By Gemma Hamilton, Alexandra Ridgway, Anastasia Powell, Georgina Heydon

This research explores the co-occurrence of family violence and sexual harm in Victoria, shedding light on the complex nature and interconnectedness between these two forms of abuse and its impact on victim survivors.

Drawing on victim/survivor and stakeholder interviews, as well as a sector wide survey, the reports present key outcomes of a research project funded by Family Safety Victoria with particular attention towards the implications of key findings for the development of policy, intervention and support. By deepening understandings of the complex interplay between family violence and sexual harm, the research seeks to assist professionals in this space to better address the needs of victim/survivors and work together to strengthen system responses.

Melbourne: RMIT University, 2023. 59p,

By Leesa Hooker, Emma Toone, Sarah Wendt, Cathy Humphreys, Angela Taft

When it comes to recovery from the trauma and harm of intimate partner violence (IPV), the evidence base shows a need for early intervention and responses that include women and their children. This research report provides findings from a pilot evaluation project examining the effectiveness of an early intervention therapeutic model, child–parent psychotherapy (CPP), designed for young children and their mothers experiencing trauma, including IPV. This therapeutic model was developed in the United States as a model of care for mothers and their children to enhance relationships and reduce trauma. This report’s findings aim to inform future trialling and expansion of CPP nationally.

With this aim in mind, the researchers tested the feasibility of CPP in the Australian context, assessed therapist fidelity to the model, and evaluated its effectiveness at improving the health and wellbeing outcomes of women and their children. The evaluation used a small-scale, multisite pilot featuring 18 mother–child dyads and 11 community-based clinical sites in both urban and regional locations in Victoria and South Australia.

The researchers found that the small-scale pilot was promising, reporting the mother–child therapy model to be feasible in the Australian context. Positive outcomes were reported for mothers and children, including increased parental warmth and improved child emotions and behaviours. Women also experienced less IPV post-intervention. Clinicians who adhered most to the model were also better able to build relationships with women and their children and convey a sense of hope. Importantly, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the overwhelming demand for evidence-based relational, child–parent, and young child-focused therapy like CPP, particularly in rural areas.

This research contributes to a better understanding of the service needs of women and children impacted by IPV, particularly the role of recovery interventions in buffering the long-term effects of IPV on families and developing children.

ANROWS - Australia's National Research Organisation for Women's Safety, 2022. 44p.

By Emma Russell, Hui Zhou, Gabriela Franich

This report documents how women experiencing domestic and family violence (DFV) are policed and criminalised. It presents findings from a research project conducted by Fitzroy Legal Service (FLS) in partnership with La Trobe University with the support of a Victorian Law Foundation Knowledge Grant (2020-21). The research aimed to identify how women who experience a range of social, economic, health and legal issues – including but not limited to DFV – become caught up in the criminal legal system.1 Investigating this point of overlap or interchange between social, financial, health or civil matters on the one hand, and criminal legal matters on the other, can help practitioners and policy strategists to explore the opportunities for systemic changes and collaborative support models that would prevent women’s criminalisation. Our use of the term women is inclusive of both cis and trans women. By using the term criminalisation, we hope to draw attention to the processes and mechanisms through which social problems come to be treated as criminal legal problems; and to highlight that there are alternatives. To investigate the relationships between criminalisation and women’s experiences of social, economic, health and/or civil legal issues, we adopted three methods of data collection and analysis: • the review and classification of 108 anonymised Fitzroy Legal Service client case files relating to women with criminal legal matters • the retrieval of publicly available statistical data on women in prison and women respondents on intervention orders • the thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with 11 legal and social service practitioners with current experience of working with criminalised women These methods generated rich quantitative and qualitative data on the policing and criminalisation of women, especially women experiencing DFV and allowed us to identify opportunities for systemic changes that would prevent criminalisation. Much of what we found has already been spoken and written about at length by women and gender diverse people with lived experience of imprisonment.2 We intend for this research to supplement their expertise and lend further evidence to their campaigns and calls for action. By triangulating the data gathered and analysed through the methods above, this report explores the following questions and main findings, outlined in Table 1

Melbourne: Fitzroy Legal Service, 2022. 44p.

