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Designing the Swedish Crime Harm Index: An Evidence-Based Strategy. 

By Fredrik Kärrholm, Peter Neyroud & John Smaaland

Research Question -  Which method for deriving a Crime Harm Index (Policing 10:171 183, 2016) for Sweden from criminal justice sources offers the best evidence for providing a sensitive indicator of differences in harm levels across offence categories? Data The number of days of imprisonment for each offence category associated with five different kinds of scales were extracted and compared: consensus by an expert panel of judges, the statutory maximum penalties, statutory minimum penalties, the average of maximum and minimum penalties and the average of actual sentences imposed in a recent time period for each crime type. Unlike the UK, for which the Cambridge Crime Harm Index draws on sentencing guidelines, Sweden has no such guidelines to offer. Methods - The data were compared for sensitivity defined as the difference in length of imprisonment days between high and low severity crimes, as well as other characteristics of the data sources. Findings - Given the available alternatives, the sentencing data average of actual sentences handed down by crime type provided the greatest reliability and sensitivity across the penalties for offences of high and low severity. Applying that method to both crime trends and crime mapping produces substantially different results from counting all crimes with equal weight and can be used by police and others to allocate resources with greater precision in relation to harm prevention. Conclusions - On both empirical and normative grounds, the average sentences in a recent time period for each crime category provides the most sensitive and democratic method for establishing an officially recognized Swedish Crime Harm Index.  

Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing 4(1): 15–33. 2021.  

Money Laundering as a Service: Investigating Business‑Like Behavior in Money Laundering Networks in the Netherlands

By Jo‑Anne Kramer,  Arjan A. J. Blokland, ·Edward R. Kleemans, Melvin R. J. Soudijn

In order to launder large amounts of money, (drug) criminals can seek help from financial facilitators. According to the FATF, these facilitators are operating increasingly business like and even participate in professional money laundering networks. This study examines the extent to which financial facilitators in the Netherlands exhibit business-like charac teristics and the extent to which they organize themselves in money laundering networks. We further examine the relationship between business-like behavior and individual money launderers’ position in the social network. Using police intelligence data, we were able to analyze the contacts of 198 financial facilitators who were active in the Netherlands in the period 2016–2020, all having worked for drug criminals. Based on social network analysis, this research shows that financial facilitators in the Netherlands can be linked in extensive money laundering networks. Based on the facilitators’ area of expertise, roughly two main types of professional money laundering networks can be discerned. Some subnetworks operate in the real estate sector, while others primarily engage in underground banking. Furthermore, the application of regression models to predict business-like behavior using individual network measures shows that facilitators with more central positions in the net work and those who collaborate with financial facilitators from varying expertise groups tend to behave more business-like than other financial facilitators

Kramer JA, Blokland AAJ, Kleemans ER & Soudijn MRJ 2023. Money laundering as a service: Investigating business-like behavior in money laundering networks in the Netherlands. Trends in Organized Crime.

The Effect of Anti-Money Laundering Policies: an Empirical Network Analysis

By Peter Gerbrands, Brigitte Unger, Michael Getzner & Joras Ferwerda 

Aim

There is a growing literature analyzing money laundering and the policies to fight it, but the overall effectiveness of anti-money laundering policies is still unclear. This paper investigates whether anti-money laundering policies affect the behavior of money launderers and their networks.

Method

With an algorithm to match clusters over time, we build a unique dataset of multi-mode, undirected, binary, dynamic networks of natural and legal persons. The data includes ownership and employment relations and associated financial ties and is enriched with criminal records and police-related activities. The networks of money launderers, other criminals, and non-criminal individuals are analyzed and compared with temporal social network analysis techniques and panel data regressions on centrality measures, transitivity and assortativity indicators, and levels of constraint.

Findings

We find that after the announcement of the fourth EU anti-money laundering directive in 2015, money laundering networks show a significant increase in the use of foreigners and corporate structures. At the individual level, money launderers become more dominant in criminal clusters (increased closeness centrality). This paper shows that (the announcement of) anti-money laundering policies can affect criminal networks and how such effects can be tested.

