By The Youth Justice Board (UK)

Key findings The Serious Incident Annual Report provides a comprehensive overview of 438 serious incidents notified to the Youth Justice Board (YJB) in 2023-24 and the 546 children involved, highlighting key themes and recommendations. Whilst serious incident reporting has been mandatory for youth justice services (YJSs) since April 2022, this is the first year of published findings. A summary of the key findings is below. Whilst there are limitations to this data (please see section 2.1 Data Limitations), this report underscores the importance of addressing exploitation, knife crime, and the vulnerabilities of children with special educational needs or who are neurodivergent. It also highlights the need for timely, effective interventions which address underlying causes, and support to prevent children from being involved in serious incidents. To learn more about the notification process itself, please see the Serious incidents notification: standard operating procedures for YJSs - GOV.UK Criminal exploitation • 41% of all children notified were said to be gang affiliated, criminally exploited, or involved with the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) process1; 42% of all boys and 29% of all girls. • 20% of all children notified had exploitation concerns identified relating to the charge, of these; 58% an NRM referral was due to be made and 42% had a previous NRM referral but were awaiting a decision. Offence types • 55% of all notifications were for Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), 16% for Rape, 13% for Murder/Manslaughter, 9% Attempted Murder and 3% Terrorism offences. • 56% of incidents notified were knife/blade enabled. • 92% of Attempted Murder notifications indicated there was knife or blade involvement, 84% of Murder/Manslaughter, and 62% of Grievous Bodily Harm incidents. • Rape charges increased from 8-13% of overall notifications when compared to the previous year. Contact with services • 36% of all children charged were under the supervision of a youth justice service at the time of the incident. • 24% were not known to YJSs, nor were they engaged in support from any other local authority service at the time of the incident. • 49% of children notified had no previous cautions and convictions, increasing to 92% for children charged with terrorism offences. • 71% of children notified for murder were not supervised by a youth justice service at the time of the incident, but were known to other agencies, social care, education, health. • 63% had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or Children and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS), of these 24% were engaged with both the youth justice service and one or more other services at the time of the incident. Safeguarding and vulnerabilities • Of the 63% who had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or CAMHS service; o 29% were identified as Children in Need or in Wales, Children with care and support needs o 19% were subject of a Child Protection Plan o 27% were in the care of the local authority as a looked after child, with 48% of these reported to have gang involvement and/or exploitation concerns. • 23% of children reported had identified Special Educational Needs, in Wales Additional Learning Needs/Neurodiversity. Of these; • 19% had an Education Health Care Plan (EHCP) or in Wales Individual Development Plans • 48% were diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) or Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) • 53% reported risks associated with exploitation. • 43% of children notified due to their death whilst under the supervision of the youth justice service were victims of murder and 19% died by suicide. Demographics and over-representation • 96% of the children notified were boys • 68% of the children notified were 16-17 years old; 99% of these were boys. • 48% of all children notified were from ethnic minority backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (27%) • 17% of children reported were from Black backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) • 17% of children reported were from Mixed backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) Timeliness of investigations and decision making • Rape offences took the longest from offence to charge, averaging 380 days, followed by terrorism offences at 230 days. • 32% of all incidents took longer than 180 days from offence to charge. • 17% of children notified were reported as being on bail for another matter at the time of the incident.

London: YJB, 2025. 38p.

By Sara T. Thompson

Banditry is a current problem in Nigeria. Historically, banditry has been a problem around the world. A review of the trends of banditry can help to identify and understand patterns that are present related to such criminal activity. To further understand and analyze this problem, this paper outlines the methodology for the systematic collection and creation of one major dataset that provides detailed information about bandit attacks in Nigeria. A review of around 1200 publications from peer-reviewed journals, news articles, and other relevant publications containing information about bandit attacks in Nigeria resulted in a dataset containing a sample of almost 1000 bandit attacks over the course of a decade in Nigeria. Upon analysis of this dataset, there are spatial concentrations related to where bandit attacks occurred as well as the identifcation of common types of bandit attacks. This paper concludes with recommendations for future research.