By Amy Young, Jennifer Boddy, Patrick O’Leary and Paul Mazerolle

Domestic and family violence (DFV) remains one of the most challenging social problems. Approximately one in six Australian women has experienced physical or sexual violence perpetrated by a current or former intimate partner, while one in four women has experienced emotional abuse (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2019). Recent government inquiries into DFV in Queensland and Victoria have called for greater focus on intervention and justice responses for perpetrators (State of Victoria 2016; Women’s Safety and Justice Taskforce 2021). Both inquiries highlight the inadequacy of programs to hold perpetrators accountable and the need to expand the range of evidence-based intervention options.

Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice No. 676. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 16p.

By Kingsley L Madueke

Cattle rustling in Nigeria has evolved from a sustainable community practice into a significant illicit economy, delivering material profits to conflict actors and multiplying harms. Since 2011, the country has experienced a surge in the number of rustling incidents, resulting in thousands of deaths, loss of livelihoods, widespread destruction and displacement of people. This has had a debilitating impact on the country’s stability.

In Nigeria’s North-West and North-Central regions, in particular, cattle rustling has contributed to growing instability by increasing levels of violent crime. The Nigerian press is awash with stories of heavily armed groups raiding communities, killing people and stealing large herds of cattle. Also of note are the violent activities of the self-defense groups that have emerged in response. Additionally, in some of Nigeria’s most volatile regions, including Northern Plateau and Southern Kaduna, cattle rustling has fed into longstanding conflicts between farmers and herders, fuelling violence and deepening polarization.

Cattle rustling deserves attention because it is among the illicit economies most clearly driving instability in Nigeria, more so than others traditionally focused on as sources of instability, such as armed robbery and drug trafficking. The relationship between cattle rustling and instability is multifaceted: not only has the phenomenon been the cause of thousands of deaths, large-scale displacement of communities and destruction of livelihoods, but it has also repeatedly operated as a significant source of financing for armed groups, including regional insurgent groups operating in north-eastern Nigeria and northern and central Mali. Cattle rustling is also interwoven with longstanding tensions between ethnicities, amplifying these and catalyzing further conflict.

This report focuses on Zamfara and Plateau states, where cattle rustling has fuelled large-scale violence and instability over the past decade. The report also explores the concerning southward diffusion of cattle rustling, with an emphasis on Kwara and Oyo states. While some underlying causes of cattle rustling cut across regions, this research highlights that local drivers of cattle rustling and instability are often distinct and therefore require context-specific responses.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime,2023. 46p.

By Flore Berger

Cattle rustling in Mali surged in 2021 and continues at unprecedented levels, with the dominant perpetrators being violent extremist groups operating in the country. The scale of cattle rustling in Mali is the climax of a decade of growth of the practice, and cattle rustling is now a central and under-reported element of the country’s security crisis variously as a driver of conflict, as a governance and intimidation mechanism, and as a key source of revenue for non-state armed groups. This has dramatic humanitarian, social and economic effects on communities. Cattle rustling has since the very start of the crisis been at the heart of Mali’s war economy, with Tuareg rebel groups (since the 1990s) and violent extremist groups (since 2012) financing themselves by looting livestock and relying on a broader network to sell it, using its proceeds to finance their operations (e.g. buying fuel, vehicles and weapons). Cattle rustling, understood in this report to mean the whole range of livestock appropriation,1 has rarely been considered as a criminal economy, yet its impacts on communities and conflict dynamics across West Africa are arguably unrivalled by other more traditional organized markets, such as high-value narcotics. It is sustained by a complex network and supply chain, and perpetrated through ever-increasing violence. Furthermore, while a range of illicit economies have been used by violent extremist groups for resourcing – including trafficking of cigarettes, fuel and drugs; artisanal gold mining; and kidnapping for ransom – cattle rustling has proven to be a particularly resilient and broadly stable source of income. Cattle rustling also stands out regarding the degree to which it intersects with a long-standing history of frustration and resentment by pastoralist communities, and is therefore integral to understanding regional conflict. Cattle rustling, and reprisals for theft, spark cycles of violence as herders protect themselves by joining armed groups and arming themselves. Other communities then respond by creating more armed groups for self-protection, many of which become predatory. Cattle rustling also operates as a mechanism wielded by armed groups to terrorize the population and deprive them of a central element of livelihoods. Hundreds of villages have been pillaged and burnt down, and cattle looted.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 54p.

