By Michael J. Zoorob,; Ju Nyeong Park,; Alex H. Kral,; et al

Importance: With the implementation of Measure 110 (M110) in 2021, Oregon became the first US state to decriminalize small amounts of any drug for personal use. To date, no analysis of the association of this law with overdose mortality has fully accounted for the introduction of fentanyl-a substance that is known to drive fatal overdose-to Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Objective: To evaluate whether the decriminalization of drug possession in Oregon was associated with changes in fatal drug overdose rates after accounting for the rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Design, setting, and participants: In this cohort study, the association between fatal overdose and enactment of M110 was analyzed using a matrix completion synthetic control method. The control group consisted of the 48 US states and Washington, DC, all of which did not decriminalize drugs. The rapid spread of fentanyl in unregulated drug markets was determined using the state-level percentage of all samples reported to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System that were identified as fentanyl or its analogues. Mortality data were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2022. Data analysis was performed from fall 2023 through spring 2024.

Exposures: Measure 110 took effect in Oregon on February 1, 2021.

Main outcomes and measures: The primary outcome assessed was fatal drug overdose rates per half-year. A changepoint analysis also determined when each state experienced a rapid escalation of fentanyl in its unregulated drug market.

Results: In this analysis, rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug supply occurred in the first half of 2021, contemporaneous with enactment of M110. A positive crude association was found between drug decriminalization and fatal overdose rate per 100 000 per half year (estimate [SE], 1.83 [0.47]; P < .001). After adjusting for the spread of fentanyl as a confounder, the effect size changed signs (estimate [SE], -0.51 [0.61]; P = .41) and there was no longer an association between decriminalization and overdose mortality in Oregon. Sensitivity analyses were consistent with this result.

Conclusions and relevance: In this cohort study of fatal drug overdose and the spread of fentanyl through Oregon's unregulated drug market, no association between M110 and fatal overdose rates was observed. Future evaluations of the health effects of drug policies should account for changes in the composition of unregulated drug markets.  

JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(9):e2431612. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.31612

By Drug Policy Alliance

In 2020, Oregon voters overwhelmingly approved Ballot Measure 110. This made Oregon the first state in the U.S. to decriminalize possession of small amounts of all drugs, while greatly expanding addiction services and social supports. But in 2024, state leaders recriminalized drug possession after a disinformation campaign led by drug war defenders and backed by corporate interests. Statewide criminal penalties for drug possession returned on September 1, 2024. Promised deflection programs were not ready, meaning people will be arrested and prosecuted because of their addictions. As before, drug use will be used as an excuse to arrest Black and Brown Oregonians at higher rates (they are statistically more likely to face incarceration and harsher sentencing due to targeted policing and enforcement). Oregon’s public defender shortage continues. People who are arrested will likely have their cases dismissed for lack of counsel. In a return to the failed war on drugs, people will cycle through the criminal legal system without connection to services. The successes of Measure 110 should neither be downplayed nor contributed to H.B. 4002. Measure 110 provided over $300 million for addiction services, including a program where police connect people to care without arrest. Policymakers must focus on implementing a thorough public health approach to drugs and real solutions to other pressing issues, not on the false promises of criminalizing drug possession.

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 5p.

By Russ Scott

Australia has one of the highest rates in the world of the use of the crystalline form of methamphetamine, a highly addictive stimulant that is often associated with a chronic, relapsing dependency. Methamphetamine use is associated with both acquisitive and violent offending, which cause substantial personal and societal costs. Whilst the short-term euphoria and stimulation provide a positive reinforcement to methamphetamine use, the aversive states of withdrawing from methamphetamine and the associated craving, which may last up to five weeks into abstinence, underlie the negative reinforcement to continued methamphetamine use. Although many methamphetamine-dependent users experience high levels of psychological distress, it is likely that less than half engage with treatment or support services, and current intervention and treatment programmes have high discontinuation rates. Stigma and discrimination, even from paramedics and health clinicians, are prominent barriers to methamphetamine-dependent users accessing treatment in Australia

