By Rajan Khatiwoda

The main ambition of this book lies in a detailed analysis of the formation and enforcement of Nepal’s Mulukī Ain of 1854, specifically focusing on the provisions regarding homicide within the Mulukī Ains of 1854 and 1870. This study also examines contemporaneous legal records, revealing the complexities of the Ain’s implementation. The articles on homicide serve as a microcosm illustrating the broader evolution of Nepal’s legal code, which departed from outdated punishments like genital mutilation and introduced fines and imprisonment instead. Still, the innovations introduced into the Ain of 1854 were not uniformly progressive. The Ain in its various stages of development thus showcases the complex ways in which legal systems inevitably undergo transformation.

 Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Publishing (heiUP), 2024. 439p.

By JFA Institute

The Colorado Justice Data Landscape Report is provided as a service to the public and to policy makers interested in Colorado’s adult criminal and youth justice systems. This report is a compilation of existing information available on criminal justice systems that should be seen as a summary and a benchmark for future data metrics. It is not intended to be an exhaustive or single-use resource. The report also provides an overview of Colorado’s adult and juvenile justice legislation from 2013 to present. Direct links to how this legislation may have quantitatively affected the criminal justice system cannot be made from this analysis. This report is first an almanac of key criminal justice system indicators but can serve as a means to highlight areas where more in-depth research can be done to expand understanding on how demographics, socio-economic factors, and racial inequities can influence an individual’s involvement in the Colorado justice system. Criminal justice systems are often complex and influenced by many factors. It is impossible to attribute a single cause or condition to “explain” what may cause crime, individual behaviors, or emerging trends that cause harm or jeopardize public safety. The best we can hope for is to use historical data and provide context to explain trends and better inform policy makers. Government policy should be based on informed decision making and this report is designed as a visual summative reference document of tables, charts, and narrative to offer highlights into criminal justice trends in Colorado. The most up to date trend data on state demographic, socio-economic factors, crime, arrests, court processes, incarceration, and community supervision are provided by age, race/ethnicity, gender, and region, where available. This report attempts to use “person first” language where possible and will generally use this language unless directly referring to, citing or quoting data sources. Words that encompass and define multiple groups of individuals and situations, like homeless or absconder, remain unchanged.

The presentation of data in this report shows Colorado as a State that has been greatly impacted by high levels of overall population growth over the past twenty years. According to U.S. Census data, Colorado’s overall population grew every year in the last decade making it the 6th fastest growing state in the US since 20101 . During that time, the population became less White with People of Color making up almost 35 percent of the state population by 2022. While this percentage is still well below the comparable US percentage, it marks a sizeable shift in Colorado demographics. Total population growth was concentrated in but not limited to urban areas. While the resident population grew, Colorado also experienced positive metrics of prosperity as the unhoused population and unemployment declined universally prior to 2020. After implementation of COVID-19 societal restrictions in 2020, Colorado saw a sharp increase in unemployment to over two and half times that of pre-COVID levels, followed by a quick rebound two years later. The unhoused population has been a recent issue in Colorado’s Denver capital area since COVID, gaining both political and media attention. Incidents of homelessness in the metro Denver area have increased almost 30 percent since 2019. The number of individuals experiencing homelessness throughout the rest of the state, however, followed a different trend, declining slightly from 2020 to 2022. Like national trends, crime rates in Colorado have been on a long-term trajectory of decreasing. Because of Colorado’s rapidly growing population, it is necessary to examine crime as a rate standardized against the size of the state population. Beginning in 2021, Colorado experienced a sharp rebounding increase in both violent and property crime rates, although the increases were pocketed to certain crimes in each category. Total increases in the violent crime rate were fueled by an increase in aggravated assaults while increases in the total property crime rate were fueled by a spike in thefts of motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts. Court filings, felony case resolutions, and sentence dispositions have remained stable in recent years, with declines in 2020 due to COVID-19 court shutdowns. Directly related to the slowing of case processing by courts and decreased law enforcement activity, newly sentenced prison admissions and jail bookings both saw a downward trajectory. Like US trends, all Colorado adult incarcerated and supervised populations were greatly impacted. As the pandemic waned in recent years, these populations have begun to rebound but have yet to reach pre-CVOID levels. Colorado’s Youthful Offender System continues its long-term de-incarceration trend, housing less than one-quarter of the youths it did in 2005. This is the result of a historic movement in 1991 by the state to limit the use of the criminal justice system for youths. As Colorado and the nation move beyond the impacts of COVID 19, it is important to learn from both the non-intended impacts and the impacts of measures taken intentionally to address the pandemic on the criminal justice system to better inform future decision making.    

