By Romi Sigsworth and Shaun Shelly

South Africa’s prohibitionist and punitive response to people who cultivate, sell and use drugs has failed to reduce the supply, demand or harms related to the use and trade in scheduled drugs. This report explores the universal costs and consequences of prohibition before providing a global contextualisation of current drug policy debates. It then outlines the historical context of drug policy in South Africa and suggests what might be done differently in the present and future to reduce the burden of drugs and drug policy in the country. Key findings • Despite the vast expenditure on a prohibitionist and criminal justice approach to drugs globally over more than five decades, drugs are more readily available at lower prices, drug use has increased significantly and the social and health harms associated with current policies and responses to drugs are substantial. • In South Africa, the criminalisation of people who use drugs is a massive burden on the police, courts and correctional services, as well as a significant barrier to resolving the economic, social and health challenges that communities face in developing an equitable and just society. • The current societal and political attitude towards people who use drugs, however, means that any changes to drug policy are unlikely to be radical or rapid until communities are  able to see the benefits of alternative approaches.

ENACT Africa, 2020. 28p.  

By Alan Martin

Illegal artisanal mining in South Africa is among the most lucrative and violent on the African continent, with lost production exceeding R14 billion (about USD$1 billion) a year. Current enforcement and policy responses, which criminalise illegal miners, are misguided, counterproductive and ignore the poverty and socio-economic drivers behind the phenomenon. A more holistic, nuanced and multi-faceted approach is required from government and industry to address the lack of formalisation and the marginalisation of the illegal mining sector. Key points ∙ Illegal mining in South Africa should be considered to be artisanal mining within large-scale mines, not separate from them. ∙ While Zama Zamas are members of, or associated with, criminal syndicates, they are not homogenous groupings. ∙ The violence and insecurity caused by the criminality associated with illegal mining makes some mining areas in South Africa more chaotic and conflict-ridden than those elsewhere in Africa. ∙ Rough estimates of Zama Zama outputs suggest that lost gold production may exceed R14 billion a year,2 making South Africa one of the biggest sources of illicit gold in Africa. ∙ The true cost of illegal mining activity includes damage to public and private infrastructure caused by vandalism or poor mining practices, as well as the costs of security upgrades undertaken by mining companies to address illegal breaches  

ENACT Africa, 2019. 12p.

By Colette Ashton

Strengthening existing institutions, prioritising prevention and engaging the private sector are needed to end corruption.

This report analyses South Africa’s anti-corruption institutions in relation to international good practice. It highlights problems with their functional independence and organisational culture. It identifies a serious gap in the area of prevention. Among the recommendations are that South Africa undertake feasible, incremental improvements to existing institutions and engage the private sector to help prevent and detect corruption.

Key findings There is insufficient empirical research on corruption in South Africa to inform context sensitive policy reform. Anti-corruption institutions are governed by a parallel informal system of social norms held in place by incentives such as promotion and disincentives such as bullying. This organisational culture prioritises obedience to authority over ethics, eroding integrity. A culture of mistrust and competition exists between law enforcement agencies, hampering collaboration. Feasible, incremental reforms of anti-corruption institutions are needed in the short term, focusing on organisational culture. Recommendations Strengthen existing agencies Amend the National Prosecuting Authority Act so that: the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) is the accounting officer; the budget is allocated by Parliament; there are merit-based appointment processes and security of tenure for senior leaders; and the NDPP has control over human resources. Develop context-sensitive prosecutorial prioritisation policy that focuses on the criteria of redress for economic harm and is mindful of the need for political stability. Revise performance targets of law enforcement agencies to incentivise cooperation, not competition. Build cultures of integrity, trust and cooperation in and among anti-corruption agencies. Prioritise prevention Work towards an independent anti-corruption prevention agency. Urgently provide the Public Administration Ethics Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit in the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation with increased funding and independence. 2 The NPA should be given control over its own budget and human resources, which are currently controlled by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Effective anti-corruption agencies in developing countries may trigger political instability. Political stability is a precondition for economic growth, which in the long term creates conditions for more effective anti-corruption institutions. Equitable economic development is a precondition for the transformation of more economically harmful types of corruption, e.g. plunder, into less harmful types, e.g. lobbying. The private sector is a key partner for government in the prevention and detection of corruption. Prioritise integrity in government by promoting ethical employees. Prioritise corruption prevention in the South African Police Service. Change the incentive structure for the private sector Introduce a statute providing for non-trial resolutions of corporate corruption cases to incentivise companies to self-police corruption. Develop capacity in the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission to support companies to develop effective anti corruption compliance programmes. Partner with the private sector to run collective action programmes in key sectors such as health, construction and shipping. Research Conduct a risk analysis for a proposed Chapter 9 anti-corruption super-agency with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Conduct research into a two-track criminal and administrative anti-corruption enforcement system. Conduct more empirical, sector-specific research into corruption

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 28p,

By Colette Ashton

Developing country theorists claim that strategies should focus on human behaviour and economic incentives, not legal measures.