Psychiatry, Psychology and Law; Vol. 31, No. 4, 671–704,, 2024

By Delvon T. Mattingly  , Maggie K. Richardson ,  Joy L. Hart

Introduction: Cannabis use is increasing due to several factors including the adoption of laws legalizing its use across the United States (US). We examined changes in current cannabis use among US youth and adults and by key socio-demographic groups. Methods: Using data from the 2013–2022 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (n=543,195), we estimated the prevalence of (2013–2019, 2020, 2021–2022) and trends in (2013–2019, 2021–2022) current (i.e., past 30- day) cannabis use among US youth (aged 12–17) and adults (aged 18+) overall and by age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, and total annual family income. We also examined sociodemographic factors associated with use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Results: Cannabis use increased from 7.59 % to 11.48 % in 2013–2019, was 11.54 % in 2020, and increased again from 13.13 % to 15.11 % in 2021–2022. Among youth, cannabis use remained constant from 2013 to 2019 and 2021–2022. In 2022, use was highest among aged 18–34, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, and generally lower SES adults. From 2021–2022, cannabis use increased among several groups such as adults who were aged 35–49 (14.25–17.23 %), female (11.21–13.00 %), and Hispanic (10.42–13.50 %). Adults who were aged 18–25, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, some college educated, and of lower annual family income had consistently higher odds of current cannabis use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Conclusions: Cannabis use is increasing overall and among certain sociodemographic groups. Our findings inform prevention and harm reduction efforts aimed at mitigating the prevalence of cannabis use in the US. 

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports 12 (2024) 10025 

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

Hawaii may be poised to become the 25th state to legalize the recreational use of cannabis for adults aged 21 and over. Nearly 90 percent of Hawaii residents supported full legalization of cannabis for adult use in a January 2023 poll conducted by the Hawaii Cannabis Industry Association. Gov. Josh Green has said he would sign a legalization bill if one is delivered to his desk—marking a significant departure from former Gov. Dave Ige, who left office in 2023. During the 2023 legislative session, lawmakers considered proposals to legalize adult-use cannabis. One of these bills was passed by the state Senate but was not heard in the state House of Representatives. Between the conclusion of the 2023 legislative session and the convening of the 2024 session, Attorney General Anne Lopez met with key lawmakers to develop proposed language for a legalization bill that could gain the support of the administration and the legislature. This working group produced a 315-page draft bill, introduced in each chamber of the legislature as House Bill 2600 and Senate Bill 3335, respectively. Despite having played a key role in drafting the legislation, however, the attorney general’s office testified in early hearings that it “does not support the legalization of adult-use cannabis,” although the current legislation is a “good faith effort toward protecting the public welfare and is an improvement on previous bills that have been heard by the legislature.” Reason Foundation has offered recommendations for improvement to successive cannabis legalization proposals in Hawaii. Several of these recommendations were adopted by Senate committees during the 2023 legislative session. Reason Foundation has also reviewed the provisions of Senate Bill 3335, as amended, and submitted recommendations for improvement. This brief goes beyond those recommendations and provides key background on the Hawaiian marijuana market and considerations for market structure and tax policy. Cannabis consumers are price-sensitive and have many options for purchasing cannabis. Prices and availability within the licensed cannabis industry can strongly influence the decisions of both producers and consumers to either participate in this industry or engage in illicit cannabis activity. In California, high taxes and a lack of legal sellers resulted in roughly two-thirds of cannabis demand being satisfied by the illicit market six years after legalization. The prevalence of illicit sales also negatively affects state tax collections, as only a minority of cannabis transactions are legal and subject to taxation. California has recently begun to take corrective action to lower the tax-induced price disparity between licensed and illicit goods, but Hawaiian lawmakers can circumvent the rise of large illicit markets with an appropriate market design. 

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 18p.