By Luke Kelly

This rapid literature review finds evidence of varied bail conditions in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania. The African Charter, which all the states have ratified, supports the right to bail, as do other international instruments. Most of the countries surveyed allow bail, but conditions vary as do practical applications. This review surveys the law on bail, as well as evidence on how the laws are enacted in practice. Legal documents, as well as academic and policy analysis have been used. This includes some analysis of "wider structural socio-political contexts, existing institutions/rules of the game (both formal and informal), associated incentive and interest structures and the particular features of the balance of power between relevant actors and stakeholders. This review highlights some key findings, including in Kenya, there is a right to bail for all offences (serious offences by a court only), but much discretion is granted to the authorities, and research has found that the rules are applied inconsistently and there is a high rate of pre-trial detention. Meanwhile, bail is a right for most in Uganda, but bail for some serious crimes can only be granted by the High Court; however, in practice, it is hard to get bail and there is a high rate of pre-trial detention. In Rwanda, bail may be given for all offences provided conditions are met and the rate of pre-trial detention is relatively low, although there is evidence that some are detained outside of the judicial system and without a trial or the option of bail. Finally, in Tanzania, bail can be granted with certain mandatory restrictions and there is an on-going legal dispute about whether the right to bail extends to those accused of certain serious crimes. Research shows refusal of bail is being used against critics of the Tanzanian government and there is a high rate of pre-trial detention.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, K4D helpdesk service, 2020. 14p.

By Arie Freiberg

The relationship between alcohol and other drugs (AOD), the criminal law, and sentencing has a long and tortuous history in Victoria. It is a saga of changing theories regarding the nature of substance use and addiction, the link between substance use and crime1 and oscillating responses to AOD-related crime ranging from ‘law and order’ to harm minimisation, from more severe penalties to decriminalisation. Over 170 years or so, Victoria’s sentencing responses have evolved from the traditional sanctions of fines, imprisonment, common law bonds and probation to a complex mix of pre-sentence interventions, diversion programs, a range of intermediate sanctions, various forms of suspended sentences and problem-oriented court models such as the drug and alcohol court. Although the criminal law forms the foundation of the legal framework for AOD offending, sentencing law and practice play an important part in that structure. They provide the context for medical and other interventions aimed at addressing the underlying causes of drug related offending.2 This paper argues that although there have been many innovations in sentencing, they have generally had only a marginal effect on AODrelated crime. While there exists a substantial literature on the sentencing of AOD-related offences (Sentencing Advisory Council 2015), and on AOD treatment policy (Ritter and Berends 2016), less attention has been paid to the structure, content and effectiveness of the various sanctions employed over the years. In contrast, this paper reflects on over 170 years of AOD sentencing reform, arguing that many of the interventions have been less than successful due to their poor construction, inadequate resourcing, lack of continuity and clarity of purpose, unrealistic and inflexible conditions, geographic disparity, and unresponsiveness to different groups of offenders. This paper concludes that sentencing alone can never provide the answer to AOD-related crime and that far more fundamental reform to the regulation of AOD-related offending is required. These conclusions reflect the current impasse between the clear and undeniable failure of the war on drugs and the continued pursuit of the same law and order policies that, asthis paper shows, have failed to provide lasting solutions  

Collingwood 3066, Victoria : The Victorian Alcohol and Drug Association (VAADA) i , 2023. 34p.

By Barry Friedman & Danielle Keats Citron

Working hand-in-hand with the private sector, largely in a regulatory vacuum, policing agencies at the federal, state, and local levels are acquiring and using vast reservoirs of personal data. They are doing so indiscriminately, which is to say without any reason to suspect the individuals whose data they are collecting are acting unlawfully. And they are doing it in bulk. People are unlikely to want this personal information shared with anyone, let alone law enforcement. And yet today, private companies are helping law enforcement gather it by the terabyte. On all of us. Our thesis is straightforward: the unregulated collection of this data must cease, at least until basic rule-of-law requisites are met. Any collection must be authorized by democratically accountable bodies. It must be transparent. It must be based on clear proof of efficacy (that a legitimate purpose actually is being served). There must be protections that minimize or avoid harms to individuals and society. And, of course, there must be judicial review of whether indiscriminate bulk data collection is constitutional, either at all or with regard to specific programs. The basis for this thesis is a first-of-its-kind review of instances, from the dawn of the Information Age, in which Congress acted on these very issues. Much of that history involves indiscriminate collection of data on Americans for reasons of national and domestic security, because national security represents the outer bounds of what law enforcement and intelligence agencies are permitted to do, and much of what is done in the name of national security is inappropriate for domestic policing. Yet, in incident after incident, Congress made clear that indiscriminate bulk collection of Americans’ data is unacceptable, unlawful, and of dubious constitutionality. To the extent that such collection was permitted at all, Congress demanded the very requisites specified above. Today’s indiscriminate bulk surveillance by federal, state, and local policing agencies violates virtually all of these congressionally established norms. It should cease, at least until the rule-of-law requisites are met. 