EPJ Data Science11(1), [15]

Estimating Money Laundering Flows with a Gravity Model‑Based Simulation 

By Joras Ferwerda, Alexander van Saase, Brigitte Unger & Michael Getzner

 It is important to understand the amounts and types of money laundering flows, since they have very different effects and, therefore, need different enforcement strategies. Countries that mainly deal with criminals laundering their proceeds locally, need other measures than countries that mainly deal with foreign illegal investments or dirty money just flowing through the country. This paper has two main contributions. First, we unveil the country preferences of money launderers empirically in a systematic way. Former money laundering estimates used assumptions on which country characteristics money launderers are looking for when deciding where to send their ill‑gotten gains. Thanks to a unique dataset of transactions suspicious of money laundering, provided by the Dutch Institute infobox Criminal and Unexplained Wealth (iCOV), we can empirically test these assumptions with an econometric gravity model estimation. We use this information for our second contribution: iteratively simulating all money laundering flows around the world. This allows us, for the first time, to provide estimates that distinguish between three different policy challenges: the laundering of domestic crime proceeds, international investment of dirty money and money just flowing through a country  

Ferwerda J, van Saase A, Unger B & Getzner M 2020. Estimating money laundering flows with a gravity model-based simulation. Scientific Reports 10(1).

Dangerous Waters: The Economic Toll of Piracy on Maritime Shipping

By Renato Molina, Juan Carlos Villaseñor-Derbez, Gavin McDonald, Grant McDermott

Maritime transport has been historically susceptible to piracy. While broad assessments suggest the impact of modern piracy causes large economic losses, the literature lacks quantification of the magnitude of the costs and the behavioral responses that underpin them. Here, we combine theory and a unique geospatial dataset combining more than 25 million shipping voyages and thousands of pirate encounters across the globe to find that pirate encounters lead to significant and costly avoidance measures. Shippers modify their path along a route to avoid locations with known pirate encounters. This increases voyage distance and duration, which lead to significant increases in fuel and labor costs estimated to be over US$1.5 billion/year. Additionally, emission of CO2, NOx, and SOx due to increased fuel consumption results in environmental damages valued at US$5.1 billion per year. Together, our results provide the first global estimates linking the presence of pirates to individual behaviour and aggregate transportation cost, as well as its environmental impact, with major implications for the shipping industry and maritime security at a global scale.

CESifo Working Paper No. 11077, Munich: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo , 2024. 72p.

Rethinking Peace and Violence from the Favelas

By Ingri Bøe Buer

This article reconsiders peace and security from the perspectives of community leaders, educators and activists in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2019–2020. Through a critical lens, it argues that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro resembles a form of new wars where the state is a major producer of insecurity. It questions the meaning of peace and top-down pacification processes in a city where the favelas, since their origin, have been considered dangerous areas needing to be pacified and controlled. The article introduces favela peace formation as a concept to describe alternative processes working to reduce the inter-sectional forms of violence in these communities: non-violent, locally legitimate peace processes working to slowly construct a positive, sustainable peace. To conclude, it discusses how favela peace formation presents a way of imagining peace as ‘care’ instead of ‘order’ in response to the state’s violent peace as ‘control’

Peacebuilding, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2024.2354083

Drug & Alcohol Related Crime Trends, 2013-2022 

 By The Idaho Statistical Analysis Center

In 2022, the overall crime rate in Idaho, as measured by offenses reported to the Idaho Incident-Based Reporting System (IIBRS), was at its lowest in years. The overall offense rate in 2022 was 55.2 offenses per 1,000 residents (compared to 97.4 in 2005, a 43% decrease and the lowest in that span). However, the rate of society crimes, which includes drug offenses, increased 47% in the same period. Additionally, drug offenses accounted for a quarter (25%) of all offenses reported in 2022, compared to 9% in 2005. This research brief takes a closer look at substance-related crime in Idaho between 2013 and 2022, the most recent 10-year period for which data is available. 10-year Offense Trend Drug and Alcohol Offense Rates Between 2013 and 2022, the total rate of drug and alcohol offenses increased by just 3.4% (from 17.6 offenses per 1,000 residents to 18.2), remaining relatively stable compared to the overall crime trends noted above. However, this stability is due to diverging trends in drug offenses (drug/narcotic violations, drug equipment violations) versus alcohol offenses (driving under the influence, or DUI1; drunkenness; liquor law violations). The drug offense rate increased 31% between 2013 and 2022 (from 10.3 to 13.5), while the alcohol offense rate decreased 36% (from 7.3 to 4.7). 

