By the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The Americas have the highest regional homicide rate in the world, and high rates of homicidal violence related to organized crime. This research brief, excerpted from the UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2023, notes several recurrent patterns with respect to factors shaping criminal homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean: › Homicides related to organized crime and gangs are significantly more volatile than homicides perpetrated by intimate partners or other family members. › Subregions, countries and cities with a high homicide rate tend to be associated with a larger proportion of firearm-related homicide. › Settings with a high homicide rate also typically report a large proportion of homicides involving male victims. › High homicide rates are also usually associated with a proportionately higher number of homicides related to organized crime. Where there is a higher density of criminal organizations, there is a higher risk of homicidal violence. › Drug markets alone do not predict homicide but they are frequently associated with lethal violence, especially in the context of multiple competing criminal factions. Amid mounting public concern with violent crime and low trust in police, some Latin American and Caribbean governments are enacting “states of emergency” in response to organized crime and violent gangs. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed concern about the human rights impacts of states of emergency introduced to address organized crime and violence1, while the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace policy brief 2 notes that over-securitized responses can be counterproductive and can reinforce the very dynamics they seek to overcome, as their far-reaching consequences – blowback from local populations, human rights violations and abuses, exacerbation of gender inequalities and distortion of local economies – can be powerful drivers for recruitment into terrorist or armed groups.  

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 42p.

By The Institute for Strategic Dialogue

In the last year, a loose network of actors from Bordeaux to Toulouse to Paris targeted drag events aimed at all-ages audiences for protest, harassment, and abuse. The behaviors and dynamics observed among these actors echo and mirror those observed in other parts of the world, particularly the US. While anti-drag action in France remains marginal compared to the activity witnessed in the US, UK, and Australia, it nonetheless emerged as a phenomenon from a standing start in 2022. March 2023 saw the nation’s first in-person protest at an all-ages drag event in Paris, and two months later a far-right group protested with banners and a smoke bomb outside of a library hosting a drag queen story hour (DQSH) for children in the small village of Saint-Senoux. A seemingly unlikely group of actors is leading this charge. The French anti-gender movement, which was at the heart of the movement against equal marriage in the early 2010s, has been joined by far-right parties and politicians, extremist groups, COVID-19 skeptics, and assorted conspiracy theorists. All are seeking to cancel drag events through tactics of protest, petitions, harassment, misinformation, and intimidation. This briefing provides an in-depth analysis of five cases of anti-drug mobilization in the period December 2022 – May 2023, using a combination of ethnographic methods and social media data analysis to examine activity related to each case. The first was in Bordeaux, the second in Lamballe-Armor, the third in Toulouse, the fourth in Paris, and the fifth in Saint-Senoux. While the earlier campaigns largely manifested online with limited in-person mobilization, the two most recent events saw increased offline activity. This report aims to summarise the key narratives, tactics, and actors involved in anti-drag action in France, and how these mobilizations are tied to anti-LGBTQ+ activity in France more broadly. However, given the small number of instances of anti-drug activism in France, the conclusions of this report are indicative and tentative.

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2024. 24p.

By Fabian Zhilla

This study asserts that the repatriation of foreign fighters from the conflict in Ukraine poses a significant threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Europe within the realm of organized crime. It contends that Southeast Europe serves as fertile ground for foreign fighters during times of war crises, facilitating their exploitation by organized crime for illicit purposes. Regarding the context of Southeast Europe, the study argues, firstly, that serious organized crime groups demonstrate a propensity to recruit individuals with military experience. Secondly, it underscores the historical roots of foreign fighters presence in the region, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Lastly, it highlights the inadequate response and policies at both national and European Union levels to address this concern in the region.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 30–41. 2024.

