By Laura Y. Calderón

Mexico had the most violent year in its history in 2019, reporting 29,406 intentional homicide cases, resulting in 34,588 individual victims.1 However, violence remains a highly focalized phenomenon in Mexico, with 23% of all intentional homicide cases concentrated in five municipalities and three major clusters of violence with homicide rates over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants. Following the national trend, the state of Guanajuato also had its most violent year in 2019, with one of its largest cities featured in the country’s top five most violent municipalities. This paper will analyze the surge in violence in Guanajuato in 2019, comparing the number of intentional homicide cases with the increasing problem of fuel theft in the state, and describing some of the state and federal government measures to address both issues. II. Background The central Mexican state of Guanajuato is a traditional agricultural-producing region, a major manufacturing hub, and a popular vacation and retirement destination for foreigners. Considered a relatively wealthy state and constituting 4.4% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Guanajuato boasts the sixth-largest economy in Mexico. The state also holds second place in terms of growth in the manufacturing sector, which makes up 26% of the state’s GDP. Guanajuato is home to economically important industries that attract considerable foreign direct investment to Mexico, including the automobile and chemical industries, among others.2 However, over the last several years, Guanajuato has been one of Mexico’s top 10 most violent states, and two of its largest cities —León and Irapuato— were among Mexico’s top 10 most violent municipalities in 2018 and 2019. The state of Guanajuato also had the highest number of organized crime-related homicides in 2019 with 2,673 cases,  according to Reforma. 3 Additionally, Guanajuato was featured in Milenio’s top five states with the highest number of murders every month in 2019, calculating 2,934 organized crime-related deaths. 4 Furthermore, Guanajuato was tied with Estado de México as the second most dangerous place for elected officials in 2019, according to Justice in Mexico’s Memoria dataset. 5 Guanajuato attracted media attention especially in 2019 because of a dramatic increase in violence. While few available studies are exploring the origins and source of increased violence in Guanajuato, there seems to be one factor that has not been fully studied in terms of violence trends: fuel theft. III. Huachicoleo and Organized Crime Groups Fuel theft is one of the most recent developments in Mexico’s violent crime spectrum, gaining nationwide notoriety in early 2017. Gasoline truck drivers, or chupaductos (pipeline suckers), were the first to adopt the name huachicol to refer to stolen hydrocarbons in Mexico.6 It is still complicated to track the origin of the word, as technically, it refers to an adulterated alcoholic beverage derived from cane alcohol. However, huachicol is also believed to come from the Mayan culture, where the word “huach” or “waach” means “foreigner,” and in some Mayan regions, “thief.”7 This term lead to the colloquial name huachicolero to refer to petroleum thieves. 8 The practice of huachicoleo has been an increasing problem in Mexico, with organized crime groups (OCGs) competing to control its revenues in a manner similar to the way in which they compete over drug-trafficking territories or plazas. Huachicoleo takes place in two different forms: through puncturing gas pipelines, which carry 20% of the country’s supply, or by stealing it on the go from the fuel distribution gas trucks on Mexico’s main highways.9 In socio-economic terms, the increase of fuel theft is partially attributable to the rise of oil prices in Mexico over the last few years, when gas went from an average of 5.00 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 USD) in 2000, to 19.40 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 1.03 USD) by December 2019 as shown in the chart below. 10 The population’s alleged inability or unwillingness to pay such high prices is believed to have created a greater demand for lower-cost gas—a demand that OCGs were willing to fulfill. Highway-side vendors started selling stolen gasoline from 5 to 10 Mexican pesos per liter (roughly 0.27 to 0.54 USD), depending on the distance from actual pipelines. 11 Networks of huachicoleros have established their vending points along major highways throughout Mexico, especially in central Mexico, where some of these vending points are disguised as legal commercial establishments such as tire shops, car repair workshops, coffee shops, restaurants, and other informal businesses.   

San Diego:  Justice in Mexico Department of Political Science & International Relations University of San Diego, 2020. 28p,

By Aili Malm, Nicholas Perez, Michael D. White

This publication represents the final research report of California State University, Long Beach’s (CSULB) evaluation of an intelligence-led problem-oriented policing (POP) project to better understand and address illicit fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA. The goals of this study were to: (1) employ problem-oriented policing to drive efforts to identify and disrupt fentanyl distribution networks in Long Beach, CA, and (2) use intelligence analysis to identify high-level distributors for investigation. To achieve these goals, researchers worked with a newly hired intelligence analyst and Long Beach Police Department (LBPD) Drug Investigation Section (DIS) detectives to improve their fentanyl distribution network investigations. The intervention included POP training, intelligence analyst support [cellular phone extractions, open-source intelligence (OSINT), social network analysis (SNA), etc.], and weekly interactions between the analyst and the research team. To assess the effectiveness of the project, we conducted both process and outcome evaluations. Primary data sources include: (1) interviews of detectives and the analyst; (2) DIS administrative data; (3) network data from three fentanyl distribution cases; and (4) fentanyl-related overdose data from the LBPD and the California Overdose Surveillance Dashboard. We identified findings across multiple analyses that, when taken together, represent a persuasive collection of circumstantial evidence regarding the positive effects of the project on two important outcomes: increased DIS activity and efficiency and effective fentanyl distribution network disruption. While fentanyl-related overdose rates did decrease substantially over the course of the project, there is no conclusive evidence that the project led to the reduction. The effects of COVID-19, the defund movement following George Floyd’s death, and the Los Angeles County District Attorney policy limiting the prosecution of drug offenses confounded our ability to draw a stronger connection between the project and enhanced DIS activity and efficiency, fentanyl distribution network disruption, and overdose rates.   