Virginia Law Review [Vol. 110:1351 2024.

By David Hyman | Mohammad H. Rahmati

Crime doesn’t pay. Or does it? We study the role of expectations regarding sanctions and the likelihood of detection on whether people obey the law. We examine how expectations influence whether people obey the law and conduct simulations of various enforcement counter-factuals. We find the average assessment of the likelihood of detection is quite accurate, but those who (mistakenly) believe the probability is lower than it is are much more likely to break the law. Further, expectations with regard to the likely consequences of getting caught are also heterogeneous. In our simulations, perceived fines have little impact on willingness to break the law, but a higher perceived likelihood of apprehension has an appreciable impact. Because marginal respondents are pivotal in the rate of law-breaking, debiasing expectations among the whole population has little impact.

Unpublished paper, 2024.

By J. Gormley

This new report published by the Sentencing Council is part of a biennial series reviewing the existing research into the effectiveness of sentencing commissioned to enable the Council to consider the most up-to-date evidence when developing and revising guidelines. This report updates the report published by the Sentencing Council in 2022 and reviews what ‘effectiveness’ might mean from the perspective of four key groups: offenders (specifically with regard to deterrence); the public; victims; and sentencers (judges and magistrates).

By Stephen Eide

Introduction - Mental health courts place seriously mentally ill defendants in community treatment as an alternative to incarceration. In recent decades, these and other “problem-solving” courts have expanded dramatically nationwide. These programs were long seen as core elements of criminal justice reform and frequently reduce recidivism more effectively than traditional court systems. But recently, problem-solving courts’ place in the criminal justice reform agenda has become more ambiguous. Not only has energy shifted toward more radical ideas (such as jail “abolition”), but some far-reaching reforms threaten court programs’ traditional incentive structure. Mental health courts rely on criminal sanctions as leverage; they lose that leverage when criminal justice reforms reduce or jettison the use of criminal sanctions entirely. This brief assesses mental health courts’ future in an era of criminal justice reform. It considers how sentencing, bail, and discovery reforms threaten the structure of mental health courts. It also evaluates attempts to “co-opt” the model, through New York’s “Treatment Not Jail Act.” Overall, the brief argues that mental health courts will retain their relevance for the foreseeable future, owing mainly to their small scale. Mental health courts serve only a small fraction of the universe of mentally ill offenders. They will therefore never contribute significantly to mass de-carceration, the goal of progressive reformers. But that also means that they are likely to retain their relevance, even if the use of criminal sanctions declines, as long as the population of mentally ill offenders remains substantial. This brief will conclude with suggestions on how to sustain mental health courts in the future 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 15p.

By Hannah Rose and Gina Vale

Also‑called ‘new generation of extremists’ has attracted significant media attention but has suffered from a lack of transparent data and comprehensive, youth‑specific analysis. Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving threat landscape, this report presents the first in‑depth research into child terrorist activity in England and Wales. Through the construction of a unique dataset of children convicted of terrorism offences in England and Wales since 2016 – published live alongside this report – it investigates how domestic policing and the criminal justice system understand child‑terrorism offending. Key Data Points In the UK since 2016, 43 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences they committed as minors. Of these, 42 were boys, with only one girl. While the oldest offenders were days before their respective 18th birthdays, the youngest was only 13 years old. Two clear waves of child terrorism offending can be identified. The first, dominated by Islamist cases, runs concurrently with the peak of Islamic State’s territorial ‘caliphate’ until its collapse in 2018. The second wave predominantly comprises extreme‑right cases, emerging in 2018 in the context of post-National Action and the decentralisation of extreme‑right online networks. In total, 16 cases relate to Islamist activity, 25 to the extreme right, and two to unknown or unclear ideologies. Almost a third of the children were convicted of preparing an act of terrorism, including the construction of improvised explosive devices, the plotting of complex mass‑casualty attacks, and attempts by seven children to travel independently overseas for the purpose of engaging in terrorism. Eight children – five extreme right and three Islamist – planned to commit domestic acts of terrorism on UK soil. Eleven minors were convicted of encouraging terrorism, one for providing training for terrorism, one for membership of a banned organisation and one for inviting support for a banned organisation. The most common offence, committed by 26 minors, was the collection of terrorist propaganda. Children created their own propaganda, engaged with violent extremist literature and downloaded operational materials. 19 minors disseminated banned materials with friends, family and anonymous online networks. Proportionally, more extreme right than Islamist offenders pleaded guilty, with many denouncing previously held views, citing adverse childhood experiences, explaining their isolation and desire to fit in with online ecosystems, and claiming childhood innocence. The most common sentence was non‑custodial, accompanied by a rehabilitative and monitoring order, which was handed down to twel  sentence, awarded in two separate Islamist cases, was eleven years to life. The disparity in sentencing between ideological categories may be shaped by four factors: the age at sentencing, greater severity of offence, stronger mitigating circumstances among extreme‑right offenders and a higher proportion of not‑guilty pleas entered by Islamist defendants. A New Threat? Children did not merely mimic the actions or do the bidding of older individuals, but proved to be innovators and amplifiers in their own right. Many attempted and managed to recruit peers and older family members, prepare acts of terrorism without the help of adults, and create their own propaganda images, videos and manifestos. In anonymous transnational online extremist ecosystems, which are widely available and have very low barriers to participation, the potential impact of extremist minors is on a par with adults. Children’s support of terrorist networks presents a new threat. While no attack has been committed by a child in the UK to date, late‑stage foiled plots and transnational activism demonstrate this potentiality. However, children cannot merely be treated as ‘small adults’ with heavily securitised policies. An outcome‑focused system must balance the interests of the public and targeted communities with the best interests of the child to address root causes of radicalisation and secure successful reintegration and threat mitigation.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2023. 76p.