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

In the wake of the 2018 Farm Bill, which legalized hemp and its derivatives across the country, an unexpected flood of hemp-derived cannabinoid products hit the market and has sparked a whirlwind of interest—and concern—among state lawmakers. Unlike marijuana, which for now remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law, hemp-derived cannabinoids, such as cannabidiol (CBD) and delta-8 THC, occupy a murkier legal and regulatory landscape. This ambiguity, along with a lack of guidance from federal authorities, has left states grappling with how to ensure consumer safety, prevent underage access, facilitate interstate commerce, and support existing marijuana markets. The growing popularity of hemp-derived products has stimulated significant legislative attention in recent years, with over 90 regulatory proposals introduced in state legislatures in 2024 alone and 14 states adopting restrictions or prohibitions to some degree. A small but growing number of states have sought to legalize and regulate intoxicating hemp derivatives as general consumer goods, similar to alcoholic beverages or tobacco, or by incorporating them into their existing regulations governing medical or recreational marijuana. Yet, the continued proliferation and evolution of hemp-derived cannabinoid products has exposed significant gaps in existing regulatory paradigms. State regulations governing hemp products vary widely and are unevenly enforced, creating a patchwork of rules that can change dramatically from one state to the next. Unlike the market for marijuana, which has remained largely intrastate due to federal prohibition, federally-legal hemp products can cross state lines more freely. This has resulted in a marketplace where consumers face an increasingly confusing array of products of uncertain quality while businesses must navigate a shifting and uncertain regulatory environment. Additionally, lawmakers and regulators must continually update or amend rules in response to the emergence of new products, consumer behaviors, and industry dynamics. This piecemeal approach leaves consumers at risk, strains state resources, and hampers the ability for even willing actors to comply with state rules. This paper advocates for a cohesive approach to regulating hemp cannabinoid products that includes action by both federal and state policymakers. Our paper presents a series of recommendations for both federal and state authorities aimed at harmonizing standards across testing, labeling, packaging, and taxation for all cannabis products. By implementing these measures, states can enhance compliance and market competitiveness, reduce costs, and ensure consumer safety as both marijuana and hemp markets evolve. Ensuring consumer safety and minimizing youth access to potentially intoxicating products can also be achieved through state regulations that differentiate between high-THC and low-THC hemp products. We recommend states adopt labeling standards by which high THC product labels must provide detailed potency disclosures and risk warnings, while low THC products may adhere to general consumer goods standards. Consistent advertising restrictions across all cannabis products will also avoid bias based on the source of cannabinoids. The disparity in tax and regulatory burdens between marijuana and hemp products also fosters an uncompetitive landscape between the two product categories. High costs in state-regulated marijuana markets, such as those in California, push consumers toward cheaper alternatives, including both illicit marijuana or less-regulated hemp. To level the playing field, states should reduce the tax and compliance costs imposed on legal marijuana businesses, aligning them more closely with those for hemp producers. Imposing a single, uniform excise tax on all intoxicating cannabis products would simplify the tax system and reduce incentives for consumers to seek cheaper, illicit options. Restrictive licensing frameworks for marijuana businesses also contribute to its competitive disadvantage compared to hemp, limiting market entry, innovation, and consumer access, with the artificial scarcity raising prices and pushing consumers toward alternatives. In contrast, intoxicating hemp products can be produced in any state, shipped to a variety of retailers, and sold directly to consumers even in states without legal marijuana sales. This dynamic distorts the market in favor of hemp products, sometimes sold under transient branding and lacking clear originating information for the producer, which consumers might not choose if legal marijuana were more affordable or available. Regulators ought to be aware of who is selling intoxicating cannabis products, but regulatory schemes should not push market participants toward the hemp market merely because marijuana licensing is too costly or unavailable. We recommend states adopt a middle ground approach between overly-restrictive marijuana licensing regimes and the lack of any such framework for hemp. In particular, we suggest state law at least require hemp producers to register with state regulatory authorities while also drastically reducing both financial and non-financial barriers to entry into the marijuana market. This may include allowing any retailer who can demonstrate competence over inventory management for age-gated products to become eligible to retail both hemp cannabinoid and marijuana products. Finally, to fully realize the potential of a national cannabis market, particularly in light of the emerging hemp derivatives sector, states must also permit the interstate sale of marijuana products. As these authors argued in a prior paper, existing bans on out-of-state marijuana products are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and exacerbate the competitive advantage hemp currently enjoys. State lawmakers should agree to remove bans on the import of marijuana and allow state-licensed producers to export to purchasers in other states. In addition, lawmakers should take steps to align packaging, labeling, and testing protocols to facilitate a robust and legal interstate market. The rapidly evolving cannabis industry presents both opportunities and challenges for state regulators. By adopting a more unified and flexible approach to both hemp and marijuana regulation, states can enhance market competitiveness, reduce costs, and protect consumers. Embracing these recommendations will position states to lead in the burgeoning cannabis sector while ensuring consumer safety and market integrity