By Shehryar Fazli

The Taliban’s 3 April 2022 edict prohibiting poppy cultivation and the use and trade of all types of narcotics across Afghanistan could have grave implications for a collapsing economy. Poppy is the country’s most valuable cash crop, and its labour-intensive cultivation employs several hundred thousand people, pushing up wages and living standards of those directly and indirectly involved. Requiring little water, the poppy’s resilience in adverse agricultural conditions makes it an attractive long-term investment, especially during one of the worst droughts in decades. The new ban would affect farmers in the rural southwest region, where many Taliban leaders are from, as well as influential players across the opium and heroin supply chain. In the absence of significant financial incentives to these constituencies, the risks of a major backlash probably outweigh any benefits of enforcing a poppy ban. Providing such financial incentives would be dependent on significant foreign assistance. Some prominent experts and commentators infer that international legitimacy and funding was the Taliban’s primary motivation in announcing the edict. If so, there are no signs yet that the move will generate the desired response. Afghanistan has been politically and economically isolated since the Taliban’s August 2021 forceful seizure of power. The freezing of around $9 billion in central bank foreign reserves, held mostly in the US, triggered a collapse of the local currency and major liquidity crisis, while aid cut-offs and sanctions triggered hyper-inflation and impeded trade and other business. There are indications that the international community, led by the US, is softening its position to prevent an economic collapse affecting millions of Afghans who face starvation. Without tangible Taliban commitments to basic rights and equality, however, especially of girls and women, deeper international engagement, including on counter-narcotics, is unlikely. How willing and able the Taliban will be to enforce its edict may remain unclear for several months. The ban came amid the poppy harvest in the southwestern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, bastions of both poppy cultivation and Taliban support. Significant quantities, therefore, may have already been harvested. Transporting them up the supply chain, and to western destinations, will depend on resourceful transnational crime groups. The most important of these are arguably in Pakistan, which shares Afghanistan’s longest border and most of the routes for westward movement of illicit goods, people, and cash from Afghanistan. Criminal networks here traverse the Indian and Iranian borders, and also move their product by sea off the southern Makran coast and Karachi port, to European, African, Asian and Australian markets. These networks, and the geography in which they operate, also require close examination. By better understanding the context and trends, policy-makers will be better able to assess policy options and their implications, especially in Europe, the destination of significant volumes of heroin from Afghanistan

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 9.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 35p.

By Summer Walker I Mariana Botero Restrepo

The relationship between illicit economies, conflict and instability has been long debated in academic and practitioner circles, and part of the international policy agenda for some time. From the diamond trade in Sierra Leone to the heroin trade in Afghanistan, illicit economies have been shown to fund insurgencies and political actors, and to contribute to ongoing conflict.

The GI-TOC’s 2021 Global Organized Crime Index shows that of the ten highest-scoring countries for criminality, meaning those with the most pervasive criminal markets and influential criminal actors, the overwhelming majority are countries experiencing conflict or fragility.

This report considers three case studies at different stages of armed conflict to assess the dynamic relationship between criminal networks, illicit economies, and conflict actors and conditions. These three case studies offer unique perspectives in terms of duration, size of the conflict area and stage of the conflict:

• Armed insurgency in northern Mozambique

• Armed groups in Libya and Mali

• Armed groups in Colombia

While these conflicts present three distinct cases, they also share relevant similarities. In these cases, unrest is created after an armed group or groups counter the legitimacy of the state. The national response to the conflict is supplemented with regional and international responses. All situations lack a swift resolution, and the instability persists primarily in areas outside capitals, even after formal conflict resolution. In this way, these three cases are representative of sustained, localized instability deriving from armed conflict between the state and non-state armed groups.

