By Alastair Reed, Joe Whitter, Fabio Votta and Sean Looney
This paper assesses whether social media platforms’ personalisation algorithms promote extremist material, finding evidence that only one platform studied – YouTube – prioritises extremist material by the recommender system.
London: Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) , 2019. 19p.
By J.M. Berger
The so-called ‘alt-right’ is an amorphous but synchronized collection of far-right people and movements, an umbrella label for a number of loosely affiliated social movements around the world, although its centre of gravity is in the United States.1 Many factors have contributed to the alt-right’s rise to prominence, but one of the most visible is its online presence. Alt-right views have been promoted online by a small army of trolls and activists staging harassment campaigns, pushing hashtags and posting links to extremist content and conspiracy theories on social media. Since 2016, the alt-right and its allies have held an increasingly prominent place in American and European politics, rallying support behind a variety of causes and candidates. This study seeks to evaluate the alt-right’s online presence with robust metrics and an analysis of content shared by adherents. The alt-right has many components online; this report will primarily examine its presence on Twitter, in part because the movement is particularly active on that platform, and in part because Twitter’s data access policies allow for more robust evaluation than is possible on other platforms.
Dublin: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2018. 59p.
By Lorenzo Vidino, Seamus Hughes and Bennett Clifford
The time period in which the Islamic State (IS) controlled territory in Syria and Iraq between 2014 and 2019 coincided with the largest groundswell of homegrown jihadist activity in United States history. This unprecedented wave of jihadist activism, which hit its peak between 2014 and 2016, could be measured through several indicators. Senior officials in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified that the Bureau managed, at any given time between 2014 and 2019, 1,000 active investigations into IS supporters throughout the U.S.; at least 239 alleged supporters were charged in U.S. courts. Meanwhile, more than 80 Americans traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS, and 16 IS sympathizers that remained in the U.S. conducted terrorist attacks that were inspired by or directed by the group. Others provided resources for IS’ global project in different ways, most notably by supporting IS’ online propaganda dissemination and social media recruitment campaigns. At its peak, IS’ perceived ideological credibility and authority, its predilection for extreme acts of violence, and its ability to direct its on-the-ground resources in Syria and Iraq towards information operations designed to incite terrorism in the West, drove its successes in recruiting Americans. However, as the organization began to hemorrhage territory, leadership, and key personnel, it became less and less able to reach its target audiences around the world, including in the U.S. The loss of the last vestiges of its territory in Syria and Iraq, the targeted killings of key English-speaking IS facilitators and “virtual entrepreneurs,” and eventually, the death of IS’ first “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were all harbingers for the decline in IS-related activity in the U.S. Nevertheless, even in a post-caliphate environment, IS continues to inspire American jihadists to conduct activities on its behalf. According to the FBI, the organization remains the predominant homegrown violent extremist (HVE) threat to the U.S., and although the group’s capabilities to recruit and mobilize Americans have significantly degraded, no other jihadist organization has made a significant effort to fill the breach and take IS’ place. While the number of IS-related cases in the American legal system in 2020, 2021, and 2022 have steadily declined from their peak in 2015, the alleged activities of supporters in these cases are more diffuse. In this paper, we evaluate 29 cases of Americans charged in the U.S. with IS-related offenses since January 2020. By comparing and contrasting them with the larger corpus of cases of American IS sympathizers in the U.S. legal system since 2014—when the first IS-related criminal case occurred—this brief report documents emerging trends in the nature of American support for IS and the U.S. counterterrorism response in the world after the collapse of IS’ physical caliphate. Furthermore, it attempts to ascertain what these trends portend for the future of the jihadist movement in America.
Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2022. 16p.