By Peter Leasure

While some have argued that drug-induced homicide laws were largely meant to target higher-level drug dealers, others have pointed out that most drug-induced homicide prosecutions have involved low-level dealers as well as family and friends of victims. However, no research has formally explored public opinion about whether there should be differing levels of culpability in drug-induced homicide scenarios. This study examined whether perceived culpability levels in a drug-induced homicide situation differed by race and factual scenario. We utilized an experimental information provision survey sent to heads of households in South Carolina. There were two randomized treatments. The first treatment was race (White and African American). Participants were randomly assigned scenarios with two White individuals, two African American individuals, or one White and one African American individual. The second treatment randomly assigned participants to one of two factual scenarios. In the first scenario, participants received a fact pattern where both individuals (trafficker and user/victim) had an existing friendship, and the trafficker was not a traditional drug dealer. In the second scenario, participants received a fact pattern where there was no existing friendship, and the trafficker was a traditional drug dealer. Our results showed large and statistically significant differences between scenarios that involved a friend relationship and a dealer relationship. Specifically, respondents who received the dealer scenarios were far more likely to assign culpability. Additionally, our results did not indicate levels of culpability assignment that were significantly (statistically) higher for African American traffickers when compared to White traffickers. Relevant decision-makers may want to consider policies or formal laws that recognize public opinion favoring lower culpability levels for traffickers in drug-induced homicide scenarios that are not traditional dealers.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 828 Drug Enforcement and Policy Center, February 2024

By Fabian Zhilla

This study asserts that the repatriation of foreign fighters from the conflict in Ukraine poses a significant threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Europe within the realm of organized crime. It contends that Southeast Europe serves as fertile ground for foreign fighters during times of war crises, facilitating their exploitation by organized crime for illicit purposes. Regarding the context of Southeast Europe, the study argues, firstly, that serious organized crime groups demonstrate a propensity to recruit individuals with military experience. Secondly, it underscores the historical roots of foreign fighters presence in the region, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Lastly, it highlights the inadequate response and policies at both national and European Union levels to address this concern in the region.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 30–41. 2024.

By Colette Ashton

Strengthening existing institutions, prioritising prevention and engaging the private sector are needed to end corruption.

This report analyses South Africa’s anti-corruption institutions in relation to international good practice. It highlights problems with their functional independence and organisational culture. It identifies a serious gap in the area of prevention. Among the recommendations are that South Africa undertake feasible, incremental improvements to existing institutions and engage the private sector to help prevent and detect corruption.

Key findings There is insufficient empirical research on corruption in South Africa to inform context sensitive policy reform. Anti-corruption institutions are governed by a parallel informal system of social norms held in place by incentives such as promotion and disincentives such as bullying. This organisational culture prioritises obedience to authority over ethics, eroding integrity. A culture of mistrust and competition exists between law enforcement agencies, hampering collaboration. Feasible, incremental reforms of anti-corruption institutions are needed in the short term, focusing on organisational culture. Recommendations Strengthen existing agencies Amend the National Prosecuting Authority Act so that: the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) is the accounting officer; the budget is allocated by Parliament; there are merit-based appointment processes and security of tenure for senior leaders; and the NDPP has control over human resources. Develop context-sensitive prosecutorial prioritisation policy that focuses on the criteria of redress for economic harm and is mindful of the need for political stability. Revise performance targets of law enforcement agencies to incentivise cooperation, not competition. Build cultures of integrity, trust and cooperation in and among anti-corruption agencies. Prioritise prevention Work towards an independent anti-corruption prevention agency. Urgently provide the Public Administration Ethics Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit in the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation with increased funding and independence. 2 The NPA should be given control over its own budget and human resources, which are currently controlled by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Effective anti-corruption agencies in developing countries may trigger political instability. Political stability is a precondition for economic growth, which in the long term creates conditions for more effective anti-corruption institutions. Equitable economic development is a precondition for the transformation of more economically harmful types of corruption, e.g. plunder, into less harmful types, e.g. lobbying. The private sector is a key partner for government in the prevention and detection of corruption. Prioritise integrity in government by promoting ethical employees. Prioritise corruption prevention in the South African Police Service. Change the incentive structure for the private sector Introduce a statute providing for non-trial resolutions of corporate corruption cases to incentivise companies to self-police corruption. Develop capacity in the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission to support companies to develop effective anti corruption compliance programmes. Partner with the private sector to run collective action programmes in key sectors such as health, construction and shipping. Research Conduct a risk analysis for a proposed Chapter 9 anti-corruption super-agency with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Conduct research into a two-track criminal and administrative anti-corruption enforcement system. Conduct more empirical, sector-specific research into corruption

