By Washington State Statistical Analysis Center

This project seeks to discover whether exclusionary discipline and later criminal justice system involvement are associated, and to determine whether race, sex, and homelessness are confounding factors.

The Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2018 State Justice Statistics Grant from BJS. Among other projects, the SAC sought the grant to evaluate the connection between a student’s exclusionary discipline and their future justice system involvement in Washington. This evaluation connects data from schools and the courts to assess the strength of this relationship and examine the influence of other factors (such as race, sex, and homelessness).

Here are some of the main takeaways from this report:

• Students identified as male were more than two times as likely to be associated with postgraduate convictions as compared to their female counterpart.

• Students with any homelessness were 1.7 times as likely to be associated with a post graduate conviction than student with no record of homelessness.

• Students identified as American Indian or Alaskan Native were more than two times more likely to have a post-graduate conviction than students identified as other races

• Students identified as Black/African American had at least one exclusionary discipline event (25.1%) at nearly twice the proportion of the cohort average (13.6%), with students identified as American Indian/Alaskan Native and Hispanic/Latino not far behind.

• Results should be interpreted with caution.

Olympia, WA: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2022. 11p.

By Antônio Sampaio

In the past decade, the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area has witnessed, consecutively, some of the world’s most intense clashes between criminal groups over territorial control, implemented one of the most innovative urban security strategies and, later, reverted to a classic militarized, iron-fisted approach to fighting crime. At the core of these clashes, strategies and crackdowns is a long-standing armed struggle involving criminals, militias and state forces for territorial control in the second largest city in Brazil, one of the world’s top 10 economies. In the main, the security actor that responds to criminal groups’ grip over the city’s large, densely populated hillside slums (known as favelas in Portuguese) is the military police, which has acquired a reputation for a ‘shoot-first-askquestions-later’ approach. The force is also often associated with its elite special-operations squad, BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion, translated from the Portuguese). This is a deadly force of heavily armed officers placed at the spearhead of police operations engaging with gang-controlled favelas. Its insignia is a skull perforated by two pistols and a knife. The state security forces, therefore, have been described as brutal and militarized – with good reason. Brazil’s new political leaders, sworn in in early 2019, both at the federal and state level, unleashed upon the country a vision of further repressive policies on public security without the accompanying governance and developmental approaches to the urban areas where armed criminal groups are concentrated. President Jair Bolsonaro’s security proposals have been thin on longterm solutions; he has resorted instead to deregulating gun possession and reducing penalties for police officers shooting suspects. The president’s lack of strategy to tackle the problem has not hindered his ‘tough-on-crime’ rhetoric: in August 2019 he said his proposals would make criminals ‘die in the streets like cockroaches’. Bolsonaro’s ally, the governor of the state of Rio, Wilson Witzel, has gone further. Witzel has ordered an increase in the use of snipers, deployed to shoot suspected criminals from helicopters. These kinds of policies mark a return to a long tradition of repressive security approaches in Rio (as analyzed in the second section of this report) and represent a radical reversal of previous governmental approaches focused on improving marginalized urban areas and communities where the grip of organized crime has been stronger. Despite this excessive focus on repression, the core security issue in Rio de Janeiro is not the authorities’ militarized policies on security. Rather, this, and the police, is just one part of the core issue, namely the consolidation of an illicit order in marginalized territories amid the declining legitimacy of the state. The militarization of security policies, which is part of declining state legitimacy, is a reaction that intensified and probably reinforced the core problem. Meanwhile, the rise of violent, armed non-state actors has been partially a response to the heavy-handed police crackdowns, but it is also a response to other criminal actors, one that serves the purpose of establishing, enforcing or defending the illicit order. (The term ‘illicit order’ refers to a situation in which an armed criminal actor has a permanent presence in a given urban territory, and establishes rules and punishments enforced by the threat or exercise of violence. The effectiveness and severity with which those rules are enforced may vary over time.) Another distinctive feature of Rio’s security landscape over the past decade has been experimentation with a stabilization strategy in gang strongholds, referred to locally as pacificação (‘pacification’). This strategy had been around for 10 years by 2018, showing that it is possible to reclaim areas from gangs (at least for a time). It also distinguished itself by the authorities’ attempt – successful for some time – to reconcile the use of armed force with socio-economic development initiatives, such as urban infrastructure and educational programmes. To break a vicious cycle of recurring police incursions in slums, which often resulted in intense gunfights and deaths, local authorities combined a heavily armed ‘occupation’ of slum areas with a gradual push for community policing, state-managed public-service delivery and development. In doing so, the government introduced a political element in its urban security policy, the thinking being that neither policing nor social development were sufficient by themselves to achieve the desired results. Instead, authorities recognized that urban security could be combined with a profoundly political purpose – to recover the allegiance of local residents, introduce state institutions and establish state governance. No wonder the pacification programme was compared to counterinsurgency by US diplomats and academics, given its parallels with the counterinsurgency principle of wrestling population support away from rebel groups and towards government authority. In the pursuit of this local political objective, policing, infrastructure investment, public services and social development programmes were deployed – with impressively positive results during the first five years or so of the pacification process (approximately from late 2008 to 2013). The programme marked a watershed moment in the perception of what is the goal of an urban security strategy: the transition of violent territories to stability through institutions, governance and security. An important reason why the programme has received worldwide attention as a case study on urban security is that it worked – for a time. A 2012 World Bank study, for instance, is titled ‘Bringing the state back into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro’....etc....

