, 1982). It is also a fairly common crime and accounts for a substantial part of the load on the police, the courts and the prison system. In 1980, about 295,000 burglaries to residential property were recorded by the police in England and Wales and these accounted for some 11% of what in official statistics are now called 'serious offences recorded by the police' (Criminal Statistics, 1980). Only 29% of these residential burglaries were 'cleared up' compared with a clear-up rate of 41 % for all serious offences. Yet, in 1980, burglars receiving prison sentences for offences against residential and non-residential properties still accounted for nearly half of all receptions into prison of males under 21 and nearly a quarter of those over 21 (Prison Statistics, 1980). On the basis of offences recorded by the police in 1980 and the numbers of households recorded in the 1971 census, a rough estimate of the average risk of burglary to households in England and Wales was 1 in 55. Risk figures however are higher when account is taken of offences not reported to the police. According to recent evidence from the General Household Survey (see Criminal Statistics, 1980) these represent some 40% of all residential burglaries which occur. On the basis of both reported and unreported crimes, then, the average risk of burglary to households in 1980 may have been closer to 1 in 35 than 1 in 55.

London: Home Office Research and Planning Unit, 1982 47p.

By Shane D Johnson, Lucía Summers and Ken Pease

Previous research by the writers and others demonstrated clustering of domestic burglary in space and time. This enabled the development of a predictive mapping instrument (PROMAP) which substantially outperforms traditional crime mapping in anticipating burglaries. This report seeks to determine whether the clustering which underpins PROMAP is also evident in relation to vehicle crime, specifically Theft from Motor Vehicle (TFMV) and Theft of Motor Vehicle (TOMV). Data of recorded vehicle crime over a one year period from Derbyshire and Dorset were examined to test that proposition. Analyses demonstrated that • TFMV clusters closely in space and time in both police force areas. When such an offence occurs at one location another is likely to occur nearby and soon after. To use the vocabulary of an epidemiologist, like burglary the risk of this type of vehicle crime is highly communicable. • TOMV clusters somewhat, but not in the same way or with the same closeness as TFMV. The pattern is similar in both force areas. • The spatio-temporal signatures of the two types of vehicle crime, as noted above, differ.This suggests different targeting or foraging strategies are employed for these two types of crime. The difference is consistent with common sense, since there is more post-offence activity implied in theft of a car (onward selling, changed identity, enjoying performance for a non-trivial period) than for theft from a motor vehicle, where the primary constraint on further offending is the offender’s carrying capacity. • There are data limitations which have implications for the ease with which a PROMAP variant dealing with vehicle crime could be deployed operationally. These include shortcomings in the current recording of locations of vehicle crime, and the special problems in mapping crime in car parks, Notwithstanding current data limitations, the patterning of vehicle crime in time and space is such as to encourage the view that prospective mapping could, with proper implementation, prove operationally useful in crime reduction and offender detection

London: UCL, Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, 2006. 52p.

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By Simone Eisenhauer

This thesis explores the security risk management and commercial organisation of public urban spaces at the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC) in South Africa. Extending knowledge of how commercial interests intersect with security risk management of public urban spaces at sport mega-events, this study examines these concepts in a developing world context. Using a neoliberal theoretical lens and drawing on the concepts of Festivalisation and Disneyisation, the research contributes to academic scholarship in the areas of both sport and event management. This is achieved through a critical examination of security and commercialisation strategies in ‘public spaces’ at a sport mega-event, namely, public viewing areas (PVAs) and commercial restricted zones (CRZs). The research problem was investigated by means of an inductive interpretive qualitative case study approach. The selected event was the 2010 FWC, and within this event an in-depth case study of Cape Town was selected for examination. Multiple sources of evidence included government, management, and media documentation.

Sydney: University of Technology, Sydney: 2013. 364p.

By Daniela Collazos, Eduardo García, Daniel Mejía, Daniel Ortega, and Santiago Tobón

Objectives: Test direct, spillover and aggregate effects of hot spots policing on crime in a high crime environment. Methods: We identified 967 hot spot street segments and randomly assigned 384 to a six-months increase in police patrols. To account for the complications resulting from a large experimental sample in a dense network of streets, we use randomization inference for hypothesis testing. We also use non-experimental streets to test for spillovers onto non-hot spots, and examine aggregate effects citywide. Results: Our results show an improvement in short term security perceptions and a reduction in car thefts, but no direct effects on other crimes or satisfaction with policing services. We see larger effects in the least secure places, especially for short term security perceptions, car thefts and assaults. We find no evidence of crime displacement but rather a decrease in car thefts in nearby hot spots and a decrease in assaults in nearby non-hot spots. We estimate that car thefts decreased citywide by about 11 percent. Conclusions: Our study highlights the importance of context when implementing hot spots policing. What seems to work in the U.S. or even in Bogotá is not as responsive in Medellín (and vice versa). Further research¿especially outside the U.S.¿is needed to understand the role of local crime patterns and police capacity on the effectiveness of hot spots policing.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2019. 44p.

By World Bank Group

Over the next 13 years, Feira de Santana, in the state of Bahia (BA), and Aracaju, in the state of Sergipe (SE) will both benefit from significant investments in street lighting. Several studies have discussed the many benefits of this type of investment, including the effects of street lighting on people’s perceptions of safety and security. This study aims to provide a baseline to support those lighting interventions and contribute to an evaluation exercise at the end of the investment cycle. The analysis contained herein tries to explore the potential impacts on people’s behavior and perceptions of safety and security, especially among women. It also addresses education and job opportunities. The study adopted a mixed-methods approach, including qualitative and quantitative tools. It conducted 21 semistructured interviews with local authorities from both cities, as well as police officers, business association representatives, civil society organizations (CSOs), and school representatives. In addition, the research team carried out phone interviews with 602 respondents living in Aracaju and Feira de Santana. The survey data show that 56 percent of the Aracaju respondents are not satisfied with their street lighting, rating it as regular (37 percent), bad (7 percent), or terrible (12 percent). In Feira de Santana, an even larger share of the population (approximately 71 percent) think the same: 37 percent consider it regular, 9 percent consider it bad, and 25 percent rate it as terrible. Seventy-seven respondents, or 12 percent of the total, declared they had been a victim of nighttime crime within the previous 12 months. Almost 62 percent of them saw a link between poor lighting and crime. People from both cities feel less safe while walking on the streets during nighttime hours as opposed to walking during the day. Data also show that women feel less safe than men both during the day and in the evening or night. Poor lighting is one of the main reasons for this sense of insecurity, although empty streets were mentioned as an even more important factor. Since perceptions of security directly affect people’s behavior, 32 percent of all respondents from both cities reported that they always change routes in search of better lighting.

Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020. 143p.