By Francis A. Citera, Greenberg Traurig Julia Steiner

Opioids have been used both medicinally and recreationally since ancient times. While their recreational functions have long since been denounced, their medicinal value remains legitimate. Yet, since the pain management revolution began in the mid-1990s, many Americans have become opioid-dependent—fueling an illicit drug market and costing many lives. The tragedy that is today’s opioid epidemic has prompted robust federal and state legislative and regulatory interventions in both the legal and illicit opioid markets—albeit with mixed success. As these initiatives have been slow to quell the opioid crisis, public nuisance claims have taken center stage. After the Big Tobacco litigation invoked the common law doctrine and ultimately resulted in the historic Master Settlement Agreement, public nuisance captured the attention of state governmental entities in the firearm and lead paint industries. Those litigations produced varying results among the states. While some courts properly rejected the novel application of public nuisance to the manufacture, sale, and distribution of lawful products, others permitted claims to survive past the motion to dismiss stage, prompting product manufacturers, distributors, and retailers to agree to exorbitant settlements. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the legal theory has gained popularity in claims against deep-pocketed opioid industry actors. However, like the tobacco, firearm, and lead paint industries, public nuisance does not fit within the historically recognized definition of public nuisance, which has long been understood as being limited to unlawful activities and real property contexts.

In addition to being, at best, unorthodox and novel, and at worst, legally deficient and unsupported by history and precedent, public nuisance is a poor vehicle to address a national, highly political problem—particularly in the legal prescription drug market, which touts many benefits and is already heavily regulated by the duly elected members of the legislative and executive branches of government.

 79 U. Mia. L. Rev. 317 (2025), 30p.

By Mary E. Richmond

“The Long View” serves both as a historical document and as a critique of the limitations and challenges facing social work in the early 20th century. The title itself suggests her forward-thinking approach, urging practitioners to consider the long-term effects of their interventions rather than focusing solely on immediate relief. In this sense, the book represents a call for a more holistic and preventive approach to social work rather than a reactive or crisis-driven model. A key strength of her work is Richmond’s insistence on the importance of professionalization in social work. She argues for a rigorous, research-informed approach to casework, emphasizing the need for training, standardization, and ethical responsibility. This argument anticipates later debates in the field about the tension between bureaucratic efficiency and personalized, client-centered care. Richmond’s work in this book also highlights her concern with the social and structural determinants of poverty, distinguishing her from social workers who focus primarily on individual moral failings.

Originally published 1930 Russell Sage Fdn. Read-Me.Org Inc. 2025. 411p.

By Robin Joy

The purpose of this study was to test the effectiveness of the Arnold Ventures’ Public Safety Risk Assessment (PSA) in Vermont. This report presents the findings of the study. The Arnold PSA measures the risk of a person failing to appear for a court date (FTA) and engaging in new criminal activity (NCA) or committing a new violent crime (NCV) while out on bail. The PSA relies on criminal histories, the current charged offenses, and the age of the defendant to score the likelihood of a person engaging in the measured behavior. This research was conducted at the request of the Vermont stakeholder group of the National Criminal Justice Reform Project (NCJRP). The NCJRP was supported by the National Governors Association, Arnold Ventures, and the National Criminal Justice Association. This report was funded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Key Findings Overall, the PSA did not perform well in Vermont, and we do not recommend its adoption. It was unable to accurately predict who would not appear while on bail, commit a new crime, or commit a new crime of violence. Additionally, there are racial equity concerns about using criminal histories in criminal justice decision making. The PSA may have performed poorly for a variety of reasons. First, the overall rate of failure to appear (FTA) for the cohort (people arraigned on felony charge in 2016-2017) was 11%. This is low; however, the real number of FTAs are likely higher, but they are not appearing in the official data. Because the PSA relies on criminal histories, the completeness and accuracy affect the score. Not all states report the same level of detail and completeness of records, therefore, the scores are likely off. New crimes of violence while out on bail were also low, with 14% of the cohort being arrested or arraigned with a new crime of violence. About 25% of the cohort committed a new criminal offense (excluding Violations of Conditions of Release), but the PSA did not accurately predict who would commit a new crime.   