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 85p.

By Andy Hochstetler1,2, David J. Peters1, Kyle Burgason1, Jeff Bouffard1, Glenn Sterner III3, Shannon Monnat

Introduction: The goal of this project was to identify rural jurisdictions with high drug overdose rates and collaborate with resourced mentors to create law enforcement intelligence responses to local opioid problems. Methods: The first part of the strategy was to control for known contributors to opioid death that are largely beyond the control of law enforcement, and thereby focus on jurisdictions that are outliers in terms of drug problems. (Work products include a Non-Metropolitan County Opioid Overdose Calculator that allows one to examine how demographics and other county conditions affect overdose risk.) Use of maps of drug overdose deaths identified high overdose places by drug type with a classification technique to group places with like drug problems (latent profile analysis) and a multiple regression data analysis to identify outliers. A survey of law enforcement agencies provided an understanding of intelligence resources available in rural areas and agencies. This information informed recruitment of enthusiastic participant agencies. A small scale, intelligence strategy appropriate to resource deprived, rural departments was developed in collaboration with participating agencies, leaving them great flexibility in design. Evaluation of outcomes included a survey, qualitative interviews providing anecdotal feedback, and official data that each department had decided would speak to successful implementation. Conclusions: Variables significantly predicting death rates include population, indicators of ethnic diversity, natural resource amenities, and labor market characteristics. Lagged indicators of drug deaths and prescribing rates are the most consistently significant and convincing block of variables as predictors of current death. The most successful departments implemented efforts based on what they had learned in previous collaborations with better resourced areas, where efforts led to arrests and judges supported use of intelligence in court proceedings, and either information sharing or use of electronic surveillance was supported such as using cell phone opening software. Also, closed network iPads were used in relation to controlled buys, search warrants, pre and post raids, evidence and picture recording during searches, overdose mapping, surveillance photos and messaging to the narcotics officer, confidential informant files and referencing files, and notes from scenes. ODMAP can inform efforts but proved difficult to use on mobile devices, lagging in time, and imprecise to use as daily actionable intelligence. Funds can be well spent in rural places, but investments in departments with little resource slack, lacking in administrative capacity, and where there are few personnel or hours of investment to spare are risky and make for difficult collaborations. Analytics and predictive problem solving are near impossible. Therefore, immediate and accessible intelligence for patrol officers without investment in analytics likely should be the goal.

Ames, IA: Iowa State University, 2023. 71p.

By Elizabeth Hacker, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked & Amit Timilsina

This research paper explores the findings from semi-structured interviews conducted with business owners operating spa and massage parlours, khaja ghars (snack shops), cabin/hostess bars, dance bars, and dohoris (folk-dance bars) in Kathmandu. It explores business owners’ perspectives on the day-to-day running of their businesses; the risks and stressors they face; their aspirations and motivations; and, where possible, their rationale for working with children, and the types of relationships they have with them.In addition to generating business-level evidence, the research provided evidence on a series of three business owner-led Action Research Groups, which began in February 2022 and continued until September 2023. These groups have generated theories of change, and will test and evaluate solutions to shift the system away from WFCL.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 6, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies

By Elizabeth Hacker, Kriti Bhattarai, Ranjana Sharma, Jody Aked, Bhujel, S. , Danny Burns, Mariah Cannon, Deshar, L. , Anita K.C., Pragya Lamsal, Barsha Luitel, Sudhir Malla, Mishra, N. , Rayamajhi, D. , Shakya, A. , Sherpa, P. , Kapil Shrestha & Amit Timilsina

Spanning five years, the focus of the CLARISSA programme in Nepal was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, with particular attention given to the informal economy where the worst forms of child labour are prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, in Nepal, 12 Participatory Action Research Groups of children and business owners spent between 12 and 18 months learning from action to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about WFCL in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour, their lived experience of it, and the businesses in which they work. With a focus on both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour, this paper aims to further understanding of the reasons why children have to work and why businesses employ children. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in and the neighbourhoods where they live. This paper synthesises the detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why worst forms of child labour occur in Kathmandu’s adult entertainment sector, and what can be done about it.

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 18,  Brighton: Institute of Development Studies,  2024. 74p.

By Jody Aked, Danny Burns and A.K.M. Maksud  

CLARISSA (Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South‑Eastern Asia), a research programme on worst forms of child labour (WFCL), aims to identify, evidence, and promote effective multi-stakeholder action to tackle the drivers of WFCL in selected supply chains in Bangladesh and Nepal. Spanning five years, the programme’s focus in Bangladesh was on identifying the system dynamics of WFCL in Dhaka’s leather industry, and particularly the informal economy, where WFCL is prevalent. In addition to extensive participatory and qualitative research inquiry, 13 participatory action research groups of children and business owners spent 12–18 months learning about actions to reduce WFCL and its impact. The Action Research component makes the CLARISSA programme unique in the child labour space because it has learned about the dynamics of WFCL from action as well as inquiry. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports, and the Hard Labour website, which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper synthesises this detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens in Dhaka’s leather industry and what can be done about it. This paper synthesises what the CLARISSA programme learned about child labour in the leather industry in and around Dhaka, Bangladesh. It looks at children’s pathways into child labour and their lived experience of it, alongside the small leather businesses they work in. The aim was to understand why children have to work and why the businesses employ children, looking at both the supply and demand dynamics of child labour. The CLARISSA programme has produced multiple research reports and the Hard Labour website,2 which reproduces some of the stories about children’s lives, their days, the businesses they work in, and the neighbourhoods they live in. This paper looks across this rich and detailed evidence landscape to draw analytical conclusions about why WFCL happens and what can be done about it.   

CLARISSA Research and Evidence Paper 11, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2024. 70p.  

By Jorge García Hombrados and Lindsey Novak  

A sizable share of marriages in several Asian and African countries are initiated by the man abducting the woman he wishes to wed. In this paper, we use quantitative and qualitative methods to characterize the practice of abduction marriage in Ethiopia. We first present the results from in-depth qualitative surveys with community leaders and abducted women in the Gambella region of Ethiopia to gain a deeper understanding of how the practice functions in these communities. These interviews suggest that abduction is typically used to overcome the refusal of the woman’s family. Second, we use Demographic and Health Survey along with ethnographic data to characterize women and ethnic groups affected by this practice in Ethiopia. Finally, we empirically examine the central hypothesis about the persistence of this practice and find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that men often use abduction to improve bargaining power in marriage negotiations and reduce the size of the bride price payment. Specifically, we demonstrate that droughts—a proxy for income shocks in this setting— increase the probability of abduction marriage only for women from ethnic groups that traditionally exchange a bride price

Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economics . 2024. 50p.