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 28p,

By Thomas D. Akoensi, Justice Tankebe

Using an experimental vignette design, the study investigates the effects of criminal records on the hiring decisions of a convenience sample of 221 human resource (HR) managers in Ghana. The HR managers were randomly assigned to read one of four vignettes depicting job seekers of different genders and criminal records: male with and without criminal record, female with and without criminal record. The evidence shows that a criminal record reduces employment opportunities for female offenders but not for their male counterparts. Additionally, HR managers are willing to offer interviews to job applicants, irrespective of their criminal records, if they expect other managers to hire ex-convicts. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume 63, Issue 3, Pages: 272-285 | Oct.2024

José Carlos Hernández-Gutiérrez

The phenomenon of organized crime in Mexico is not new. However, it is no less true that, for a few years now, violence caused by or related to criminal organizations has been registering higher levels than ever. This has caused, from different spheres, to wonder if indeed the problem facing the country can still be called organized crime. Can non-state armed actors in Mexico qualify as terrorists? Have they evolved into some form of insurgency? The author of these pages, after conducting a bibliographic review on the variants of terrorism and insurgency used by some authors to refer to the Mexican case, affirms that Mexican criminal organizations are not terrorists or insurgents, but rather profit-making organizations that make a tactical use of terrorism and / or insurgency to achieve economic benefits or the goals of their organizations.

2021, Los desafíos de la globalización: respuestas desde América Latina y la Unión Europea

By Michael McLaggan

The South African public transport sector is facing a critical crisis, marked by escalating violence and extortion within the taxi industry. This report delves into the dynamics behind these troubling incidents, shedding light on the severe impact they have on bus companies and the broader public transport ecosystem.

Since 2015, the Intercape Ferreira Mainliner bus company has experienced over 176 attacks, highlighting the pervasive nature of violence linked to the taxi industry. These attacks include stonings, shootings, and acts of intimidation, creating a climate of fear and insecurity for passengers and operators alike. The violence is not isolated, but part of a broader campaign of economic coercion and extortion aimed at controlling the transport market.

The taxi industry’s aggression towards long-distance bus companies stems from intense competition over routes and pricing. Taxi operators argue that bus companies, with their extensive networks and competitive pricing, are undermining their business. In response, some actors within the taxi industry resort to violent tactics to enforce their demands, including dictating where buses can stop and what prices they can charge. This extortion threatens economic freedom and disrupts the stability of the public transport system.

The report reiterates that the violence and extortion tactics employed by the taxi industry amount to organized crime. Despite numerous court orders and high-profile cases, the state’s response has been inadequate. Law enforcement and political bodies often show reluctance to intervene, partly due to complex relationships with the taxi industry. This lack of decisive action perpetuates the cycle of violence and undermines the rule of law.

To combat this crisis, the report recommends several critical actions:

Prosecution of Coordinated Attacks: Treating violent incidents as organized crime under the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA).

Comprehensive Investigations: Multi-organizational task forces should investigate extortion in the public transport sector.

Engagement and Dialogue: Convening high-level panels involving all stakeholders to find peaceful resolutions to disputes.

The report underscores the urgent need for a coordinated, robust response to the violence and extortion plaguing South Africa’s public transport sector. By addressing these issues head-on, the state can restore safety, uphold economic freedom, and reinforce the rule of law, ensuring a secure and stable environment for all public transport users.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024. 52p.

By Observatory of Illicit Markets and the Conflict in Ukraine.

