By Prem Mahadevan

India has seen a tripling of demand for sand from 2000 to 2017, creating a market worth 150 billion rupees, or just over two billion US dollars. The country has the third-largest construction industry in the world, following those of China and the United States, accounting for 9 per cent of its two-trillion-dollar economy and employing more than 35 million people. Given the dizzying rate of India’s construction boom, guesstimates indicate a massive shortage of licitly mined sand.

This paper looks at patterns of sand mining in India and the impact that it may have on governance, security, the environment and the growth of entrenched criminal networks. The conclusions suggest that civil administration is retreating before a mafia-like nexus of political, business and bureaucratic interests, which connive to flout judicial orders. The secondary and tertiary effects of such activity bode ill for societal stability, even though a certain amount of (tenuous and often exploitative) employment is generated by illicit sand mining. The paper also highlights a policy conundrum: can India, which, paradoxically, combines widespread economic backwardness with sky-high consumer aspirations, find a model of environmentally sustainable development? Or is it doomed to exacerbate the harshness of already abysmal living standards experienced by its rural population (who make up two-thirds of its population) to satisfy the needs of its urban middle class?

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2019. 27p.

By Mohamed Daghar

Kenya faces a scourge of illegal and unregulated sand mining, a crime which is leaving irreversible scars on ecosystems, lives and livelihoods. Sand mining has been driving inter-communal conflict and has ushered in a violent cartel market protected and controlled by state actors. Weak legislation, ineffective controls and an insatiable demand for sand, fuelled mainly by the construction industry, all contribute to the problem. With lack of a formidable alternative, sand remains the only option for mass concrete production. But it must be harvested sustainably and not mined – as promising practices in communities suggest. Key findings • The sand trade is driven by organised criminal cartels that enjoy protection from powerful state actors. • Communities play a crucial role in ensuring sustainable sand harvesting, which can provide long-term employment opportunities and help to reduce job scarcity for Kenya’s youth. • Sand mining in Kenya is fuelling environmental degradation, affecting livelihoods and increasing inter-communal conflict. • A lack of strong regulations and sufficiently mandated authorities means that there is no effective framework to oversee sand activities. • Properly regulated sand harvesting and trading could generate much-needed revenue for local governments.

ENACT-Africa, 2022. 24p.

By Francisco Cuamea

Until 2012, when the United States gradually began the regulation and decriminalization of marijuana, Mexican cartels had secured a decades-long monopoly on the US cannabis market. As they became displaced from that market, the cartels scaled up their production of synthetic drugs, such as crystal methamphetamine, which is produced in clandestine laboratories that are generally set up in remote locations in the mountains, rural areas or small towns. The rich biodiversity that surrounds these sites is affected by the chemical waste resulting from crystal meth production that is dumped near these labs. In addition to the crystal meth market, Mexican organized crime groups also entered the black market in endangered marine species and industries built on other high-value species. Organized crime groups have begun to leave a significant environmental and social footprint, accelerating the disappearance of certain marine species and the disintegration of fishing communities.

• More....

  One of the affected regions is the Sea of Cortez, also known as the Gulf of California, made up of the Mexican states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, Nayarit, Sinaloa and Sonora, which together contribute 11% of the country’s gross domestic product and are united by the immense gulf of north-western Mexico, declared a world heritage site by UNESCO. According to UNESCO, the Sea of Cortez comprises 244 islands, islets and coastal areas. It contains 695 vascular plant species and 891 types of fish, of which 90 are endemic. The number of plant species is much higher than those recorded at any other island or marine site on the World Heritage List. The region is home to 39% of the world’s total number of marine mammal species and 33% of the global number of cetacean species. The region also contains a wealth of endangered land flora and fauna as well as examples of intangible cultural heritage, many of which come from the indigenous peoples of north-western Mexico, such as the Yaqui, the Cora and the Cucapá.6 This brief explores the threat that illicit economic activities pose to biodiversity and ecosystems in the Sea of Cortez region, as well as to some of the area’s most vulnerable communities, those that depend on the fishing industry.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), 2023. 17p.