By Lorenzo Vidino and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens
The global LGBTQIA+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, intersex and asexual/aromantic/agender) community has historically been subjected to hateful rhetoric, discriminatory practices and acts of violence. In the West, this animosity has traditionally mostly originated from a heterogeneous array of actors that can broadly be identified with the far-right. And while in recent years the LBGTQIA+ community has received rights and a degree of acceptance largely unthinkable only a few decades ago, episodes of intolerance and violence are still very much present. Recently, for example, in June 2022, authorities detained 31 members of a white nationalist group called Patriot Front who were allegedly about to attack the Pride in the Park event in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho.1 If animosity against the LGBTQIA+ community from right wing circles is a well-known and fairly uncontested topic, less so is that originating from Islamist milieus.2 Yet, an abundance of evidence indicates that, over the last few decades, hateful rhetoric and occasional acts of violence against the LGBTQIA+ community in the United States and virtually all other Western countries have increasingly come from Islamist actors. Both in the Muslim world and in the West, mainstream Islamists, such as those from Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist backgrounds, depict homosexuality as a perversion and a grave sin. Islamist anti-LGBTQIA+ rhetoric takes different angles. At times, it focuses on warning the Muslim community about engaging in homosexual acts, evoking the divine punishments that await those who do so. In line with some Christian fundamentalists, natural events such as hurricanes and earthquakes or diseases like AIDS are also painted as divine punishments against homosexuality. A substantial part of the messaging also views homosexuality and gay rights as a Western plot devised to pervert and weaken Muslims. This report documents several instances of preachers and top-ranking officials linked to prominent Islamist organizations in the U.S. and Europe, several of whom are engaged as partners by Western governments and civil society, that espouse such views.
Washington, DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2022. 21p.
By Anne Speckhard, Molly Ellenberg, and TM Garret
The following report is an interim report of an ongoing study, with the current results based on 50 in-depth psychosocial interviews of white supremacists in five countries (the U.S., Canada, Germany, UK and New Zealand) collected over the time period of October 2020 to October 2021. The interviews focused on the subjects’ childhood histories, exposures to white supremacism, recruitment and joining processes, experiences in the group including ideological indoctrination and with violence and if disillusioned their disengagement and deradicalization experiences. All of the interviews were conducted over Zoom and video recorded with most participants agreeing to have their interview used to produce a short counter narrative video for use in disrupting white supremacist online and face-to-face recruitment.
McLean, VA: International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism, 2022. 46p.
By Sibusiso Nkomo and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke
Afrobarometer’s Round 7 surveys, conducted between late 2016 and late 2018, asked security-related questions in 34 African countries, including five countries along the East Africa Corridor that have experienced terrorist activity in recent years: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa. (While Somalia has been heavily impacted by terrorism, and has been a source of terrorist activity in the region, no Afrobarometer survey has taken place in the country due to security challenges.) In these five countries, citizens show a generally mixed response to their respective governments’ handling of violent extremism. Public trust in the security sector, particularly the police, is low throughout the region, which may hamper efforts to develop sustainable approaches to addressing violent extremism and insecurity. Many citizens in the region report fearing violence from extremist groups, even where actual incidents have been infrequent, and indicate a willingness to accept government restrictions on certain civil liberties, such as rights to privacy, freedom of movement, and freedom of religion. These findings highlight the need for counter-terrorism policies whose national security objectives do not come at the expense of democratic ideals and good governance.
Ghana: Afrobarometer, 2020. 26p.
Edited by Marc Engelhart and Sunčana Roksandić Vidlička
The events surrounding the terrorist group officially known as the Islamic State (IS) have galvanized anti-terrorist efforts far beyond the first reactions after September 11, 2001, and led to varying state responses, especially in Europe, e.g., in addressing the phenomenon of foreign fighters. In »Dealing with Terrorism – Empirical and Normative Challenges for Fighting the Islamic State« an international panel of experts analyses current trends and new developments in legal systems and in law enforcement in Europe as well as in the USA and the Middle East. Offering a succinct overview with special focus on criminal law, police law, and European and international law, the book provides unique insights into what dealing with terrorism means to European and non-European countries. It includes material from non-English-speaking countries that is seldom available to a broader academic community. Its comparative approach offers readers three levels of understanding: by country, in terms of the European Union, and the international community as a whole. The book is geared at specialists in national and international institutions, scholars, and students in the field but will also be of great interest to the wider legal community. Its profound insights and expert perspectives enhance the ongoing national and international debate on public security issues by striking a balance between freedom and security
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 2019. 317p.