Security Journal, 2025, 17p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is proud to release a practical resource designed to empower law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and stakeholders in tackling cryptocurrency-related crimes. The guide "Decoding Crypto Crime: A Guide for Law Enforcement" simplifies complex concepts like blockchain technology and virtual assets, offering best practices for investigating common crypto crimes such as investment scams, extortion, and phishing.

It provides actionable steps for collecting critical evidence, interacting with Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), and utilizing blockchain analytics tools. Recognizing the challenges victims face, the guide also offers support strategies and emphasizes the importance of cross-jurisdictional collaboration. While not exhaustive, this guide serves as a foundational tool to bridge the knowledge gap and enhance law enforcement’s ability to navigate the rapidly evolving world of crypto crime. Download the guide today to strengthen your capacity to combat digital financial crime and ensure a safer digital landscape.

Prague: OSCE, 2025. 64p.

By Marwa Alnasaa, Nikolay Gueorguiev, Jiro Honda, Eslem Imamoglu, Paolo Mauro, Keyra Primus, and Dmitriy Rozhkov 

  The emergence of crypto-assets (private digital assets that depend primarily on cryptography and distributed ledger technology for record keeping) has unleashed a plethora of financial innovation that will likely revolutionize the form of money and the ways it is used. These developments create opportunities as well as risks. As noted, for example, by a group of G-20 policymakers, “…technological innovation, including that underlying crypto-assets, has the potential to improve the efficiency and inclusiveness of the financial system and the economy more broadly,” but “crypto-assets […] raise issues with respect to consumer and investor protection, market integrity, tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing.” The pseudonymity of crypto-assets (whereby transactions require only digital identities) makes them a potential vehicle for illicit flows, including flows of proceeds from corruption. This pseudonymity is not an intrinsic feature of the underlying technology, but rather a choice made in the design and practice of most currently existing crypto-assets. Whereas cash provides full anonymity and large denomination bills have long been considered an aid for crime and tax evasion (Rogoff 2017, Chodorow-Reich et al. 2020), crypto-assets in their current form make it possible to move even larger amounts speedily and with greater ease, including across national borders (Graf von Luckner et al., 2021). As crypto-assets rapidly gain macroeconomic relevance (International Monetary Fund 2021) and policymakers consider the optimal degree of regulation, it is urgent to bring empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether crypto-assets facilitate corruption. Likewise, it is helpful to explore the extent to which crypto-assets are used to circumvent capital controls, for countries where these are in place, and whether crypto-assets are more likely to gain traction in countries where the local currency has historically not been a secure store of value. There are also potential benefits of the technologies that crypto-assets are based on. In particular, prudently designed central bank digital currencies could offer additional resilience, safety and availability with lower costs. These technologies could also be used to improve transparency and record-keeping for procurement or other payments related to government projects, thereby increasing accountability, and reducing the scope for corruption. Likewise, property and registry systems could be enhanced, reducing red tape, and streamlining processes. However, these initiatives are currently less advanced or widespread than crypto-assets. Empirical investigation of the factors underlying the growing usage of crypto-assets is in its infancy, owing to data limitations. In this paper, we present a simple cross-country analysis drawing on recently released survey-based data. We explore the correlation of crypto-asset usage with indicators of corruption, capital  controls, a history of high inflation, and other factors. We find that crypto-asset usage is significantly and positively associated with corruption and capital controls. Whereas the small sample size and uncertain quality of the data on crypto-assets implies that our results must be interpreted with caution, it is also worth recalling that measurement error tends to reduce the likelihood of finding a significant empirical association; significant results with low-quality data are thus worth paying attention to. With these caveats in mind and considering the urgency of acting before it is too late, rather than waiting for conclusive evidence, we believe that, on balance, our results add to the case for regulating crypto-assets, including know-your-customer approaches, as opposed to taking a laissez-faire stance. 

Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2022. 19p.

By Europol

These recommendations follow the 6th Global Conference on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies on 1–2 September 2022. The conference was hosted by Europol at its headquarters in The Hague, the Netherlands, together with the Basel Institute on Governance through the Joint Working Group on Criminal Finances and Cryptocurrencies.

The Recommendations are intended to highlight broad approaches and best practices. They are designed to help public and private actors stay one step ahead of those seeking to abuse crypto assets (also known as virtual assets) and services to make, hide and launder illicit money.

The main message is that as the use of crypto assets expands into practically every country and sector, so does its abuse to commit new forms of crime and launder criminal proceeds. Yet with the right tools, capacity and cooperation, the unique characteristics of blockchain-based technologies offer an unprecedented opportunity to investigate organised crime and money laundering networks and to recover stolen funds.

The five recommendations cover:

1. Breaking down silos between “traditional” and “crypto”

2. Regulating broadly and make full use of existing laws 

3. Taking advantage of the blockchain to disrupt organised crime 

4. Raising crypto literacy through capacity building and clear communication 

5. Increasing public-private cooperation

Europol and Basel Institute on Governance, 2022.  6p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

Cybercrime poses serious threats and financial costs to individuals and businesses in the United States and worldwide. Reports of data breaches and ransomware attacks on governments and businesses have become common, as have incidents against individuals (e.g., identity theft, online stalking, and harassment). Concern over cybercrime has increased as the internet has become a ubiquitous part of modern life. However, comprehensive, consistent, and reliable data and metrics on cybercrime still do not exist - a consequence of a shortage of vital information resulting from the decentralized nature of relevant data collection at the national level.

Cybercrime Classification and Measurement addresses the absence credible cybercrime data and metrics. This report provides a taxonomy for the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of measuring different types of cybercrime, including both cyber-enabled and cyber-dependent crimes faced by individuals and businesses, and considers the needs for its periodic revision. 

Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2025. 259p.

By Claudio Mezzetti,  keshini muthukuda,  Haishan Yuan

We study whether data hacking of local organizations causes an increase in identity theft in the organization's local area. We use a difference in differences approach exploiting the timing of incidents of hacking and identity theft in the USA from 2015 to 2018, and estimate a fixed effects model that includes time and Core Based Statistical Area, or County, fixed effects. We find that a hacking incident in a local organization leads to 0.792 to 1.044 more identity thefts per 10,000 population in the local area the following year. The increase represents a 42% to 77% increase in the average prevalence of identity theft. We also show that among all our controls the unemployment rate is the most significant predictor of identity theft.

Mezzetti, Claudio and muthukuda, keshini and Yuan, Haishan, Crime in the Digital Age: Do Cyber Attacks Lead to Identity Theft? (April 24, 2024).