All three conflict areas overlap with areas of established illicit economies. In these settings, the connections between armed conflict and illicit markets evolve over time. The impacts may be commodity-dependent, with different considerations for illegal mining as opposed to trafficked drugs. Illicit markets change over time, as do the power brokers and beneficiaries involved. Illicit economies contribute to long-term enabling environments for instability by prolonging conflict and eroding government responses to conflict. Through the case studies of northern Mozambique, the Sahel region and Colombia, this report identifies ten dynamics that influence illicit economies and conflict situations. These findings make a contribution to vital policy discussions for stabilization and conflict mediation in these – and other – re

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime., 2022. 74p.

By Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

Before February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian organized crime formed the strongest criminal ecosystem in Europe. Having developed along similar lines in the 1990s, Russian and Ukrainian criminal groups and networks controlled a lucrative transnational smuggling highway between Russia and Western Europe that carried gold, timber, tobacco, coal, counterfeit/untaxed goods, humans and drugs. At the more politically connected end of the spectrum, corrupt officials and criminal bosses from both countries exploited Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russian gas to siphon off millions of dollars, while Ukraine’s oligarch class exerted a strong grip over the country’s economic, political and information spheres.

Kyiv made serious efforts to tackle organized crime and corruption after the 2014 Maidan Revolution but results were mixed, especially in the case of judicial reform; meanwhile, the conflict in the Donbas region helped bolster an array of illicit economies and criminal actors. For organized crime, business was generally good.

The Russian invasion has inflicted a profound shock to this ecosystem. With the war, collaboration between Russian and Ukrainian organized crime interests became impossible due to the political situation (which led many criminals to break such ties) and the pragmatic challenge of smuggling across what was now a violently contested and dynamic front line. Many Ukrainian crime bosses chose to leave the country, as did many oligarchs, including several accused of pro-Russian sympathies. Martial law and the curfew also initially constrained criminal activity. According to senior sources in the Ukrainian police, incidents of armed robberies declined by a factor of between three and four, and the homicide rate dropped to almost zero at the beginning of the war (although this may partly reflect the impact of the war on reporting in the early days of the war). It may be that the impact of the invasion also whittled out some less robust and resilient organized crime groups: according to data from the general prosecutor’s office, the number of organized crime groups under investigation decreased from 499 in 2021 to 395 in 2022 (although this decline alternatively could reflect dimished investigative capacity).

This report explores the changing dynamics in the political economy of Ukrainian organized crime up till December 2022 and maps how the criminal landscape has adapted to the new situation. Given the complexity of the impact of the war in Ukraine on organized crime in both parties to the conflict, the GI-TOC is producing two reports. This report concentrates on developments within Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders – with the exception of the so-called Luhansk and Donetsk ‘people’s republics’ (LDNR) in the Donbas region, which broke away from Kyiv in 2014 with Russian backing and assistance, and Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed the same year. The impact of the conflict on organized crime in these areas and on Russian organized crime more generally will be discussed in a separate report, which will assess trends in sanctions busting and money laundering, changes in trafficking flows east of Ukraine and how Russian organized crime groups have responded to the conflict.

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 60p.

By Julia Stanyard | Thierry Vircoulon | Julian Rademeyer

Russia has rapidly increased its engagement in Africa in recent years, both politically and economically, as it seeks to expand its influence on the continent. However, Russia’s activities in Africa are subject to controversy. Our new report sheds light on the Wagner Group, a private military company rapidly becoming the most effective form of Russian engagement in Africa.

The group comprises a network of political influence operations and economic entities such as mining companies. It has been accused of using whatever means necessary to achieve its aims, including criminal activity. The US government recently designated Wagner as a ‘transnational criminal organization,’ allowing for broader sanctions against Wagner and its enablers.

The report argues that the Wagner Group is unique as an organization in the breadth, scale, and boldness of its activities. However, the study also shows that Wagner did not emerge in a vacuum: The group’s activities and characteristics reflect broader trends in the evolution of Russia’s oligarchs and organized crime groups, their respective relationships with the Russian state, and their activities in Africa.