By Stephen Reimer and Matthew Redhead

Numerous deadly terrorist attacks across Europe – from the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris and the Manchester Arena bombing of 2016 to the far-right firearms assault in Hanau, Germany in early 2020 – demonstrate that self-activating terrorism (sometimes referred to as lone actor or small cell terrorism) has become a major security concern for the continent. Much of the current ‘conventional wisdom’ around these kinds of actors assumes that terrorist financing and a counterterrorist financing (CTF) response are not relevant to this growing threat. Reports of attacks involving little to no preparation or financial resourcing have shaped a false perception that self-activator activity produces no usable financial intelligence. This has generated a high degree of unease among both CTF professionals in law enforcement, whose role it is to use legal investigatory powers to apprehend terrorists and would-be terrorists, and practitioners in the financial services sector, whose controls and instruments are designed to identify and report abuse of the financial system by terrorists planning attacks. The natural fear is that if the private sector cannot produce the kind of financial intelligence required, then law enforcement cannot do its job as effectively as it might. In light of this, the European Commission commissioned RUSI Europe to carry out this research study as part of Project CRAAFT, which seeks to answer two related research questions: 

• How do self-activating terrorists operating in Europe conduct their financial attack preparations? 
   

• How should the CTF regime be changed to meet this pervasive terrorist threat? 

For evidence, the research team reviewed relevant academic and policy literature and credible media reports, conducted 37 semi-structured interviews with relevant experts, reviewed 106 cases of successful and disrupted self-activated attacks in Europe between January 2015 and November 2020, and carried out three in-depth case study analyses. 

RUSI Occasional Paper, May 2021 51p.   

By Yanwen Wang, Jacquelyn Gilbreath , Lynne Mock

While drug crime-related criminal legal system and victim costs reached $113 billion across the United States in 2007, just $14.6 billion was spent on treating substance use disorder (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014). Due, in part, to drug crimes, many U.S. citizens are under correctional supervision, with 1 in 66 adults being on probation or parole in 2020 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2021). In Illinois, 67,587 individuals were on probation in 2020 (Administrative Offices of the Illinois Courts, 2021) and 26,426 were on parole (Illinois Department of Corrections, 2020). The supervision population rate of substance use is estimated to be two to three times higher than that of the general population, with nearly half of the people under community supervision having a substance use disorder (PEW Charitable Trusts, 2018). The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority’s Adult Redeploy Illinois (ARI) program was established by the Crime Reduction Act of 2009 to provide financial incentives to local jurisdictions for programs that divert justice-involved individuals from state prisons by providing community-based supervision and individualized services. While researchers have evaluated ARI, models used in some jurisdictions (DeLong & Reichert, 2016; Kroner, et al., 2021; Mock et al., 2017; Reichert et al., 2016), research on ARI client outcomes related to the impact of drug testing is limited. The research goals for this study included: • Quantitatively examining all local ARI program drug test data, including tested drugs, drug test frequencies, and drug test results. • Systematically examining how ARI drug testing contributes to the possibility of revocation including other factors such as age, sex, and race. • Proposing recommendations for better program practice to reduce the rate of revocation. This study sought to answer the following research questions: 1. How is drug testing being practiced and observed in ARI in terms of its frequency, pass rates, and tested drugs? 2. Does drug testing have a significant impact on ARI participant outcomes when controlling for demographic variables? The study included 53,159 records of 1,055 individuals collected from October 3, 2011, to June 20, 2019. The median number of drug tests per individual was 19, and the median of the average days between drug tests was 10 days. The most frequently tested drugs also had the highest positive results: heroin (32%), marijuana/THC (30%), cocaine/crack (14%), alcohol (10%), and other opiates (8%). Logistic regression analyses were used to determine what demographic, drug testing, and criminal justice variables predicted program outcomes of completion or revocation. Among the demographic variables, only age predicted program outcomes. Neither sex nor race emerged as significant program outcome predictors. Drug test positivity rates predicted revocation, as well as drug test frequency (number of times an individual was tested) and average number of days between the drug tests. i Overall, the average drug positivity rate was 29% and most tests were passed with no drug found. Most successful clients who were older women at medium to medium-high recidivism risk and whom tested monthly with lower test positivity rates. Those most likely to experience program revocation were younger men who tested several times per month with higher test positivity rates during their program tenure. Graphing the programs by test positivity, number of tests, and frequency of tests suggests that individuals enrolled in some programs had higher test positivity rates (>50%) and were subject to less frequent drug tests than other programs. This study focuses on drug test outcomes, however, it also would be worth exploring data on drug testing rewards, sanctions, and requirements for program completion and their impacts on program outcomes.   

