By Mohamed Daghar

Kenya faces a scourge of illegal and unregulated sand mining, a crime which is leaving irreversible scars on ecosystems, lives and livelihoods. Sand mining has been driving inter-communal conflict and has ushered in a violent cartel market protected and controlled by state actors. Weak legislation, ineffective controls and an insatiable demand for sand, fuelled mainly by the construction industry, all contribute to the problem. With lack of a formidable alternative, sand remains the only option for mass concrete production. But it must be harvested sustainably and not mined – as promising practices in communities suggest. Key findings • The sand trade is driven by organised criminal cartels that enjoy protection from powerful state actors. • Communities play a crucial role in ensuring sustainable sand harvesting, which can provide long-term employment opportunities and help to reduce job scarcity for Kenya’s youth. • Sand mining in Kenya is fuelling environmental degradation, affecting livelihoods and increasing inter-communal conflict. • A lack of strong regulations and sufficiently mandated authorities means that there is no effective framework to oversee sand activities. • Properly regulated sand harvesting and trading could generate much-needed revenue for local governments.

ENACT-Africa, 2022. 24p.

By Mark Freeman and Vanda Felbab-Brown

Negotiations with violent criminal groups – such as mafias, cartels, gangs and pirates – occur more often than imagined. This publication, grounded in more than three years of in-depth IFIT research and dozens of first-person interviews conducted with actual negotiators, offers key lessons drawn from the most diverse set of negotiations with violent criminal groups ever examined in one place. One of the prominent discoveries of this study – which centres on negotiations intended to reduce or end violence – is how the best of theory and practice regarding peace talks with militant groups (and associated areas such as transitional justice) appears largely absent from consideration or application in talks with violent criminal groups. The gap is striking and counterproductive, but also heralds an opportunity to achieve greater results in future. Another key discovery relates to the endgame of the negotiation. With militant groups, the point of negotiations is typically to end the use of organised political violence, by exchanging disarmament (and/or incorporation into the army) for some form of political empowerment and rehabilitation. With violent criminal groups, the endgame is harder to pin down, because their motivations are understood to be mainly pecuniary, leaving it unclear what they could transform into. However, the examined cases suggest that the challenge is surmountable – and under a surprising variety of conditions.

Barcelona, Spain: Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT), 2021. 34p.

By Paula Miraglia, Rolando Ochoa, Ivan Briscoe

Transnational organised crime (TOC) refers to a fluid and diversified industry that engages in illicit activities ranging from drug and human trafficking to drug smuggling, piracy and money laundering. Although it may affect strong states, conflict-affected and fragile states are especially vulnerable to the dynamics of TOC and may provide more favourable conditions for its development. The implications for those states are many and serious. This paper outlines the ways in which TOC has evolved in recent years and how policy might be adapted to take account of this evolution. It emphasises that TOC today is less a matter of organised cartels established in producer or end-user states, but increasingly characterised by fluid, opportunistic networks that may for example specialise in transport and logistics. The paper recommends tackling the problem through a comprehensive approach that considers TOC as but one element within a greater complex of cause and effect. This would entail a re-evaluation of many current assumptions about TOC and a reformulation of current policies.

Paris: OECD, 2012. 37p.

By Marie-Laure Allain, Marcel Boyer, Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean-Pierre Ponssard

The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. We provide an analysis of static and dynamic frameworks to characterize the restitution and deterrence properties of fines: cartel stability depends on their ability to prevent deviation by firms, while the benefit of a deviation depends on the fines to be imposed in case of detection by the antitrust authority. We show that the proper consideration of the dynamics of competition has a major impact on the determination of optimal dissuasive fines: our results suggest that a clear majority of fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective.

Paris: Ecole Polytechnique Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, 2011. 38p.

By InSight Crime

Drug traffickers today realize that their best protection is not a private army but anonymity. This is the story of “Memo Fantasma” or “Will the Ghost,” who started life in the Medellín Cartel, funded the bloody rise of a paramilitary army, and today lives the high life in Madrid. He has helped move hundreds of tons of cocaine yet has no arrest warrants, and nobody is looking for him.

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2020. 50p.

By John P. Sullivan

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a ‘criminal insurgency’ against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors.

Paris: Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme , 2011. 21p.

By John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker.

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent,” a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Books, 2013. 72p.