California State University, Long Beach; School of Criminology, Criminal Justice, and Emergency Management; 2024 77p. 

By United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime - UNODC

Fraud has evolved significantly over the years, adapting to technological advancements and changes in society. It has become increasingly sophisticated, often using psychological manipulation, enabled by information and communications technologies (ICTs). The high volume and severity of fraud pose a significant risk to people, economies and prosperity worldwide, and have a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. However, developing an accurate understanding of fraud presents several challenges. Victims often underreport fraud due to feelings of shame, self blame or embarrassment, as well as a lack of recognition that a crime has occurred. Moreover, a significant portion of fraud targets businesses, many of which choose not to report these crimes to avoid damaging their reputation. The anonymity and remoteness often associated with fraud perpetration conceal the identities of offenders from both victims and authorities, hindering efforts to assess underlying patterns, factors of vulnerability and associated risks. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of fraud — which is constantly being adapted to changes in legal, social, commercial and technological systems — means that new and innovative methods of the offence may go unnoticed within static official data. In many cases, domestic law enforcement entities do not have the capacity to investigate and uncover the offenders and the organized criminal groups behind the crime: international cooperation is required, suggesting the need to give greater prominence to fraud in the policy framework and legislation against organized crime.

The international community has recognized the worrying scale of fraud and the need for joint efforts in preventing and combating it. The General Assembly, in its resolution 78/229, reaffirmed the importance of the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the fulfilment of its mandate in crime prevention and criminal justice, including providing to Member States, upon request and as a matter of high priority, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance, and coordinating with and complementing the work of all relevant and competent United Nations bodies and offices in respect to all forms of organized crime, including fraud. Nevertheless, the intersection between fraud and organized crime is not well understood and is further complicated by overlaps with other key areas, including cybercrime, white-collar crime, money-laundering and corruption. An understanding of organized fraud is necessary to inform the decisions of policymakers and other stakeholders and drive effective responses. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the main global legally binding instrument to prevent and fight all forms and manifestations of transnational organized crime and protect the victims thereof, provides a framework to understand the nature of organized fraud and how the response to it can be integrated into the response to the different threats presented by transnational organized crime.

Scope of the issue paper

Fraud is an expansive category of crime. One of the greatest challenges to understanding it is its scope. It encompasses a range of criminal behaviours that are bound together by the common principle of dishonesty. The opportunities to employ dishonesty for the purposes of fraud span the full range of social, commercial, financial and technological settings, which can vary in different regions of the world. These opportunities are exploited by criminals from highly diverse backgrounds, ranging from professionals exploiting a legitimate corporate position to cybercriminals from within deprived communities. In this way, fraud is distinct from many other criminal categories that cover more discrete criminal behaviours occurring in specific settings (e.g. burglary). This diversity creates challenges in terms of developing a single, cohesive and comprehensive picture of fraud. The present issue paper covers fraud perpetrated by organized criminal groups (i.e. organized fraud). The role of organized crime can vary depending on the type of fraud, although, to a greater or lesser extent, it has a footprint in nearly all types of fraud. For the purposes of containing the scope of the issue paper, the following elements are not included:

• Other crimes in which fraud plays an enabling role, including the fraudulent use of identity to prevent a perpetrator from being traced, such as opening financial accounts to launder the proceeds of crime; fraudulent communications to enter into a relationship with a victim for the purpose of blackmailing or extorting money from them;1 and fraudulent job advertisements for recruiting and trafficking victims into forced labour and servitude.

• Fraud targeting the financial interests of the State (e.g. tax regimes), such as missing trader intra-community fraud (otherwise known as MTIC or VAT fraud); excise fraud, in which duties on imported products are not paid (e.g. fuel); public procurement fraud; and fraudulent applications for government grants and subsidies. The policy and response landscape for addressing these types of fraud can be distinct, being made up of various agencies and regulatory powers beyond law enforcement (e.g. the tax authority). The links between these types of fraud and organized crime are more well established in the literature.

The focus of the issue paper is organized fraud that targets individual members of the public or private institutions for the purposes of obtaining a financial or other material benefit.

Vienna: UNODC< 2024. 82p.

By Christopher Blattman, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón

Organised crime poses one of the greatest threats to national security and development in the 21st century. Despite this, most policy, data collection, and scholarly research focuses on individuals and disorganised violence. Our work addresses several critical gaps in knowledge:

• What are the incentives for gangs to engage in violence and socially costly behaviour?

