By The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

This document was developed through efforts by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC or Council) Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group, to develop guidelines for local and state agencies in relation to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence (i.e., the fusion process). Those efforts laid the foundation for the expansion of the Fusion Center Guidelines to integrate the public safety and private sector entities. The guidelines are intended to ensure that fusion centers are established and operated consistently, with enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened partnerships, and improved crime-fighting and antiterrorism capabilities. Key elements include: sector-specific information and sharing plans; identification of goals for the fusion center; creation of a representative governance structure and collaborative environment for intelligence sharing among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies, public safety agencies, and the private sector; utilization of memoranda of understanding (MOUs), non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), and other agency agreements, as appropriate; leveraging of databases, systems, and networks to maximize information sharing; creating environments that promote communication among entities; development and publication of privacy and civil liberties policies; ensuring appropriate security measures for the facility, data, and personnel; integration of technology, systems, and people; achievement of a diversified representation of personnel based on the needs and functions of the center; ensuring adequate personnel training; provision of multitiered educational program for intelligence-led policing and information sharing; offering a variety of intelligence services and products to customers; developing and adhering to a policies and procedures manual; defining expectations and performance measurement for determining effectiveness; establishing and maintaining the center based on funding availability and sustainability; and the development and implementation of a communications plan among personnel, officers, and the general public. The eighteen guidelines provided reflect those key concepts; the document includes eight appendices.

Washington, DC: DHS, 2023. 104p..

By The Center for Public Safety Management

The Center for Public Safety Management, LLC (CPSM) was commissioned to review the operations of the Little Rock Police Department. While our analysis covered all aspects of the department’s operations, particular areas of focus of this study included: identifying appropriate staffing of the department given the workload, community demographics, and crime levels; the effectiveness of the organizational structure; and efficiency and effectiveness of division/unit processes. We analyzed the department workload using operations research methodology and compared that workload to staffing and deployment levels. We reviewed other performance indicators that enabled us to understand the implications of service demand on current staffing. Our study involved data collection, interviews with key operational and administrative personnel, focus groups with line level department personnel, on-site observations of the job environment, data analysis, comparative analysis, and the development of alternatives and recommendations. Based upon CPSM’s detailed assessment of the Little Rock Police Department, it is our conclusion that the department, overall, provides quality law enforcement services. The staff is professional and dedicated to the mission of the department. Through this report, we will strive to allow the reader to take a look inside the department to understand its strengths and its challenges. We sincerely hope that all parties utilize the information and recommendations contained herein in a constructive manner to make a fine law enforcement agency even better. As part of this Executive Summary, we offer general observations that we believe identify some of the more significant issues facing the department. Additionally, we also list key recommendations for consideration; we believe these recommendations will enhance organizational effectiveness. Some of these recommendations involve the creation of new job classifications; others involve the reassignment/repurposing of job duties to other sections and units. Oftentimes these types of recommendations require a substantial financial commitment on the part of a jurisdiction. In the case of the Little Rock Police Department, some may be accomplished by a realignment of workload and/or reclassification of job descriptions. It is important to note that in this report we will examine specific sections and units of the department and will offer a discussion of our observations and recommendations for each.

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  The list of recommendations is extensive. Should the Little Rock Police Department choose to implement any or all recommendations, it must be recognized that this process will not take just weeks or even months to complete, but perhaps years. The recommendations are intended to form the basis of a long-term improvement plan for the city and department. It is important that we emphasize that this list of recommendations, though lengthy, is common in our operational assessments of agencies around the country and should in no way be interpreted as an indictment of what we consider to be a fine department. While all of the recommendations are important, we suggest the Little Rock Police Department in conjunction with other city departments, the city council, the city manager, and members of the community decide which recommendations should take priority for implementation.   

Washington, DC: Center for Public Safety Management, 2022. 212p.

By Keith Finlay, Elizabeth Luh, Matthew Gross and Michael Mueller-Smith.

  We estimate the causal impact of financial sanctions in the U.S. criminal justice system. We utilize a regression discontinuity design and exploit two distinct natural experiments: the abrupt introduction of driver responsibility fees (DRF) in Michigan and Texas. These discontinuously imposed additional surcharges ($300–$6,000) for criminal traffic offenses. Although the policies generated almost $3 billion of debt, we find consistent evidence that the DRFs had no impact on recidivism, earnings, or romantic partners’ outcomes over the next decade. Without evidence of a general or specific deterrence effect and modest success with debt collection, we find little justification for these policies.