Chicago:  Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority., 2022. 33p 

By Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg

This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.

Journal of Peace ResearchVolume 61, Issue 4, July 2024, Pages 673-693

By Peter Leasure, Maria M. Orsini and Dexter Ridgway

The current paper builds upon previous research and seeks to estimate the likelihood of a drug arrest/violation across race/ethnicity and gender using data from the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Research seeking to identify disparities is important as appropriate policy interventions to address concerns about inequities can only be soundly explored after the identification of any disparities. This paper begins with a discussion of the data and analytic strategy. In the subsequent section, results are presented. It is critical for readers to understand that this study only seeks to identify if racial/ethnic disparities in drug arrests/violations exist and does not seek to identify the underlying causes of any disparities. Therefore, any results of this study should not be used to imply that the enforcement practices of the Ohio State Highway Patrol are discriminatory in any way. 

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 880, Drug Enforcement and Policy Center, September 2024, 

By Meghan M. O'Neil and Peter Leasure

This study explored, among persons undergoing drug treatment, whether one’s likelihood of possessing any felony charge differed depending upon their primary drug of choice. The results showed that individuals in drug treatment who reported cocaine or heroin/opioids as their primary drug of choice had significantly higher probabilities of having a felony charge than those who reported alcohol as their primary drug of choice.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 878,

By Sherry, Suzanna

Last October, progressive Jews were shocked by the raw antisemitism displayed by their erstwhile allies on the political left. After Hamas terrorists tortured, raped, or murdered more than 1200 Israeli civilians and took some 200 civilians hostage, some progressives – especially on college campuses – celebrated. They chanted the Palestinian mantra “from the river to the sea,” seeking to erase Israel (and Jews) from the face of the earth. The number of antisemitic incidents on campus soared, coming from both students and faculty. A Stanford lecturer forced Jewish students to the back of the classroom and labeled them “colonizers.” Jewish students had to barricade themselves inside a library at Cooper Union, and Jewish students at MIT were told by faculty to avoid the university’s main lobby for their own safety. Many university presidents who had previously sent out campus-wide emails condemning the murder of George Floyd, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the overruling of Roe v. Wade, and countless other world events suddenly discovered the Kalven Principles and claimed it would be inappropriate for them to take sides, or issued weak statements about how the situation in the Middle East was complicated. This double standard continued as some universities responded to student calls for genocide of Jews by invoking principles of free speech, principles that had been notably ignored when the speech in question was directed at other groups. Most campus DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) offices, especially at the most elite universities, had nothing to say about the surging antisemitism. This essay explains why no one should have been shocked, or even mildly surprised, by the progressive response to the massacre. Progressive or “woke” culture –as exemplified by critical race theory, anti-racism of the Ibram X. Kendi variety, and, especially on college campuses, the DEI juggernaut – is necessarily and inevitably antisemitic at its core. That these related movements have now exposed their antisemitism publicly is no surprise: antisemitism is bred in their bones.

FIU Law Review from Vol. 25 to Vol. 19, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 24-4, 2024. 