• Which are the trade-offs that practitioners face when deciding how to engage with organised violence?

• What type of information do relevant decision-makers need to inform their policies?

• Which are the most relevant tools for tracking down gang behaviour and use of violence?

We address these questions in the context of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest and most important city. Over the past six years, our work has covered a broad methodological spectrum, including:

• qualitative data collection through interviews with dozens of criminals and criminal justice experts;

• quantitative data collection from thousands of citizens in surveys representative at highly localised levels;

• active collaboration with local relevant stakeholders such as the city administration and the local police department;

• quasi-experimental evaluations of long-running policies dating back to the 1980s; and

• experimental evaluations of marginal improvements in state presence in violent and gang controlled areas.

Our preliminary findings point to terrible trade-offs, where authorities face plausibly impossible questions when balancing short-term gains in violence reduction and sacrifices in state legitimacy, with long-term uncertainty concerning both violence and state legitimacy. We highlight preliminary recommendations for guiding policy decisions.

Birmingham, UK: The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2022. 9p.

By Bridget Freisthler, ; Rouba A. Chahine, ; Jennifer Villani,; et al

Importance: The HEALing Communities Study (HCS) evaluated the effectiveness of the Communities That HEAL (CTH) intervention in preventing fatal overdoses amidst the US opioid epidemic.

Objective: To evaluate the impact of the CTH intervention on total drug overdose deaths and overdose deaths involving combinations of opioids with psychostimulants or benzodiazepines.

Design, Setting, and Participants: This randomized clinical trial was a parallel-arm, multisite, community-randomized, open, and waitlisted controlled comparison trial of communities in 4 US states between 2020 and 2023. Eligible communities were those reporting high opioid overdose fatality rates in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio. Covariate-constrained randomization stratified by state-allocated communities to the intervention or control group. Trial groups were balanced by urban or rural classification, 2016-2017 fatal opioid overdose rate, and community population. Data analysis was completed by December 2023.

Intervention: Increased overdose education and naloxone distribution, treatment with medications for opioid use disorder, safer opioid prescribing practices, and communication campaigns to mitigate stigma and drive demand for evidence-based interventions.

The primary outcome was the number of drug overdose deaths among adults (aged 18 years or older), with secondary outcomes of overdose deaths involving specific opioid-involved drug combinations from death certificates. Rates of overdose deaths per 100,000 adult community residents in intervention and control communities from July 2021 to June 2022 were compared with analyses performed in 2023. RESULTS In 67 participating communities (34 in the intervention group, 33 in the control group) and including 8 211 506 participants (4 251 903 female [51.8%]; 1 273 394 Black [15.5%], 603 983 Hispanic [7.4%], 5 979 602 White [72.8%], 354 527 other [4.3%]), the average rate of overdose deaths involving all substances was 57.6 per 100 000 population in the intervention group and 61.2 per 100 000 population in the control group. This was not a statistically significant difference (adjusted rate ratio [aRR], 0.92; 95% CI, 0.78-1.07; P = .26). There was a statistically significant 37% reduction (aRR, 0.63; 95% CI, 0.44-0.91; P = .02) in death rates involving an opioid and psychostimulants (other than cocaine), and nonsignificant reductions in overdose deaths for an opioid with cocaine (6%) and an opioid with benzodiazepine (1%). CONCLUSION AND RELEVANCE In this clinical trial of the CTH intervention, death rates involving an opioid and noncocaine psychostimulant were reduced; total deaths did not differ statistically. Community-focused data-driven interventions that scale up evidence-based practices with communications campaigns may effectively reduce some opioid-involved polysubstance overdose deaths 

JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(10):e2440006. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.40006

By Heather Wardle, Louisa Degenhardt, Virve Marionneau, Gerda Reith, Charles Livingstone, Malcolm Sparrow