By Tecj Against Terrorism
A new report from Tech Against Terrorism has found that global terrorist and violent extremist actors are running at least 198 websites on the surface web. In-depth analysis of 33 of the most prominent websites – run by actors such as Islamic State, al-Qaeda, Atomwaffen Division and the Taliban – confirms that these sites have 1.54 million monthly visitors, with the majority of visits coming from Algeria, Pakistan, United States, and the United Kingdom.
Tech Against Terrorism, 2022. 32p.
By OSCE Transnational Threat Department Action against Terrorism Unit
Terrorist activity in today’s world is complex, multifaceted, and not confined to national borders. Terrorist groups are less cohesive, and the threat they pose is harder to understand and predict. We are witnessing not only directed attacks in the OSCE area, but also self-inspired acts of violence. Some terrorist actors are foreign fighters; others have never left their communities. The goals, motives, and justification for the violence have changed as well, and the causes and drivers of violent extremism are multifaceted. This reality requires a comprehensive, nuanced, and internationally coordinated response. The OSCE participating States have been unequivocal not only in their condemnation of terrorism and violent extremism, but also in their support of a multidimensional approach that focuses on the prevention of radicalization and of violent extremism that leads to terrorism (VERLT). The OSCE’s commitment to preventing and countering VERLT (P/CVERLT) reflects the growing awareness and understanding that effective counterterrorism efforts are vital but insufficient without an emphasis on prevention. Understanding why individuals are willing to give their lives to a violent extremist movement or cause and working to address and mitigate the issues and grievances and that push them in that direction is a critical investment of our time and resources. While there is an increased awareness among policymakers in the OSCE area of the importance of P/CVERLT, there is still not enough dialogue, engagement, and co-operation with civil society and other non-governmental actors in conceptualizing, developing, and implementing impactful P/CVERLT activities and policies
Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 2020. 86p.
By Seumas Miller
Undoubtedly, the events of September 11, 2001 served as a wake-up call to the scourge of global terrorism facing twenty-first century societies. But was the attack on the World Trade Center a crime or an act of war? Is seemingly indiscriminate violence inflicted on civilians ever morally justified? And should society's response always be in kind--with blind, destructive violence? For that matter, are all civilians truly "innocent"? The answers are not always so simple.Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Ethics and Liberal Democracy provides sobering analyses of the nature of terrorism and the moral justification--or lack thereof--of terrorist actions and counter-terrorism measures in today's world. Utilizing a variety of thought-provoking philosophical arguments, the historic roots of terrorism and its contemporary incarnations are explored in depth. Detailed analyses of organizations such as the IRA, ANC, Hamas, and al-Qaeda will reveal the many faces of terrorism and its disparate motives and tactics. Early chapters on the Definition of Terrorism, and Is Terrorism ever Morally Justified? are balanced with discussions on Counter-terrorism Strategies and Methods and Moral Limits on Counter-terrorism to provide insights into the complexities and ethical dilemmas posed by terrorism in today's world.Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism will greatly broaden our understanding of the nature and morality of terrorism and counter-terrorist pursuits--a crucial precondition for establishing any form of enduring peace between nations in the twenty-first century world.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009. 231p.
By Martin Bouchard
This book examines two key themes in terrorism studies, the radicalization process and counter-terrorism policies, through the lens of social networks.
The book aims to show that networks should be at the forefront not only when analysing terrorists, but also when assessing the responses to their actions. The volume makes a unique contribution by addressing two relatively new themes for terrorism studies. First it puts social relations and cooperation issues at the forefront – an approach often identified as crucial to future breakthroughs in the field. Second, many contributions tackle the role of the Internet in the process of radicalization and in recruitment more generally, a highly debated topic in the field today. In addition, the book provides a valuable mix of review essays, critical essays, and original empirical studies. This balanced approach is also found in the topics covered by the authors, as well as their academic disciplines, which include sociology, computer science, geography, history, engineering, and criminology as well as political science. Many of the true advances in terrorism studies depend on the successful collaboration of multi-disciplinary teams, each with a different set of methodological and conceptual tools. This volume reflects the newfound diversity in this field and is a true product of its time.
Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon. UK: Routledge, 2015. 256p.