Meridian, ID: Idaho Statistical Analysis Center, 2024. 22p.

Immigration Policies as Political Determinants of Alcohol and Drug Misuse Among US-Born Latinos 

By Pinedo M  , Montero-Zamora P , Pasch KE , Schwartz SJ 

Background: The role of immigration policies as political determinants of health among US-born Latinos is signifi- cantly understudied. Immigration policies can produce immigration-related stressors that have ‘spill over’ effects on the health behaviors of US-born Latinos. However, less is known about how immigration-related stressors relate to substance misuse among US-born Latinos. Methods: 1,784 US-born Latinos were recruited via web-panels in September 2021 to complete an online ques- tionnaire. Inclusion criteria included: (1) self-identifying as Latino; (2) born in the US; and (3) being 18 years of age or older. Participants were asked 14-items related to immigration-related stressors and past-year substance use behaviors. Dependent variables included past-year: heavy drinking, high intensity drinking, illicit drug use, prescription drug misuse, cannabis use, cocaine use, methamphetamine use, prescription sedative misuse, and prescription opioid misuse. Two separate multivariable logistic regression models were conducted for each out- come to investigate associations between (1) specific immigration-related stressors and substance misuse; and (2) experiencing greater (vs. fewer) number of immigration-related stressors and substance misuse. Results: On average, US-born Latinos reported experiencing 3 immigration-related stressors. In multivariable analyses, being fearful or worried about being detained for immigration reasons was associated with increased odds of engaging in heavy drinking, high intensity drinking, and illicit drug use. Having ever feared or worried about being potentially deported for immigration reasons and having ever witnessed or experienced an immi- gration raid was associated with high intensity drinking. Parental detentions and deportations in childhood were independently associated with high intensity drinking, illicit drug use, and prescription drug misuse. Notably, greater number of immigration-related stressor experiences increased the odds of substance misuse. Conclusion: Punitive immigration and enforcement policies give rise to multiple stressors that may render US- born Latinos vulnerable to misusing substances as a way of coping. Policies and public health interventions aimed at preventing and treating substance misuse should consider how immigration policies impact the behaviors of US-born Latinos.

International Journal of Drug Policy, 106, 2022

The Cost Crisis and Crime in Scotland

By Safer Communities Directorate

Executive Summary

  • There is an ongoing cost of living crisis in Scotland, and the rest of the United Kingdom, which is characterised by higher energy costs, higher food and other household costs and real term pay decreases. This paper focuses on the relationship between this cost crisis and crime in Scotland.

  • The academic evidence is by no means conclusive in favour of a certain economic variable having a relationship with overall or total crime. This is an important finding as it dispels the idea that worsening economic conditions will inevitably result in a rise in crime.

  • Unlike the recessions of the 1980s, the 1990s and 2008 which brought periods of higher unemployment and decreasing inflation, the current cost crisis is characterised by increasing levels of inflation, combined with low levels of unemployment. Therefore, whilst the existing literature helps us to understand how previous economic shifts have impacted upon crime in the past, any attempts to use this literature to predict the impact of the cost crisis on crime is methodologically unadvisable. We must rely on present day data to monitor crime trends during this current period of cost crisis in Scotland.

  • Gross Domestic Product is too broad a measure when it comes to determining the impact of the economy on crime. Therefore, we must specify and explore how changes in specific economic variables impacts upon crime.

  • For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians explored the relationship between levels of unemployment in Scotland, all recorded crime, and some specific crime types from 1971 until the present day. The analysis found a strong positive linear correlation between unemployment and overall recorded crime, housebreaking and, theft of a motor vehicle. Considering forecasted increases in unemployment, this relationship is noteworthy.

  • We know from the academic evidence that relative falls in the wages of low wage workers increases rates of property and violent crime. This finding has present-day relevance given recent real-term falls in wages as a result of the cost crisis.