This report assesses the organized crime risks associated with veterans in Ukraine. It is a complicated, sensitive subject: while the hot state of the conflict means that very few military personnel are being demobilized at present, there is also concern that discussing veterans in such a context may stigmatize them. But, as this report highlights, such risks cannot be ignored and preparations for demobilization now may help prevent negative outcomes in future. Our research identifies the following as key organized crime risks: the incidence of drug use among service personnel, the profusion of weapons in the country and the possibility of veterans being recruited into or forming organized crime groups or joining private security firms as muscle. More tangentially, a sense of disaffection among veterans – rooted in a perception that the state is not keeping its promises to provide individual support or reform society as a whole – may also drive a wedge between veterans and society, generating friction and increasing the risk of confrontation, perhaps with violence. Veterans policy in Ukraine is a fast-moving field. The Ministry for Veteran Affairs is spearheading the new veterans law – a crucial development to ensure that Ukraine’s legislation is fit for the new realities of a post-conflict period that will see a million or more veterans in society. Work is also underway on draft laws governing the legal ownership of weapons, which will bring much-needed clarity and control to the millions of trophy weapons in the country.1 With a new demobilization law yet to be submitted to parliament (at the time of writing) and relatively few veterans in Ukraine today, 2024 is a critical window of opportunity. Ukraine should use this time to determine and implement a comprehensive veterans policy before the wave of demobilizing veterans arrives. Although there was no upsurge in veteran-related organized crime in the 2014–2022 period, the size of the veteran population will be much larger. Even a fraction of these veterans falling into crime will have a significant impact on Ukrainian society. At present, there is little sign of institutional readiness. Implementation of the initiatives announced to date has been patchy and slow, and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs has lacked a permanent head for much of the first half of 2024. Demobilization, for those who are eligible, is a frustrating and even humiliating process. Our interviews with veterans revealed scarce access to information about benefits, with many unaware of what was available to them. In terms of rehabilitation, there is a lack of effective psychological, physiological, legal and social support for veterans. Some of this is explainable by the very real strictures the war has imposed on Ukraine: training that usually takes years must be completed in a matter of weeks.

But the need remains. Since the full-scale invasion, civil society organizations, many of which have worked in veterans affairs since 2014, have been making strenuous and effective efforts to cover the gaps in care and provision for veterans, from physiological and psychological support to forming business collectives and designing a ‘whole-life’ veterans policy. Yet many feel they are working in isolation, with the state resisting their attempts to work collaboratively and introduce strategic and innovative thinking to veterans affairs.2 Only the state can deliver a veterans policy with the scope and resources needed, but NGOs have much to offer, not least their agility and ability to deliver help where it is most needed. Both the state and civil society will be needed if Ukraine is to deliver a programme of ‘deep prevention’ – a strategy that addresses veterans’ needs at the level of contributing social factors rather than the individual level – which will reap the most dividends in reducing exposure to organized crime risks. The hard reality is that, as Ukraine dedicates as many resources as it can to the day-to-day conflict, it must also begin planning for the decades-long aftermath.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024 48p.

By Angélica Durán-Martínez

Objective/context: After the paramilitary demobilization in Colombia, Cali and Medellín—major cities with a long history of political and criminal violence—saw a decline in violence despite the continuing operation of criminal groups. Yet, while Cali remained more violent than the national average, with criminal groups displaying less ability to regulate local affairs and security, Medellín became less violent than the national average and criminal groups engaged in more intensive governance. Methodology: I compare these cities using case studies constructed through fieldwork and interviews with security officials, NGO and social leaders, and former members of groups, drawing on my long-term, ongoing research engagement in both locations. Conclusions: The contrast between these cities exemplifies varied manifestations of post-conflict criminality. I argue that this variation in criminal governance is connected to the wartime balance of power, specifically, the level of territorial control and political connections armed groups had before the demobilization. Where control and political connections of paramilitary before demobilization were high, post-conflict crime groups were more likely to engage in governance behaviors. By contrast, disputed territories during wartime were likely to experience less criminal governance. Drawing on path dependence ideas, I introduce an overlooked mechanism through which wartime orders affect criminal behavior: learning processes inside and outside criminal groups. Originality: I show that to fully understand post-conflict criminality, it is crucial to consider armed actors peripherally involved in the war but essential for territorial control, whereas to understand criminal governance, the mid-ranks of armed groups and learning processes are crucial.