By Kim Thomas

  Targeted killings instil fear, silence activists and whistle-blowers, corrode democracies, and assist criminal actors in achieving their goals. The criminal economies of Kenya, Mozambique and South Africa are marked by these killings for social, political or economic gain. Yet, their nature and extent remain underexplored. We have chosen these three countries for analysis for several reasons. South Africa has a long history of targeted violence in various sectors of society, and our established database on the country provided a methodological framework for expanding the study. Kenya was chosen, as it has struggled not only with political violence, but also organized crime and gang culture, all of which, based on our South African research, provide a foundation for assassinations. Its fairly extensive media coverage also provided a good framework for the study. Although Mozambique’s media coverage is limited and less free, Mozambique was included in the study because our ongoing fieldwork there has revealed that targeted killings are prevalent in the country, particularly in manipulating political outcomes. The sociopolitical landscape of these three countries, although different from one another, all have commonalities that are conducive to targeted killings. South Africa has a long-standing history of violence deployed to achieve various political or economic outcomes, as was seen during the apartheid government’s administration and in the various post-democratic political party struggles. Violence in the mass-transit minibus-taxi industry as well as interpersonal violence are not new to the country. However, the use of targeted violence, by means of contracting a third party, to achieve political, economic or personal gain is something that has increased over the past two decades. Previous research on assassinations in South Africa by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) has revealed that targeted violence increased from 2000 to 2017 and that there were particularly high rates of assassinations in the KwaZulu-Natal province, owing to both political motives and the taxi industry’s power struggles and conflict over routes. The research further revealed that, nationally, the taxi industry made up over 40% of the assassinations during that data period. Continued data collection and analysis up to 2020 seeks to determine if these trends are continuing or if there have been any significant changes in the targeted-killing landscape.  Kenya, although not as violent as South Africa, also has a history of political struggles and interconnectedness of the state and organized crime. This relationship is particularly evident in the deployment of gangs by politicians to intimidate the opposition and rally support for their campaigns. Kenya’s matatu industry, much like South Africa’s taxi industry, is also deeply criminalized. The industry experiences high levels of extortion, intimidation and corruption. Kenya has also experienced various land disputes over the years, which have led to violence and assassinations. It is in light of all these factors and their similarities with the South African landscape for assassinations, that the Kenyan database was compiled to determine the extent of these assassinations and their impact in Kenya. Mozambique has long been afflicted with political instability and violence. The current insurgency in the northern province of Cabo Delgado is one of many examples of the violence that has plagued the country. Although our research picked up some assassinations related to terrorism in the region, they were generally excluded from our database, as they were not linked to organized crime and did not fit within our methodological criteria. This is consistent with our field research in the country that has shown that the Islamic militants are in fact not profiteering from the illicit economy. The GI-TOC’s ongoing research in the country, as well our network of local journalists, has revealed that assassinations, particularly politically motivated ones, are having a profound impact on Mozambican society and democracy. This was first documented in a short GI-TOC data collection and article on the problem titled ‘Mozambique’s quiet assassination epidemic’. It is in light of this research that we decided to expand the database to better understand this phenomenon. As a result of the contexts in these countries, and their histories of violence, there are sources of violence available to those who have historically deployed it. This experience, coupled with dire social circumstances and limited economic opportunities, as seen in the context of Kenyan and South African gangs, creates reservoirs of violence that fuel targeted killings.8 Once involved in the business of targeted killings, the hired hitmen become vulnerable themselves. Interviews with hitmen in Cape Town gangs revealed that they were often as vulnerable as those whom they killed. In the gang context particularly, hitmen often exist outside of the formal gang structure and as a result do not have protection from gangs. However, they are still beholden to the gang bosses.  

Geneva:  Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2021. 64p.

By Hannah Miles Samantha Bricknell

The National Homicide Monitoring Program is Australia’s only national data collection on homicide incidents, victims and offenders. This report describes 262 homicide incidents recorded by Australian state and territory police between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024. During this 12-month period there were 277 victims of homicide and 278 identified offenders

Statistical Report no. 52.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2025. 77p.

By The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

Ransomware attacks target individuals, businesses and government agencies, across the world. The impact of these attacks can be devastating for individuals, government agencies and business activity and even disrupt essential infrastructure and services.

This FATF report analyses the methods that criminals use to carry out their ransomware attacks and how payments are made and laundered. Criminals are almost exclusively using crypto, or virtual assets and have easy access to virtual asset service providers around the world. Jurisdictions with weak or non-existent AML/CFT controls are therefore of concern.

The report proposes a number of actions that countries can take to more effectively disrupt ransomware-related money laundering. This includes building on and leveraging existing international cooperation mechanisms, given the transnational nature of ransomware attacks and related laundering. Authorities also need to develop the necessary skills and tools to quickly collect key information, trace the nearly instantaneous financial transactions and recover virtual assets before they dissipate. The multi-disciplinary nature of ransomware also means that authorities must extend their collaboration beyond their traditional counterparts to include cyber-security and data protection agencies.

The FATF also finalized a list of potential risk indicators that can help public and private sector entities identify suspicious activities related to ransomware.