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 40p.

By Piotr Bąkowski and Martina Prpic

Drawing on diverse underlying rationales, policies on prostitution – in the EU and elsewhere – vary both in their objectives and in their strategies for achieving those objectives. These distinctions manifest in the terminology used, with 'prostitution' typically favoured by stakeholders aiming to curb or eradicate the practice, and the term 'sex work' embraced by those who view prostitution as a legitimate form of employment. Formulating policies on prostitution presents numerous challenges, including a lack of comprehensive statistical data. However, these policies often lack emphasis on the importance of evidence-based approaches – shaped instead by ideological beliefs and moral perspectives. While discussions on prostitution transcend feminism, feminist ideologies have had a particularly strong impact on policy formulation. Academic classification of prostitution policies into national models or regimes is subject to ongoing debate, with criticism directed towards the 'model approach' for oversimplifying the complexities of these policies and failing to capture regional and local variations. Traditionally, policies have been categorised into overarching ideological approaches: 'prohibitionism', which seeks to outlaw all aspects of prostitution; and 'abolitionism', which focuses on criminalising the facilitation and purchase, but not the sale of sexual services. However, there is a growing tendency towards classifying policies as falling under criminalisation (of purchase or sale), legalisation (regulation) or decriminalisation. Given the EU's lack of explicit authority to regulate prostitution, which falls within the exclusive competence of individual Member States, stakeholders both within and outside EU institutions advocate framing prostitution as a problem linked to areas where the EU does have competence; these include gender equality, violence against women, human trafficking, and the free movement of services. With the European Commission and the Council largely silent on the issue, debates predominantly occur within the European Parliament, and are marked by strong disagreements between Members subscribing to opposing approaches. Prostitution is subject to varying regulations across the EU, leading to a diverse array of national legislative and policy frameworks. Member States differ as to how they address the sale or purchase of sex, as well as the exploitation of prostitution. This variety is due not only to EU Member States' different historical and cultural backgrounds, but also to the current local state of affairs, especially as regards the situation in the field, and the priorities of the governments in power. In some Member States, there is a strong concern that prostitution constitutes violence against women. Those States usually tend to penalise buyers of sexual services. By contrast, some other Member States recognise that 'sex work' is a voluntary choice for some and tailor their legal frameworks accordingly.

Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 39p.

By Norman Maldonado, Blanca Amalia Llorente, Roberto Magno Iglesias, Diego Escobar