To remedy systemic corruption in South Africa, policymakers must look beyond the discourse of transparency and accountability to emerging anti-corruption theory. Policy research in this field should be multi-disciplinary, grounded in empirical research and informed by decolonial thought. There is a need for more research into the unique types and drivers of corruption at national, local and sector-specific levels, to inform policy reform.

Key findings There is international consensus that anti-corruption reforms often fail or backfire, particularly in developing countries. The dominant Western good governance approach should be supplemented by theory emerging from other schools of thought from developing countries. The good governance approach recommends transparency and accountability, prioritising better laws and improved enforcement as the primary solutions. Theorists from developing countries claim that where there is systemic corruption, it is more helpful to focus on human behaviour and economic incentives to prevent corruption. Legalistic measures tend to be one-dimensional, ineffective and sometimes harmful. Recommendations Government should: Reconsider policies in light of emerging theory and evidence from global anti- corruption practices. Develop a strategy for communicating alternative perspectives and approaches to heads and staff of anti-corruption agencies and other government institutions. Researchers should: 2 Conduct localised and sector-specific empirical research into corruption in South Africa. Conduct qualitative research into the social norms governing government institutions and the private sector. Critically analyse the South African anti corruption discourse through a decolonial lens. Social norms – what people expect others to do – are the unwritten rules governing institutions and are a primary driver of corruption. For many, obeying these rules is a logical response to structural conditions, including economic incentives and disincentives. Research shows that most people are inclined to behave ethically if their environment facilitates it. Reframing corruption as a collective action problem, where policy is designed to influence the behaviour of groups, is likely to result in more effective anti-corruption initiatives. Economic development that delivers more equitable distribution of opportunities and wealth is a precondition for building a state with the capacity to reduce corruption. Determine who the rule-following elites are and devise ways to incentivise them to exert pressure on non-rule-following elites. NGOs should: Develop partnerships with institutions working with alternative theoretical/policy approaches. Explore opportunities for cooperation with business and government in developing sector specific anti-corruption projects. Develop and execute a strategy for communicating alternative perspectives to civil society and media, and in doing so, highlight success stories. Develop pilot anti-corruption reform projects based on emerging alternative perspectives

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 12p.

By Michael McLaggan

The South African public transport sector is facing a critical crisis, marked by escalating violence and extortion within the taxi industry. This report delves into the dynamics behind these troubling incidents, shedding light on the severe impact they have on bus companies and the broader public transport ecosystem.

Since 2015, the Intercape Ferreira Mainliner bus company has experienced over 176 attacks, highlighting the pervasive nature of violence linked to the taxi industry. These attacks include stonings, shootings, and acts of intimidation, creating a climate of fear and insecurity for passengers and operators alike. The violence is not isolated, but part of a broader campaign of economic coercion and extortion aimed at controlling the transport market.

The taxi industry’s aggression towards long-distance bus companies stems from intense competition over routes and pricing. Taxi operators argue that bus companies, with their extensive networks and competitive pricing, are undermining their business. In response, some actors within the taxi industry resort to violent tactics to enforce their demands, including dictating where buses can stop and what prices they can charge. This extortion threatens economic freedom and disrupts the stability of the public transport system.

The report reiterates that the violence and extortion tactics employed by the taxi industry amount to organized crime. Despite numerous court orders and high-profile cases, the state’s response has been inadequate. Law enforcement and political bodies often show reluctance to intervene, partly due to complex relationships with the taxi industry. This lack of decisive action perpetuates the cycle of violence and undermines the rule of law.

To combat this crisis, the report recommends several critical actions:

Prosecution of Coordinated Attacks: Treating violent incidents as organized crime under the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA).

Comprehensive Investigations: Multi-organizational task forces should investigate extortion in the public transport sector.

Engagement and Dialogue: Convening high-level panels involving all stakeholders to find peaceful resolutions to disputes.

The report underscores the urgent need for a coordinated, robust response to the violence and extortion plaguing South Africa’s public transport sector. By addressing these issues head-on, the state can restore safety, uphold economic freedom, and reinforce the rule of law, ensuring a secure and stable environment for all public transport users.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024. 52p.

By David Bruce

The South African per-capita murder rate has steadily escalated since 2011/12, when it was at its lowest since 1994. The 2022/23 rate of 45 per 100 000 is the highest in 20 years. But focusing on national murder trends is misleading as trends vary greatly across the nine provinces. The current high per-capita murder rate is driven by high rates in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng. Key findings: South African murder trends vary considerably across provinces. The Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest per-capita murder rates. In 2022/23, the Eastern Cape had the highest murder rate (71 per 100 000), followed by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, both with annual murder rates of 56. The four provinces with the most murders have also recorded the highest per-capita murder rate increases in the last 10 years. Since 2011/12, rates have increased most dramatically in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. The increase has been greatest from 2017/18 to 2022/23. The per-capita murder rate in the Western Cape decreased over the last five years. Recommendations The government and society must prioritise reducing murder rates, which are high and increasing. The collection of data about murder, and the analysis thereof, must be improved. ‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches to addressing murder are unlikely to be effective. Responses should be adapted to respond to the drivers of murder focusing on high-murder localities. Priority should be given to understanding and addressing murder in the four provinces with the highest per-capita murder rates. KwaZulu-Natal and, to a lesser degree, Gauteng experienced major surges in murder in 2021/22, with increases continuing in 2022/23. These have taken them well above their rates in the year before the COVID-19 pandemic and national lockdown. Deaths during the July 2021 unrest were not a major contributor to the increases in murder in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng in 2021/22. Many experts believe that the entrenchment and growth of organised crime has played a major role in the increasing number of murders. More in-depth provincially focused research and analysis is required to better understand the factors and circumstances driving murder trends. 

Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

By Anine Kriegler

Cannabis legalization has the potential to weaken organized crime, but it can just as easily strengthen it unless a balance is found between restriction and liberalization, coordinated across both the supply and demand sides of the market. South Africa’s current cannabis policy lacks coherence, with reforms driven more by legal challenges than by strategic policymaking, posing challenges in effectively countering organized crime.

This paper summarizes the history and status of cannabis decriminalization in South Africa and draws on a review of literature to identify a key set of variables that determine the impact of legalization on organized crime: the type and degree of restrictiveness of the new regulations; various cultural, socio-economic, and political factors; features of the criminal justice system; and the structure and nature of criminal organization in the illegal cannabis market.

Reflections are provided on what these suggest about the likely impact of South African cannabis legalization on organized crime, and potential lessons and recommendations are proposed for effective policy reform in South Africa, as well as guidance for similar decision-making in other contexts.

Effective reform requires integrating marginalized communities and black-market participants into the legal market, along with considerations for managing legal supply, strategic enforcement against criminal gangs, and public health education to ensure a comprehensive approach to reducing organized crime. A phased implementation of regulatory frameworks, ongoing monitoring, and investment in data collection are essential to assess and optimize the impact of legalization on organized crime. Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024. 29p.

By Zenobia Ismail and Robin Richards

State capture occurs when a small number of elites in the public and private sectors collude to modify rules, policies and legislation for their own benefit at the expense of the public interest. The term emerged in the 1990s to describe relations between the state and the private sector in Eastern European states that were transitioning away from communism. In South Africa, state capture became a prominent topic in the media in 2016 following widespread allegations that several state-owned enterprises and other agencies, including South African Airways, Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa (ESKOM), South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Denel (arms manufacturer), South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the State Security Agency, were “captured” by individuals with close ties to the then president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma.

The literature on state capture tends to focus on the close relations and exchange of favours among key actors in the public and private sectors. It does not provide detailed accounts of how institutions are captured or the consequences of this for the functioning of the institution. In order to deepen the evidence on state capture, this study provides a detailed account of the impact of state capture on the capacity of one state agency, SARS. The research examines the capacity of SARS to detect, investigate and prevent tax and financial crime and how this changed as a result of state capture.

There were three key components of the so-called capture of SARS:

• Infiltration of the organisation by new employees aligned to politicians associated with state capture. This included Tom Moyane, appointed by Zuma as the new Commissioner of SARS in 2014;

• Allegations in the media which cast doubt on the integrity of the institution and its leaders. These included aspersions regarding an alleged ‘rogue unit’ in SARS which exceeded its legislative authority to investigate tax and financial crimes. These accusations undermined the integrity of some senior managers at SARS and enabled them to be suspended pending investigation;

• Organisational change and staff purges that further weakened the institution. Moyane, with the help of the local office of the consulting firm Bain International, introduced a sweeping restructuring of SARS. During the restructuring process, key units that were responsible for detecting and investigating financial crimes pertaining to the illicit economy were disbanded. There were staff purges and an organisational climate of intimidation, which contributed to widespread resignations. Consequently, SARS lost much of its human capacity to detect and investigate tax and financial crimes. Likewise, information technology systems that were used to detect or investigate tax or financial crimes were dismantled or altered under the guise of improvement.

This study contributes to the literature on state capture by providing evidence of the detrimental impact of state capture on institutions and the public interest. It suggests that the lack of similar detailed case studies may lead to an underestimation of the negative impact of state capture for institutions in the public sphere. The study illuminates the unintended consequences of state capture on institutions. The integrity of SARS as the receiver of revenue has been tarnished; this is expected to lead to taxpayer apathy and a decline in direct and indirect tax revenue. This prediction does not bode well for national development which is a critical function of the South African state. The study suggests that state capture will undermine economic development in South Africa.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 12. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 42p.

By Jenni Irish-Qhobosheane

Our new report focuses on the pervasive issue of copper theft in South Africa. This socio-economic challenge has severe consequences on the country's already strained infrastructure, affecting the capacity and operations of state-owned entities and municipalities.

Our 2022 South Africa Strategic Organized Crime Risk Assessment revealed that the nation's critical infrastructure is 'at a tipping point after years of chronic mismanagement and rampant theft,' noting the role of copper theft as an exacerbating factor. In light of this alarming situation, our latest report delves into the repercussions of copper theft on South Africa's infrastructure and its links to organized crime networks.

This comprehensive study examines the value chain and market dynamics for stolen copper, a familiar yet often overlooked area where criminal enterprises have become deeply entrenched. With a focus on solutions, the report outlines measures taken to combat copper theft and explores possible future strategies for addressing this growing concern.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.