By Arjun Punaji

India has risen as a global attraction, captivating audiences with its vibrant cinematic innovations, rich artistic heritage, and profound literary works. These very expressions, however, sometimes clash with the state's desire to follow expected moral codes. The government, wary of "immoral activities" within these creative mediums, prescribes certain norms and imposes penalties for non-compliance. One such contested area is "obscenity," a concept with criminal law repercussions. This paper delves into Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the concept of obscenity. I will analyse the current legal tests and thresholds for obscenity in light of a rapidly changing world that demands more liberal legislation. Since "obscenity" often aligns with "socially immoral codes," I will examine obscene material through the lens of legal moralism. This paper's main focus is to examine the sanctity and clarity of ‘contemporary community standard’ and also examine that does morality and decency have static meanings or changes over time. Though the ‘Contemporary Community Standard’ is a good law at present, and invoked this standard repeatedly, courts were unable to define and clarify what the contemporary community standard constitutes. My argument is that this standard is problematic and unconvincing since the ‘Contemporary community standard’ itself is highly subjective because within the same community, both conservative and liberal ideas meet and one’s ugliness may become another’s creativity and freedom of expression. Also, morality does not uniformly apply in the same society. What I ‘like’ and approve of material or content may be ‘disgusting’ to others and the ‘contemporary community’ belongs to all sections of society such as rich and poor, readers and illiterates, old and adult, conservatives, and liberals. Therefore, I examine this standard through a ‘legal moralism’ perspective. This includes exploring the famous arguments of Lord Devlin in his "The Enforcement of Morals" lecture, along with the counter-arguments presented by H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Furthermore, we will investigate some of India's landmark (or controversial) obscenity cases. These cases often rely heavily on Western legal interpretations like the Hicklin Test, Miller Test, and the Contemporary Community Standard Test, without providing clear explanations for their application in the Indian context. This analysis aims to demonstrate why India needs to reevaluate its current legal tests in light of societal changes. Then I will propose the "harm principle" as a framework for regulating obscenity, advocating for a higher threshold for punishment. By taking a critical look at existing legal frameworks and advocating for a harm based approach, we can ensure that India's vibrant artistic expressions can flourish while upholding a sense of community decency.

National Law School of Indian University

By Thomas Greminger and Nayef Al-Rodhan

Pirates have existed in different guises since ancient times, from Cilician pirates seizing olive oil cargoes from Roman ships to corsairs seeking spoils along North Africa’s Barbary Coast and buccaneers attacking Spanish treasure ships in the Caribbean. Currently the Gulf of Guinea is the world’s hotspot for maritime piracy. Over the last 15 years container ships, fishing vessels, and oil tankers in the region have been the targets of numerous armed attacks and kidnappings.

The past year has seen some positive developments regarding global maritime security. According to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB), global piracy and armed robbery incidents are at their lowest recorded figure in three decades. The IMB’s last annual report showed a 32% drop in overall attacks in 2021 compared to 2020. These promising trends are also evident in the Gulf of Guinea. Of the 90 global piracy and armed robbery incidents reported between January and September 2022, 13 have been reported in the Gulf of Guinea region, compared to 27 over the same period in 2021. The decline in the number of reported incidents in West African waters should be welcomed, but this progress is likely to be short-lived unless the international community increases its focus on the region.

The threat level in the Gulf of Guinea region remains high, as highlighted by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2634 on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, which was unanimously adopted in May 2022. Spearheaded by Ghana and Norway, the resolution expressed the UNSC’s deep concern about the “grave and persistent threat” posed by piracy and transnational organised crime in the Gulf of Guinea. The resolution correctly stressed that unless tackled head-on, piracy will continue to impede international security and navigation, and the sustainable development of states in the region. These challenges are particularly important given the Gulf of Guinea’s geopolitical significance.

Bordering 20 countries and with 6,000 kilometres of coastline, the Gulf of Guinea is a key shipping route for a region that relies heavily on imports. This is why the costs of piracy weigh so heavily on the region’s economic and trade potential, with direct and indirect costs estimated at US$1.925 billion annually for 12 Gulf of Guinea countries. Tackling piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will require both sustained political will at the national and regional levels and deeper and more effective cooperation among members of the international community. All sea-faring nations have a stake in improving the security of the region – including Switzerland, which assumes its seat on the UNSC at the start of 2023, with the aim of promoting global peace and security.

Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2022. 12p.

By Tasnim Abderrahim

Morocco is a key departure point for both local and foreign migrants embarking on irregular sea crossings to Europe. The country is strategically linked to Spain in particular through three main migratory pathways. These include the land passages into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, a maritime route to mainland Spain and a maritime route to the Canary Islands. Furthermore, substantial numbers of migrants cross in and out of Morocco over the border with Algeria.