By 2016, tobacco industry provided the only illicit trade estimates in Colombia and used these to discourage tax increases since the 1990s. To establish the viability of a threefold hike in the excise tax, policy makers needed unbiased estimates of the illicit cigarette. , Roberto Magno Iglesias, cigarette smoking in urban areasi equal to 12.95% in 20134 and a decreasing trend from 17.06% when compared with 2008.5 In 2016, the median price of a 20- stick cigarette pack in supermarkets was COP$ 3128, approximately $2.5 international dollars (supplementary figure 1). Following a rapid adjustment in 2010 after a moderate tax increase, prices increased slightly above the inflation rate until December 2016. Colombia displayed until that year the second lowest price in the Americas.6 Objective To estimate the size of illicit cigarette trade in five Colombian cities (63% of the market), analyse characteristics of smokers of illicit cigarettes and compare market share results with one industry- funded survey. Methods Street cross- sectional survey with smokers’ self- report on consumption pattern, last purchase information and direct observation of smoker’s packs. Sampling frame: smokers, men and women, 12 years old or older, all income levels, resident in five Colombian cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Cartagena and Cúcuta) with 1 733 316 smokers in 2013. Sample size 1697, simple random sample by city, sampling weights based on age groups and cities. Confidence level 95%, margin of error 3.5% for Bogotá and Medellín and 5% for the other three cities. Data collection period: 24 August–14 September 2016. results Illicit cigarettes represent 3.5% of consumption in the five cities, a much lower estimate than the industry data. There are significant differences across cities, with Bogotá at the bottom (1.5%) and Cúcuta at the top (22.8%). Conclusion The low overall penetration of illicit cigarettes in Colombia indicates that the industry’s warnings against tax increases are not justified. The limited importance of tax levels as determinant of consumption of illicit cigarettes is also suggested by the differences across cities, all of them with the same tax regime

Tob Control, 2020

By Richard Garside and Roger Grimshaw

A unique overview of the main criminal justice institutions across the three UK jurisdictions of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the combined jurisdiction of England and Wales.

• How are the main UK criminal justice institutions organised?

• How did they develop over time into their current form?

• How are they held to account?

• How can ordinary citizens challenge them and influence their work?

These are the main questions covered in Criminal justice systems in the UK.

No gold standard

Across the UK, there is no single, UK-wide criminal justice model; no ‘gold standard’ arrangement. Three criminal justice jurisdictions, with different histories, structures and operations, cover the United Kingdom: the combined jurisdiction of England and Wales, and the separate jurisdictions of Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

The diverse UK criminal justice arrangements, the result of distinctive histories, cultures and politics, offer a variety of operational and reform options.

Criminal justice systems in the UK takes the varieties of criminal justice across the UK as its starting point, drawing out similarities, and identifying contrasting arrangements across the UK's nations and regions.

Criminal justice systems are under constant scrutiny. Calls for improvement and change are never far away. This report outlines a number of key mechanisms currently available in the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom to hold these institutions to account and to press for change and reform.

Report structure

Criminal justice systems in the UK is divided into four main chapters, covering the police, prosecution, courts and prisons. Each chapter examines the main mechanisms for accountability and change:

• Governance

• Inspection

• Complaints

• Citizen accountability

Each chapter examines how these four main mechanisms operate across the three UK jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2022. 56p.

By Carla Álvarez

Ecuador is experiencing an unusual growth in violence and criminality. In addition to being among the 10 countries with the greatest incidence of criminality in the world,1 it currently has the highest rate of violent deaths in Latin America, 47.25 for every 100 000 residents,2 eight times higher than in 2016, the year Ecuador recorded its lowest rate since 1980.3 In less than a decade, it has gone from being the second safest country in South America (after Chile)4 to becoming the most violent. Firearms play a central role in this security crisis. According to the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index,5 arms trafficking is one of the largest-growing criminal markets in the country. Firearms have become an instrument for strengthening the capacity of criminal organizations dedicated to drug trafficking and illegal mining, as well as a way to assert territorial control. In 2023, firearms were involved in nine out of every 10 violent deaths in the country.6 As shown in Figures 1 and 2, since 2020 the number of homicides has virtually doubled year after year, as well as the recurrence of the use of firearms. These figures exceed the regional and worldwide averages of violence committed with these devices.7 In addition, while young men have accounted for the majority of the violent deaths recorded, the assassinations of women have also grown significantly in recent years. In the case of the femicides recorded in 2023, a total of 321 violent deaths of women were gender-related, 37% of which were committed using firearms.8 The centrality of firearms in the dynamics of violence in Ecuador is the result of the loosening of internal regulations that permit the import, manufacture, commerce and carrying of weapons. Despite the growth in armed violence, on 1 April 2023 the Ecuadorian government relaxed several measures that expanded the legal market for firearms. These decisions were adopted despite the institutional inability of the state to exercise effective control over the permits to carry and possess weapons;9 the growing corruption in security-related institutions;10 and the harsh criticism by some sectors of civil society of the government for having fostered the adoption of measures on self-protection and the privatization of security instead of promoting a public security policy.

This change has facilitated the proliferation of arms amid a process of expansion of criminal activities in the country, which has in turn led to the growth of an active and concerning market for arms. Without a doubt, the increase in violence is related to the increase in arms trafficking, which, in addition to being lucrative, facilitates other crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, illegal mining, contract killings and kidnappings.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2024. 31p.