By focusing on case studies in several African countries, the report helps to shed light on the complex dynamics between Russia, its oligarchs, and its criminal networks and how they interact with African governments, businesses, and populations. This report draws on research conducted since July 2022, as well as other sources from across the continent, providing a comprehensive overview of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. The report provides important insights into the evolving relationship between Russia and Africa and how this is shaping politics and economics on the continent, serving as a resource for journalists, policymakers, and researchers seeking to understand the complex dynamics of Russian engagement in Africa.

Center for the Study of Democracy; Global Initiative Against Organized Crime, 2023.92p.

By Irwin, Véronique; Wang, Ke; Cui, Jiashan; Thompson, Alexandra (Statistician)

From the document: "'Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2022' provides the most recent national indicators on school crime and safety. The information presented in this report serves as a reference for policymakers and practitioners so that they can develop effective programs and policies aimed at violence and school crime prevention. Accurate information about the nature, extent, and scope of the problem being addressed is essential for developing effective programs and policies. This is the 25th edition of Indicators of School Crime and Safety, a joint effort of the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). This report provides summary statistics to inform the nation about current aspects of crime and safety in schools. 'Report on Indicators of School Crime and Safety' includes the most recent available data at the time of its development, compiled from a number of statistical data sources supported by the federal government. Such sources include results from the School-Associated Violent Death Surveillance System, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); the National Vital Statistics System, sponsored by CDC; the School Shooting Safety Compendium, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense; the Studies of Active Shooter Incidents, sponsored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the National Crime Victimization Survey and School Crime Supplement to that survey, sponsored by BJS and NCES, respectively; the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System, sponsored by CDC; the School Survey on Crime and Safety, Fast Response Survey System, ED'Facts', and National Teacher and Principal Survey, all sponsored by NCES; and the Campus Safety and Security Survey, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education. Some of these data are collected annually, while others are collected less frequently."

Washington D.D. National Center For Education Statistics; United States. Bureau Of Justice Statistics. 2023.. 38p.

Edited by Susanna Johansson · Kari Stefansen Elisiv Bakketeig · Anna Kaldal

This edited collection explores the background and implementation of the Nordic Barnahus (or 'Children's House') model - recognised as one of the most important reforms related to children who are the victims of crime in the Nordic region. This book discusses both its potential to affect change and the challenges facing it. The model was introduced as a response to a growing recognition of the need for more integrated and child-centred services for children exposed to violence and sexual abuse. In the Barnahus structure, different professions work together to ensure that victimized children receive help and treatment and that their legal rights are met. This original study is organised into four broad themes: child-friendliness, support and treatment; the forensic child investigative interview; children's rights perspectives; and interagency collaboration and professional autonomy. Each themed section includes in-depth chapters from different Nordic countries, outlining and analysing the practice and outcomes of the collaborative work engaged in by Barnahus from different perspectives. The introductory and concluding chapters offer a comparative lens useful for policy and practice implementation within the Nordic welfare state context and beyond, ensuring this book has global academic and practical appeal. This work was published by Saint Philip Street Press pursuant to

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 402p.

Edited by Danilo Antonio Baltieri

This book covers some recent researches on the interface between drug misuse and crime and demonstrates that some types of violent crimes are more intimately related to alcohol and / or drug consumption. It is written for researchers, health and law professionals engaged in the evaluation, management and treatment of different types of offenders. It is organized by a number of phenomena that are known (or supposed) to link drugs and crime. This book shows that the application of punishment under the guise of deterrence, despite its ineffectiveness, is frequently preferred to a more adequate management for some types of offenders. This book provides ten manuscripts that describe different aspects of the relationship between drugs and crimes, always focusing on Brazilian reality. It shows that a partnership between specialized mental health professionals, lawyers and policy makers is urgent with respect to this subject in Brazil and other countries.

Bentham Books, 2009. 100p.