By Vanessa Bettinson

• Coercive control is a recognised form of domestic abuse under section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and it is a criminal offence to engage in controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. Domestic abuse disproportionately affects women as victims and this is reflected in the female prison population where research has found that 57% of women in the prison population in England and Wales have been victims of domestic abuse.

• Coercive control by a male intimate partner or relative can directly result in women’s offending. This occurs in a variety of ways such as taking responsibility for a partner’s crime, possession of a controlled substance belonging to an abuser and theft to support a partner’s drug habit, stealing personal items or using violent resistance against the abuser.

• Coercive control has also been linked to women’s reoffending with short custodial sentences leading to financial hardship and homelessness. Access to women’s refuges is limited as female offenders often have complex and multiple needs which make them ineligible for most refuges. Returning to an abuser to avoid homelessness is likely to lead to the continuation of coerced offending. Abusive partners can also prevent a female offender from complying with supervision under a community order by exerting coercive and controlling behaviours on them. In an effort to maintain their safety, the victim-offender can perceive that compliance with the abuser’s demands is their safest option.

• Existing sentencing guidelines do recognise ‘coercion, intimidation or exploitation’ as a mitigating factor in sentencing. It can operate as a factor that lowers the culpability threshold in some offence specific sentencing guidelines or, alternatively, it can be assessed as personal mitigation in accordance with the Sentencing Council’s ‘General guideline: overarching principles’. This means there is a high potential that coercive control as mitigation in sentencing is not consistently applied to all sentencing decisions.

• The guidelines do not explicitly adopt the term coercive control and sentencers could be limiting their approach to coercion for mitigation purposes to physical forms of coercion. HM Courts and Tribunals ought to apply the statutory guideline that supports the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 at sentencing hearings, however, there is no research on the ability of sentencers to identify coercive control and apply it to sentencing decisions.

• Pre-Sentence Reports (PSRs) are a valuable tool to assist the court in understanding the role coercive control played in the offending, however, there is a reduction in the volume of full written PSRs being requested by courts. In addition, there is no research on the ability of probation officers to identify coercive control and the extent it is included in PSRs

London: Sentencing Academy, 2024. 16p.

By Kathryn Hollingsworth, Jonathan Bild and Gavin Dingwall

This report describes the findings from a survey of 1,038 children living in England and Wales aged between 10-17 years, drawn from the general public and conducted in 2023. The research contributes to the literature on the public’s knowledge and opinion of sentencing and this survey follows up an earlier report by the Sentencing Academy, published in January 2022, which explored public knowledge of sentencing practice and trends through a survey of adult respondents. This report, however, focuses on a cohort – children over the minimum age of criminal responsibility – who are largely absent from the existing research literature.

Key Findings

• Most children reported having spoken to someone about what happens in a criminal court. The most common answer (57%) was that they had spoken to ‘my family’, with 39% of respondents having spoken to ‘my teacher at school’. However, very few respondents (2%) reported having been to a criminal court.

• Respondents reported having seen what happens in a criminal court from a variety of sources, with the two most common responses being ‘on a TV programme’ and ‘in a film’.

• Despite all participants in the survey having reached the minimum age of criminal responsibility, respondents generally over-estimated the age at which children become criminally responsible: 61% of those who provided an answer to the question of at what age does a child become criminally responsible (i.e. excluding those who answered ‘don’t know’) thought it was over the correct age of 10-years-old.