By A.K.M. Maksud, Sayma Sayed and Khandaker Reaz Hossain

The Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South-Eastern Asia (CLARISSA) project in Bangladesh focused on the worst forms of child labour in the leather industry.1 From early in the project, it was clear that most of the children were working in small informal enterprises. As our interactions with enterprises evolved through interviews, workshops, and Action Research meetings, we learned that many of the enterprises hiring children in the worst forms of child labour were serving domestic markets. The CLARISSA team felt it was important to comprehensively test this new understanding with a survey of small enterprises in Hazaribagh, Hemayetpur, and Bhairab. Hazaribagh city is the traditional centre of leather production, with a large number of enterprises working in the informal economy; Hemayetpur is where the government relocated the tanneries, which were located in Hazaribagh until 2016; and Bhairab is a large hub for shoe manufacturers. These three locations have been central to the work of CLARISSA. 1 Each one is an important, but quite different, component of the leather industry, which contributes 4 per cent of Bangladesh’s total exports (0.5 per cent of the country’s total gross domestic product). A target has been set to increase export earnings from the sector to 425bn taka (US$5bn) by 2024, which would contribute 1 per cent to the total gross domestic product. In 2016, Bangladesh ranked eighth in the world for footwear production. More than 76 per cent of the total processed leather produced in 220 tanneries in Bangladesh was exported (Ministry of Industries 2019). Yet, the working assumption underpinning this survey was that while a significant proportion of the children will be working in informal enterprises that supply formally registered businesses, which in turn supply foreign markets, an even higher proportion will be in small enterprises serving domestic markets.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 15, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 2024 34p.

By Hestia

.The number of potential victims of modern slavery in the UK is at its highest level since records began in 2009. London is a central hub for modern slavery offences; the Metropolitan Police has identified an increase of 12.6% in cases of modern slavery in London over the last three years. Modern slavery is a constantly evolving crime, with increasingly sophisticated recruitment and exploitation methods contributing to the growth of offences in London and across the UK. Hestia commissioned independent research agency Thinks Insight & Strategy to identify what modern slavery looks like in London today, and how it has changed in recent years. Central to the work was the need to bring the voices of those impacted by modern slavery to the forefront of a much needed conversation about modern slavery in the capital. Thinks Insight & Strategy conducted multi-method primary and secondary research to build a picture of experiences of modern slavery in London and understand public and political perceptions and assumptions. The research included: A scoping review of existing literature and data on modern slavery in the UK, including relevant data from the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) and from the Metropolitan Police (requested via an FOI) on instances of modern slavery in the UK and in London. Qualitative research, including six interviews with Hestia service users who have previously experienced modern slavery in London, one interview with a Hestia representative advocating on behalf of two service users who have experienced modern slavery in London and two interviews with experts in the field of modern slavery. Quantitative research, including a nationally representative online survey of 2,000 members of the UK public (including 265 based in Greater London) and an online survey with 99 MPs, completed prior to the dissolution of Parliament on 30th May 2024. The research found that: Modern slavery offences occur across every region of the UK, including in every London borough and are becoming more frequent. • Three in five (59%) adult potential victims referred to the NRM in 2023 stated they were exploited in the UK. • The number of NRM adult referrals increased by 70% between 2020 and 2023. However, modern slavery does not feel close to home for most. Just a quarter (25%) of the public believe that modern slavery is an issue in their local area. • This rises to 32% amongst those living in London. However, even here the public is underestimating the prevalence of the issue: data from the Metropolitan Police shows that numerous modern slavery offences occurred in every London borough in 2023. • Data shows that in 2023, across adults only, British citizens were the second largest group by nationality amongst adult victims of modern slavery (behind Albanians). However, only 10% of the public agrees that British citizens are one of the most likely nationalities to become victims of modern slavery. Despite low understanding of the issue, the public lacks confidence that enough is being done to prevent modern slavery and to protect those impacted. • Seven in ten (71%) agree that more attention should be given to the issue of modern slavery in the UK. • Prevention is high on the public agenda: 8 in 10 (81%) agree that the UK Government should do more to deter traffickers and those who commit modern slavery offences. • Similar proportions (78%) also agree that the UK Government should do more to support those who have experienced modern slavery. While the public want to see the Government take more action to prevent and support victims of modern slavery, MPs remain divided on whether new UK legislation will have an impact. • Just under half (47%) of MPs think new UK legislation (such as the Illegal Migration Act and the Nationality and Borders Act, and Safety of Rwanda Act) will not significantly reduce modern slavery in the UK, and 45% agree that new UK legislation will not deter traffickers1. • Labour MPs are significantly more likely to think that new UK legislation will not have an impact on reducing modern slavery and deterring traffickers than Conservative MPs. Note that fieldwork with MPs was carried out in May 2024, before policies like the Safety of Rwanda Act were axed by the current Government.