Revista Colombia Internacional ,2024. 35p.

By Iffat Idris GSDRC, University of Birmingham 28 February 2019

This review presents findings on the prevalence and nature of serious and organized crime1: in Jordan, and efforts to combat this. The extremely limited literature on the topic indicates that Jordan has low levels of serious and organized crime: the main forms are smuggling of goods and drugs, and human trafficking. The influx of large numbers of Syrian refugees has promoted crime within refugee camps, but the impact on crime in Jordan overall appears limited.

The review drew on academic and grey literature, as well as media reports. It found very little literature on the topics covered in the query, and nothing on the links between tribal groups and organized crime or on specific drivers of crime. The dearth in literature is perhaps a reflection of low levels of organized and serious crime in Jordan – though, without data on this, it is impossible to assert this definitively. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016: 13) highlights the problem of lack of data on serious and organized crime across the Middle East:

• In general, data on drugs, drug use, HIV, people living in closed settings, crime, corruption and terrorism in the region are scarce. Analytical studies on the profile of organized criminal groups involved in illicit trafficking, their modus operandi and the routes used are very limited, as is information on the relationship between organized crime and terrorism. This can be the result of a lack of capacity and/or infrastructure to generate, manage, analyse and report data, or the lack of or poor coordination amongst the relevant institutions.

Key findings of the review are as follows:

• Crime statistics – There is a dearth of crime statistics for Jordan, but available figures point to a rise in crime in recent years, notably murder, aggravated assault and kidnapping. A total of 24,000 crimes were recorded in 2016 (OASC, 2018). 

• Smuggling – Jordan’s long and remote desert borders with neighbouring countries make it susceptible to smuggling of cash, gold, fuel, narcotics, cigarettes and other contraband. Smuggling into Jordan tends to be small-scale, largely fuel and cigarettes. With regard to drugs, Jordan is more a corridor country than a destination point: the main drugs being captagon, heroin, hashish and marijuana. Large quantities of narcotics were seized by the authorities in 2017: increased seizures point to a rise in narcotics smuggling. 

• Money laundering and corruption – Jordan is not considered a hub for money laundering. Corruption is a bigger problem: Jordan ranked 52nd (out of 140 countries) for incidence of corruption (WEF, 2018: 313). Government efforts to contain and prosecute corruption have not been effective. 

• Trafficking – Jordan is a source, transit, and destination country for adults and children subjected to forced labour, domestic servitude, and sex trafficking. Trafficking victims in Jordan are primarily from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria; refugees from Syria, the Palestinian Territories, and Iraq are especially vulnerable to trafficking. Forced labour victims in Jordan experience withheld or non-payment of wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, isolation, and verbal and physical abuse. Diverse migrant women can be forced into prostitution: those who migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and nightclubs; Egyptian women married to Jordanian husbands; out-of status domestic workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka who have fled their employers; Iraqi refugee women who have to provide for their families. 

• Crime in Syrian refugee camps – the literature indicates that, while crime is prevalent in Syrian refugee camps, it is not serious in nature: largely smuggling of camp vouchers and goods, though one report notes that the camps’ proximity to border areas of conflict makes them susceptible to smuggling and drug trafficking. While there are reports of a rise in crime in Jordan overall, this is attributed to economic pressures rather than the influx of Syrian refugees into the country. 

• Regional findings – A brief examination of serious and organized crime in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region points to a post-Arab Spring rise in transnational organized crime – facilitated by public disorder, deterioration in capacity of state law enforcement agencies, and economic hardship. Jordan is not explicitly mentioned, but given its geographic location, would likely be a target for such transnational crime networks.