Montpelier, VT: Crime Research Group, 2022. 16p.

By Monica Deza, Thanh Lu, Johanna Catherine Maclean, and Alberto Ortega

  We study the impact of losing health insurance on criminal activity by leveraging one of the most substantial Medicaid disenrollments in U.S. history, which occurred in Tennessee in 2005 and lead to 190,000 non–elderly and non–disabled adults without dependents unexpectedly losing coverage. Using police agency–level data and a difference–in–differences approach, we find that this mass insurance loss increased total crime rates with particularly strong effects for non violent crime. We test for several potential mechanisms and find that our results may be explained by economic stability and access to healthcare. 

Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 2024, 56pg

By Emily Mooney and Casey Witte

  Over 50 years ago, President Richard Nixon kindled a fire of fear by claiming drug addiction was a rampant problem among white, well-to-do teens. During a 1969 speech to governors across the nation, President Nixon remarked:

There has been sort of a general thought that so far as drugs were concerned, we find them in the ghettos, among the deprived, those who are depressed and turn to drugs as a last resort. That may have once been the case. It is not the case today. The primary use, as far as drugs are concerned, has moved to the upper middle class…

No longer seen as a problem simply relegated to the inner city, Republican and Democrat policymakers enacted policies which attempted to save youth from the perils of marijuana and narcotics by further criminalizing drug use and sales. Yet, while both urban Black leaders and suburban whites supported these changes, the former group did not benefit from investments in efforts to address the root causes of addiction—poverty, trauma and poor educational opportunities, among them—for which they advocated.

Much of the War on Drugs was based on misinformation and fear. Drug users and sellers in America’s urban centers were seen as sources of corruption—their incarceration necessary to prevent more addiction and crime. However, research suggests increased criminal penalties and other policy efforts to fight illicit drug use have had little effectiveness. Indeed, many American youth continue to use illicit drugs at high rates. And while some research suggests marijuana use may bring some harmful side effects, its role as a “gateway” drug to more addictive substances like heroin and cocaine was largely over-stated. For instance, at least one recent study suggests that the legalization of marijuana has not been marked with an increase in the use of harder substances.

Currently, opportunities for and examples of misinformation and fear-mongering within the criminal justice system are bountiful. The United States is facing a global health crisis and struggling to productively address long-standing issues of racial injustice. In the first half of 2020, our nation continued to see property crime and most forms of violent crime decrease, while murder and nonnegligent manslaughter rates (although historically still low) rose by nearly 15 percent when compared to the first half of 2019, while aggravated assaults rose by about 5 percent.8 Although still one of the most crime-free times in our nation’s history, many have been quick to blame this increase on policy changes, such early prison releases due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and civil unrest. Yet, as experts have pointed out, the intersecting forces of a global pandemic, economic recession, racial unrest and nationwide protests mean it will take more time, data and intentional analysis to decipher the causal mechanisms of any current crime trends.

In both the past and present, it has been easy for criminal justice policy to be driven by fear and emotional policymaking rather than a sober assessment of the facts. This occurs for somewhat natural reasons, as the consequences of criminal justice policy failures can appear more immediate and visceral: the potential for the death of a loved one, lost property or abuse are far more tangible concepts than cybersecurity threats or green energy. This is likely, at least in part, due to human memory—research shows experiences and events tied to strong emotions are more memorable than less dramatic or weighted incidents. Further, policy success is often measured by recidivism—a zero-sum measure of an individual’s return to crime—rather than other metrics which show incremental progress. On top of this, the media, more often than not, focuses on policy failures rather than policy successes.

Yet, fear-based and emotionally-driven policy debates and policymaking are a disservice to the American public. Policymakers and the public may incorrectly deduce or be blind to the collateral consequences of their policies and are prone to letting biases impact their decision-making. As a result, the same problems remain, which cost life, property and liberty in the process.

This paper seeks to address this trend by first examining the relationships between fear, misinformation and policy and then providing illustrative examples of modern criminal justice myths alongside the evidence stacked against them. It will then conclude with a short list of policy solutions to combat misinformation and fear-mongering in criminal justice policy.

R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 213

Washington, DC: R Street, 2020. 14p.