London: Hestia, 2024. 28p.

By Yennesit Palacios Valencia and Ignacio García Marín

Colombia is among the countries with the highest levels of violence and crime in the world, despite the peace agreements between the State and different armed groups, including the FARC. This is partly due to the fact that the Colombian case is complex and multifaceted because of the variety of participants in the armed conflict context and due to the mutation of new actors, under the modality of organized crime. Based on the above, the objective is to study the Colombian reality, contextually and diachronically, from theoretical and epistemological elements to demonstrate how violence and criminality factors intersect in the context of the armed conflict. The study concludes, among other findings, that in Colombia the ambiguity and the multiplicity of terms used to name the emerging criminal groups presents a legal problem because of their hybrid composition and regarding their treatment within or outside of the armed conflict.   

Dossiê - Criminalidade, Justiça e Estado-nação no Brasil e na América Latina • Tempo 29 (3) • Sep-Dec 2023 

By Luana Marques-Garcia Ozemela,  A lessandra Conte, Guilherme Sedlaceck, Leopoldo Laborda

We test for racial differences in crime victimization between whites and Afro-descendants in the form of thefts, robberies, sexual and physical assaults and police aggressions in Brazil. We explore the presence of skin color tone bias in victimization by the police. Methods With a novel dataset produced by the Ministry of Justice of Brazil in 2012, we use 6 different logit regression models to estimate marginal effects. We found that the probabilities of thefts and verbal aggressions by the police, even after controlling for all the considered individual and community variables, are higher for Afro-descendants. African descent women are more likely to be victims of theft and physical aggression by the police, while white women are more likely to be robbed. In the case of men, Afro-descendants have higher probabilities of being victims of thefts, robberies and verbal aggressions by the police. Regarding skin color bias, the probability of verbal and physical victimization by the police is higher for darker skin individuals. Because of its strategic importance to citizen security policy-making, further race-based data collection is needed, as well as research on the effectiveness of police targeting practices.

Washington DC: IDB, 2019. 37p.

By the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

The Americas have the highest regional homicide rate in the world, and high rates of homicidal violence related to organized crime. This research brief, excerpted from the UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2023, notes several recurrent patterns with respect to factors shaping criminal homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean: › Homicides related to organized crime and gangs are significantly more volatile than homicides perpetrated by intimate partners or other family members. › Subregions, countries and cities with a high homicide rate tend to be associated with a larger proportion of firearm-related homicide. › Settings with a high homicide rate also typically report a large proportion of homicides involving male victims. › High homicide rates are also usually associated with a proportionately higher number of homicides related to organized crime. Where there is a higher density of criminal organizations, there is a higher risk of homicidal violence. › Drug markets alone do not predict homicide but they are frequently associated with lethal violence, especially in the context of multiple competing criminal factions. Amid mounting public concern with violent crime and low trust in police, some Latin American and Caribbean governments are enacting “states of emergency” in response to organized crime and violent gangs. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed concern about the human rights impacts of states of emergency introduced to address organized crime and violence1, while the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace policy brief 2 notes that over-securitized responses can be counterproductive and can reinforce the very dynamics they seek to overcome, as their far-reaching consequences – blowback from local populations, human rights violations and abuses, exacerbation of gender inequalities and distortion of local economies – can be powerful drivers for recruitment into terrorist or armed groups.  

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 42p.