The global gambling industry The global gambling industry is rapidly expanding, with net losses by consumers projected to reach nearly US$700 billion by 2028. Industry growth is fuelled by the rise of online gambling, widespread accessibility of gambling opportunities through mobile phones, increased legalization, and the introduction of commercial gambling to new areas. Recent expansion is most notable in low-income and middle-income countries, where regulatory infrastructure is often weak. Gambling, in some form at least, is now legally permitted in more than 80% of countries worldwide. Online gambling, given its borderless accessibility, is available everywhere via the internet. Digitalization has transformed the production and operation of commercial gambling, but the consequences of this shift and its effects on consumers have not yet been fully recognized. The production of online gambling is interconnected with an ecosystem of software, information technology infrastructure, and financial technology services. The commercial gambling industry has also developed strong partnerships in media and social media. Sponsoring and partnering with professional sports organizations provides gambling operators with marketing opportunities with huge new audiences. This far-reaching and interdependent corporate ecosystem collectively wields substantial influence over policy and has multiple points of contact through which to leverage the behavior of consumers. Online gambling products are designed to be rapid and intensive, characteristics that are associated with a higher risk of harm for consumers. The introduction of in-game betting during live matches has made online sports betting instantaneous and increased both its frequency and prevalence. Traditional gambling products, such as lotteries and bingo, now have faster cycles and are continuously accessible through smartphone apps. The boundaries between digital gaming and gambling are becoming blurred, with gaming increasingly acting as a conduit to gambling. Leveraging online digital infrastructures and surveillance data, gambling companies now have unparalleled capabilities to target consumers, including through the use of social media and influencers to engage individuals and online user data to tailor marketing to individuals, cross-sell products, and prolong user engagement. To safeguard their interests, stakeholders in the commercial gambling ecosystem deploy a range of strategies, many of which are similar to those used by other industries selling potentially addictive or health-harming products. To shape public and policy perceptions, and as they lobby policymakers directly to further their commercial interests, the industry portrays gambling as harmless entertainment and stresses the economic benefits (including tax revenues) and employment opportunities that the industry provides. The gambling industry particularly stresses the social benefits that accrue when some portion of gambling profits are used to fund education, health services, or other worthwhile social causes. According to industry narratives, responsibility for gambling harm is attributed to individuals, particularly those deemed as engaging in problematic gambling, which deflects attention from corporate conduct. The gambling industry also exerts considerable influence over research into gambling and gambling harms, which helps it retain control of the framing and messaging surrounding these issues. Industry messaging has substantially influenced gambling policy and regulation. Most policy solutions to gambling harms rest on the notion of individual responsibility. Providing support services, treatments, and protections for at-risk individuals is, of course, important. Improving these remedies further and making protective supports broadly available remains a priority. However, framing the problem in this way and narrowly focusing policy attention on a small subset of the people who gamble draws attention away from industry practices and Key messages • Commercial gambling is a rapidly growing global industry and is becoming increasingly digital. • The harms to health and wellbeing that result from gambling are more substantial than previously understood, extending beyond gambling disorder to include a wide range of gambling harms, which affect many people in addition to individuals who gamble. • The evolution of the gambling industry is at a crucial juncture; decisive action now can prevent or mitigate widespread harm to population health and wellbeing in the future. Thus far, globally, governments have paid too little attention to gambling harms and have not done enough to prevent or mitigate them. • Stronger policy and regulatory controls focused on harm prevention and the protection of public health and wellbeing, independent of industry or other competing influences, are now needed. Given the increasingly global and boundary-spanning nature of the industry, international coordination on regulatory approaches will be necessary for corporate behavior. We must also seriously examine the structures and systems that govern the design, provision, and promotion of gambling products. 

Lancet Public Health, Oct. 2024.

By Tena Prelec

The research paper that this briefing note summarises introduces a new framework for assessing the relationship between information manipulation and organised crime. Through applied real-world case studies from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania, the framework reveals diverse patterns in these relationships, and the varying intensity of the information manipulation employed at a granular level. An emerging hypothesis emerging from the research suggests that authoritarian states may wield greater freedom in misusing information when they have intermediate – rather than high – levels of integration with the organised crime groups (OCG’s) executing disinformation campaigns on their behalf. The paper also identifies several areas for further research, including public receptivity to information manipulation, the mercurial nature of ties between elite actors and the use of information manipulation by elites, to create confusion amongst the public rather than to change their minds.

SOC ACE Research Paper. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024. 7p.

By Huma Haider

Organised criminal actors can extend their influence over security sector officials through corruption, paying them to selectively enforce the law. In some cases, the rise of organised crime (OC) has eroded the state’s capacity to deliver security and justice. In other contexts, criminality is associated with a strong state that can protect corrupt officials and criminal actors. Strengthening the capabilities of corrupt security institutions can, in turn, be counterproductive in the fight against OC. The linkages between corruption, OC, the functioning of security and justice institutions, and their reform processes, call for integrated analysis, planning and implementation of initiatives to achieve security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and to counter OC. There is, however, a gap in scholarship analysing connections between SSR/G and OC. In seeking to address this gap, this paper adopts an inter-disciplinary approach, reviewing scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. Key findings from the evidence review include:

• Delayed or weak implementation of security sector reform (SSR) in transitional contexts can result in the entrenchment of corruption in security sectors, alongside new forms of corruption (for example, from privatisation processes), which in turn risks the rise of illicit activities.

• OC can thrive where state institutions are absent or weak and where they are present or strong. A binary focus on strong versus weak states, with inadequate attention to context, has led at times to counterproductive interventions aimed at strengthening state institutions and the capabilities of security forces.

• The political context in which SSR and initiatives to counter OC take place can have a significant influence on outcomes. Such reforms and initiatives require political will and support. Elites in authoritarian contexts may block reforms that could hold them accountable and undermine their ability to profit from OC.

• Many SSR studies indicate that programming often prioritises less politically sensitive capacity building interventions. Yet, reforms that increase deterrent capacity can reinforce militarisation and increase violent crime by OC actors.

