By Salma Hamza , Imran Khan, Linlin Lu , Hua Liu , Farkhunda Burke , Syed Nawaz-ul-Huda, Muhammad Fahad Baqa and Aqil Tariq

The geographical concentration of criminal violence is closely associated with the social, demographic, and economic structural characteristics of neighborhoods. However, few studies have investigated homicide patterns and their relationships with neighborhoods in South Asian cities. In this study, the spatial and temporal patterns of homicide incidences in Karachi from 2009 to 2018 were analyzed using the local indicators of spatial association (LISA) method. Generalized linear modeling (GLM) and geographically weighted Poisson regression (GWPR) methods were implemented to examine the relationship between influential factors and the number of homicides during the 2009–2018 period. The results demonstrate that the homicide hotspot or clustered areas with high homicide counts expanded from 2009 to 2013 and decreased from 2013 to 2018. The number of homicides in the 2017–2018 period had a positive relationship with the percentage of the population speaking Balochi. The unplanned areas with low-density residential land use were associated with low homicide counts, and the areas patrolled by police forces had a significant negative relationship with the occurrence of homicide. The GWPR models effectively characterized the varying relationships between homicide and explanatory variables across the study area. The spatio-temporal analysis methods can be adapted to explore violent crime in other cities with a similar social context.

Sustainability 2021, 13, 5520. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su13105520

Julia P Schleimer , Shani A Buggs , Christopher D McCort , Veronica A Pear , Alaina De Biasi , Elizabeth Tomsich , Aaron B Shev , Hannah S Laqueur , Garen J Wintemute

Objectives. To describe associations between neighborhood racial and economic segregation and violence during the COVID-19 pandemic. Methods. For 13 US cities, we obtained zip code-level data on 5 violence outcomes from March through July 2018 through 2020. Using negative binomial regressions and marginal contrasts, we estimated differences between quintiles of racial, economic, and racialized economic segregation using the Index of Concentration at the Extremes as a measure of neighborhood privilege (1) in 2020 and (2) relative to 2018 through 2019 (difference-in-differences). Results. In 2020, violence was higher in less-privileged neighborhoods than in the most privileged. For example, if all zip codes were in the least privileged versus most privileged quintile of racialized economic segregation, we estimated 146.2 additional aggravated assaults (95% confidence interval = 112.4, 205.8) per zip code on average across cities. Differences over time in less-privileged zip codes were greater than differences over time in the most privileged for firearm violence, aggravated assault, and homicide. Conclusions. Marginalized communities endure endemically high levels of violence. The events of 2020 exacerbated disparities in several forms of violence. Public Health Implications. To reduce violence and related disparities, immediate and long-term investments in low-income neighborhoods of color are warranted.

(Am J Public Health. 2022;112(1):144-153. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2021.306540).

By Nicholas Pope

This thesis examines the emergence and sustainment of milícias (militias) in the 1990s in the West Zone ‘margins’ of the city of Rio de Janeiro. It considers the rise of milícias as they coincide with urbanisation, economic liberalisation, democratisation, decentralisation and the rise of violent drug trafficking organisations. This thesis sets out to answer the following overarching research question: ‘How and why did milícias emerge in Rio de Janeiro’s West Zone since the 1990s and how and why were they sustained? What is their relationship to the management of (dis)order?’ The analytical approach developed to answer this question draws on an historically situated political settlements framework to understand milícias as power relations within coalition formations and as facilitators of rent extraction and distribution. The framework introduces urban and political geography literatures on frontiers to advance a thesis that milícias in Rio de Janeiro are coercive brokers that mediate urban frontier zones. This study draws on ethnographic fieldnotes from direct and participant observation, in-depth interviews and oral histories, and extensive archival research of parliamentary documents. It argues that milícias emerged to provide temporary ‘solutions’ to address the violent inequalities, structural insecurities, and the threats and insecurities posed by drug trafficking organisations in the urban frontiers. They emerged through ‘bottom-up’ processes but were also seen as convenient to political and economic elites in the central state who were unable (or unwilling) to provide formal security in the West Zone. However, this thesis makes the case that there was a trade-off for the central state as paramilitaries, as accrued power in the urban frontier, they also attempted to reshape state institutions. Because of their roots in local communities, this thesis also recognises the dependency of milícias on legitimacy, ideas, beliefs and norms, and the power imbued in community relations. This study contributes to the literatures on milícias by accounting for their role as co-producers of (dis)order in the urban margins, the literature on political settlements by intertwining questions of violence and conflict with spatiality, and finally the Latin American literatures on local political order and governance by advancing a conceptualisation of armed groups straddling state and society and challenging conventional state/-non-state binaries.

London: Department of Development Studies SOAS, University of London , 2019. 307p.

By Cheyenne Pamela Hodgen

This thesis presents two individual research papers that examine the relationship between greenspaces and crime in Portland, Oregon. The two papers use an adapted street network buffer to better measure crime concentration around discrete locations. This methodological development allows for an improved measure of crime concentration around discrete locations. The first contribution, presented in Chapter 2, explores the relationship between different greenspace types and crime, breaking down different crime types into discrete categories. The results of this study suggest that overall, Portland greenspaces do not experience a concentration of crime, however, different patterns emerge as greenspace and crime types are disaggregated. Only one greenspace type, small parks, appear to be important local features—experiencing a high concentration of crime—while other types experienced a concentration of a few crime types, or none at all. Building off of these results, the second contribution—Chapter 3—examines the relationship between small parks and crime in more detail, looking at the level of crime concentration beyond the park, the presence of certain amenities, and the surrounding landuse zoning. A non-linear pattern in the level of crime concentration was found in the 3- block area around parks. Three park characteristics (statues/public art, water features/fountains, and plazas) were found to be associated with higher levels of crime at parks, while one characteristic (unpaved paths) and two activity generators (soccer fields and softball fields) were associated with lower levels of crime. The surrounding zoning also had an impact on crime at parks, with parks with exclusively or majority residential land use experiencing lower levels of crime.