  • The academic evidence also tells us that increases in inequality and poverty rates increase the rates of property crime and violent crime. However, it is not yet clear how these two economic variables are being affected by the cost crisis and therefore if, and how, they may impact upon crime.

  • Non-economic factors play a significant role with regard to fluctuations in overall crime rates as well as rates of specific crime types and are impossible to precisely disentangle from the economic factors that impact upon crime. Such factors include the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of police officers, and population demographics.

  • For example, analysis undertaken by Scottish Government statisticians found a strong, positive, linear correlation between the proportion of young men (16-24) in the population and overall recorded crimes of housebreaking and theft of a motor vehicle. Population forecasts tell us that over the next 10 years the size of this group is projected to steadily increase.

  • This paper's case study on housebreaking further explores this phenomenon of economic and non-economic factors impacting upon the rates of specific crimes. The case study suggests that housebreaking, an acquisitive crime, may not be susceptible to the cost crisis. This contrasts with findings from the academic evidence review and suggests the presence of non-economic factors that are acting to limit any rise in housebreaking.

  • That being said, analysis demonstrates a rise in overall recorded crime and Crimes of Dishonesty that may be the result of cost crisis pressures. It is unclear, however, whether crime is simply returning to pre-pandemic levels. Of particular note is the large uplift in shoplifting, which increased by 21% in the year ending June 2023, when compared to the previous year.

  • With regard to next steps, a second occasional paper will be published in 2024 which will draw on the latest Police Recorded crime data and the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey data and will focus on the impact of the cost crisis on violent crime and domestic abuse in addition to revisiting the crime types identified in this paper.

Edinburgh: Scottish Government, Social Research, 2023. 28p.

The Logic of Criminal Territorial Control: Military Intervention in Rio de Janeiro

By Nicholas Barnes

How Do Organized criminal groups (OCGs) respond to military interventions intended to weaken and subdue them? In many cases, such crackdowns have proven counterproductive as OCGs militarize, engage in violence, and confront state forces directly. Existing studies have pointed to several explanations: inter-criminal competition, unconditional militarized approaches, and existing criminal governance arrangements. Much of this work, however, has focused on national, regional, or even municipal level variation and explanations. This article takes a micro-comparative approach based on 18 months of ethnographic research in a group of Rio de Janeiro favelas (impoverished and informal neighborhoods) divided between three drug trafficking gangs and occupied by the Brazilian military from 2014 to 2015. It argues that an active territorial threat from a rival is the primary mechanism leading OCGs to respond violently to military intervention. It also demonstrates that geographic patterns of recruitment play an important role in where OCG rivalries turn violent during intervention.

Comparative Political Studies 2022, Vol. 55(5) 789–831

Left Behind Corruption in Education and Health Services in Africa 

By Jamie Bergin

People with disabilities having to pay carers to carry them within health facilities. + Local leaders selecting undeserving service users for social protection support, at the expense of poor families who need it. + Officials colluding to put non-existent “ghost teachers” on the books of rural schools, to siphon off already scarce resources. + Women students being coerced into giving sexual favours to pass the next class, with no repercussions for the perpetrator. marginalised communities, Transparency International’s national chapters in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda and Zimbabwe conducted corruption risk assessments in these sectors as part of the Inclusive Service Delivery for Africa project. Each chapter selected and studied different functions within the two sectors, largely with an eye to services and operational areas that most impact women, girls and groups at risk of discrimination. What do all these examples have in common? The answer is an abuse of power for private gain, that is exclusionary of marginalised groups and deprives them of education and health care they are entitled to. Corruption undermines the equal access to quality education and health services. The result is the failure of states to uphold fundamental rights and meet basic needs – with women, girls and groups at risk of discrimination shouldering the impacts most severely. Corrupt practices and associated abuses of power deprive millions of people of the opportunities that well-functioning education and health institutions can provide. While this is clearly a human rights issue at the individual level, the aggregate impact on socio-economic development can be ruinous for societies straining to escape the traps of poverty. At the same time, corruption widens the equality gap faced by marginalised groups, and aggravates social exclusion. To better understand how in practice corruption obstructs access to health care and education for These national-level findings revealed stark common trends, pointing to a multitude of corruption risks occurring across the entire service delivery cycle.   