• The children in this survey were much less likely than adult respondents to think that the sentencing of adults is too lenient: 27% of respondents thought that sentencing was too lenient but a greater proportion – 34% – thought it was ‘about right’. Only 16% of respondents thought that the sentencing of children was too lenient.

• Whilst the vast majority (81%) of respondents correctly identified that a judge ‘would’ sentence a 25-year-old more severely than a 15-year-old for an identical offence, only 50% of respondents thought that they ‘should’ do so; 38% thought that both offenders should receive the same punishment.

• Respondents generally under-estimated the severity of sentencing for children convicted of a repeat knife offence. In a scenario crafted to engage a mandatory custodial sentence as the most likely outcome, 57% of respondents thought that the offending would most likely be met with a non-custodial sentence. This included a majority of 16- and 17-year old respondents to whom the mandatory sentencing provisions apply

London: Sentencing Academy, 2024. 26p.

By Rita E. Kuckertz

This study examines the impact of Mexico’s 2008 criminal justice reform on the practice of utilizing torture and mistreatment to extract criminal confessions. Complaint data submitted to the National Commission on Human Rights (Comisión Nacional de Derecho Humanos, CNDH) and detainee survey data compiled by the National Institute for Statistics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI) were employed to assess if the use of torture and mistreatment by judicial sector operators had decreased (1) in states with advanced levels of reform implementation and (2) in judicial districts that had already implemented the reform. The author also examined the incidence of forced confessions before and after the reform’s implementation at the judicial district level. The author hypothesized that decreases in torture, mistreatment, and forced confessions would be observed in each of these cases. Basic correlation and regression tests were employed to assess the geographic hypothesis, while two chi-square tests for independence were utilized for judicial district data. The results of these analyses demonstrate evidence rejecting the null hypothesis in each instance, suggesting that the reform can indeed be credited for small but meaningful reductions in torture, mistreatment, and forced confessions in Mexico. The author argues that reforms must be accompanied by further action to address the pervasive use of torture and mistreatment in Mexico

San Diego: Justice in Mexico Department of Political Science & International Relations University of San Diego 2020. 51p.

By Kisha Bird, Caitlin Dawkins, and Lisa Johnson

Too many young people cycle in and out of prison, jails, and detention centers and face probation and parole conditions that keep them locked out of opportunity. These interactions with the criminal justice system demand the need for both equitable practices and programs that support second chances and large-scale investments in decarceration. They also require critical analysis and undoing of historical policies that manifest in an unequal and unjust criminal justice system. From Surviving to Thriving: Supporting Transformation, Reentry and Connections to Employment for Young Adults, from FHI 360 and CLASP, offers practical programmatic solutions that support second chances for young people and raise policy and systems considerations to address equity, collateral consequences, and opportunity. The report features insights of best practices from nine communities that are part of the Compass Rose Collaborative (CRC). Launched in 2017, the CRC began as a three-year program funded by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The CRC connects young adults ages 18-24 who have had contact with the juvenile justice or criminal justice system to employment, education pathways, and supportive services across nine communities. Policymakers and practitioners can use this analysis to increase equity and access to jobs and education for young people in need of another chance and in navigating the converging fields of workforce development, education, and criminal justice. Ultimately, the lessons shared here can offer a variety of stakeholders, including public agencies and employers, a roadmap to better understand strategies to support dismantling structural barriers and implementing strategies that support young adults on a journey of transformation and connectedness.

Washington, DC: CLASP, 2020. 28p.

By Ireland. Department of Health, Ireland. Department of Justice

It is increasingly recognised that the criminal justice system and in particular prison are not suitable to address the specific needs and challenges of those with mental health and drug addictions. The two reports of the Interdepartmental Group (IDG) to examine issues relating to people with mental illness who come in contact with the Criminal Justice System (dating from 2012 and 2018) contain recommendations on addressing the issues around this complex challenge. The Programme for Government: Our Shared Future is committed to the establishment of a Task Force to consider the mental health and addiction issues of persons in prison and primary care support on release. It also acknowledged the recent Mental Health Policy Sharing the Vision (StV) and committed to establishing the National Implementation and Monitoring Committee to oversee this work. The task force had three subgroups focused on three key elements to holistically meet these needs going forward; One subgroup, on Diversion, chaired by a member of An Garda Síochána, focused on diverting individuals with mental illness who have committed minor offences from progressing into the criminal justice system, in the best interests of both the public and the individual concerned. A second subgroup, on Irish Prison Service/Central Mental Hospital Capacity, which was chaired by an Irish Prison Service Director, examined the existing and future needs of individuals within the custodial criminal justice system. The objective of this group was to ensure that there is adequate provision of services to meet the mental health and dual diagnosis needs of those in prison. A third subgroup  examined community issues and through-care upon release from custody, and was chaired by the Director of the Probation Service. The objective of this group was to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards in place and adequate provision of services to prevent individuals from relapsing into damaging behaviours undermining the rehabilitative efforts made by the individual and the State. Overall, the Taskforce has put forward 61 recommendations which emphasise the shared responsibility of a number of Government Departments and agencies to deliver on meeting the needs of those with mental health and addiction challenges who come into contact with the criminal justice system.