By The Institute for Strategic Dialogue

In the last year, a loose network of actors from Bordeaux to Toulouse to Paris targeted drag events aimed at all-ages audiences for protest, harassment, and abuse. The behaviors and dynamics observed among these actors echo and mirror those observed in other parts of the world, particularly the US. While anti-drag action in France remains marginal compared to the activity witnessed in the US, UK, and Australia, it nonetheless emerged as a phenomenon from a standing start in 2022. March 2023 saw the nation’s first in-person protest at an all-ages drag event in Paris, and two months later a far-right group protested with banners and a smoke bomb outside of a library hosting a drag queen story hour (DQSH) for children in the small village of Saint-Senoux. A seemingly unlikely group of actors is leading this charge. The French anti-gender movement, which was at the heart of the movement against equal marriage in the early 2010s, has been joined by far-right parties and politicians, extremist groups, COVID-19 skeptics, and assorted conspiracy theorists. All are seeking to cancel drag events through tactics of protest, petitions, harassment, misinformation, and intimidation. This briefing provides an in-depth analysis of five cases of anti-drug mobilization in the period December 2022 – May 2023, using a combination of ethnographic methods and social media data analysis to examine activity related to each case. The first was in Bordeaux, the second in Lamballe-Armor, the third in Toulouse, the fourth in Paris, and the fifth in Saint-Senoux. While the earlier campaigns largely manifested online with limited in-person mobilization, the two most recent events saw increased offline activity. This report aims to summarise the key narratives, tactics, and actors involved in anti-drag action in France, and how these mobilizations are tied to anti-LGBTQ+ activity in France more broadly. However, given the small number of instances of anti-drug activism in France, the conclusions of this report are indicative and tentative.

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2024. 24p.

By Fabian Zhilla

This study asserts that the repatriation of foreign fighters from the conflict in Ukraine poses a significant threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Europe within the realm of organized crime. It contends that Southeast Europe serves as fertile ground for foreign fighters during times of war crises, facilitating their exploitation by organized crime for illicit purposes. Regarding the context of Southeast Europe, the study argues, firstly, that serious organized crime groups demonstrate a propensity to recruit individuals with military experience. Secondly, it underscores the historical roots of foreign fighters presence in the region, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Lastly, it highlights the inadequate response and policies at both national and European Union levels to address this concern in the region.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 30–41. 2024.

By Peter Leasure

While some have argued that drug-induced homicide laws were largely meant to target higher-level drug dealers, others have pointed out that most drug-induced homicide prosecutions have involved low-level dealers as well as family and friends of victims. However, no research has formally explored public opinion about whether there should be differing levels of culpability in drug-induced homicide scenarios. This study examined whether perceived culpability levels in a drug-induced homicide situation differed by race and factual scenario. We utilized an experimental information provision survey sent to heads of households in South Carolina. There were two randomized treatments. The first treatment was race (White and African American). Participants were randomly assigned scenarios with two White individuals, two African American individuals, or one White and one African American individual. The second treatment randomly assigned participants to one of two factual scenarios. In the first scenario, participants received a fact pattern where both individuals (trafficker and user/victim) had an existing friendship, and the trafficker was not a traditional drug dealer. In the second scenario, participants received a fact pattern where there was no existing friendship, and the trafficker was a traditional drug dealer. Our results showed large and statistically significant differences between scenarios that involved a friend relationship and a dealer relationship. Specifically, respondents who received the dealer scenarios were far more likely to assign culpability. Additionally, our results did not indicate levels of culpability assignment that were significantly (statistically) higher for African American traffickers when compared to White traffickers. Relevant decision-makers may want to consider policies or formal laws that recognize public opinion favoring lower culpability levels for traffickers in drug-induced homicide scenarios that are not traditional dealers.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 828 Drug Enforcement and Policy Center, February 2024

By Fabian Zhilla

This study asserts that the repatriation of foreign fighters from the conflict in Ukraine poses a significant threat to the peace and stability of Southeast Europe within the realm of organized crime. It contends that Southeast Europe serves as fertile ground for foreign fighters during times of war crises, facilitating their exploitation by organized crime for illicit purposes. Regarding the context of Southeast Europe, the study argues, firstly, that serious organized crime groups demonstrate a propensity to recruit individuals with military experience. Secondly, it underscores the historical roots of foreign fighters presence in the region, including the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Lastly, it highlights the inadequate response and policies at both national and European Union levels to address this concern in the region.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(1): pp. 30–41. 2024.

By Colette Ashton

Strengthening existing institutions, prioritising prevention and engaging the private sector are needed to end corruption.

This report analyses South Africa’s anti-corruption institutions in relation to international good practice. It highlights problems with their functional independence and organisational culture. It identifies a serious gap in the area of prevention. Among the recommendations are that South Africa undertake feasible, incremental improvements to existing institutions and engage the private sector to help prevent and detect corruption.