By The International Crisis Group
What’s new? The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), the most powerful faction of the jihadist movement known as Boko Haram, has since May 2021 largely decimated its rival led by the late Abubakar Shekau, seizing new territory. The authorities have stepped up military operations and other stabilisation efforts to counter ISWAP. How did it happen? ISWAP’s power grab comes after years of tensions within Boko Haram that eventually splintered the movement. The Islamic State (ISIS) core appears to have intensified its support for dissenting commanders who broke with Shekau in 2016, seeing them as more reliable partners in fighting the Nigerian state. Why does it matter? While the Nigerian military’s increased air capacity has allowed it to better defend garrison towns, ISWAP has gained in strength since Shekau’s death. It is expanding into new rural areas in Nigeria’s north east. Scattered former Shekau fighters may further aggravate insecurity elsewhere in northern Nigeria. What should be done? Authorities should redouble efforts to demobilise fighters from Shekau’s group. They should be discerning when resettling civilians in state-controlled towns situated in ISWAP areas, where they could be caught in the crossfire or subject to the group’s taxation. Abuja and its partners should tighten intelligence cooperation to stem the flow of ISIS support to ISWAP.
Dakar/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2022. 24p.
By Malik Samuel
Having waged deadly violence for over a decade, Boko Haram has survived various interventions by the Lake Chad Basin countries and their partners. The longevity of the group can, in part, be attributed to its continued access to resources. This report explores the economic drivers that reinforce Boko Haram’s resilience, including the key actors involved in these activities.
Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2022. 28p.
By Glenn E. Curtis
his report examines the role of Russian organized crime and Central Asian terrorist organizations in narcotics trafficking in four countries of central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan); in the three former Soviet republics of the south Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia); and in Chechnya.
Although a variety of sources were used for this report, the focus was on current news accounts from the regions examined. Over the past 2 years, the narcotics smuggling routes established in Georgia in the 1990's have seen an increased volume of drug trafficking. In this enterprise Chechen guerrilla forces have apparently gained the advantage in the competition with conventional crime organizations. The Georgian Government's efforts to counter narcotics trafficking have increasingly deteriorated. Afghanistan continues to be a conduit for the flow of heroin through Central Asia into Russia and to the West. Trafficking routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus countries continue to diversify and expand, due largely to the smuggling of Afghan opium and chaotic conditions in transit countries. Members of several ethnic groups are major players in the narcotics trade based in Central Asia; Russian criminal organizations apparently have a diminishing role.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) relies heavily on drug trafficking through a number of central Asian routes as a means of funding military, political, and propaganda activities. As markets and processing capacity expand into new parts of Central Asia, the IMU has adjusted its military and trafficking activities to cope with interdiction in particular areas. The impact of military losses in Afghanistan on IMU's narcotics activity is not yet known because the status and priorities of its leaders are unclear. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a fundamentalist Islamic group whose membership in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is expanding rapidly. Its decentralized structure conceals its activities; individual cells may be involved in narcotics trafficking. HT's expanding appeal among the poor provides a strong recruiting base for potential terrorist activity. Although its operations have thus far relied on peaceful means to propagate its central mission of Islamic governance throughout Central Asia, ongoing repression in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan may drive some parts of the organization to engage in violence
Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2002. 39p.
From the Foreword: "It is a vital interest of the United States to manage the risk of biological incidents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. This 'National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security' updates the 2018 'National Biodefense Strategy' and serves as a foundational component of the President's vision to create a world free from catastrophic biological incidents, laying out a set of objectives to effectively counter the spectrum of biological threats. It defines biodefense as actions to counter biological threats, reduce biological risks, and prepare for, respond to, and recover from biological incidents, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin and whether impacting human, animal, plant, or environmental health. It is broader than a Federal Government strategy; it is a call to action for state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) entities, practitioners, physicians, scientists, educators, industry, and the international community to work together to elevate biological preparedness and response."
United States. White House Office 2022. 53p.
By Carlos Solar
While the effects of militarism and militarization toward security are evident in the Americas, most notably transmitted via images of soldiers complementing and replacing law enforcement agencies at times of social crisis, this report seeks potential answers to what this means in theory and practice. The author does this in two ways. First, it unpacks an up-to-date understanding of militarism and militarization aiming to feed academic and policy debates with a perspective on what citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean think. Second, it expands knowledge of militarism and militarization informing security and defense planners, specifically those preparing tailored policies toward conflict and peace in the region.