Key actions include:

• Progressive and empathetic approach by Gardaí to dealing with offenders with mental health and addiction challenges, informed by mental health and addiction awareness training for Gardaí 

• Efficient and effective means of implementing a prosecution avoidance policy when Garda members come in contact with adults with mental illness and addiction, through the adult caution scheme

• The establishment of a pilot specialist dual diagnosis service to support prisoners with a mental health condition and substance misuse in a prison, to inform roll-out across the entire prison estate

• Access to tiered mental health supports that are recovery-oriented for every person with mental health difficulties coming into contact with the forensic system

• Reducing attrition by maintaining engagement and motivation at the point of release, including through the use of community-agreed discharge plans for prisoners (identifying multi-agency supports required).

  Dublin: Department of Health; Department of Justice.2022. 231p.

By Amy Pisani, Sara Rahman, Madeleine Griffiths and Suzanne Poynton

To determine which factors of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW), are influential in first-court bail decisions in NSW Local Courts, and the reasons why courts release adult defendants who have already been refused bail by police. METHOD We descriptively and thematically analysed a dataset combining observations of 252 first court bail hearings in the NSW Local Court between February and May 2023, and administrative data from the BOCSAR Re-offending Database (ROD) and the New South Wales (NSW) Police Force’s Computerised Operational Policing System. We supplemented these data with a thematic analysis of 40 interviews with criminal justice stakeholders involved in adult bail proceedings in NSW Local Courts. RESULTS Of the 252 observations where police had refused bail, 110 defendants (44%) were released on bail by the court, with six released unconditionally, 12% were finalised at first appearance or had their bail dispensed with, and 44% had their bail refused by the court. Similar to prosecutors and police, magistrates were most concerned with a defendant’s criminal history and the nature and seriousness of the offence, and to a lesser extent defendant vulnerabilities and needs, when determining bail. There was also general agreement between police/prosecutors and the courts regarding bail concerns, with both parties most frequently identifying reoffending and endangering the safety of victims/community as their primary concerns. Two main differences between police and court decisions emerged from the analysis. Firstly, while magistrates identified bail concerns in the majority of matters observed, they were often satisfied that these risks could be mitigated by bail conditions. The bail conditions most commonly imposed were accommodation (82%), reporting (60%), non-contact orders (47%), and place restrictions (34%). Secondly, police rarely grant bail to people charged with show cause offences, whereas 55% of defendants charged with a show cause offence, who were refused bail by police, were able to successfully demonstrate to the court why their detention was not justified. Stakeholders reported that this occurred because police prioritise community and victim safety, have limited access to information from defendants and legal representatives, and do not apply discretion when applying the show cause requirement. CONCLUSION Legal factors, such as criminal history and seriousness of offences, are the most influential factors in both the police and courts’ bail decisions. However, magistrates who are legally trained, less subject to time pressures, and can be informed by legal practitioners, are more able to thoroughly assess show cause requirements and the suitability of bail conditions at the first court bail hearing. In the absence of these factors, police are more risk-averse  

Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 2024. 42p.

By Brandon L. Garrett

In response to wrongful convictions, there has been a revolution in criminal procedure and research in law and science. This review seeks to summarize the cross-disciplinary explosion in work studying known wrongful convictions, examining their causes, and assessing policy reforms designed to help detect and prevent errors in criminal justice. Scholars have increasingly studied the characteristics of known wrongful-conviction cases, including by analyzing archival records and by creating public registries of exonerations. Scholars have conducted research in law, psychology, statistics, criminology, and other disciplines, as well as interdisciplinary research, designed to better understand the phenomenon of wrongful convictions and how to prevent errors. Scientific bodies, such as the National Academy of Sciences, have made important recommendations based on this research. Furthermore, the conversation is global, with litigation, research, and policy work across jurisdictions. A wide range of jurisdictions have adopted noteworthy changes designed to safeguard crucial types of evidence, such as confession, forensic, and eyewitness evidence, during police investigations and at trial. As a result, law and science have increasingly come together to produce tangible improvements to criminal justice.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2020. 3:245–59

By Steven A. Camarota and Karen Zeigler

Under current policy all persons — not just citizens — are included in the population count when apportioning seats to states in the U.S. House of Representatives and for votes in the Electoral College, which is based on House seats. Although we focus on the next census in 2020, the impact of immigration has been building for decades as the number of people settling in the country has increased dramatically. This report examines the cumulative impact of immigration, both legal and illegal, on the apportionment of House seats; this is not an analysis of the impact of immigration only since the previous census. Apportionment is a zero-sum system; by adding more population to some states rather than others, immigration will continue to significantly redistribute political power in Washington.