Key findings of the review with regard to efforts to combat serious and organized crime in Jordan are as follows: 

• Agencies - A number of government agencies are involved in combating serious and organized crime, including trafficking. Key among these is the Public Security Directorate (PSD), which includes the Anti-Narcotics Department. The PSD and Ministry of Labour have a joint Anti-Trafficking Unit. 

• Legislation – The Anti-Human Trafficking Law was passed in 2009 but there are shortcomings with regard to meeting international standards in both the legal provisions and, even more, in enforcement. Challenges with the latter include victims being too afraid to file complaints, repatriation of victims, non-availability of evidence, and perpetrators being located out of the jurisdiction/reach of the country or hidden from the police. Jordan's Penal Code criminalizes corruption, including abuse of office, bribery, money laundering and extortion, but again the law is not implemented effectively. 

• Support from international partners – The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is the main international development organization supporting the Govt. of Jordan to combat serious and organized crime. Its interventions are often part of wider regional programmes, notably the Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) which strengthening the capacities of international airports to detect and intercept drugs, other illicit goods and high-risk passengers (including foreign terrorist fighters), and the Container Control Programme (CCP) which helps member states strengthen their border control capacity and detect illicit goods in cargo containers. Interventions by other development partners include an EU project to combat human trafficking (JEMPAS) and the UK Jordan Security Sector Programme, aimed at reducing internal security threats in Jordan. etc.

K4D Helpdesk Report 537. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2019. 13p.

By Andrés Cajiao | Paula Tobo | Mariana Botero Restrepo

Just how organized is organized crime? This report on the relationship between migration and organized crime along the Colombia–Panama border explores this recurring question in research on organized crime with the aim of demystifying two underexplored phenomena in Colombia. The first is the Gulf Clan (Spanish: Clan del Golfo), which calls itself the Gaitanist Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, a group that continues to control the region despite being the object of one of the most intensive intelligence and judicial operations in the country’s recent history. While the specifics of how the Clan operates are unknown, this report demonstrates that criminal governance always depends on a complex set of relationships between organized crime, local communities and the state. Violence and the threat of violence are not enough to govern. In fact, one of the main findings of this study is that the influence of organized crime means that irregular migration and the economy that arises around it do not operate through violence. The second phenomenon explored here is migrant smuggling, which is widespread in border areas. The actions taken by states and international organizations have not curbed this highly complex illicit economy. Although irregular migration is stigmatized and presents a serious humanitarian problem in the region, it has been key in reviving the economies of Urabá and the Darién Gap, along the Colombian border, which should play a central role in public policy discussions. Without a better understanding of migratory phenomena and the key players involved, there is little the state can do to guarantee people’s safety or recover territorial control where it has lost it.

Geneva: Global Initiative AGainst Transnational Organized Crime, 2022.

By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Annette Idler | Frederik Florenz | Ajmal Burhanzoi John Collins | Marcena Hunter | Antônio Sampai

This paper contributes to research on the relationship between conflict and organized crime (the crime–conflict nexus), using Afghanistan as a case study. For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been plagued by internal armed conflict, influenced by local, national, regional, and international external actors, and the intricate relationships among them. To varying degrees, power, politics, and criminality informed these relationships. Organized crime provides actors in Afghanistan with significant political power, while powerful political actors are uniquely positioned to reap the profits of the country’s criminal markets. This paper gives an account of the existing literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, identifying some of the key insights that this literature has revealed. To do so, it uses a four-pronged framework, exploring how conflict has fuelled organized crime in Afghanistan; how organized crime has fuelled conflict; how conflict over the control of illicit markets has resulted; and how organized crime has contributed to the erosion of the state. By assessing the literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, the paper identifies knowledge gaps and suggests areas for future research.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 36p.