In 2023, human smuggling trends in Morocco were broadly stable, although the dynamics differed by route. There was a significant rebound in movements from northern Morocco to Spain across the Alboran Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar. According to Frontex data, Moroccan arrivals in mainland Spain jumped from 4 307 in 2022 to 7 910 in 2023.1 Moroccan nationals dominated this route, as security measures restricted foreign migrants’ access to the north of the country.

This rise is especially notable given this heightened enforcement, which began during the COVID-19 pandemic and increased further following Spain’s endorsement of Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara conflict in 2022. Border controls along the northern coast remained tight in 2023 and security forces continued to crack down on smuggling networks. In addition, the government persisted in the forced transfer of undocumented migrants from the northern coastal areas to cities in the interior.

The other main northern Moroccan route to Spain, involving land crossings to Ceuta and Melilla, saw a dramatic drop in 2023. Only 467 arrivals were recorded from 1 January to 31 December, a 75% reduction compared to the same period in 2022.2 Despite this, persistent efforts to reach the enclaves continued, including attempts to climb over fences or swim around barriers, underscoring that the decline was largely due to heightened security operations by Spanish and Moroccan forces. To the south, in the Canary Islands, arrivals from Morocco rebounded slightly in 2023, after falling by almost a third between 2021 and 2022. This moderate increase appears to have been driven primarily by foreign migrants, as Moroccan arrivals decreased. Specifically, only 5 817 Moroccan migrants, the most easily identifiable of those departing from Morocco, arrived in the Canaries in 2023, down from 6 411 in 2022. This was likely due to heightened security and the perception among Moroccan migrants that the route was dangerous and costly, with an uncertain chance of success.

Finally, cross-border movement into Morocco from Algeria also continued. Although reliable estimates were limited, there were indications of a slight increase in arrivals through this route, particularly Algerians planning to attempt the sea crossing to the Spanish enclaves. Movement in the opposite direction, from Morocco to Algeria, also appeared to rise. This mainly involved Moroccans heading to Algeria’s north-west coast, from where smuggling to Spain is prevalent.

Over the course of 2023, irregular migration from and through Morocco was influenced by a combination of factors, with intensified enforcement playing a significant role. Morocco had moved to stem migratory flows in 2022, with the government orchestrating a structured crackdown on irregular migrants across the country. Throughout 2023, authorities continued to implement counter-migration measures, including restrictions on migrants’ mobility and the forced relocation of undocumented people.

Despite these efforts, poor economic prospects for both Moroccans and foreign migrants drove departures higher. In 2023, Morocco began to bounce back from the overlapping shocks the economy had experienced in the previous year, including a severe drought, rising commodity prices and the global economic slowdown, all of which derailed growth. However, despite the nascent recovery, many Moroccans continued to grapple with the effects of the successive economic blows that have been occurring since 2020, chiefly price hikes, which have strained the purchasing power of citizens and residents alike, especially low-income populations.

This is the latest Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) monitoring report on human smuggling in Morocco. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2021, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Morocco, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 28p.

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Farmer-herder conflict in Chad has reached unprecedented levels during the political transition following the former president’s death in 2021, leaving more than 1,000 people dead and more than 2,000 injured. This violence is exacerbating the country’s perceived north-south divide.

Why does it matter? A growing number of cattle owners are from the north. The sedentary populations of the south and centre see the northerners as protected by the central authorities, fuelling resentment. The farmers’ grievances, sharpened by May’s disputed presidential election, could lead them to take the law into their own hands.

What should be done? President Mahamat Déby should make resolution of farmer-herder conflict a priority during his term. His government should provide security and impartial justice in the affected areas, involving residents in mediation efforts to help restore their confidence in the authorities.

New York: International Crisis Group, 2024. 24p.

By Hamid Azizi and Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes

The drug trade has garnered significant attention as a critical funding source for various terrorist organisations. This systematic review summarises the existing empirical knowledge about the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) involvement, and profit from the drug trade, and methods of estimating drug trade revenue. Thirty-one studies were identified. Twenty-three about the Taliban, seven about the FARC, and one about both groups. Estimates of annual profit varied from US$19 to US$500 million for the Taliban and US$140 to US$3.5 billion for the FARC. Fourteen of the twenty-four studies about the Taliban provided an estimate and merely six studies discussed the methods used to generate those estimates. Among the eight studies about the FARC, four provided an estimate but one described the method employed. Studies used a variety of information sources. The review shows the need for caution regarding existing estimates and a more methodologically rigorous analysis of linkages.