Among the findings:

The 2020 census will show that the presence of all immigrants (naturalized citizens, legal residents, and illegal aliens) and their U.S.-born minor children is responsible for a shift of 26 House seats. This is the cumulative impact of immigration, not the change from the previous census.To put this number in perspective, changing the party of 21 members of the current Congress would flip the majority in the U.S. House. The 26 seats represent the effect of all immigrants and their children 17 years of age and younger, and is not the change from one census to another.Ohio will have three fewer seats in 2020 than it otherwise would have had but for the presence of all immigrants and their minor children in other states. Michigan and Pennsylvania will have two fewer; and Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin will each have one fewer seat. California will have 11 more seats in 2020 than it otherwise would have; New York and Texas will have four more seats each; Florida will have three more seats; New Jersey will have two more seats; and Illinois and Massachusetts will each have one additional seat.Of the 26 seats that will be lost, 24 are from states that voted for Donald Trump in 2016. Of states that will gain House seats because of immigration, 19 seats will go to the solidly Democratic states of California, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Illinois. Texas is the only solidly Republican state that gains, while Florida is a swing state.Doing the same calculation, but counting only immigrants themselves (naturalized citizens, legal permanent residents, guestworkers, foreign students and illegal aliens), but not their U.S.-born minor children, will redistribute 18 seats in the House in 2020. Ohio will have two fewer seats than it otherwise would have had but for the presence of immigrants in other states. Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia will each have one fewer seat. California will have seven more seats in 2020 than it otherwise would. New York and Florida will have three more each; Texas and New Jersey will have two more seats; and Illinois will have one more seat.Looking at non-citizens and their U.S.-born minor children redistributes 10 seats, with Ohio, Michigan, Alabama, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, West Virginia, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island each having one fewer seat. California will have four more seats than it otherwise would have; Texas will have three more seats; and New York, Florida, and New Jersey will have one additional seat each.Looking at only non-citizens (legal residents and illegal immigrants) redistributes eight seats, with Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Alabama, Idaho, West Virginia, and Rhode Island each having one fewer seat in 2020 due to the presence of non-citizens in other states. California will have three additional seats; Texas will have two more seats; and Florida, New Jersey, and New York will each have one more seat.Illegal immigrants and their U.S.-born minor children will redistribute five seats in 2020, with Ohio, Michigan, Alabama, Minnesota, and West Virginia each losing one seat in 2020 that they otherwise would have had. California and Texas will each have two additional seats, and New York will have one additional seat.Illegal immigrants alone in the 2020 census will redistribute three seats, with Ohio, Alabama, and Minnesota each having one fewer seat than they otherwise would have had, while California, New York, and Texas will have one additional seat.

Center for Immigration Studies, 2019. 11p.

By Tirion Havard, Sarah Bartley, Ian Mahoney,  Chris Magill,  Chris Flood

This research was funded by the Nuffield Foundation and the British Academy, as part of their Understanding Communities programme. The research involved collaboration between four higher-education institutions, namely London South Bank University, The Royal Central School of Speech and Drama, Nottingham Trent University and the University of Brighton. Partnerships were also formed with local and national organisations, including Clean Break Theatre Company, Restoke and Staffordshire Women’s Aid. The research focused on two communities: women with convictions (WwC) in Staffordshire and residents of Stoke-on-Trent. It used a mixed methodological approach that involved designing and delivering an arts-based transformative justice (TJ) intervention, undertaking ethnographic observations, running focus groups and conducting interviews with TJ experts. The overarching aims of this project were to see: • if TJ can effectively facilitate social cohesion and promote equality within local communities (for the purposes of this research, ‘equality’ is appraised by exploring strengths, assets, attributes, connectedness, enhanced individual welfare and social well-being); • if TJ can effectively support WwC to reintegrate and resettle into their local communities. To achieve these aims, we set out to explore and meet the following objectives: i. Identify the needs of and barriers faced by WwC when they try to resettle/reintegrate into their local community. ii. Identify and activate the strengths, assets and attributes that local communities can bring to the reintegration and engagement of WwC. iii. Determine the suitability of an arts-based approach to TJ for improving community cohesion. iv. Establish whether TJ can support the reintegration of WwC into their local community by making them feel stronger, more equal and more connected, and assess the broader impact this has on community cohesion. v. Establish whether TJ can enhance individual welfare and social well-being for both WwC and local residents and measure the costeffectiveness of the approach. vi.Inform policy and practice about the needs of WwC and how best to meet them through community-led interventions. vii. Contribute to the literature and knowledge base about using TJ to engage and integrate communities within a UK context. viii. Promote the personal and professional development of all those involved in the project. As a conceptual framework, TJ focuses on overcoming ingrained social and structural barriers to engagement and justice issues including the social, political and economic status of communities and the individuals within them. In focusing on community accountability for crime, victimisation and subsequent support for victims and people convicted of offences, TJ recognises that patriarchal social structures can legitimise violence, particularly towards women, and that the state, in this case the criminal justice system (CJS), perpetuates cycles of abuse and (re) traumatises people. TJ is vital for understanding and exploring societal attitudes to justice, and to engage with difficult conversations around the role that communities can play in addressing the harms associated with the actions of people within them  