Paris: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 2023. 54p.

By Costas Meghir Marten Palme Marieke Schnabel

We study the intergenerational effect of education policy on crime. We use Swedish administrative data that links outcomes across generations with crime records and we show that the comprehensive school reform, gradually implemented between 1949 and 1962, reduced conviction rates both for the generation directly affected by the reform and for their sons. The reduction in conviction rates occurred across many types of crime. Key mediators for this reduction in the child generation are an increase in education and a decline in crime amongst their fathers.

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2356, New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2023. 40p.

By Maeve E. Wallace; Jaquelyn L. Jahn

IMPORTANCE Despite growing national concern about high and increasing rates of pregnancyassociated mortality due to homicide, suicide, and drug overdose, state-level incidence has previously not been available. OBJECTIVE To identify cases of pregnancy-associated homicide, suicide, drug overdose, and deaths involving firearms in the US from calendar year 2018 to 2022 and estimate 5-year proportionate mortality and mortality ratios per 100 000 live births by state and cause of death. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This cross-sectional study is a population-based analysis of the 2018-2022 restricted-use mortality files provided by the National Center for Health Statistics. These data include all deaths occurring in the US, with geographic identifiers for state of residence. All records in which the decedent was female aged 10 to 44 years and pregnant at the time of death or up to 1 year earlier were included in the analysis. Data were analyzed from July 1 to December 1, 2024. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision codes for underlying cause of death were used to identify cases of homicide, suicide, drug overdose, and deaths involving firearms occurring in each state from 2018 to 2022. Proportionate mortality was estimated as the count of cases divided by the total count of deaths of pregnant and postpartum women in each state. Cause-specific mortality ratios were estimated as the count of cases divided by the total count of live births in each state from 2018 to 2022. RESULTS Nationally, there were 10 715 deaths of people who were pregnant or within 1 year post partum from 2018 to 2022, including 837 homicides, 579 suicides, 2083 drug overdoses, and 851 that involved firearms. Proportionate mortality and mortality ratios for homicide, suicide, and drug overdose varied across the US. Of states with more than 9 cases, pregnancy-associated homicide mortality was highest in Mississippi (12.86 per 100 000 live births), pregnancy-associated suicide mortality was highest in Montana (21.55 deaths per 100 000 live births), and pregnancy-associated drug overdose was highest in Delaware (36.03 deaths per 100 000 live births). Firearms accounted for as many as 15.56% of pregnancy-associated deaths in Colorado, and pregnancy-associated firearm mortality was highest in Mississippi (13.42 deaths per 100 000 live births). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE The information in this study may provide relevant guidance for state and local intervention strategies to advance the health, safety, and well-being of women during pregnancy and beyond.

JAMA Network Open. 2025;8(2):e2459342. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.59342 (R

By Stacy Calhoun

This randomized controlled trial to assess the effectiveness of a curriculum-based gang prevention program in addressing gang risk factors within a school setting encountered delays and challenges in implementing the program and completing the study. Despite challenges, progress was made as the clinic adapted to the evolving circumstances. Although the clinic lost its dedicated space, it successfully established Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with two new school districts where they implemented their universal screening program and services at one middle school and two high schools. Despite efforts by the clinic team, school staff, and SSGP facilitator to enhance student engagement during the project performance period through special events, motivating students to submit signed enrollment forms and to attend clinic and group appointments remained challenging. Participation in this study allowed the clinic to significantly expand its focus, addressing gang risk factors on a much broader scale than before. Despite facing substantial challenges, including adapting to COVID-19 disruptions, forming relationships in new school districts with differing policies, and coping with the loss of dedicated clinical space and staff, the clinic has remained committed to refining their processes to better support these students. Moreover, the clinic has taken a proactive role in educating stakeholders about the potential of integrating gang prevention services within school-based systems of care.

Los Angeles: Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences University of California, Los Angeles, 2024. 29p.