Global Crime, 2024, VOL. 25, NO. 2, 122–155

By Alice Fereday

Niger’s location at the crossroads of key trans-Sahelian routes has positioned it at the heart of migratory flows for decades. The country’s role as a transit hub for migrants heading north towards Libya with the aim of reaching Europe has also attracted the focus of extensive international efforts to curb irregular migration. In 2023, however, it was the major political and security developments at national and regional levels that had the greatest impact on human smuggling in Niger. On 26 July, a military coup overthrew the president, Mohamed Bazoum, and transitional authorities were formed under the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland – CNSP). The military takeover resulted in the closure of the country’s borders with Benin and Nigeria, further complicating movement into Niger, which was already severely affected by growing insecurity in Burkina Faso and south-west Niger. Rather than preventing movement, however, the border closures led to an increased demand for smuggling services, particularly at the Benin border, from both migrants and those transporting commodities. By March 2024, the Nigerian border had reopened, while the Benin border remained closed at the time of writing. An even more significant change came in November, when the CNSP repealed the 2015 anti-smuggling law that had caused the collapse of the industry in northern Niger. This led to one of the most profound shifts in the dynamics of human smuggling since 2015. Since the repeal of the law, passeurs – the colloquial name in the Sahel for transporters involved in human smuggling – across the country have been able to transport foreign migrants legally. The effects were immediately felt in Agadez, which had been the main focus of anti-smuggling operations, resulting in the demise of its human smuggling economy in 2016. With the repeal of the law, departures to Libya have risen steadily since November, as have departures to Algeria. Rather than a sharp spike in foreign movements, the repeal appears to have caused steady, though not exponential, growth since November. Some of the key factors that influenced human smuggling before the legislation change remain in place, such as a preference for routes to Algeria and persistent challenges on regional routes to reach Niger. As a result, the migration landscape in the country is unlikely to return to what it resembled pre-2015. In particular, the westbound displacement of routes, which led to the increased use of Algeria as a transit country to reach Tunisia and to a lesser extent Morocco, is now firmly established and unlikely to shift back. Insecurity linked to the expansion of violent extremist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and south-west Niger also remains a major constraint on regional mobility, and could further deteriorate amid continued political and security upheaval in the Sahel.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 38p.

By Gaurav Verma, Rynaa Grover, Jiawei Zhou, Binny Mathew, Jordan Kraemer, Munmun De Choudhury, Srijan Kumar

Violence-provoking speech -- speech that implicitly or explicitly promotes violence against the members of the targeted community, contributed to a massive surge in anti-Asian crimes during the pandemic. While previous works have characterized and built tools for detecting other forms of harmful speech, like fear speech and hate speech, our work takes a community-centric approach to studying anti-Asian violence-provoking speech. Using data from ~420k Twitter posts spanning a 3-year duration (January 1, 2020 to February 1, 2023), we develop a codebook to characterize anti-Asian violence-provoking speech and collect a community-crowdsourced dataset to facilitate its large-scale detection using state-of-the-art classifiers. We contrast the capabilities of natural language processing classifiers, ranging from BERT-based to LLM-based classifiers, in detecting violence-provoking speech with their capabilities to detect anti-Asian hateful speech. In contrast to prior work that has demonstrated the effectiveness of such classifiers in detecting hateful speech (F1=0.89), our work shows that accurate and reliable detection of violence-provoking speech is a challenging task (F1=0.69). We discuss the implications of our findings, particularly the need for proactive interventions to support Asian communities during public health crises.

2024

By Team of Analysts at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Observatory

In 2023, Tunisia emerged as the primary country of embarkation for irregular migrants seeking to reach Europe, eclipsing Libya, which had long been the main North African departure point. In total, some 97 306 migrants arrived in Italy from Tunisia, just over three times as many as in 2022. Tunisia’s new status as North Africa’s leading embarkation hub followed four years of constant growth in irregular migration and human smuggling. In previous years, the increase in departures had primarily involved Tunisian nationals. In 2023, however, the surge in irregular migration was largely driven by foreigners, mostly from West Africa and Sudan. While some of these migrants were long-term residents in Tunisia, the spike was fuelled by a notable and rapid rise in the arrival of sub-Saharans across the border with Algeria and, to a lesser extent, the border with Libya. The high demand for departures led to a more complex smuggling ecosystem in Tunisia, with networks offering increased and diversified services. There were also key shifts in the way foreign migrants, in particular, embarked, with a growing number forgoing engagement with smugglers and turning instead to self-smuggling. However, as in previous years, it was the worsening of the country’s complex political, social and economic problems that spurred clandestine departures and licit migration. While some aspects of the multidimensional crisis facing Tunisia improved, overall the challenges remained acute, with severe drought, uncertain financing conditions and the slow pace of reforms hampering economic recovery, while failures of governance continued to affect the delivery of public services such as water, education and health care. Moreover, a dramatic shift in Tunisia’s approach to irregular migration led to a deterioration in conditions for migrants and an acceleration in the pace of foreign migrants leaving the country. In February, President Kais Saied denounced undocumented sub-Saharan migration to Tunisia, triggering a series of events that resulted in foreign migrants being evicted from their homes, dismissed from their jobs, and threatened with arrest and violence. This growing climate of fear in turn influenced and hastened the departure of undocumented migrants from the country. In response to rising migration, the Tunisian government instituted tighter security controls, with occasional escalations in response to spikes in departures. Enforcement in maritime areas and along the land borders with Libya and Algeria intensified in the second half of the year. In addition, the Tunisian government increasingly resorted to the forced transfer of migrants – mainly to and across the borders with Libya and Algeria – in order to manage tensions among the local population and curb departures. According to public reports documenting the testimonies of deported migrants, a notable element of these forced transfers was the level of violence and abuse inflicted by the Tunisian security forces. The exceptional growth in irregular migration from and through Tunisia in 2023 marked a rapid escalation of trends observed since 2020. Given the enduring influence of the factors driving irregular movement from Tunisia and other key countries of origin, interest in departures to Europe is expected to persist further into 2024. However, volumes will be influenced by a number of variables, including the effectiveness of security forces in managing increased migratory pressures and the adaptability of smuggling networks to evolving enforcement tactics. This is the latest Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) monitoring report on human smuggling in Tunisia. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2021, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Tunisia, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 41p.