Unpublished paper, 2022. 47p.

By Ram Subramanian, Jackie Fielding, Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Hernandez Stroud, and Taylor King    

Financial incentives throughout the criminal justice system encourage punitive enforcement and sustain mass incarceration. Realigning them will require action from municipalities to the federal government.

New York Brennan Center for Justice, 2022. 73p.

By Daniel C.K. Chow 

The proliferation of counterfeits for sale on e-commerce sites has created new and more dangerous challenges to brand owners than counterfeits sold through brick and mortar establishments. Most brand owners are currently focusing their efforts on simplifying and streamlining Notice and Takedown (“NTD”) procedures set up by ecommerce platforms to remove illegal listings. The shortcomings of these efforts are that NTDs do not directly reach the counterfeiter who remains free to conduct its illegal activities with impunity and that NTDs do not prevent delisted counterfeiters from reappearing in short order under a new fictitious name and identity. Brand owners should seek to induce China to rigorously enforce its recently enacted Electronic Commerce Law (“ECL”), which was designed by China’s lawmakers to create a “choke point” that excludes counterfeiters and other unscrupulous merchants from gaining access to online accounts. The ECL requires multiple layers of government review and approval that were designed so that they can be satisfied only by legitimate and economically viable business entities. To date, e-commerce sites in China do not strictly comply with the ECL, and U.S.-based ecommerce sites do not require any compliance whatsoever with the ECL. Rigorous enforcement of the ECL should result in preventing counterfeiters from gaining access to e-commerce sites based in China and the United States and should lead to a decrease in sales of counterfeits on the internet. 

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 676. 52 Seton Hall Law Review 1053 (2022)

By Liberty, et al.

Whatever our postcode or the colour of our skin, we all deserve to grow up in communities where we are cared for and given the tools we need to flourish in life. But instead of investing in young people or providing support to deal with the causes of social problems, the government has given the police more powers to try and tackle the symptoms of these issues. This has led to more and more people being treated unfairly by the police, rather than being given the help they need. Our communities need investment, so that together we can create spaces and services that we know will give our young people the best chance in life. And we need to roll back the powers of the police so no-one faces harsh and traumatising treatment at the hands of police. That’s why a coalition including Liberty, have launched a groundbreaking report calling for a new approach to tackling serious youth violence, with the powers of the police rolled back and more funding and support given for young people to thrive., 

London?: 2023,Liberty, 133p.

By Ranae Jabri

  Predictive policing algorithms are increasingly used by law enforcement agencies in the United States. These algorithms use past crime data to generate predictive policing boxes, specifically the highest crime risk areas where law enforcement is instructed to patrol every shift. I collect a novel dataset on predictive policing box locations, crime incidents, and arrests from a major urban jurisdiction where predictive policing is used. Using institutional features of the predictive policing policy, I isolate quasi-experimental variation to examine the causal impacts of algorithm-induced police presence. I find that algorithm-induced police presence decreases serious property and violent crime. At the same time, I also find disproportionate racial impacts on arrests for serious violent crimes as well as arrests in traffic incidents i.e. lower-level offenses where police have discretion. These results highlight that using predictive policing to target neighborhoods can generate a tradeoff between crime prevention and equity.

 Unpublished paper, 2021. 44p.  

By Richard A. Berk

  There are widespread concerns about the use of artificial intelligence in law enforcement. Predictive policing and risk assessment are salient examples. Worries include the accuracy of forecasts that guide both activities, the prospect of bias, and an apparent lack of operational transparency. Nearly breathless media coverage of artificial intelligence helps shape the narrative. In this review, we address these issues by first unpacking depictions of artificial intelligence. Its use in predictive policing to forecast crimes in time and space is largely an exercise in spatial statistics that in principle can make policing more effective and more surgical. Its use in criminal justice risk assessment to forecast who will commit crimes is largely an exercise in adaptive, nonparametric regression. It can in principle allow law enforcement agencies to better provide for public safety with the least restrictive means necessary, which can mean far less use of incarceration. None of this is mysterious. Nevertheless, concerns about accuracy, fairness, and transparency are real, and there are tradeoffs between them for which there can be no technical fix. You can’t have it all. Solutions will be found through political and legislative processes achieving an acceptable balance between competing priorities.  

  Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2021. 4:209–37  

By Liz Campbell, Nessa Lynch, Joe Purshouse, Marcin Betkier

  The use of automated facial recognition technology (FRT) is becoming commonplace globally and in New Zealand. FRT involves the use of an algorithm to match a facial image to one already stored in a system, is used in automated passport control and other border control measures, as a biometric identifier in the banking, security and access contexts, and on social media platforms and various other consent-based applications

  This report contributes to the understanding of how and when this rapidly emerging hnology should be used and how it should be regulated. It is centred in what has been described as the ‘second wave’ of algorithmic accountability – While the first wave of algorithmic accountability focuses on improving existing systems, a second wave of research has asked whether they should be used at all—and, if so, who gets to govern them.3 This project seeks to address the regulation gap through ascertaining how FRT can and should be regulated in New Zealand. While the benefits that might be offered by FRT surveillance are increasingly observable, its effect on civil liberties is subtler, but certainly pernicious. Given the potential for FRT to be used as a key identity and access management tool in the future, there are pertinent questions around how images are being collected and stored now by the private sector. Where are these images being stored? Who has access to this data? What else might the images be used for? Without a detailed appraisal of the benefits of state FRT surveillance, and an understanding of the ethical issues raised by its use, any framework for the regulation of this activity cannot hope to engender public confidence that its use is fair and lawful.

Monash University, 2020. 118p.   

By Lakomy, Miron; Bożek, Maciej

From the document: "Researchers who study online terrorism and political violence face a broad spectrum of risks to their safety and wellbeing. Awareness of the challenges researchers face in this subdiscipline has remained relatively low for years. Since the launch of Islamic State's propaganda campaign on the internet, which skilfully deployed scenes of death and dying to influence online audiences, that awareness has increased. Subsequently, some researchers have reported that prolonged exposure to terrorist content can be harmful across many wellbeing dimensions. This research project aims to determine if exposure to terrorist propaganda may be a factor in causing trauma for researcher or their development of mood disorders. Our study is founded on two research methods: an online survey and a novel experiment. The online survey was completed by a group of recognised terrorism researchers who were asked about their opinions and experiences related to the impact of their research activities on mental health. The experiment used a biofeedback device and an eye-tracker to measure the short-term psychophysiological response of researchers to ordinary content available on the internet (Control Group) and certain types of terrorist propaganda (Experimental Group). The reactions of both groups, primarily their eye fixation and skin conductance, were subsequently compared."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (Gnet. 2023. 44P.

By 21CP Solutions.

From the Introduction: The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was established by Executive Order under then President Barack Obama on December 18, 2014. President Obama charged the task force with identi- fying best practices and offering recommendations on how policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust. Since the publication of the task force’s final report in May 2015, there have been more than 133 national, state, or local task forces, councils, and working groups responding to police violence in communities throughout the country.1

The nation remains in a policing crisis, and too many poor communities of color face the adverse conditions of poverty and economic exclusion that aggravate the relationship between communities and police. The 2015 report by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing remains a significant influence on policing reform, but the country still confronts police violence that undermines community trust and confidence.

Task Force on 21st Century Policing: A Renewed Call to Action. Chicago: 21CP Solutions, LLC. 2023. 40p.

By Durham, John H.