By:Jessie Austin, Nicole MartinRogers, Anna Granias, Maria Robinson, and Leticia Risco

Indigenous relatives are disproportionately likely to experience violence, be murdered, or go missing compared to other demographic groups. In Utah, although they make up just 1.5% of the population, American Indian and Alaska Native relatives account for over 5% of all murder victims (Utah Department of Health and Human Services, 2023). In 2020, the Utah Legislature created the Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women and Girls Task Force (renamed the Murdered and Missing Indigenous Relatives Task Force in 2023; MMIR; Utah H.B. 116, 2020; Utah H.B. 25, 2023). The Task Force’s responsibilities include conducting Tribal consultation on issues related to the MMIR injustice, developing model protocols and procedures, identifying best practices related to case investigation and prosecution, and conducting community education and outreach. This report addresses nine key topics of relevance to murdered and missing Indigenous relatives which emerged throughout the research process: 1. Reporting and initial investigation of missing person cases 2. Communication and alert systems 3. Review and investigation of unresolved (“cold”) cases 4. Death investigation 5. Jurisdiction issues and government-to-government collaboration 6. Data issues 7. Victim and family services 8. Prevention 9. Media reporting For each topic, the report presents major findings based on an analysis of the results from interviews with key informants, and listening sessions with family members of MMIR victims and community members in Utah; an inspection of existing federal and state legislation; and a review of relevant research literature. Based on these findings, the report:  Describes the policy context, identifying laws relevant to murdered and missing Indigenous relatives  Provides insight on best and emerging practices, including some protocols for effective investigations  Identifies issues which affect missing persons and homicide investigations related to Native Americans in Utah  Offers recommendations This summary synthesizes the findings across topics and identifies common themes in the report. The full report provides more detailed information, including extensive references. This summary presents the overarching themes that define and perpetuate MMIR injustice in Utah. These themes are based on a literature review, key informant interviews, and listening sessions with family members of Indigenous relatives who are missing or died by murder or other suspicious circumstances and other community members. Each section of the full report explores these issues in more depth.

Salt Lake City: Utah Legislature, 2023. 130p.

By The United States Government Accountability Office

According to researchers, AI/AN women in the U.S. experience higher rates of violence than most other women, and tribal and federal officials have stated that this incidence of violence constitutes a crisis. Various federal officials and tribal stakeholders have raised concerns about challenges with cross-jurisdictional cooperation and a lack of comprehensive national data on cases. GAO was asked to review the federal response to the missing or murdered AI/AN women crisis. This report examines the extent to which (1) the number of missing or murdered AI/AN women in the U.S. is known and (2) DOJ and DOI have taken steps to address the crisis. GAO reviewed available data on missing persons and violent deaths, relevant reports, and agency documentation, including agency policies and procedures. Using agency data—which were determined to be reliable for location selection— and qualitative factors, GAO selected seven locations to interview federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials; tribal officials; and nongovernmental victim service providers on the federal response to the crisis. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations, including that DOJ develop a plan for how it will accomplish ongoing analyses of missing or murdered AI/AN women data and that DOJ and DOI both develop plans to implement the requirements in Savanna’s Act and the Not Invisible Act of 2019 that remain unfulfilled past their statutory deadlines. Both agencies concurred with our recommendations.

GAO-22-104045

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2021. 68p.

By Melanie L. Fillmore and Lane K. Gillespie, et al.

House Concurrent Resolution No. 33 (HCR33) was introduced in the Health and Welfare Committee, and passed by both houses of the Legislature in March 2020. HCR33 recognizes Missing and Murdered Indigenous Persons (MMIP) as a crisis in Idaho, designates May 5th as a day of awareness for MMIP, and supports efforts to further investigate incidence rates, underlying causes, and possible solutions through collaborative efforts. Public testimony in support of the resolution came from a diverse group of stakeholders, including legislative sponsors, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Idaho, tribal legal and justice practitioners, and Indigenous advocates. The following passages serve as a reminder of the central role of Idaho’s tribes, and the opportunities and challenges in addressing MMIP.