By: Alice Fereday

Over the past four years, the human smuggling ecosystem in Chad has continued to evolve and change. The Chadian government, for its part, has increasingly sought to tighten controls on the northbound movement of migrants, perceiving the flow of people as contributing to instability, rebel activity, and organized crime in the north as well as in southern Libya.

Movement north has remained robust, despite – and in some cases because of – conflict and instability, the COVID-19 pandemic, and government enforcement. The changed security landscape, however, has driven smuggling networks to adopt increasingly clandestine approaches to movement and operations. All of these dynamics remained salient in 2023. However, mobility in Chad was also substantially shaped by the outbreak of war in Sudan. The conflict led to a mass arrival of refugees in eastern Chad and, more broadly, posed significant risks to the stability of the country. The enormous influx of refugees into Chad further strained the limited assistance capacities in the Ouaddaï, Sila and Wadi Fira regions, triggering a large-scale humanitarian crisis in these areas, and negatively affecting the prices and availability of basic commodities. While most refugees remain in refugee camps in eastern Chad, some have begun to leave, intending to travel to northern Chad, Libya and Tunisia, often with the help of smugglers. The conflict initially reduced the number of Sudanese travelling to northern Chad, but movements picked up towards the end of the year. Human smuggling from western Chad, while less affected by the conflict in Sudan, continues to be suppressed, although there has been some relaxation of law enforcement efforts. Meanwhile, artisanal mining at the Kouri Bougoudi goldfield has flourished since its reopening in late 2022, with most operations now formalized. Efforts by the Société Nationale d’Exploitation Minière et de Contrôle (National Society for the Exploitation and Control of Mining – SONEMIC) to formalize and regulate activities caused tensions among gold miners, but security at the goldfield has reportedly improved. Mid-2023 also saw renewed rebel incursions into northern Chad and clashes between rebel groups and the Chadian military. However, pressure on rebel groups from the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in Libya and the surrender of significant numbers of rebels in northern Chad have weakened key groups such as the Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République (Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic – CCMSR) and the Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (Front for Change and Concord in Chad – FACT). As a result, the risk of rebel incursions into Chad, while not permanently eliminated, appears to be largely contained for the time being. Chad also entered the next phase of its transition process, preparing for the elections, which were held in May 2024. This was a crucial period for the transitional authorities to consolidate their power and credibility, given the high level of opposition to the largely controversial transition process. However, following a contested constitutional referendum in December 2023, which enshrined the principle of a unitary state pushed for by the transitional authorities, political violence escalated in early 2024. In February, following the announcement that presidential elections would be held on 6 May, a key opposition figure, Yaya Dillo Djérou, was killed by security forces amid clashes at the headquarters of his party, the Parti Socialiste sans Frontières (Socialist Party Without Borders – PSF).1 The Chadian government claimed that its forces were in fact involved in a shootout at the PSF’s headquarters, after an attack on government security forces the night before. This raised fears that there would be further violence and repression of opposition and civil society voices after the May elections. While the elections were in fact relatively peaceful, there are still ongoing concerns related to the contraction of civil society space and democratic process.

Geneva: SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 37p..

By Felipe Botero Escobar

Cannabis is the most widely consumed illicit drug globally, with around 219 million users in 2021, according to the UNODC. It is also the illicit drug that is being legalized most rapidly for medicinal or recreational use. While Colombia has taken steps toward regulation, such as legalizing medicinal cannabis in 2015, the complete legalization of recreational cannabis is still under discussion.

This report draws on experiences from countries like Uruguay, Canada, and the United States, which have already implemented cannabis legalization, to explore the possible outcomes for Colombia. It concludes that while legalization could reduce the size of the illegal cannabis market, a grey market supplying both local and international demands is likely to persist.