Key findings There is insufficient empirical research on corruption in South Africa to inform context sensitive policy reform. Anti-corruption institutions are governed by a parallel informal system of social norms held in place by incentives such as promotion and disincentives such as bullying. This organisational culture prioritises obedience to authority over ethics, eroding integrity. A culture of mistrust and competition exists between law enforcement agencies, hampering collaboration. Feasible, incremental reforms of anti-corruption institutions are needed in the short term, focusing on organisational culture. Recommendations Strengthen existing agencies Amend the National Prosecuting Authority Act so that: the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) is the accounting officer; the budget is allocated by Parliament; there are merit-based appointment processes and security of tenure for senior leaders; and the NDPP has control over human resources. Develop context-sensitive prosecutorial prioritisation policy that focuses on the criteria of redress for economic harm and is mindful of the need for political stability. Revise performance targets of law enforcement agencies to incentivise cooperation, not competition. Build cultures of integrity, trust and cooperation in and among anti-corruption agencies. Prioritise prevention Work towards an independent anti-corruption prevention agency. Urgently provide the Public Administration Ethics Integrity and Disciplinary Technical Assistance Unit in the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation with increased funding and independence. 2 The NPA should be given control over its own budget and human resources, which are currently controlled by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. Effective anti-corruption agencies in developing countries may trigger political instability. Political stability is a precondition for economic growth, which in the long term creates conditions for more effective anti-corruption institutions. Equitable economic development is a precondition for the transformation of more economically harmful types of corruption, e.g. plunder, into less harmful types, e.g. lobbying. The private sector is a key partner for government in the prevention and detection of corruption. Prioritise integrity in government by promoting ethical employees. Prioritise corruption prevention in the South African Police Service. Change the incentive structure for the private sector Introduce a statute providing for non-trial resolutions of corporate corruption cases to incentivise companies to self-police corruption. Develop capacity in the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission to support companies to develop effective anti corruption compliance programmes. Partner with the private sector to run collective action programmes in key sectors such as health, construction and shipping. Research Conduct a risk analysis for a proposed Chapter 9 anti-corruption super-agency with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Conduct research into a two-track criminal and administrative anti-corruption enforcement system. Conduct more empirical, sector-specific research into corruption

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 28p,

By Thomas D. Akoensi, Justice Tankebe

Using an experimental vignette design, the study investigates the effects of criminal records on the hiring decisions of a convenience sample of 221 human resource (HR) managers in Ghana. The HR managers were randomly assigned to read one of four vignettes depicting job seekers of different genders and criminal records: male with and without criminal record, female with and without criminal record. The evidence shows that a criminal record reduces employment opportunities for female offenders but not for their male counterparts. Additionally, HR managers are willing to offer interviews to job applicants, irrespective of their criminal records, if they expect other managers to hire ex-convicts. The implications of these findings are discussed.

The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, Volume 63, Issue 3, Pages: 272-285 | Oct.2024

José Carlos Hernández-Gutiérrez

The phenomenon of organized crime in Mexico is not new. However, it is no less true that, for a few years now, violence caused by or related to criminal organizations has been registering higher levels than ever. This has caused, from different spheres, to wonder if indeed the problem facing the country can still be called organized crime. Can non-state armed actors in Mexico qualify as terrorists? Have they evolved into some form of insurgency? The author of these pages, after conducting a bibliographic review on the variants of terrorism and insurgency used by some authors to refer to the Mexican case, affirms that Mexican criminal organizations are not terrorists or insurgents, but rather profit-making organizations that make a tactical use of terrorism and / or insurgency to achieve economic benefits or the goals of their organizations.

2021, Los desafíos de la globalización: respuestas desde América Latina y la Unión Europea

By Michael McLaggan

The South African public transport sector is facing a critical crisis, marked by escalating violence and extortion within the taxi industry. This report delves into the dynamics behind these troubling incidents, shedding light on the severe impact they have on bus companies and the broader public transport ecosystem.

Since 2015, the Intercape Ferreira Mainliner bus company has experienced over 176 attacks, highlighting the pervasive nature of violence linked to the taxi industry. These attacks include stonings, shootings, and acts of intimidation, creating a climate of fear and insecurity for passengers and operators alike. The violence is not isolated, but part of a broader campaign of economic coercion and extortion aimed at controlling the transport market.