• Higher levels of popular trust in the military have often been accompanied by greater state reliance on the military to perform civilian law enforcement and/or militarisation of the police to address OC and restore public order.

• The militarisation of law enforcement has typically failed to counter OC, producing greater violence and criminality in many fragile and violent contexts.

• Relying on armed forces to counter OC has often reduced incentives and resources for strengthening police institutions

• Community-oriented policing is often employed to improve public trust in the police, yet there is limited systematic or comparative evidence that this is achieved.

• Mass incarceration, from law and order approaches, has frequently strengthened the cohesion of organised crime groups (OCG), giving them a territorial base for power projection.

• Overcrowded prison facilities and insufficient state staffing levels have often resulted in the rise of criminal governance and prisoner syndicates as parallel powers.

• Inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants, or gang members in situations of urban violence, can encourage their involvement in criminal activities.

• Conventional approaches to investigating and prosecuting criminal activity can be ineffective against complex OC networks. A proactive approach is required that seeks to disrupt and dismantle such networks, beyond arresting individual criminals.

• Criminal justice actors need to recognise that women can be both victims and perpetrators in the context of OC, possibly allowing for legal leniency.

• Judicial reforms tend to be more effective when they produce institutional change and empower new personnel to push through reforms.

• Special courts, established to tackle OC and corruption, may divert resources from elsewhere in the judicial sector. It can also be challenging to reconcile accountability for past gross human rights violations and the need to counter contemporary OC.

• Transitional trials, selective prosecutions and vetting, which remove officials guilty of corruption, OC and/or human rights violations from security and justice institutions, can help to reform abusive institutions and build trust.

• There is evidence that failure to properly vet military officials and ex-combatants prior to their entry into a civilian police force has resulted in corrupt police forces with links to criminality.

• There is debate as to whether transitional justice activities enable institutional reform and rule of law programming that can help to counter OC, or whether they are isolated from domestic capacity building.

• Developing accountability and oversight of security sector institutions (for example, anti-corruption mechanisms and civilian oversight) can help to reduce OC infiltration.

• Citizen security, a concept that extends to non-security sectors (for example, education, infrastructure and livelihoods), can be a helpful lens in designing more comprehensive interventions required to counter OC.

• Where gender-responsive SSR is advocated, it is often reduced to adding women to programming and institutions, without addressing the structural, institutional and cultural barriers to meaningful engagement.

• An effective system for combatting transnational OC requires the development of entities and mechanisms aimed at building operational cooperation and coordination among the security agencies of different states.

This Evidence Review Paper demonstrates the importance of adopting an OC-informed perspective in SSR/G and a SSR/G-informed perspective in addressing OC. By exploring the interlinkages, complementarities and trade-offs between security and justice sectors and their reforms, on the one hand, and countering OC, on the other, this paper seeks to provide insights into these perspectives.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 05. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham 2024. 97p.

By Alana M. Vivolo-Kantor; Christine L. Mattson, Maria Zlotorzynska,

Ketamine, a Schedule III controlled substance* that is Food and Drug Administration (FDA)–approved for general anesthesia, can produce mild hallucinogenic effects and cause respiratory, cardiovascular, and neuropsychiatric adverse events (1). In 2019, a form of ketamine (esketamine) was approved by FDA for use in treatment-resistant depression among adults† (2). Ketamine use, poison center calls for ketamine exposure, and ketamine drug reports from law enforcement have increased through 2019 (3), but recent trends in ketamine involvement in fatal overdoses are unknown. Data from CDC’s State Unintentional Drug Overdose Reporting System (SUDORS) were analyzed to describe characteristics of and trends in overdose deaths with ketamine detected or involved during July 2019–June 2023.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024;73:1010–1012

By: Arantza Alonso Berbotto and Spencer Chainey

The theft of refined oil products provides criminal groups with significant financial resources that threaten the environment and socio-economic stability of countries where it occurs. Violence is also associated with this criminal activity. Using crime script analysis, a detailed interpretation of the theft of oil via the illegal tapping of pipelines in Mexico was constructed. The analysis revealed the roles performed by members of criminal groups, the recruitment of individuals outside of the criminal group to provide information about the pipelines and perform technical activities, and the supporting role of citizens and businesses from local communities. The analysis also revealed the decision-making necessary for the successful commission of oil theft via the illegal tapping of pipelines. The use of situational crime prevention measures and improvements in the use of deterrence are identified as offering opportunities for preventing this criminal activity.