A key focus is on how criminal control over cannabis production areas could hinder the transition of growers to a legal market. The report emphasizes the need for coordinated cannabis regulatory and security policies to protect small-scale and traditional growers and integrate them into the legal market. Furthermore, the potential for reduced violence is explored, though the report notes that this is unlikely to happen immediately. Criminal groups may resist the establishment of a legal market, leading to short-term increases in violence as they compete for control over remaining illicit markets.

Another significant finding is the potential transformation of Colombia’s criminal justice system. Legalization could free up resources, allowing law enforcement to prioritize more serious public safety issues and reducing low-level cannabis prosecutions and prison overcrowding.

This report offers crucial insights for policymakers, emphasizing that while cannabis legalization is not a cure-all for crime and violence in Colombia, it is a critical step toward more effective drug policy reform and organized crime reduction.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 35p.

By Washington State Statistical Analysis Center

This project seeks to discover whether exclusionary discipline and later criminal justice system involvement are associated, and to determine whether race, sex, and homelessness are confounding factors.

The Washington Statistical Analysis Center (SAC) applied for and received the 2018 State Justice Statistics Grant from BJS. Among other projects, the SAC sought the grant to evaluate the connection between a student’s exclusionary discipline and their future justice system involvement in Washington. This evaluation connects data from schools and the courts to assess the strength of this relationship and examine the influence of other factors (such as race, sex, and homelessness).

Here are some of the main takeaways from this report:

• Students identified as male were more than two times as likely to be associated with postgraduate convictions as compared to their female counterpart.

• Students with any homelessness were 1.7 times as likely to be associated with a post graduate conviction than student with no record of homelessness.

• Students identified as American Indian or Alaskan Native were more than two times more likely to have a post-graduate conviction than students identified as other races

• Students identified as Black/African American had at least one exclusionary discipline event (25.1%) at nearly twice the proportion of the cohort average (13.6%), with students identified as American Indian/Alaskan Native and Hispanic/Latino not far behind.

• Results should be interpreted with caution.

Olympia, WA: Washington State Statistical Analysis Center, 2022. 11p.

By Antônio Sampaio

In the past decade, the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan area has witnessed, consecutively, some of the world’s most intense clashes between criminal groups over territorial control, implemented one of the most innovative urban security strategies and, later, reverted to a classic militarized, iron-fisted approach to fighting crime. At the core of these clashes, strategies and crackdowns is a long-standing armed struggle involving criminals, militias and state forces for territorial control in the second largest city in Brazil, one of the world’s top 10 economies. In the main, the security actor that responds to criminal groups’ grip over the city’s large, densely populated hillside slums (known as favelas in Portuguese) is the military police, which has acquired a reputation for a ‘shoot-first-askquestions-later’ approach. The force is also often associated with its elite special-operations squad, BOPE (Special Police Operations Battalion, translated from the Portuguese). This is a deadly force of heavily armed officers placed at the spearhead of police operations engaging with gang-controlled favelas. Its insignia is a skull perforated by two pistols and a knife. The state security forces, therefore, have been described as brutal and militarized – with good reason. Brazil’s new political leaders, sworn in in early 2019, both at the federal and state level, unleashed upon the country a vision of further repressive policies on public security without the accompanying governance and developmental approaches to the urban areas where armed criminal groups are concentrated. President Jair Bolsonaro’s security proposals have been thin on longterm solutions; he has resorted instead to deregulating gun possession and reducing penalties for police officers shooting suspects. The president’s lack of strategy to tackle the problem has not hindered his ‘tough-on-crime’ rhetoric: in August 2019 he said his proposals would make criminals ‘die in the streets like cockroaches’. Bolsonaro’s ally, the governor of the state of Rio, Wilson Witzel, has gone further. Witzel has ordered an increase in the use of snipers, deployed to shoot suspected criminals from helicopters. These kinds of policies mark a return to a long tradition of repressive security approaches in Rio (as analyzed in the second section of this report) and represent a radical reversal of previous governmental approaches focused on improving marginalized urban areas and communities where the grip of organized crime has been stronger. Despite this excessive focus on repression, the core security issue in Rio de Janeiro is not the authorities’ militarized policies on security. Rather, this, and the police, is just one part of the core issue, namely the consolidation of an illicit order in marginalized territories amid the declining legitimacy of the state. The militarization of security policies, which is part of declining state legitimacy, is a reaction that intensified and probably reinforced the core problem. Meanwhile, the rise of violent, armed non-state actors has been partially a response to the heavy-handed police crackdowns, but it is also a response to other criminal actors, one that serves the purpose of establishing, enforcing or defending the illicit order. (The term ‘illicit order’ refers to a situation in which an armed criminal actor has a permanent presence in a given urban territory, and establishes rules and punishments enforced by the threat or exercise of violence. The effectiveness and severity with which those rules are enforced may vary over time.) Another distinctive feature of Rio’s security landscape over the past decade has been experimentation with a stabilization strategy in gang strongholds, referred to locally as pacificação (‘pacification’). This strategy had been around for 10 years by 2018, showing that it is possible to reclaim areas from gangs (at least for a time). It also distinguished itself by the authorities’ attempt – successful for some time – to reconcile the use of armed force with socio-economic development initiatives, such as urban infrastructure and educational programmes. To break a vicious cycle of recurring police incursions in slums, which often resulted in intense gunfights and deaths, local authorities combined a heavily armed ‘occupation’ of slum areas with a gradual push for community policing, state-managed public-service delivery and development. In doing so, the government introduced a political element in its urban security policy, the thinking being that neither policing nor social development were sufficient by themselves to achieve the desired results. Instead, authorities recognized that urban security could be combined with a profoundly political purpose – to recover the allegiance of local residents, introduce state institutions and establish state governance. No wonder the pacification programme was compared to counterinsurgency by US diplomats and academics, given its parallels with the counterinsurgency principle of wrestling population support away from rebel groups and towards government authority. In the pursuit of this local political objective, policing, infrastructure investment, public services and social development programmes were deployed – with impressively positive results during the first five years or so of the pacification process (approximately from late 2008 to 2013). The programme marked a watershed moment in the perception of what is the goal of an urban security strategy: the transition of violent territories to stability through institutions, governance and security. An important reason why the programme has received worldwide attention as a case study on urban security is that it worked – for a time. A 2012 World Bank study, for instance, is titled ‘Bringing the state back into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro’....etc....