Miami: Florida International University, 2021. 27p.
By Unidad de investigación de Venezuela
For twenty years, Venezuela was a refuge for Colombia’s Marxist guerrillas, a place where they could hide out from the military, run criminal economies, and carry out political work with impunity thanks to their friendly relationship with the government of President Hugo Chávez. But today, it is so much more. Guerrillas such as the ELN have spread deep into Venezuelan territory, they are filling their ranks with recruits, taking control of communities, and interfering in politics. Today, they are binational guerrilla groups. The product of five years of fieldwork along the Colombia-Venezuela border and beyond, this investigation reveals the Venezuelan operations of Colombia’s guerrillas and explores the far-reaching implications for both countries of their evolution into Colombo-Venezuelan groups.
Washington, DC: InsightCrime, 2022. 53p.
By Michael J. Williams; John G. Horgan; William P. Evans
The CVE program examined was initiated by the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), a community-based Muslim-led organization whose CVE programming focuses on creating and maintaining networks of civically engaged individuals who are sensitized to issues of violent extremism and have proactive, cooperative relationships with local social services and law enforcement agencies… As part of its community education focus WORDE programming addresses the early identification of individuals at risk for violent extremism. One of the highlights of the current evaluation was the development of empirically based recommended practices for both the recruitment and retention of CVE program participants. The evaluation's experimental tests found that fear of damaging one's peer relationships reduced individuals' willingness to intervene when they observe signs of the potential for violent extremism. Evidence-based initiatives are suggested for addressing this fear of peer rejection in training people to act appropriately in recognizing and responding to indications that a person advocates or is motivated to engage in extremist violence. In examining whether WORDE programs are effective, the evaluation found that of all of WORDE's activities, their volunteer-service and multicultural programming had the intended positive effects on 12 of 14 CVE-relevant outcomes. In addition, there were no discernable unintended effects. Thus, the evaluation concludes that WORDE's volunteer-service and multicultural programming is the first evidence-based CVE-relevant programming in the United States. It is worthy of expansion and testing in other municipalities.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 167p.
By Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security
Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) is on the rise in Canada and its affects are being experienced throughout Canadian society, including by elected officials…. A number of Canadian influencers and proselytizers have emerged within IMVE movements. These IMVE influencers promote misinformation and action, including violence. It is against this background that, on 10 February 2022, the committee adopted the following motion: That pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee undertake a study of the rise of Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE) in Canada; … Drawing on evidence heard by the committee, this report describes what is meant by IMVE, examines the targets of IMVE attacks, recent IMVE trends, Canada’s current response to IMVE threats, and presents the committee’s findings and recommendations to tackle this important issue. The committee recognizes that several areas aimed at combatting IMVE are matters of shared jurisdiction and that collaboration between all levels of government and civil society is required to address this issue.
Ottawa: House of Commons, 2022. 54p.
By Public Safety Canada
Canada faces the threat of violence by a small number of individuals who have become radicalized for political, religious or other ideological reasons. The Government of Canada is concerned with all forms of violent extremism, not associating this phenomenon with any particular religious, political, national, ethnic, or cultural group. While Canada has faced a variety of threats stemming from violent extremism in recent decades, the main terrorist threat to Canada continues to be violent extremists inspired by terrorist groups such as Daesh and al-Qaeda. However, individuals espousing and engaging in violence can be inspired by any extremist group promoting such behaviour. For example, some individuals within the far-right movement have espoused, glorified, promoted, and even engaged in violence. As well, historically, some far-left extremists have taken part in violent acts such as pipeline bombings. The Government of Canada is also alerted to the dangers of lesser-known forms of violent extremism. In its ongoing efforts to keep Canadians safe, the Government of Canada is expanding how it responds to violent extremism. Specifically, the federal government is investing in the prevention of radicalization to violence as articulated through the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence. Prevention aims to thwart violent radicalization from happening in the first place and to intervene as early as possible when it is occurring. Preventing and countering violent extremism is an effective complement to security agencies’ traditional methods of safeguarding national security.
Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2018. 46p.