By Luke Kelly

This annotated bibliography includes research and evidence on militarized approaches to combating serious and organized crime (SOC) in various contexts. Militarised approaches involve using military forces or methods to deter and disrupt SOC groups. These approaches have been employed in states facing high levels of violence, fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings, and against threats like piracy and wildlife crime. The research finds that the evidence on the effectiveness of militarised approaches is largely negative. While there are a range of militarised approaches, applied in a variety of contexts, most papers nevertheless agree that military force, or military techniques, can only address one facet of SOC at best, and need to be linked with a range of other measures such as policing, rule of law interventions and economic interventions, to effectively combat SOC. As well as drawing resources away from these other measures, militarised approaches have also been found to have a number of direct and indirect negative effects, such as human rights abuses, increases in violence, and undermining the rule of law.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper 4.   

By The New South Wales Crime Commission

Tracking devices are a growing enabler of serious and organized crime in NSW. Accessible, inexpensive, and easily concealed – they are used by organized crime networks to monitor, locate, and ultimately attack their rivals. An initial review of joint operations between the Commission and partner agencies identified frequent and increasing use of tracking devices to facilitate murders, public place shootings, kidnappings, violent drug thefts, and drug trafficking, and tracking devices are extensively being used by high-risk domestic and family violence offenders. 

By matching sales data against criminal histories and intelligence records, Project Hakea identified that:

• 37% of customers who had purchased tracking devices were adversely known to police

• 25% of customers had a history of domestic and family violence

• 15% had a history of serious and organized crime

•  9% of customers had a history of both domestic and family violence and serious and organized crime.

In addition to the extensive use of tracking devices by organized criminals, their widespread use by domestic and family violence offenders creates an urgent need to address the issue. 

 By Virginia Comolli   

Building and expanding on the analysis in the Global Organized Crime Index, the GI-TOC has undertaken to map trends in organized criminality in the Pacific (Oceania). The resulting papers contribute to filling some of the gaps in a region where crime-related data can be scarce. In turn, these analyses allow us to identify vulnerabilities as well as opportunities for intervention and mitigation. The Pacific islands now occupy a more prominent place on the international strategic chessboard as a result of the proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security engagements in the region in the 21st century.  This is due to greater foreign presence and influence in Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, and intensifying geopolitical competition among external partners. This reality, alongside greater connectivity and market trends, is also drastically  transforming the criminal landscape. Pacific islands have traditionally been considered as mostly immune from high levels of criminality due to their geographic remoteness.  However, highly pernicious illicit markets are taking hold, and the islands are becoming increasingly vulnerable to new threats in the form of cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes and the introduction of new narcotics, to mention just two examples. Who is behind these activities? There are multiple criminal actors present and active in the Pacific islands, but the most pervasive are foreign actors.  And within the foreign actor sub-set, there are a diverse array of nationalities and sectors. The one thing they have in common is their pivotal role vis a vis evolving crime dynamics. Across the series of papers, we map their different typologies. The emerging pictures suggest that, possibly contrary to expectations, business operators are often responsible for the bulk of organized criminality. This is particularly evident in the extractive industries, but also in sectors such as real estate and financial services. Yet, more ‘obvious’ criminal actors such as cartels and triads have also made their way to the islands and intensified their operations.

Geneva, SWIT:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 29p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? With its “total peace” policy, the Colombian government aims to engage all the country’s armed groups in talks, but it has no dialogue underway with the largest armed criminal outfit, the Gaitanista Self-Defence Force. This gap is significant, given the Gaitanistas’ deep pockets and their drive to expand. Why does it matter?From their Atlantic coast stronghold, where they run some of the country’s main drug trafficking routes as well as migrant smuggling rackets, the Gaitanistas exercise coercive control of numerous communities. If they remain outside peace talks, they could undermine negotiations with other groups or capitalise on their demobilisation. What should be done?Bogotá should start down a path of progressively more substantive discussions with the Gaitanistas aiming, first, to reduce violence against civilians and, secondly, to discuss legal conditions for laying down arms. In parallel, the police and military should continue operations to protect civilians and press the group toward talks. Latin America Report N°105

Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group 2024. 52p.