GLOBAL CRIME 2021, VOL. 22, NO. 4, 265–287https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2021.1925552© 2021

By Camilo Pardo-Herrera 

The environment is under increasing pressure from global economic dynamics and the constantly increasing demand for raw materials. In this context, environmental crimes in general, and illegal mining in particular, play a key role as they disregard any consideration for sustainable resource extraction. In the Amazon region, one of the most vital ecosystems around the world, illegal gold mining has been identified as the most critical threat to the sustainability of the life of its ecosystems. There is evidence of large quantities of illegal mining production both in Colombia (two-thirds of all production) and Peru (25 to 30 percent of all production). However, since gold is extremely valuable, and portable, it stores value —even under extreme market conditions—, it can be reshaped in any way thinkable, and is not intrinsically illegal, introducing illicitly extracted gold into official supply chains is fairly easy. Once introduced, it flows freely through national, regional, and global markets, and its proceeds do so through the international financial system. It is estimated that illegal mining accounts for up to USD 48 billion a year in criminal proceeds.1 In this context, organized crime associated with the illegal extraction of gold in the Amazon continues to grow in number, size, and scope in response to the insatiable global demand, and thanks to the possibility of laundering and reinvesting their proceeds through illicit financial flows. Thus, an efficient response to the challenges posed by illegal gold mining should be comprehensive and include not just efforts to curb illegal mining, but also, more importantly, efforts to address the illegal flows of money taking place through the gold trade. Although it only analyzes a small sample of the entire global gold market, this paper provides substantive evidence of the illegal flows of money through the gold trade from Peru and Colombia into the United States. While this report is in no position to assert the commission of crimes —since it is only analyzing data— it presents enough evidence to identify points of entry for further criminal investigations and potential judicial action. There is evidence of companies smuggling gold from Venezuela into Colombia, which is then exported to the United States. Between 2010 and 2021, a total of 68,2 tons of gold worth a total of 2.6 billion US dollars, were smuggled through the border in vicinities of Cucuta. Three companies, one in Colombia (CIJ Gutierrez) and two in the United States (Asahi Refining USA Inc., and Johnson Matthey Inc.) concentrate over 90 percent of this trade. Gold trade through this route stopped after 2018 when an Executive Order was signed targeting all parties involved in the trade of Venezuelan gold. There is also evidence of gold and mercury smuggling along the border between Peru and Bolivia and illegal gold production shifting geographies after policy decisions are made. Data show an inexplicable spike in Bolivian gold export in 2014 —with no increases in production— which coincides both, with a ban on mercury by Peru, and a decrease in Peruvian production and exports. This suggests the shifting of illegal mining from Peru into Bolivia, and also of gold smuggling in the same direction. There are clear indications of mis-invoicing of gold trade between these three countries. Peruvian data show significantly higher weight values than those reported at US destinations between 2016 and 2018. A very similar pattern can be seen in Peruvian total exports to the world. Concurrently, trade data show that 29 percent of all shipments from Peru to the US were priced at 70 percent or less than the actual international price during that same time. Although available data does not permit us to assert whether it is a case of overstating the weight of the gold or undervaluing its value, the temporal coincidence of weight and value discrepancies allows us to suggest a general case of mis-invoicing during this time. Colombian data also suggests potential cases of mis-invoicing. Between 2015 and 2016, US statistics reported weight about 50% above those reported by Colombian customs. Price data show that in nine percent of the shipments —approximately 16 tons— gold was paid at 70 percent or less of the global gold price at the time of the transaction. Only a handful of businesses on both sides of the transactions explain most of this trade and are identified — 85 percent of the undervalued shipments are executed by five Colombian firms, and six businesses on the US side concentrate 86 percent of undervalued purchases. Trade in overpriced gold is also identified. Data analysis suggests irregular patterns in the rate between net and gross weights, which could respond to fraudulent reporting and concurrent illicit flows of value. For example, while most shipments use 0.2 grams (or less) of packaging per every gram of gold sent, an important percentage report uses three and up to five times that weight. Of these irregular shipments, over 90 percent were sent by one company in Colombia —Metales Procesados Industriales— to two businesses in the US —Atomic Gold Inc., and United Precious Metal Refining Inc. The analysis also raises warnings as to how certain reports are made. This is the case of the volume of shipments reported by Colombian customs, which is not the result of a measurement, but of an estimation using the net weight of the shipment. Instead of measuring the volume of each shipment, this field is populated using the density of gold, which is a constant, derived from the net weight of the shipment. Although not the result of fraud, but a standard procedure, this hinders transparency and the possibility of monitoring the trade between Colombia and the US. There is evidence of a trend to create shell companies to engage in the trade in gold; presumably of illegal gold. Peruvian tax data shows large numbers of companies participating in the trade in a very sporadic fashion, which contradicts stable and long-lasting trade relationships usual in the international gold market. These companies have a very short legal life, and concentrate all of their commercial activity within a few months, only to cease to exist shortly after. Between 2016 and 2021, these companies traded gold for a total of 230 million USD. 

The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center. George Mason University. Arlington, Va. 2022. 34p.