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2019. 40p.

By Piotr Bąkowski and Martina Prpic

Drawing on diverse underlying rationales, policies on prostitution – in the EU and elsewhere – vary both in their objectives and in their strategies for achieving those objectives. These distinctions manifest in the terminology used, with 'prostitution' typically favoured by stakeholders aiming to curb or eradicate the practice, and the term 'sex work' embraced by those who view prostitution as a legitimate form of employment. Formulating policies on prostitution presents numerous challenges, including a lack of comprehensive statistical data. However, these policies often lack emphasis on the importance of evidence-based approaches – shaped instead by ideological beliefs and moral perspectives. While discussions on prostitution transcend feminism, feminist ideologies have had a particularly strong impact on policy formulation. Academic classification of prostitution policies into national models or regimes is subject to ongoing debate, with criticism directed towards the 'model approach' for oversimplifying the complexities of these policies and failing to capture regional and local variations. Traditionally, policies have been categorised into overarching ideological approaches: 'prohibitionism', which seeks to outlaw all aspects of prostitution; and 'abolitionism', which focuses on criminalising the facilitation and purchase, but not the sale of sexual services. However, there is a growing tendency towards classifying policies as falling under criminalisation (of purchase or sale), legalisation (regulation) or decriminalisation. Given the EU's lack of explicit authority to regulate prostitution, which falls within the exclusive competence of individual Member States, stakeholders both within and outside EU institutions advocate framing prostitution as a problem linked to areas where the EU does have competence; these include gender equality, violence against women, human trafficking, and the free movement of services. With the European Commission and the Council largely silent on the issue, debates predominantly occur within the European Parliament, and are marked by strong disagreements between Members subscribing to opposing approaches. Prostitution is subject to varying regulations across the EU, leading to a diverse array of national legislative and policy frameworks. Member States differ as to how they address the sale or purchase of sex, as well as the exploitation of prostitution. This variety is due not only to EU Member States' different historical and cultural backgrounds, but also to the current local state of affairs, especially as regards the situation in the field, and the priorities of the governments in power. In some Member States, there is a strong concern that prostitution constitutes violence against women. Those States usually tend to penalise buyers of sexual services. By contrast, some other Member States recognise that 'sex work' is a voluntary choice for some and tailor their legal frameworks accordingly.

Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2024. 39p.

By Norman Maldonado, Blanca Amalia Llorente, Roberto Magno Iglesias, Diego Escobar