Berlin: Transparency International, 2024. 62p

Mapping a moral panic: News media narratives and medical expertise in public debates on safer supply, diversion, and youth drug use in Canada

By Liam Michaud a b, Gillian Kolla c d, Katherine Rudzinski e, Adrian Guta 

The ongoing overdose and drug toxicity crisis in North America has contributed momentum to the emergence of safer supply prescribing and programs in Canada as a means of providing an alternative to the highly volatile unregulated drug supply. The implementation and scale-up of safer supply have been met with a vocal reaction on the part of news media commentators, conservative politicians, recovery industry representatives, and some prominent addiction medicine physicians. This reaction has largely converged around several narratives, based on unsubstantiated claims and anecdotal evidence, alleging that safer supply programs are generating a “new opioid epidemic”, reflecting an emerging alignment among key institutional and political actors. Employing situational analysis method, and drawing on the policy studies and social science scholarship on moral panics, this essay examines news media coverage from January to July 2023, bringing this into dialogue with other existing empirical sources on safer supply (e.g. Coroner's reports, program evaluations, debates among experts in medical journals). We employ eight previously established criteria delineating moral panics to critically appraise public dialogue regarding safer supply, diverted medication, and claims of increased youth initiation to drug use and youth overdose. In detailing the emergence of a moral panic regarding safer supply, we trace historic continuities with earlier drug scares in Canadian history mobilized as tools of racialized poverty governance, as well as previous backlashes towards healthcare interventions for people who use drugs (PWUD). The essay assesses the claims of moral entrepreneurs against the current landscape of opioid use, diversion, and overdose among youth, notes the key role played by medical expertise in this and previous moral panics, and identifies what the convergence of these narratives materialize for PWUD and healthcare access, as well as the broader policy responses such narratives activate.

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 127, May 2024, 104423

Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Address Organised Environmental Crime in Africa

By Romi Sigsworth 

Artificial intelligence (AI) offers innovative solutions for addressing a range of illegal activities that impact Africa’s environment. This report explores how AI is being used in Africa to provide intelligence on organised environmental crime, craft tools to assess its impact, and develop methods to detect and prevent environmental criminal activities. It discusses the challenges and opportunities AI poses for policing environmental crime in Africa, and proposes recommendations that would allow AI-powered policing to make a real difference on the continent. Recommendations • African governments and organisations should invest in gathering large, local data sets to allow AI models to produce appropriate and relevant solutions. • Investments in digital and communication infrastructure need to be made across Africa to improve and expand access to and affordability of AI solutions. • Police forces across Africa should include technology and AI skills capacity building into their basic and professional development training curricula. • Guardrails should be established through legislation to protect data, ensure privacy where necessary, and regulate the use of AI. • Public-private partnerships must be strengthened for law enforcement agencies across Africa to receive the technology and training they need to effectively embed AI tools into their methodologies to combat environmental (and other) organised crime

Enact Africa 2024. 28p.

"The Obscenity Tightrope: Legal Analysis of Judicial Standards, Legal Moralism and Social Debate" 