By Mark Ungar

Because of the increasingly organized and lethal nature of criminality in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), OC policy may be the single most important safeguard for regional security. Nearly every current report, in fact, stresses OC’s increasingly threatening impact “on the economic and sociopolitical environment of the region” as it fuels manifestations of criminal violence such as “trafficking of persons, exploitation of natural resources, threats to protected areas, forced displacement, criminal governance, robbery, physical aggression, extortion and kidnapping,” according to UNDP. A recognition of the tandem growth of OC’s forms, though, does not mean a policy-relevant understanding of them. Such an understanding requires disentangling these crimes’ many overlapping sources, removing embedded layers of methodological obstruction, and attuning responses with OC practice. This multiple challenge, though, first requires stepping back to re-evaluate existing paradigms in at least three ways that this report discusses. First is to question existing OC data, since much of it is suspect, biased, or incomplete – reflecting the misalignment of institutional process and policy goals. Second is the ways in which OC draws its power from a multitude of local, national and regional links among non-state, economic, and state agencies that, like dark matter, are omnipresent but largely invisible. Third is a need to widen and re-examine physical and geographic space.

Miami: Florida International University, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, 2021.

By The Organization of American States, Department against Transnational Organized Crime

Peru’s well-developed mining sector has shaped the country’s economy and society to a significant degree. The mining sector contributes up to 10% of GDP, while minerals like gold and copper weigh heavily in Peru’s trade composition. Peru’s abundant reserves of mineral resources have helped to fuel the development of its mining sector, attracting a variety of small, medium, and large enterprises to engage in exploration and extraction. However, the country’s mineral wealth and governance challenges in remote mining areas, also offer ample opportunities for organized crime and illegal mining activity. As a result, large populations of illegal miners and transnational criminal networks have become deeply entrenched in Peru, giving the country a central role in the international illegal gold trade. While Peru has taken active steps to combat illegal gold mining and the sale and export of illegal gold, a variety of criminal actors have continued to successfully engage in and promote these illicit activities, producing detrimental effects for citizen security, the economy, and the environment.

Washington, DC: Organization of American States, Department against Transnational Organized Crime 2021. 40p.

By Cassie Dummett and Arthur Blundell

While subsistence agriculture and logging still contribute to deforestation, commercial-scale agricultural expansion is now recognized as by far the single largest driver of deforestation worldwide and thus also of greenhouse gas emissions from land-use change.

Several initiatives have quantified how much and where deforestation is driven by commercial agriculture, and even how much of this deforestation was driven by international trade. However, fewer analyses have been able to determine the extent to which agricultural commodities are being grown on lands that have been illegally cleared of forests. This study therefore focuses on illegal deforestation driven by agricultural expansion, and places it within the scope and scale of all tropical deforestation.

This report revisits Forest Trends’ 2014 report, by reassessing the extent of illegal agro-conversion across the tropics from 2013 to 2019, and finds a similar story: more forest land is being illegally cleared to make way for agricultural crops and pastures than ever before.

Washington, DC:Forest Trends, 2021. 81p.

By Blue Justice

The Large Ocean Nations Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime was launched at the UN City in Copenhagen on 15 October 2018. The forum was hosted by PescaDOLUS in cooperation with the Faroese Ministry of Fisheries, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries and the Nordic Council of Ministers. The forum, which gathered more than 80 participants from Large Ocean Nations (LONs) as well as from other countries, intergovernmental organizations and civil society, was opened by the Ministers of Faroe Islands, Palau, and Kiribati alongside high-level participants from the Nordic Council of Ministers and Norway. The establishment of the Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime built on the Large Ocean Nations Forum on Blue Growth launched in Malta in 2017. The objective of the LON Forum on Fisheries Crime was to facilitate agreement between LON participants on the particular challenges posed by transnational organised fisheries crime to LONs and the importance of cooperatively fighting such crime. Presentations from Fiji, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles highlighted the common challenges and opportunities of Large Ocean Nations and the need for cooperative action to address transnational fisheries crime towards fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals and Blue Growth. Drawing on the content of the speeches, presentations and discussion points at the Forum, suggested ways forward are highlighted at the end of the Report. The launching of the LON Forum on Transnational Organised Fisheries Crime is a concrete first step towards fostering such cooperation, as subsequently reflected in the joint ministerial declaration agreed by the LON government representatives present at the meeting

Oslo: Blue Justice, 2019. 53p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