By Layla Hashemi, Edward Huang & Louise Shelley 

 Over 58 million counterfeit respirators of substandard quality unable to protect individuals from infection have been seized globally since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. These seizures have primarily occurred in urban warehouses and ports around the world according to analysis of public and corporate data shared with the authors. The presence of tens of millions of respirators in storage facilities prior to distribution demonstrates that urban areas are key elements of illicit supply chains. Data suggests that the concept of urban insecurity needs to be reconsidered in light of illicit supply chains for counterfeit respirators and their role in facilitating disease transmission in urban areas. The analysis presented in this article suggests that threats to human life should not be confined narrowly to violent acts or the consumption of drugs. Human life can also be threatened through the massive distribution of counterfeit N95 masks during a pandemic, a problem that has become more acute with more contagious mutations of COVID-19. 

Urban Crime - An International Journal Vol. 3-No 2-September 2022 

By Mahmut Cengiz  and Oguzhan Omer Demir 

Because of supply and demand factors, human trafficking for sexual exploitation has always been a profitable industry. Turkey, as a host country for immigrants from both former Soviet countries and the Middle East, combines supply and demand, attracting illicit business. Few studies have been conducted in the previous two decades to investigate the organized criminal element of human trafficking in this region. This research is based on ethnographic research in which trafficking victims (N = 11) were interviewed, and on-site observations were made. Our findings revealed that the trafficking industry in our study area was carried out by persons who were only loosely related to one another. There was no sophisticated, long-lasting sex trafficking organization. Membership was not severely limited, and individuals did not identify themselves as members of a well-known criminal organization. We provided policy recommendations and proposals for future research to address female trafficking for sexual exploitation

Social Sciences 11: 511. 2022. 

By Louise I. Shelley

In 1994, the second full year of Demokratizatsiya’s publication, I analyzed the impact of organized crime on the development of post-Soviet states in an article entitled “Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Implications for Economic, Social, and Political Development.”1 This article was written at a time when many in the West were sure that the future course of development for Russia and other post-Soviet states was one of free markets and democracy. Most research on organized crime and high-level corruption in Russia would not be published until much later.2 My article provided a very different and contrarian approach to this rosy scenario for Soviet successor states. In the article’s introduction, I asserted that the infiltration of organized crime into the state would ensure that organized crime would “play a significant role in determining the future course of developments in the Soviet successor states.” In my view, organized crime represented an amalgam of traditional criminals, members of the state security apparatus, former military personnel, and law enforcement officials. I did not associate post-Soviet organized crime exclusively with the very v zakone, the traditional thieves in law or professional criminals. I was especially concerned at the time that the rapid and non-transparent privatization of state property to the benefit of corrupt politicians, organized crime, and their business partners would have persistent and deleterious long-term consequences, leading to the monopolization of key sectors of post-Soviet economies rather than the competitive economies needed for growth.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Volume 30, Number 4, Fall 2022, pp. 411-419

Organized Theft Groups (OTG) and Organized Retail Crime (ORC) .  A Comprehensive Educational Guide for Law Enforcement and Financial Crime Investigators  

By Lauren Kohr and Tiffany Polyak,

Organized retail crime (ORC) remains at the forefront of most major news channels across the United States. High-profile “smash-n-grab” robberies, and nationwide cases involving major retailers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, garner the headlines. Recent hearings by the United States Congress, that discuss and debate proposed legislation, target the ability of criminal organizations to resell stolen goods online with relative anonymity.1 ORC is a low-risk, high-reward business line for transnational criminal organizations’ portfolios that presents a significant financial and public safety risk. While retailers and law enforcement partner to investigate ORC cases and provide education on the misconceptions and misunderstandings, it is clear there is a missing link in these partnerships, and that link is financial institutions. Criminal organizations need to launder the nearly 70 billion US dollars of illicit proceeds gained from ORC activities annually. These organizations are looking to launder their billions through the formal financial sector, unregulated payment processors, and online marketplaces. 1. The Brand Protection Professional, Professional Pointer: What Is ORC And Is It Related To IPRC? To combat ORC and take down organized theft groups (OTGs) more effectively, first, financial institutions must be brought into the awareness and education triangle. Second, public-private partnerships and information-sharing channels between retailers, law enforcement, and financial institutions need to be created. Third, as law enforcement and retailers prioritize investigations involving ORC, financial institutions should look to reasonably enhance their anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) programs to detect and report illicit proceeds stemming from these crimes. Financial institutions should ensure proper controls are in place to detect and report illicit activities tied to or involving ORC. While not specifically addressed in the National AML/CFT Priorities issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on June 20, 2021, it should be addressed that ORC has been tied to many of the priorities issued and other heinous crimes, as reflected in this guide.  

ACAMS and Homeland Security Investigations, 53p.

By Spencer P. Chainey & Arantza Alonso Berbotto 

Crime script analysis is becoming an increasingly used approach for examining organized crime. Crime scripts can use data from multiple sources, including open sources of intelligence (OSINT). Limited guidance exists, however, on how to populate the content of a crime script with data, and validate these data. This results in crime scripts being generated intuitively, restricts them from being scrutinized for their quality and limits the opportunity to combine or compare crime scripts. We introduce a practical process for populating the content of a crime script that involves simple coding procedures and uses document analysis to quality assure data that are extracted from open sources. We illustrate the process with the example of the theft of oil from pipelines in Mexico committed by organized crime groups. The structured methodical process we introduce produces a crime script of high quality, helps to improve the systematic analysis of decision-making performed by members of organized crime groups, and can improve the identification of opportunities for crime control.