From the document: "Following Special Counsel [Robert] Mueller's report, on May 13, 2019, Attorney General [William] Barr 'directed United States Attorney John Durham to conduct a preliminary review into certain matters related to the 2016 presidential election campaigns,' and that review 'subsequently developed into a criminal investigation. [...] On October 19, 2020, the Attorney General determined that, 'in light of the extraordinary circumstances relating to these matters, the public interest warrants Mr. Durham continuing this investigation pursuant to the powers and independence afforded by the Special Counsel regulations.' [...] [This] review and investigation, in turn has focused on separate but related questions, including the following: [1] Was there adequate predication for the FBI to open the Crossfire Hurricane investigation from its inception on July 31, 2016 as a full counterintelligence and Foreign Agents Registration Act ('FARA') investigation given the requirements of 'The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations' and FBI policies relating to the use of the least intrusive investigative tools necessary? [2] Was the opening of Crossfire Hurricane as a full investigation on July 31, 2016 consistent with how the FBI handled other intelligence it had received prior to July 31, 2016 concerning attempts by foreign interests to influence the Clinton and other campaigns? [3] Similarly, did the FBI properly consider other highly significant intelligence it received at virtually the same time as that used to predicate Crossfire Hurricane, but which related not to the Trump campaign, but rather to a purported Clinton campaign plan 'to vilify Donald Trump by stirring up a scandal claiming interference by Russian security services,' which might have shed light on some of the Russia information the FBI was receiving from third parties, including the Steele Dossier, the Alfa Bank allegations and confidential human source ('CHS') reporting? [...] [4] Was there evidence that the actions of any FBI personnel or third parties relating to the Crossfire Hurricane investigation violated any federal criminal statutes, including the prohibition against making false statements to federal officials? [...] [5] Was there evidence that the actions of the FBI or Department personnel in providing false or incomplete information to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ('FISC') violated any federal criminal statutes? [...]"

U.S. Department of Justice. 2023. 316p

By John Comiskey

Abstract: This study identified and analyzed the utilization of theory in college homeland security curricula in the United States. Faculty and program directors with diverse academic and professional backgrounds actively teach theory from multiple fields and disciplines to help prepare students for the field, address homeland security problems, and to grow and mature the field. The most prevalent theories which are taught as part of college homeland security curricula constellate around leadership, risk management, security, social identity, and terrorism themes. Homeland security, however, lacks a grand theory or overarching framework. Essentially, homeland security is an eclectic discipline or field of study that seeks to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risks to the Nation.

Journal of Homeland Security Education. Volume 7 (2018). 17p.

By Homer, Juliet; Judi, David; Fuller, Jason; Bates, Shannon

From the document: "A workshop co-hosted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Seattle City Light was held at the Seattle Municipal Tower on November 8-10, 2022. Participants from research organizations, utilities, professional associations, consultants, and government organizations attended. The purpose of the workshop was to develop a vision for addressing climate extremes that include improving forecasting and characterization, infrastructure resilience modeling, and investment planning and decision support. The workshop also aimed to provide a platform for sharing approaches and information and identifying possible collaborations."

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (U.S.) 2023. 42p.

By United States. Department Of Homeland Security

From the document: "This Report reaffirms the five enduring homeland security missions as articulated in the first two QHSR [Quadrennial Homeland Security Review] Reports issued in 2010 and 2014 and focuses on how the Department must adapt and evolve to accomplish them. It also introduces a new homeland security mission, 'Combatting Crimes of Exploitation and Protecting Victims,' reflecting the overriding urgency of supporting victims and stopping perpetrators of such heinous crimes as human trafficking, labor exploitation, and child exploitation, the importance of engaging the public, and the heroic work of the DHS workforce and our homeland security enterprise partners in this mission space. DHS investigates crimes of exploitation, supports victims, trains law enforcement partners, and enforces trade laws related to human trafficking, and we will continue to advocate for additional resources to execute on these lines of effort at an ever-increasing level. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated more than 6,000 child exploitation cases and U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized 3,605 shipments valued at $816.5 million due to forced labor concerns in fiscal year 2022. By elevating this work as a new mission, we are laying the groundwork for further growth in our commitment and capabilities, including planning, increased budget requests, operational cohesion, and partnerships."

United States. Department of Homeland Security. 2023. 92p

By Ronald V. Clarke and Graeme R. Newman

This book analyzes the expanding crime opportunities created by the Internet and e-commerce, and it explains how concepts of crime prevention developed in other contexts can be effectively applied in this new environment. The authors note that the Internet and associated e-commerce constitute a lawless "wild frontier" where users of the Internet can anonymously exploit and victimize other users without a high risk of being detected, arrested, prosecuted, and punished. For acquisitive criminals who seek to gain money by stealing it from others, e-commerce through the Internet enables them to "hack" their way into bank records and transfer funds for their own enrichment. Computer programs that are readily available for download on the Web can be used to scan the Web for individual computers that are vulnerable to attack. By using the Internet addresses of other users or using another person's or organization's computers or computing environment, criminals can hide their trails and escape detection. After identifying the multiple opportunities for crime in the world of e-commerce, the book describes specific steps that can be taken to prevent e-commerce crime at particular points of vulnerability. The authors explain how two aspects of situational crime prevention can prevent Internet crime. This involves both a targeting of individual vulnerabilities and a broad approach that requires partnerships in producing changes and modifications that can reduce or eliminate criminal opportunities. The authors apply the 16 techniques of situational crime prevention to the points of vulnerability of the e-commerce system. The points of vulnerability are identified and preventive measures are proposed. In discussing the broad approach of institutionalized and systemic efforts to police e-commerce, the book focuses on ways to increase the risks of detection and sanctions for crime without undue intrusions on the freedom and privacy of legitimate Internet and e-commerce users.Links coming….