By 2016, tobacco industry provided the only illicit trade estimates in Colombia and used these to discourage tax increases since the 1990s. To establish the viability of a threefold hike in the excise tax, policy makers needed unbiased estimates of the illicit cigarette. , Roberto Magno Iglesias, cigarette smoking in urban areasi equal to 12.95% in 20134 and a decreasing trend from 17.06% when compared with 2008.5 In 2016, the median price of a 20- stick cigarette pack in supermarkets was COP$ 3128, approximately $2.5 international dollars (supplementary figure 1). Following a rapid adjustment in 2010 after a moderate tax increase, prices increased slightly above the inflation rate until December 2016. Colombia displayed until that year the second lowest price in the Americas.6 Objective To estimate the size of illicit cigarette trade in five Colombian cities (63% of the market), analyse characteristics of smokers of illicit cigarettes and compare market share results with one industry- funded survey. Methods Street cross- sectional survey with smokers’ self- report on consumption pattern, last purchase information and direct observation of smoker’s packs. Sampling frame: smokers, men and women, 12 years old or older, all income levels, resident in five Colombian cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Cartagena and Cúcuta) with 1 733 316 smokers in 2013. Sample size 1697, simple random sample by city, sampling weights based on age groups and cities. Confidence level 95%, margin of error 3.5% for Bogotá and Medellín and 5% for the other three cities. Data collection period: 24 August–14 September 2016. results Illicit cigarettes represent 3.5% of consumption in the five cities, a much lower estimate than the industry data. There are significant differences across cities, with Bogotá at the bottom (1.5%) and Cúcuta at the top (22.8%). Conclusion The low overall penetration of illicit cigarettes in Colombia indicates that the industry’s warnings against tax increases are not justified. The limited importance of tax levels as determinant of consumption of illicit cigarettes is also suggested by the differences across cities, all of them with the same tax regime

Tob Control, 2020

By O’Mochain, Robert and Ueno, Yuki

Bringing together two voices, practice and theory, in a collaboration that emerges from lived experience and structured reflection upon that experience, O’Mochain and Ueno show how entrenched discursive forces exert immense influence in Japanese society and how they might be most effectively challenged. With a psychosocial framework that draws insights from feminism, sociology, international studies, and political psychology, the authors pinpoint the motivations of the nativist right and reflect on the change of conditions that is necessary to end cultures of impunity for perpetrators of sexual abuse in Japan. Evaluating the value of the #MeToo model of activism, the authors offer insights that will encourage victims to come out of the shadows, pursue justice, and help transform Japan’s sense of identity both at home and abroad. Ueno, a female Japanese educator and O’Mochain, a non-Japanese male academic, examine the nature of sexual abuse problems both in educational contexts and in society at large through the use of surveys, interviews, and engagement with an eclectic range of academic literature. They identify the groups within society who offer the least support for women who pursue justice against perpetrators of sexual abuse. They also ask if far-right ideological extremists are fixated with proving that so called “comfort women” are higaisha-buru or “fake victims.” Japan would have much to gain on the international stage were it to fully acknowledge historical crimes of sexual violence, yet it continues to refuse to do so. O’Mochain and Ueno shed light on this puzzling refusal through recourse to the concepts of ‘international status anxiety’ and ‘male hysteria.’ An insightful read for scholars of Japanese society, especially those concerned about its treatment of women.

London; New York: Routledge, 2023. 

By Richard Garside and Roger Grimshaw

A unique overview of the main criminal justice institutions across the three UK jurisdictions of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the combined jurisdiction of England and Wales.

• How are the main UK criminal justice institutions organised?

• How did they develop over time into their current form?

• How are they held to account?

• How can ordinary citizens challenge them and influence their work?

These are the main questions covered in Criminal justice systems in the UK.

No gold standard

Across the UK, there is no single, UK-wide criminal justice model; no ‘gold standard’ arrangement. Three criminal justice jurisdictions, with different histories, structures and operations, cover the United Kingdom: the combined jurisdiction of England and Wales, and the separate jurisdictions of Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

The diverse UK criminal justice arrangements, the result of distinctive histories, cultures and politics, offer a variety of operational and reform options.

Criminal justice systems in the UK takes the varieties of criminal justice across the UK as its starting point, drawing out similarities, and identifying contrasting arrangements across the UK's nations and regions.

Criminal justice systems are under constant scrutiny. Calls for improvement and change are never far away. This report outlines a number of key mechanisms currently available in the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom to hold these institutions to account and to press for change and reform.

Report structure

Criminal justice systems in the UK is divided into four main chapters, covering the police, prosecution, courts and prisons. Each chapter examines the main mechanisms for accountability and change:

• Governance

• Inspection

• Complaints

• Citizen accountability

Each chapter examines how these four main mechanisms operate across the three UK jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2022. 56p.