By Arjun Punaji

India has risen as a global attraction, captivating audiences with its vibrant cinematic innovations, rich artistic heritage, and profound literary works. These very expressions, however, sometimes clash with the state's desire to follow expected moral codes. The government, wary of "immoral activities" within these creative mediums, prescribes certain norms and imposes penalties for non-compliance. One such contested area is "obscenity," a concept with criminal law repercussions. This paper delves into Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the concept of obscenity. I will analyse the current legal tests and thresholds for obscenity in light of a rapidly changing world that demands more liberal legislation. Since "obscenity" often aligns with "socially immoral codes," I will examine obscene material through the lens of legal moralism. This paper's main focus is to examine the sanctity and clarity of ‘contemporary community standard’ and also examine that does morality and decency have static meanings or changes over time. Though the ‘Contemporary Community Standard’ is a good law at present, and invoked this standard repeatedly, courts were unable to define and clarify what the contemporary community standard constitutes. My argument is that this standard is problematic and unconvincing since the ‘Contemporary community standard’ itself is highly subjective because within the same community, both conservative and liberal ideas meet and one’s ugliness may become another’s creativity and freedom of expression. Also, morality does not uniformly apply in the same society. What I ‘like’ and approve of material or content may be ‘disgusting’ to others and the ‘contemporary community’ belongs to all sections of society such as rich and poor, readers and illiterates, old and adult, conservatives, and liberals. Therefore, I examine this standard through a ‘legal moralism’ perspective. This includes exploring the famous arguments of Lord Devlin in his "The Enforcement of Morals" lecture, along with the counter-arguments presented by H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. Furthermore, we will investigate some of India's landmark (or controversial) obscenity cases. These cases often rely heavily on Western legal interpretations like the Hicklin Test, Miller Test, and the Contemporary Community Standard Test, without providing clear explanations for their application in the Indian context. This analysis aims to demonstrate why India needs to reevaluate its current legal tests in light of societal changes. Then I will propose the "harm principle" as a framework for regulating obscenity, advocating for a higher threshold for punishment. By taking a critical look at existing legal frameworks and advocating for a harm based approach, we can ensure that India's vibrant artistic expressions can flourish while upholding a sense of community decency.

National Law School of Indian University

Maritime Security: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

By Thomas Greminger and Nayef Al-Rodhan

Pirates have existed in different guises since ancient times, from Cilician pirates seizing olive oil cargoes from Roman ships to corsairs seeking spoils along North Africa’s Barbary Coast and buccaneers attacking Spanish treasure ships in the Caribbean. Currently the Gulf of Guinea is the world’s hotspot for maritime piracy. Over the last 15 years container ships, fishing vessels, and oil tankers in the region have been the targets of numerous armed attacks and kidnappings.

The past year has seen some positive developments regarding global maritime security. According to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) International Maritime Bureau (IMB), global piracy and armed robbery incidents are at their lowest recorded figure in three decades. The IMB’s last annual report showed a 32% drop in overall attacks in 2021 compared to 2020. These promising trends are also evident in the Gulf of Guinea. Of the 90 global piracy and armed robbery incidents reported between January and September 2022, 13 have been reported in the Gulf of Guinea region, compared to 27 over the same period in 2021. The decline in the number of reported incidents in West African waters should be welcomed, but this progress is likely to be short-lived unless the international community increases its focus on the region.

The threat level in the Gulf of Guinea region remains high, as highlighted by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2634 on Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, which was unanimously adopted in May 2022. Spearheaded by Ghana and Norway, the resolution expressed the UNSC’s deep concern about the “grave and persistent threat” posed by piracy and transnational organised crime in the Gulf of Guinea. The resolution correctly stressed that unless tackled head-on, piracy will continue to impede international security and navigation, and the sustainable development of states in the region. These challenges are particularly important given the Gulf of Guinea’s geopolitical significance.

Bordering 20 countries and with 6,000 kilometres of coastline, the Gulf of Guinea is a key shipping route for a region that relies heavily on imports. This is why the costs of piracy weigh so heavily on the region’s economic and trade potential, with direct and indirect costs estimated at US$1.925 billion annually for 12 Gulf of Guinea countries. Tackling piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will require both sustained political will at the national and regional levels and deeper and more effective cooperation among members of the international community. All sea-faring nations have a stake in improving the security of the region – including Switzerland, which assumes its seat on the UNSC at the start of 2023, with the aim of promoting global peace and security.

Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2022. 12p.

Morocco: Moroccans Drive an Increase through the Western Mediterranean Route

By Tasnim Abderrahim

Morocco is a key departure point for both local and foreign migrants embarking on irregular sea crossings to Europe. The country is strategically linked to Spain in particular through three main migratory pathways. These include the land passages into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, a maritime route to mainland Spain and a maritime route to the Canary Islands. Furthermore, substantial numbers of migrants cross in and out of Morocco over the border with Algeria.

In 2023, human smuggling trends in Morocco were broadly stable, although the dynamics differed by route. There was a significant rebound in movements from northern Morocco to Spain across the Alboran Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar. According to Frontex data, Moroccan arrivals in mainland Spain jumped from 4 307 in 2022 to 7 910 in 2023.1 Moroccan nationals dominated this route, as security measures restricted foreign migrants’ access to the north of the country.