By Alejandro Melgoza and Alex Papadovassilakis

We traveled over 300 kilometers through a trio of nature reserves to document how illegal loggers have ravaged some of the region’s most biodiverse forests and to chronicle the unlikely story of a small group of park rangers fighting back. This investigation, which used video and other multimedia elements to explain this complex criminal economy, is our most in-depth exploration of environmental crime yet..

Washington, DC: InSight Crime, 2022. 38p.

By Gary Sweeten and Matthew Larson

This report describes a project that had the main goal of developing a broad, nationally representative understanding of how often statutory rape occurs in the U.S., who the victims and perpetrators are, how self-reported estimates compare to estimates from law enforcement data, and whether short- and/or long-term consequences exist and if they do, what the consequences might be. In order to accomplish that goal, the project had four specific objectives: to estimate nationally representative rates of statutory rape victimization and perpetration using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97); to assess situational differences between first sexual experiences that are statutory rape compared to those that are not; to estimate the likelihood of women’s statutory rape victimization being reported to police, using data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS); and to assess the short- and long-term consequences of statutory rape victimization, based on the nature and characteristics of relationships as well as on the age differences between victims and perpetrators. The authors provide a breakdown of their research design, methods, analytical and data analysis techniques, results and findings for the four objectives, research limitations, artifacts, datasets generated, and dissemination activities.

Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice Research and Evaluation on Violence Against Women, 2023. 57p.

By The San Francisco Domestic Violence Death Review Team

This Domestic Violence Death Review Team (DVDRT) Pilot was created under the provisions of the California Penal Code 11163.3, in order to fulfill a commitment to review domestic violence-related fatalities, strengthen system policies and procedures, and identify prevention strategies that will reduce future incidents of domestic violence-related injuries and deaths. The DVDRT fulfills a need in San Francisco, as the city lacks staffing for a dedicated Death Review Team. This DVDRT Pilot provides an overview of the DVDRT process and methodology for their investigation into a murder case from October 2014; it lays out details of the event as well as DVDRT’s analysis of evidence and case-related data, and notes the aspects of the event that the DVDRT focused on include: computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems; real-time assistance for police officers in crime scene evaluation; broad interaction and information gathering; the ability of the police department to enforce physical separation when physical violence has occurred; custodial treatment of intoxicated individuals; real-time assistance for police from domestic violence advocates; providing closure and well-being assistance to 911 call-takers and dispatchers; availability and use of body-worn video (BWV) cameras; and in multiple responses to the victim’s address, the efficient and thorough transfer of information to later-responding officers.

San Francisco: The Review Team, 2023. 57p.