The taxi industry’s aggression towards long-distance bus companies stems from intense competition over routes and pricing. Taxi operators argue that bus companies, with their extensive networks and competitive pricing, are undermining their business. In response, some actors within the taxi industry resort to violent tactics to enforce their demands, including dictating where buses can stop and what prices they can charge. This extortion threatens economic freedom and disrupts the stability of the public transport system.

The report reiterates that the violence and extortion tactics employed by the taxi industry amount to organized crime. Despite numerous court orders and high-profile cases, the state’s response has been inadequate. Law enforcement and political bodies often show reluctance to intervene, partly due to complex relationships with the taxi industry. This lack of decisive action perpetuates the cycle of violence and undermines the rule of law.

To combat this crisis, the report recommends several critical actions:

Prosecution of Coordinated Attacks: Treating violent incidents as organized crime under the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA).

Comprehensive Investigations: Multi-organizational task forces should investigate extortion in the public transport sector.

Engagement and Dialogue: Convening high-level panels involving all stakeholders to find peaceful resolutions to disputes.

The report underscores the urgent need for a coordinated, robust response to the violence and extortion plaguing South Africa’s public transport sector. By addressing these issues head-on, the state can restore safety, uphold economic freedom, and reinforce the rule of law, ensuring a secure and stable environment for all public transport users.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2024. 52p.

By Observatory of Illicit Markets and the Conflict in Ukraine.

This report assesses the organized crime risks associated with veterans in Ukraine. It is a complicated, sensitive subject: while the hot state of the conflict means that very few military personnel are being demobilized at present, there is also concern that discussing veterans in such a context may stigmatize them. But, as this report highlights, such risks cannot be ignored and preparations for demobilization now may help prevent negative outcomes in future. Our research identifies the following as key organized crime risks: the incidence of drug use among service personnel, the profusion of weapons in the country and the possibility of veterans being recruited into or forming organized crime groups or joining private security firms as muscle. More tangentially, a sense of disaffection among veterans – rooted in a perception that the state is not keeping its promises to provide individual support or reform society as a whole – may also drive a wedge between veterans and society, generating friction and increasing the risk of confrontation, perhaps with violence. Veterans policy in Ukraine is a fast-moving field. The Ministry for Veteran Affairs is spearheading the new veterans law – a crucial development to ensure that Ukraine’s legislation is fit for the new realities of a post-conflict period that will see a million or more veterans in society. Work is also underway on draft laws governing the legal ownership of weapons, which will bring much-needed clarity and control to the millions of trophy weapons in the country.1 With a new demobilization law yet to be submitted to parliament (at the time of writing) and relatively few veterans in Ukraine today, 2024 is a critical window of opportunity. Ukraine should use this time to determine and implement a comprehensive veterans policy before the wave of demobilizing veterans arrives. Although there was no upsurge in veteran-related organized crime in the 2014–2022 period, the size of the veteran population will be much larger. Even a fraction of these veterans falling into crime will have a significant impact on Ukrainian society. At present, there is little sign of institutional readiness. Implementation of the initiatives announced to date has been patchy and slow, and the Ministry for Veterans Affairs has lacked a permanent head for much of the first half of 2024. Demobilization, for those who are eligible, is a frustrating and even humiliating process. Our interviews with veterans revealed scarce access to information about benefits, with many unaware of what was available to them. In terms of rehabilitation, there is a lack of effective psychological, physiological, legal and social support for veterans. Some of this is explainable by the very real strictures the war has imposed on Ukraine: training that usually takes years must be completed in a matter of weeks.

But the need remains. Since the full-scale invasion, civil society organizations, many of which have worked in veterans affairs since 2014, have been making strenuous and effective efforts to cover the gaps in care and provision for veterans, from physiological and psychological support to forming business collectives and designing a ‘whole-life’ veterans policy. Yet many feel they are working in isolation, with the state resisting their attempts to work collaboratively and introduce strategic and innovative thinking to veterans affairs.2 Only the state can deliver a veterans policy with the scope and resources needed, but NGOs have much to offer, not least their agility and ability to deliver help where it is most needed. Both the state and civil society will be needed if Ukraine is to deliver a programme of ‘deep prevention’ – a strategy that addresses veterans’ needs at the level of contributing social factors rather than the individual level – which will reap the most dividends in reducing exposure to organized crime risks. The hard reality is that, as Ukraine dedicates as many resources as it can to the day-to-day conflict, it must also begin planning for the decades-long aftermath.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2024 48p.