This rise is especially notable given this heightened enforcement, which began during the COVID-19 pandemic and increased further following Spain’s endorsement of Morocco’s position on the Western Sahara conflict in 2022. Border controls along the northern coast remained tight in 2023 and security forces continued to crack down on smuggling networks. In addition, the government persisted in the forced transfer of undocumented migrants from the northern coastal areas to cities in the interior.

The other main northern Moroccan route to Spain, involving land crossings to Ceuta and Melilla, saw a dramatic drop in 2023. Only 467 arrivals were recorded from 1 January to 31 December, a 75% reduction compared to the same period in 2022.2 Despite this, persistent efforts to reach the enclaves continued, including attempts to climb over fences or swim around barriers, underscoring that the decline was largely due to heightened security operations by Spanish and Moroccan forces. To the south, in the Canary Islands, arrivals from Morocco rebounded slightly in 2023, after falling by almost a third between 2021 and 2022. This moderate increase appears to have been driven primarily by foreign migrants, as Moroccan arrivals decreased. Specifically, only 5 817 Moroccan migrants, the most easily identifiable of those departing from Morocco, arrived in the Canaries in 2023, down from 6 411 in 2022. This was likely due to heightened security and the perception among Moroccan migrants that the route was dangerous and costly, with an uncertain chance of success.

Finally, cross-border movement into Morocco from Algeria also continued. Although reliable estimates were limited, there were indications of a slight increase in arrivals through this route, particularly Algerians planning to attempt the sea crossing to the Spanish enclaves. Movement in the opposite direction, from Morocco to Algeria, also appeared to rise. This mainly involved Moroccans heading to Algeria’s north-west coast, from where smuggling to Spain is prevalent.

Over the course of 2023, irregular migration from and through Morocco was influenced by a combination of factors, with intensified enforcement playing a significant role. Morocco had moved to stem migratory flows in 2022, with the government orchestrating a structured crackdown on irregular migrants across the country. Throughout 2023, authorities continued to implement counter-migration measures, including restrictions on migrants’ mobility and the forced relocation of undocumented people.

Despite these efforts, poor economic prospects for both Moroccans and foreign migrants drove departures higher. In 2023, Morocco began to bounce back from the overlapping shocks the economy had experienced in the previous year, including a severe drought, rising commodity prices and the global economic slowdown, all of which derailed growth. However, despite the nascent recovery, many Moroccans continued to grapple with the effects of the successive economic blows that have been occurring since 2020, chiefly price hikes, which have strained the purchasing power of citizens and residents alike, especially low-income populations.

This is the latest Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) monitoring report on human smuggling in Morocco. It builds on the series of annual reports that has been issued since 2021, tracking the evolution of human smuggling in Morocco, as well as the political, security and economic dynamics that influence it.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 28p.

Chad: Breaking the Cycle of Farmer-Herder Violence

By The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Farmer-herder conflict in Chad has reached unprecedented levels during the political transition following the former president’s death in 2021, leaving more than 1,000 people dead and more than 2,000 injured. This violence is exacerbating the country’s perceived north-south divide.

Why does it matter? A growing number of cattle owners are from the north. The sedentary populations of the south and centre see the northerners as protected by the central authorities, fuelling resentment. The farmers’ grievances, sharpened by May’s disputed presidential election, could lead them to take the law into their own hands.

What should be done? President Mahamat Déby should make resolution of farmer-herder conflict a priority during his term. His government should provide security and impartial justice in the affected areas, involving residents in mediation efforts to help restore their confidence in the authorities.

New York: International Crisis Group, 2024. 24p.

A Systematic Review of the Extent of the Taliban and FARC’s Involvement and Profit from Drug Trade and Methods of Estimating Income from the Drug Trade

By Hamid Azizi and Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes

The drug trade has garnered significant attention as a critical funding source for various terrorist organisations. This systematic review summarises the existing empirical knowledge about the Taliban and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia’s (FARC) involvement, and profit from the drug trade, and methods of estimating drug trade revenue. Thirty-one studies were identified. Twenty-three about the Taliban, seven about the FARC, and one about both groups. Estimates of annual profit varied from US$19 to US$500 million for the Taliban and US$140 to US$3.5 billion for the FARC. Fourteen of the twenty-four studies about the Taliban provided an estimate and merely six studies discussed the methods used to generate those estimates. Among the eight studies about the FARC, four provided an estimate but one described the method employed. Studies used a variety of information sources. The review shows the need for caution regarding existing estimates and a more methodologically rigorous analysis of linkages.