By Rupert Horsley

This report details the key trends and developments in human smuggling in Libya in 2023. In large degree, the year was one of continuity with the patterns seen in 2022. Over the course of the year, for example, 77 470 migrants departed the Libyan coast, only marginally higher than 2022’s figure of 75 500.1 Furthermore, hybrid migration, in which migrants travel to Libya regularly or semi-regularly before attempting the sea crossing to Europe, accounted for an estimated 75% of these departures, also roughly similar to the proportion recorded in 2022. Many of the migrants involved in hybrid journeys first arrived in Libya at Benina airport in the east of the country. This indicates the increasing importance of eastern Libya to human smuggling writ large. In addition to the migrant arrivals at Benina airport, eastern Libya also saw a dramatic rise in departures from the coastal areas in and around Tobruk in 2023, with some 40% of sea crossings in the first half of the year taking place from there. Some, though not all, of the migrants leaving from the east coast had arrived in Benina. While heightened enforcement by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) suppressed departures from the Tobruk hub in the second half of 2023, the body reportedly continued to allow Benina to be used as the main air travel arrival point for hybrid migration for the rest of the year. Thus, the LAAF clearly emerged as one of the main actors influencing hybrid migration in Libya in 2023. Following the shutdown of the Tobruk system, hybrid migration sea crossings were displaced to the west coast. By August, departures from this area had increased significantly and there were reports of migrants accumulating in warehouses in several hubs. In October, a notably large series of departures from Zuwara occurred at a remarkable rate. Increased departures from the west coast indicate that entrenched smuggling networks remain ready to seize opportunities. Given the political and security fragmentation of the region, these networks are likely to underpin the resilience of human smuggling in Libya for the foreseeable future. A notable element that remained marginal in 2023 was trans-Saharan smuggling through Libya. This was once a major route for migrants departing from Libya, but has declined significantly since 2017/18 due to insecurity and migrant abuse in Libya and law enforcement action in downstream countries. One of the few significant developments was the relatively moderate but growing number of Sudanese refugees fleeing the civil war in that country. However, this was not substantial enough to drive systematic changes in the dynamics of overland human smuggling. Similarly, Sudanese nationals did not leave the Libyan coast in large numbers. This is the latest GI-TOC monitoring report on human smuggling in Libya. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2017, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Libya, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.2   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 36p.

By Mark McMullen

Although it is particularly pronounced in Oregon, there is no question that the fentanyl epidemic is imposing severe economic costs across the nation. The current report quantifies some of these costs and describes the state policy environment. Public policy regarding drug use is evolving rapidly in Oregon as we speak. As with all CSI does, the primary goal of this report is to educate and inform Oregonians on policy issues such as this that impact their lives. Key Findings • The economic cost of Oregon’s fentanyl crisis is more than $31 billion annually, up from $5.88 billion in 2017. • Enough fentanyl was seized last year to kill every Oregonian more than 20 times over. • Most western states have seen above-average growth in fentanyl use during recent years. Even so, Oregon’s experience stands out relative to its neighbors. Since the pandemic began, fentanyl-related overdose deaths in Oregon have increased by over 1,000%, more than in any other state. Alaska’s experience is the only one that even comes close. • Although Oregon’s decriminalization experiment cannot be blamed for all the disproportionate local impact of the fentanyl epidemic, it is clearly playing a role. When decriminalization went into effect in February 2021, Oregon ranked 38th out of 48 states with available data in the rate of fentanyl related overdose deaths. By January 2024, Oregon’s rank rose to 13th. • Many voters and policymakers quickly experienced regrets associated with the decriminalization effort and are making some efforts to improve the law. During the 2023 legislative session, legislators enacted House Bill 4002, which created a new misdemeanor for simple drug possession. The new law gives leeway to counties on how to implement it locally, and we are likely to learn much as the different programs evolve.

Greenwood Village, CO: Common  Sense Institute 2024. 

By Shiying Zhang, Ao Huang

There have been numerous debates regarding the educational practice of grade retention and social promotion. This study analyzes the effect of an exogenous policy reform in China that abolishes grade retention during the compulsory education period. We exploit the staggered introduction of the reform across provinces and estimate a flexible difference-in-differences model that can capture the effect of exposure to the reform in different grades. The results indicate that abolishing grade retention significantly decreases the probability of junior high school completion, and most of these negative impacts are concentrated among students exposed to the reform in early grades. Moreover, rural children and boys are more likely to be negatively affected by the reform. Finally, we find that the reform increases the likelihood of later criminal behavior in early adulthood.

Unpublished paper, 2024.