Missing Persons • Missing persons cases are dynamic and missing persons data may represent individuals or incidents of missing persons. There are more incidents than individuals, as some individuals go missing more than once. Understanding this distinction is important to understanding the impact of MMIP in terms of people and resources. • Idaho’s average missing persons rate is approximately 10.59 per 100,000 persons. The average rate for Indigenous persons in Idaho is 18.99 per 100,000 persons. • A disproportionate percentage of Idaho’s missing persons are identified as Indigenous, as much as 2.1 times their proportion of the population. • Approximately 63% of Idaho’s Indigenous missing persons have been missing for more than 1 year. • Most of Idaho’s Indigenous missing persons are female (75%), in contrast with Idaho’s non-indigenous missing persons of which 28.8% are female. • Fifty percent of Idaho’s Indigenous missing persons went missing as adults and 50% went missing as juveniles. Among non-indigenous missing persons, 61.5% went missing as adults and 33.5% as juveniles. • On average in Idaho, there are 81.6 Indigneous missing persons entries in NCIC each year; and entries for Indigneous missing persons average 3.39% of annual missing persons entries in the state. • In 2020, NCIC entries for Indigenous persons were 3.38% of total entries in Idaho, compared to 1.76% of total entries nationwide. Homicide • Indigenous persons are disproportionately represented in deaths attributable to assault (3.05 times their proportion of the population). • There is variation across homicide data sources in counting potential Indigenous murder victims. • Homicide cases involving Indigenous persons occur in tribal jurisdictions and non-tribal jurisdictions

Submitted to the Idaho Legislature, September 30, 2021.2021. 59p.

By E. Lopez

With the holiday season upon us, shopping at store locations throughout the nation will increase. Bigger crowds are a welcome sight for retailers, but they also amplify concerns about shoplifting and the safety of the shopping experience for consumers and employees alike.

This report builds on a previous Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) shoplifting report and CCJ’s ongoing crime trends reports by exploring recent trends in shoplifting for the nation’s three largest cities—Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. It also examines seasonal trends for a sample of 23 cities and takes a closer look at shoplifting data available from the FBI.

Key Takeaways

Data collected through the fall of 2024 for Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York suggest that shoplifting levels remain higher than pre-2020 rates. Chicago, in particular, experienced notably elevated rates of reported shoplifting through the first 10 months of this year. In 2023, rates were 10% lower in Chicago, 87% higher in Los Angeles, and 55% higher in New York than in 2019.

Over the past several years, shoplifting rates were higher in November and December than they were during earlier months of the year, coinciding with increased in-person retail activity. Because shoplifting rates in a 23-city sample for the first half of 2024 are higher than in 2023, it is likely that the reported shoplifting rate for the full year will rise from 2023 to 2024.

Two national sources of law enforcement data on reported shoplifting—both available from the FBI—show different trends. Statistics from the Summary Reporting System (SRS) suggest that reported shoplifting in 2023 was the same level as in 2019. However, rates from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), show that shoplifting was 93% higher in 2023 than it was in 2019.

It is unclear why there is a sizable difference between these two sources. One possibility is that law enforcement agencies recently added to the group providing data through NIBRS reported disproportionally higher levels of shoplifting, even after adjusting for an increase in population coverage. Clear guidance from the FBI on the limitations of the data and the implications of using certain sources of FBI crime data is needed

Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice. 2024. 9p.

By B. Boxerman and K. Cundiff

This report focuses on reported shoplifting in Chicago, IL, and Los Angeles, CA, from 2018 through 2023. It uses incident location data to examine reported shoplifting prevalence and concentration in both cities and how these have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. It also examines how patterns in reported shoplifting may be related to the concentration of retail establishments. The pandemic is central to this analysis because property crime patterns, especially for larceny and shoplifting, are sensitive to changes in patterns of activity, such as the major shifts in public life that occurred under stay-at-home orders in response to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. This report is focused on the periods directly before, during, and after the pandemic to lend context to the increased interest and attention related to shoplifting at the national level.