Devon, U.K. Willan Publishers. 2003. 224p.

By United States. Government Accountability Office

From the document: "Critical infrastructure provides essential functions--such as supplying water, generating energy, and producing food--that underpin American society. Disruption or destruction of the nation's critical infrastructure could have debilitating effects. CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] is the national coordinator for infrastructure protection. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to report on the effectiveness of sector risk management agencies in carrying out responsibilities set forth in the act. This report addresses (1) how the act changed agencies' responsibilities, and the actions agencies have reported taking to address them; and (2) the extent to which CISA has identified and undertaken efforts to help agencies implement their responsibilities set forth in the act. GAO analyzed the act and relevant policy directives, collected written responses from all 16 sectors using a standardized information collection tool, reviewed other DHS documents, and interviewed CISA officials."

Wasginton D.C. United States. Government Accountability Office. 2023.

By Klare, Michael T.,

From the document: "Increasingly in recent years, advanced military powers have begun to incorporate and rely on new kinds or new applications of advanced technologies in their arsenals, such as artificial intelligence, robotics, cyber, and hypersonics, among others. The weaponization of these technologies may potentially carry far-ranging, dangerous consequences that expand into the nuclear realm by running up the escalation ladder or by blurring the distinction between a conventional and nuclear attack. Arms control, therefore, emerges as a tool to slow the pace of weaponizing these technologies and to adopt meaningful restraints on their use. This report examines four particular new kinds or new applications of technologies-- autonomous weapons systems, hypersonic weapons, cyberattacks, and automated battlefield decision-making--and proposes a framework strategy aimed at advancing an array of measures that all contribute to the larger goal of preventing unintended escalation and enhancing strategic stability."

Washington, D.C.. Arms Control Association. 2023. 76p.

By Macdonald, Bruce W.; Freeman, Carla P. (Carla Park), 1962-; Mcfarland, Alison

From the document: "Strategic competition between the United States and China is intensifying in the domain of outer space. [...] This report spotlights three sources of instability in space that merit immediate attention because of the growing risks they pose to space security specifically and to global security more broadly[.] [...] The report is organized as follows: It begins with a discussion of how the space environment is changing and the ways in which global space governance has failed to keep pace with those changes. It then considers China's activities in this evolving environment and key dimensions of US-China competition in space, along with the risks that attendant dynamics pose to global stability. The report looks in turn at each of the three drivers of instability in this context. The report concludes with recommendations geared toward US policymakers for actions that can be taken unilaterally, as well as in cooperation with other space powers, to strengthen space governance and mitigate the risks of a congested, debris-strewn, or entangled space environment."

United States Institute Of Peace . 2023. 28p.

By Goldstein, Josh A.; Sastry, Girish; Musser, Micah; Diresta, Renee; Gentzel, Matthew; Sedova, Katerina

From the Executive Summary: "This report aims to assess: how might language models change influence operations, and what steps can be taken to mitigate these threats? This task is inherently speculative, as both AI [artificial intelligence] and influence operations are changing quickly. Many ideas in the report were informed by a workshop convened by the authors in October 2021, which brought together 30 experts across AI, influence operations, and policy analysis to discuss the potential impact of language models on influence operations. The resulting report does not represent the consensus of workshop participants, and mistakes are our own. We hope this report is useful to disinformation researchers who are interested in the impact of emerging technologies, AI developers setting their policies and investments, and policymakers preparing for social challenges at the intersection of technology and society."

Georgetown University. Walsh School Of Foreign Service. Center For Security And Emerging Technology; Openai; Stanford Internet Observatory. 2023. 85p.