Lonron; Nuffield Foundation, 2024. 86p.

By Lore Joplin, Justice System Partners, Maureen McDonnell, , et al.

In January 2023, California became the first state in the nation to receive approval from the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for a Medicaid Section 1115 demonstration request to amend Medicaid’s inmate exclusion. People detained in jails and prisons have high rates of chronic and acute health needs, including physical, mental health, and substance disorders and reentry is a high-risk time. A key to addressing these reentry risks is addressing people’s health needs while they are incarcerated and building continuity of care from jail to community when they are released. California’s waiver, called California’s Advancing and Innovating Medi-Cal (CalAIM), and the specific component focused on individuals who are transitioning out of the criminal justice system, the Justice Involved (JI) initiative, will for the first time provide a targeted set of Medicaid-covered services right before someone is released from prison or jail. These services aim to smooth reentry transitions from jail and prison to the community, establish better connections to community-based providers at release, and enhance access to necessary care and support. California’s approach is designed to reduce the high risk of post- release mortality, morbidity, and other adverse outcomes, including repeat contact with the criminal justice system, by bringing Medicaid financing and coverage standards to bear. The work to implement California’s waiver and make these changes a reality is demanding, involving multiple partners at the state, county, and local level who have not previously worked together at this level of vital cross-system collaboration. Implementation of these changes is well underway, and county-level changes will roll out over the next two years, starting in October 2024. This paper highlights California’s implementation approach, focusing on the county-level impacts on jails, health care providers, and reentry processes. It also explores several implementation challenges and the steps the state and the counties have taken thus far to implement this change.

Safety and Justice Challenge. Org: 2024. 42p.

By  Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Selective Traffic Enforcement Program (STEP) provides additional funding to law enforcement agencies implementing programs to deter dangerous driving. As a condition, agencies must report the number of traffic stop warnings and tickets issued to the state’s STEP grant administrator. Agencies risk reduced funding if found to be not “productive” by issuing a sufficient amount of citations. Police departments in Alabama use these federal grants to drive economic sanctions by paying patrol officers overtime to be “productive” and rewarding the “most active” officers with more overtime at the end of the year; those found to be not “productive” face suspension from the program in some departments. Using municipal budgets and audits, legal records of those ticketed and arrested over court debt, and federal and state grant data, this report examines the incentives that drive policing decisions in Alabama and highlights how traffic stops–primarily regulatory and economic stops–harm low-wealth people. The report also includes personal accounts of individuals who faced court debt and provides recommendations for law enforcement, courts, and lawmakers.

Key Findings:

68 percent of law enforcement agencies statewide that received STEP funding issued more warnings to speeders than to drivers with car insurance violations —who instead received tickets.Cleburne County adds an additional $30 fee to the base of their fines for planning, designing, constructing, furnishing, equipping, and financing a county jail.Findings from two municipal budgets showed revenue from fines and fees is volatile.In 2021, the Anniston Police Department was twice as likely to issue tickets for an insurance violation than a warning when compared to those stopped for speeding.  Drivers who miss enough payments or court appearances are issued a suspended driver’s license and an order for arrest.

Recommendations:

Alabama police departments should look into how the prioritization of moving violations over equipment and regulatory stops by the Fayetteville Police Department in North Carolina has reduced traffic fatalities, injuries, and racial disparities.Courts should hold ability to pay hearings before ordering an arrest or placing a person on payment plans.Lawmakers should require publicly available reporting on all traffic stops.

Alabama Appleseed Center for Law & Justice, 2023. 36p.