By Carla Álvarez

Ecuador is experiencing an unusual growth in violence and criminality. In addition to being among the 10 countries with the greatest incidence of criminality in the world,1 it currently has the highest rate of violent deaths in Latin America, 47.25 for every 100 000 residents,2 eight times higher than in 2016, the year Ecuador recorded its lowest rate since 1980.3 In less than a decade, it has gone from being the second safest country in South America (after Chile)4 to becoming the most violent. Firearms play a central role in this security crisis. According to the 2023 Global Organized Crime Index,5 arms trafficking is one of the largest-growing criminal markets in the country. Firearms have become an instrument for strengthening the capacity of criminal organizations dedicated to drug trafficking and illegal mining, as well as a way to assert territorial control. In 2023, firearms were involved in nine out of every 10 violent deaths in the country.6 As shown in Figures 1 and 2, since 2020 the number of homicides has virtually doubled year after year, as well as the recurrence of the use of firearms. These figures exceed the regional and worldwide averages of violence committed with these devices.7 In addition, while young men have accounted for the majority of the violent deaths recorded, the assassinations of women have also grown significantly in recent years. In the case of the femicides recorded in 2023, a total of 321 violent deaths of women were gender-related, 37% of which were committed using firearms.8 The centrality of firearms in the dynamics of violence in Ecuador is the result of the loosening of internal regulations that permit the import, manufacture, commerce and carrying of weapons. Despite the growth in armed violence, on 1 April 2023 the Ecuadorian government relaxed several measures that expanded the legal market for firearms. These decisions were adopted despite the institutional inability of the state to exercise effective control over the permits to carry and possess weapons;9 the growing corruption in security-related institutions;10 and the harsh criticism by some sectors of civil society of the government for having fostered the adoption of measures on self-protection and the privatization of security instead of promoting a public security policy.

This change has facilitated the proliferation of arms amid a process of expansion of criminal activities in the country, which has in turn led to the growth of an active and concerning market for arms. Without a doubt, the increase in violence is related to the increase in arms trafficking, which, in addition to being lucrative, facilitates other crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, illegal mining, contract killings and kidnappings.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2024. 31p.

By A.K.M. Maksud, Sayma Sayed and Khandaker Reaz Hossain

The Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South-Eastern Asia (CLARISSA) project in Bangladesh focused on the worst forms of child labour in the leather industry.1 From early in the project, it was clear that most of the children were working in small informal enterprises. As our interactions with enterprises evolved through interviews, workshops, and Action Research meetings, we learned that many of the enterprises hiring children in the worst forms of child labour were serving domestic markets. The CLARISSA team felt it was important to comprehensively test this new understanding with a survey of small enterprises in Hazaribagh, Hemayetpur, and Bhairab. Hazaribagh city is the traditional centre of leather production, with a large number of enterprises working in the informal economy; Hemayetpur is where the government relocated the tanneries, which were located in Hazaribagh until 2016; and Bhairab is a large hub for shoe manufacturers. These three locations have been central to the work of CLARISSA. 1 Each one is an important, but quite different, component of the leather industry, which contributes 4 per cent of Bangladesh’s total exports (0.5 per cent of the country’s total gross domestic product). A target has been set to increase export earnings from the sector to 425bn taka (US$5bn) by 2024, which would contribute 1 per cent to the total gross domestic product. In 2016, Bangladesh ranked eighth in the world for footwear production. More than 76 per cent of the total processed leather produced in 220 tanneries in Bangladesh was exported (Ministry of Industries 2019). Yet, the working assumption underpinning this survey was that while a significant proportion of the children will be working in informal enterprises that supply formally registered businesses, which in turn supply foreign markets, an even higher proportion will be in small enterprises serving domestic markets.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 15, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies 2024 34p.

By Liam Michaud, Jenn McDermid, Aaron Bailey, Tyson Singh Kelsall 

The unregulated drug toxicity crisis in British Columbia (BC), Canada, has claimed over 14,000 lives since 2016. The crisis is shaped by prohibitionist policies that has led to the contamination of the unregulated drug supply, resulting in a surge of fatal and non-fatal overdose events. The criminalization of drug users exacerbates this situation, pushing individuals into carceral systems for the possession of and/or social practices related to drug use. This commentary examines the involvement of policing in the development, and throughout the first 15 months of its implementation, of BC's decriminalization framework. We highlight concerns regarding police discretion, the expansion of scope, and the interweaving of carceral logics into policies that purport to be public health-oriented.

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 129, July 2024, 104478

By Luca Giommoni

This review examines a series of twelve studies led by James K. Cunningham and his team, focusing on the effects of precursor regulation on illicit drug markets. Their research shows that the regulation of chemicals essential for the production of drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine is associated with several positive outcomes. These include a decrease in drug purity, a reduction in seizures, lower demand for treatment and hospitalization, and an increase in drug prices. According to the research, this decrease in harmful outcomes results from a combination of diminished overall consumption and a reduction in harm per dose. However, this review identifies some inconsistencies within their studies. These inconsistencies include premature assumptions about the timing of intervention impacts, uneven influences of similar interventions, variations in the implementation of these interventions, and the disregard of alternate explanations for sudden shifts in drug markets. Cunningham's work can be considered one of the most substantial contributions in this field. However, to secure the full confidence of the drug policy community in the authenticity of their findings, they must effectively address the issues identified in this review.

International Journal of Drug Policy 17 June 2024, 104498