Published: 23 August 2021, Trends in Organized Crime, Volume 25, pages 272–300, (2022)

Edited by Erica Charters, Marie Houllemare, and Peter H. Wilson

This is the first extensive analysis of large-scale violence and the methods of its restraint in the early modern world. Using examples from Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, it questions the established narrative that violence was only curbed through the rise of western-style nation states and civil societies. Global history allows us to reframe and challenge traditional models for the history of violence and to rethink categories and units of analysis through comparisons. By decentring Europe and exploring alternative patterns of violence, the contributors to this volume articulate the significance of violence in narratives of state- and empire-building, as well as in their failure and decline, while also providing new means of tracing the transition from the early modern to modernity.

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,  2020.  317p.

By Jonah Rexer

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states may face resource theft by armed groups. This criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased participation by Nigerian firms substantially. Despite evidence that local firms are of lower quality, localization increases output and reduces oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on raids by government forces show that local firms receive preferential law enforcement protection. I find that connections to military elites drive the local advantage.

.Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2022. 113p  

By Christian Gunadi; Yuyan Shi,

Recreational cannabis legalization (RCL) has been advocated as a way to reduce the number of individuals interacting with the US criminal justice system; in theory, however, cannabis decriminalization can achieve this objective without generating the negative public health consequences associated with RCL. It is still unclear whether RCL can bring additional benefits in terms of reducing cannabis possession arrests in states that have already decriminalized cannabis. OBJECTIVE -  To examine whether RCL was associated with changes in cannabis possession arrests in US states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period and whether these changes differed across age and racial subgroups. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - This repeated cross-sectional study used cannabis possession arrest data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCRP) for US states from 2010 through 2019. Statistical analysis was conducted from October 6, 2021, to October 12, 2022. EXPOSURES -  Implementation of statewide RCL. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES - Cannabis possession arrest rates per 1000 population per year were assessed with a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design and were used to estimate the association of RCL with arrest rates in RCL states that had or had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. This association was also examined in subgroups for age (adults vs youths) and race (Black vs White). RESULTS - This study included UCRP data for 31 US states, including 9 states that implemented RCL during the study period (4 without and 5 with decriminalization) and 22 non-RCL states. In the 4 states that had not decriminalized cannabis before legalization, RCL was associated with a 76.3% decrease (95% CI, −81.2% to −69.9%) in arrest rates among adults. In the 5 states that had already decriminalized cannabis, RCL was still associated with a substantial decrease in adult arrest rates (−40.0%; 95% CI, −55.1% to −19.8%). There was no association of RCL with changes in arrest rates among youths. In addition, changes in arrest rates associated with RCL did not differ among Black and White individuals. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE -  In this repeated cross-sectional study, RCL was associated with a sizable reduction in cannabis possession arrests among adults in states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period (2010-2019), albeit the magnitude was smaller compared with states that had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. In addition, RCL did not seem to be associated with changes in arrest rates among youths or disparities in arrest rates among Black and White individuals. 

JAMA Netw Open. 2022 Dec 5;5(12):e2244922

By Yvon DanduranA discussion of organized crime and governance is not complete until it addresses the question of police governance and its impact on the fight against organized crime, illicit markets and money laundering. Given the relative failure of law enforcement to control organized crime and contain illegal markets, a focus on police governance forces us to consider how law enforcement priorities are set and law enforcement strategies adopted and implemented. This in turn may lead us to conclude, as I am about to suggest, that we me need to both increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts and reduce our expectations with respect to the impact that law enforcement can really have on controlling organized crime and illicit markets. In our discussions thus far, we acknowledged that public awareness of organized crime and its consequences is an important starting point, but that we also need to find more effective ways to control organized crime and counter its activities. Most of us recognize that law enforcement and regulatory enforcement are crucial elements of effective action against organized crime, yet we must also recognize that the actual impact of law enforcement is usually quite limited. Countering organized crime requires establishing effective police governance and accountability. Governance includes key management issues such as policy formation and implementation, the determination of priorities and strategies, the allocation of resources, deployment strategies and decisions, the implementation of standards, the prevention of corruption internally, and the maintenance of internal discipline. It follows that weak governance can undermine the effectiveness of police actions against organized crime. At the same time, transnational organized crime entails policing in a transnational context and, with this, come the pressing and complex governance and accountability issues presented by the growth of cross-border policing,  transnational policing, and the growing reliance on multi-jurisdictional police teams. In many instances, one is not talking about a single police force, but broad and ill-defined security networks.3 As Walsh and Conway explained, “(m)achinery that is struggling to cope with the governance and accountability challenges presented by the domestic operations of home based police forces may well prove seriously deficient when confronted with the formers’ activities on other sovereign territories, or domestic operations by foreign based police forces  

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2020. 15p.