By Dyna Ibrahim

Intimate partner violence is a serious issue which continues to negatively affect victims long after the abuse has ended (McGarryet al. 2017; Campbell et al. 2002). This complex issue, broadly, involves physical, sexual, emotional and financial abuse, between current and former partners (Northcott 2012; Coker et al. 2002). While, presently, there are no legislated offences in the Canadian Criminal Code specifically related to intimate partner violence, Criminal Code offences of general application, such as physical and sexual assault, criminalize intimate partner violence. There are Criminal Code provisions which consider the fact that an offender abused their intimate partner an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes (Heslop et al. 2016). Even with ample tools, programs and policies at the national, provincial and community levels dedicated to reducing and preventing intimate partner violence in Canada (McCormick and Irwin 2016; Gill and Fitch 2016; Hilton and Eke 2016; Beaupré 2015; Benoit et al. 2014; Northcott 2012), there remains much to be done in the area. In particular, while many studies (Simpson 2018; Calton et al. 2016; Parry and O’Neal 2015; Perreault 2015; Sinha 2013; Beauchamp 2004) have shown that people who identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual are at increased risk for victimization in general, there is little quantitative research on the extent and nature of violence which takes place within same-sex intimate relationships in Canada (Langenderfer-Magruder et al. 2016; Ristock 2011). Related studies suggest that individuals in same-sex partnerships who experience intimate partner violence may face special barriers when it comes to disclosing their experiences or seeking help. For example, the threat of exposing one’s sexual orientation to others and fears about other people’s misguided beliefs that abuse among same-sex partners is mutual have been identified as obstacles which are often unique to victims in same-sex relationships. Moreover, individuals who are in same-sex intimate partnerships are vulnerable to “minority stress”, the psychological pressure from being a member of a minority group that is stigmatized or marginalized. Additionally, previous negative experiences such as discrimination and harassment, and perceptions or anticipation of stigma and negative stereotypes—all of which are particularly prevalent among individuals in same-sex partnerships—may lead to beliefs that these experiences will occur in various other facets of life (Calton et al. 2016; Baker et al. 2015; Edwards et al. 2015; Parry and O’Neal 2015; Benoit et al. 2014; Overstreet and Quinn 2013; Brown 2008; Rostosky et al. 2007). All these factors can reduce the reporting of violence to police and help-seeking among this share of the population. This Juristat article aims to help shed light on the nature of violence which is experienced within same-sex intimate partnerships. Using data from the Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, this article will examine, for the first time, the characteristics of police-reported violence among same-sex intimate partners in Canada. In order to increase the scope of analysis and allow for a more detailed examination of incident, victim and accused characteristics, data from 2009 to 2017 are pooled.1 In addition, data from the most recent (2014) General Social Survey on Canadians’ Safety (Victimization) is included in order to examine the self-reported experiences of various forms of intimate partner violence whether it was reported to the police or not. While the focus of this article is violence among individuals in same-sex relationships, information on gender-diverse individuals is not included. Research has shown that people who identify as transgender or non-gender conforming are especially vulnerable to violence in general, as well as violence within an intimate partner setting (Langenderfer-Magruder et al. 2016; Mitchell-Brody et al. 2010; Stotzer 2009). However, the data sources used in this article do not allow for the examination of the experiences of individuals belonging to this segment of the population.

Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2019. 29p.

By Claire Ferguson and Freya McLachlan

Links between IPF and homicide concealment have been observed but not explained. We theorize IPF perpetrators use concealment to continue coercively controlling investigators, children, courts and finances post-IPF. We compare abuse in the relationship and surrounding IPF in five diverse cases. Facilitated by concealment, offenders use versatile, subtle and overt tactics to extend control post-IPF. They capitalize on opportunities for concealment and regaining control, sometimes without other benefits. Tactics are akin to those employed previously, aligning with the power and control wheel. Concealment allows offenders to dominate the death narrative and assists with remaining unaccountable.

Feminist Criminology 2023, Vol. 0(0) 1–23

By Jens Ludwig

The purpose of this project, a collaboration between the University of Chicago Crime Lab and the New York City Police Department, was to develop and test a novel machine-learning based statistical model to predict the risk of domestic-violence victimization to improve intervention in cases at high risk for violence. The field intervention with the NYPD was launched in July 2017. NYPD command maintains a list of high-priority individuals who are thought to be at risk for serious domestic assault. Individuals on this list receive regular home visits from one of the local NYPD’s Domestic Violence Officers (DVOs) to reduce the risk of future victimization. The researchers believe that upon the completion and dissemination of this work, the results will be relevant to researchers and policymakers who are assessing ways to reduce domestic violence.

Washington, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Research and Evaluation, National Institute of Justice, 2022. 11p.

By Kristine Denman, Callie Dorsey, Joel Robinson, Jenna Dole and Ashleigh Maus

The New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center received funding from the Bureau of Justice Statistics to study the case processing of domestic and non-domestic aggravated and sexual assault cases. Two primary research questions guide the study. First, it explores whether there are criminal justice disparities among aggravated assault and sexual assault cases involving domestic violence relative to cases not involving domestic violence. Second, it examines whether female defendants are treated differently than male defendants. Overall, we find that case processing outcomes for domestic assault are either the same or less serious than case processing outcomes for non-domestic assault. These findings differ from those found in a national study conducted by BJS, but are similar to other findings in New Mexico and elsewhere. We also find that male defendants generally have more serious case processing outcomes than female defendants, but this is moderated somewhat by domestic violence involvement. This report describes these findings. A summary report can be found in the “Fast Facts” section of our website.

Albuquerque: New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center, 2020. 37p.