Global Crime, 2024, VOL. 25, NO. 2, 122–155

Niger: Coup Reverses 2015. Human Smuggling Ban Among Major Political and Security Upheaval

By Alice Fereday

Niger’s location at the crossroads of key trans-Sahelian routes has positioned it at the heart of migratory flows for decades. The country’s role as a transit hub for migrants heading north towards Libya with the aim of reaching Europe has also attracted the focus of extensive international efforts to curb irregular migration. In 2023, however, it was the major political and security developments at national and regional levels that had the greatest impact on human smuggling in Niger. On 26 July, a military coup overthrew the president, Mohamed Bazoum, and transitional authorities were formed under the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland – CNSP). The military takeover resulted in the closure of the country’s borders with Benin and Nigeria, further complicating movement into Niger, which was already severely affected by growing insecurity in Burkina Faso and south-west Niger. Rather than preventing movement, however, the border closures led to an increased demand for smuggling services, particularly at the Benin border, from both migrants and those transporting commodities. By March 2024, the Nigerian border had reopened, while the Benin border remained closed at the time of writing. An even more significant change came in November, when the CNSP repealed the 2015 anti-smuggling law that had caused the collapse of the industry in northern Niger. This led to one of the most profound shifts in the dynamics of human smuggling since 2015. Since the repeal of the law, passeurs – the colloquial name in the Sahel for transporters involved in human smuggling – across the country have been able to transport foreign migrants legally. The effects were immediately felt in Agadez, which had been the main focus of anti-smuggling operations, resulting in the demise of its human smuggling economy in 2016. With the repeal of the law, departures to Libya have risen steadily since November, as have departures to Algeria. Rather than a sharp spike in foreign movements, the repeal appears to have caused steady, though not exponential, growth since November. Some of the key factors that influenced human smuggling before the legislation change remain in place, such as a preference for routes to Algeria and persistent challenges on regional routes to reach Niger. As a result, the migration landscape in the country is unlikely to return to what it resembled pre-2015. In particular, the westbound displacement of routes, which led to the increased use of Algeria as a transit country to reach Tunisia and to a lesser extent Morocco, is now firmly established and unlikely to shift back. Insecurity linked to the expansion of violent extremist groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and south-west Niger also remains a major constraint on regional mobility, and could further deteriorate amid continued political and security upheaval in the Sahel.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 38p.

A Community-Centric Perspective for Characterizing and Detecting Anti-Asian Violence-Provoking Speech

By Gaurav Verma, Rynaa Grover, Jiawei Zhou, Binny Mathew, Jordan Kraemer, Munmun De Choudhury, Srijan Kumar

Violence-provoking speech -- speech that implicitly or explicitly promotes violence against the members of the targeted community, contributed to a massive surge in anti-Asian crimes during the pandemic. While previous works have characterized and built tools for detecting other forms of harmful speech, like fear speech and hate speech, our work takes a community-centric approach to studying anti-Asian violence-provoking speech. Using data from ~420k Twitter posts spanning a 3-year duration (January 1, 2020 to February 1, 2023), we develop a codebook to characterize anti-Asian violence-provoking speech and collect a community-crowdsourced dataset to facilitate its large-scale detection using state-of-the-art classifiers. We contrast the capabilities of natural language processing classifiers, ranging from BERT-based to LLM-based classifiers, in detecting violence-provoking speech with their capabilities to detect anti-Asian hateful speech. In contrast to prior work that has demonstrated the effectiveness of such classifiers in detecting hateful speech (F1=0.89), our work shows that accurate and reliable detection of violence-provoking speech is a challenging task (F1=0.69). We discuss the implications of our findings, particularly the need for proactive interventions to support Asian communities during public health crises.

2024