.The global fishing industry is made up of a complex net of activities, actors and authorities spread across multiple countries and jurisdictions. The sheer complexity brings with it regulatory and enforcement challenges, and provides numerous opportunities for criminals to break the law. Corruption strikes at the core of the fight against fisheries crime. It threatens effective regulation and crime prevention at every stage of the fisheries value chain, exposing it to a wide range of risks, from the preparation of forged licences and the underreporting of quantities of caught fish at landing, through to the sale of mislabeled fish, among others. Corruption also undercuts the efforts of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute fisheries crime when it does occur. All other efforts to regulate the fisheries sector and combat fisheries crime will fail unless the disease of corruption is addressed.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019. 66p.

By Rebecca Wing Yee Wong

The thesis is a study of how Chinese illegal tiger parts trading networks are organized. In particular, this thesis tests in a qualitative manner the causal relationship between three independent variables and the network organizations of these markets. The three independent variables are “ethnicity”, “level of enforcement” and “proximity to the source country”. The thesis also discusses the dynamics of the illegal transactions of tiger parts products. Legitimate meditators or dispute resolutions mechanisms are lacking in the underworld so the risks, which the parties undertake during trading, are far higher. This thesis explores how illegal transactions are enforced, carried out and honored in this trade. In order to map the organization of the tiger trade, I conducted fieldwork in three trading hubs across China: Lhasa. Kunming and Xining.

I discovered five tiger parts trading networks, three of which specialized in the trading of tiger skins and two in tiger bones. Within these networks, the level of perceived but not the actual level of risk influences the decisions of the actors in the network. Entry into the network is easy when the perceived level of enforcement is low. In these settings, there is no ethnic restriction for entering the network; the supplier is willing to trade with anyone with a trustworthy reputation. On the other hand, accessibility to the network is strictly controlled when actors perceive a high level of enforcement in their operating environment. Under this setting, the organization of the network becomes more exclusive and ethnically homogenous, as shown in the Tibetan tiger skin-trading network in Lhasa and the tiger bone-trading network in Kunming. The proximity of the tiger source country to the re-distribution sites (fieldwork cities) also influences the organization of the networks. When the level of enforcement is low and the tiger source country is far away from the re-distribution sites, a monetary deposit is required in order to show that the buyer is serious about his/her request, as shown by the tiger skin-trading network in Kunming.

Oxford, UK: St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford . 2013. 280p.

By Julian Rademeyer

The rhino population is nearing the ‘tipping point’ where the numbers of rhino deaths could outnumber births, critically reducing the ability of the population to sustain itself. In the first part of this two-part series, “Tipping Point: Transnational crime and the ‘war’ on poaching,” the Global Initiative brought together evidence that the impact of rampant poaching and deeply entrenched transnational criminal networks active in Southern Africa over the past decade has been severe. Driven by seemingly insatiable demand in Southeast Asia and China, rhino horn has become a black market commodity rivalling gold and platinum in value. Six thousand rhinos have fallen to poachers’ bullets in Africa over the past decade.1 Dozens more have been shot in so-called “pseudo-hunts” in South Africa. Today there are estimated to be about 25,000 rhino left in Africa, a fraction of the tens of thousands that existed just half-a-century ago. Numbers of white rhinos (Ceratotherium simum) have begun to stagnate and decline, with 2015 population figures estimated at between 19,666 and 21,085. While the numbers of more critically endangered black rhino (Diceros bicornis) - estimated to number between 5,040 and 5,458 – have increased, population growth rates have fallen.2 Since 2008, incidents of rhino poaching have increased at a staggering rate. In 2015, 1,342 rhinos were killed for their horns across seven African range states, compared to just 262 in the early stages of the current crisis in 2008. While the vast majority of poaching incidents occurred in South Africa, home to about 79% of the continent’s last remaining rhinos, dramatic spikes in poaching in Namibia and Zimbabwe, two key black rhino range states, have counteracted the growing efforts of conservationists and the South African government to protect their remaining herd. Namibia, which had experienced little to no poaching from 2006 to 2012 saw incidents increase from four in 2013 to 30 in 2014 and 90 in 20153 . In Zimbabwe, 51 rhinos were killed, up from twenty in 2014. It was the country’s worst year on record since 2008, when 164 rhinos were lost to poachers.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2016. 44p.