Key Takeaways

In Chicago, the year-end rate of reported shoplifting was 11.6% lower for 2023 than it was for 2018. In Los Angeles, the rate for 2023 was 77% higher than it was for 2018.

Prior to the pandemic, the shoplifting rate in Los Angeles was less than half that of Chicago. By the end of 2023, the difference between the two cities had narrowed and the Los Angeles rate was 17.7% lower than that of Chicago.

In Chicago, the top 5% of all reported shoplifting locations by address had 68.5% of all reported shoplifting from 2018 to 2023. In Los Angeles, the top 5% of addresses had 62.8% of all reported shoplifting during this period.

Shoplifting patterns between the cities differed greatly. Chicago shoplifting clustered in two geographically close areas, while shoplifting in Los Angeles was distributed across multiple smaller areas that were less concentrated than in Chicago.

In Chicago, areas with substantial concentrations of retail outlets did not consistently experience concentrated amounts of shoplifting. In Los Angeles, however, there was considerable overlap between retail and shoplifting clusters.

Both cities saw large drops in reported shoplifting in 2020, likely due to store closures at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. For both cities, in 2020 and 2021, shoplifting was less prevalent and concentrated in fewer areas.

Portions of both cities that were not high-shoplifting areas before and during the pandemic began to experience increases in shoplifting after the pandemic (2022 and 2023).

Shoplifting in both cities was often highly concentrated in places with high concentrations of other crimes, such as other types of theft and violent offense

Washington DC: Council on Criminal Justice, 2024.

By Randi Hjalmarsson, Stephen Machin, Paolo Pinotti

The economics of crime has emerged as a critical field over the past 30 years, with economists increasingly exploring the causes and consequences of criminal behavior. This paper surveys key contributions and developments from labor economists, who investigate the (often two-way) intersection of crime with labor market factors, such as education, wages, and unemployment. The paper underscores the importance of understanding criminal decision-making in economic analysis through the lens of opportunity costs and labor market conditions. Methodological advancements, particularly those addressing causation, have propelled the field forward, enabling more accurate conclusions to be drawn for policy recommendations. The paper also explores the role of social policies and international contexts, emphasizing the need for evidence-based reforms to effectively reduce crime. This comprehensive review underscores the transformative impact of economics on crime research and its potential to influence real-world policies.

IZA DP No. 17423 Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics , 2024. 66p.

By Nicole Kravitz-Wirtz,  Angela Bruns , Amanda J Aubel , Xiaoya Zhang , Shani A Buggs

Understanding the burden of gun violence among youth is a public health imperative. While most estimates are based on direct and witnessed victimization, living nearby gun violence incidents may be consequential too. Yet detailed information about these broader experiences of violence is lacking. We use data on a population-based cohort of youth merged with incident-level data on deadly gun violence to assess the prevalence and intensity of community exposure to gun homicides across cross-classified categories of exposure distance and recency, overall and by race/ethnicity, household poverty, and neighborhood disadvantage. In total, 2–18% of youth resided within 600 m of a gun homicide occurring in the past 14–365 days. These percentages were 3–25% for incidents within 800 m and 5–37% for those within a 1300-m radius. Black and Latinx youth were 3–7 times more likely, depending on the exposure radius, to experience a past-year gun homicide than white youth and on average experienced incidents more recently and closer to home. Household poverty contributed to exposure inequities, but disproportionate residence in disadvantaged neighborhoods was especially consequential: for all racial/ethnic groups, the difference in the probability of exposure between youth in low vs high poverty households was approximately 5–10 percentage points, while the difference between youth residing in low vs high disadvantage neighborhoods was approximately 50 percentage points. Given well-documented consequences of gun violence exposure on health, these more comprehensive estimates underscore the importance of supportive strategies not only for individual victims but entire communities in the aftermath of gun violence.

J Urban Health, 2022 Jun 7, 16p.