Portland, OR: Portland State University 2023.

By Yiying Wang

This Paper Is Dedicated To The Completion Of A Visual Urban Report On Safety In Informal Settlements. This Research Explores The History Of Apartheid In South Africa And Investigates How Urban Development Processes Within Informal Settlements Contribute To The Development Of Unsafe Neighbourhoods. Cape Town And The Largest Of These Slums, Khayelitsha, Were Selected As Macro And Micro Cases. Also The Barrio Ciudad Project In Honduras Was Analysed In This Study As A Best Practice Case Study. This Provides Insight Into How Design And Non-Design Measures Can Be Used To Address Insecurity In Informal Settlements.

2022 5th International Conference on Economy Development and Social Sciences Research (EDSSR 2022) 7p.

By Zahid ul Arefin Choudhoury, Fahima Durrat, Maria Hussain, et al.

The study takes up the pertinent challenges in human rights work of consistent lacks, deficiencies and uncertainties in human rights work and human rights reporting. These challenges pose questions to the human rights community on how to provide reliable information on violence, torture and ill-treatment, which includes the detection and identification of both victims and perpetrators necessary to ensure individual justice and institutional accountability. The report demonstrates that it is possible to address sensitive political issues of governance and violence, even in a nervous political setting, and produce relevant and solid data on violent encounters, that describes the unfolding of these events and the effects on life and livelihood, including health and economy, of the individuals and families involved. The richness and depths of the data confirms the usefulness of the methodological approach, at least in Korail Basti in the centre of Dhaka. It indicates a potential for broader and hopefully general applicability in other similar areas of the city, the country or the region and perhaps even at a global level. Confirming this general applicability would entail the need to replicate, adapt and carry through the study in additional sites and places with other contextual social, political and economic conditions and configurations. The solidity of the survey’s findings is a promising result of the study and could be a possible departure point for further testing of the proposed methodology

Bangladesh, UK and Denmark: University of Dhaka Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, DIGNITY and University of Edinburgh Anthropology Department, 2016. 110p.

By The Blue Ribbon Panel on MTA Fare and Toll Evasion, Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Fare and toll evasion is a sensitive issue that raises difficult questions about social cohesion, inequality, and appropriate use of enforcement. But the situation in New York has reached a crisis level, and avoiding the topic is no longer a viable option. Losses to the MTA’s operating budget are staggering, with nearly $700 million in revenue not collected in 2022 alone. This includes $315 million lost in bus fares, $285 million in subway fares, $46 million in bridge and tunnel tolls, and $44 million in railroad fares. Fares and tolls account for a significant proportion of the MTA’s annual budget revenue — almost $7 billion a year. But every dollar lost to evasion impairs the MTA’s financial stability, threatens reliable transit for all New Yorkers, and increases the need for alternative revenue sources, including through larger fare and toll hikes. The MTA convened a Blue-Ribbon Panel of high-profile New Yorkers with expertise in relevant fields to better understand fare and toll evasion, and develop fresh solutions to the issue. Panelists spent the better part of a year meeting with stakeholders inside and outside the MTA, speaking with transit users, and observing fare and toll collection operations throughout the system. The panel’s final report proposes a cohesive and comprehensive set of strategies around education, environment, equity, and enforcement.

New York: MTA, 2023. 125p.

By G. Herbert

This review provides a summary of the evidence on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) between China and developing countries in Africa and Asia. Specifically, it looks at the evidence on how IFFs to and from China impact on developing countries, as well as on the drivers of IFFs and of how flows are facilitated. The review draws upon a combination of academic and grey literature sources, though it is not exhaustive and only draws upon English language sources. IFFs involving China have attracted particular attention, due to estimates suggesting it is responsible for the largest IFFs by value globally. However, little has been published to date specifically on IFFs between China and developing countries. This paper attempts to help address this gap. Section 2 provides some background information on the debates and uncertainties around IFFs, including conceptual issues, difficulties in measuring these flows, and their potential impacts, as well as attempts to quantify China’s overall IFFs. Section 3 focuses on trade-related IFFs between China and developing countries in Asia and Africa. Discrepancies indicative of potential IFFs are identified using trade data from 2018 and an attempt is made to determine the scale of the revenue consequences of trade is-invoicing for China’s developing country partners. Section 4 considers IFFs-related to corrupt business practices, focusing largely on Chinese investment in Africa. Section 5 moves on to consider IFFs that relate to the trade in illegal products, including illegal narcotics, human trafficking, the illegal arms trade, the illegal wildlife trade, the illegal organ trade, and the trade-in counterfeit products. Finally, Section 6 discusses enabling environment factors relevant to IFFs between China and developing countries.

K4D Helpdesk Report.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. 2020. 37p.

By INTERPOL

With the increase in Internet coverage, online trade of illicit goods is likely increasing on the African continent. In recent years, cyber-enabled crimes have increased on the African continent. This has been a result of a combination of factors, including, the improvement of Internet coverage, the wide availability of cyber-tools and the growing flexibility of cybercriminals. As a consequence, online crime nowadays represents a bigger security issue for law enforcement in African member countries than ever before. In this framework, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, examines through this assessment the issue of cyber and cyber-enabled crimes in Africa in order to help drive a more strategic law enforcement response.

Lyon, France: INTERPOL, 2020. 79p.

By Laure de Batza and Evžen Kočendab

We provide the first quantitative synthesis of the literature on how financial markets react to the disclosure of financial crimes committed by listed firms. While consensus expects negative stock price returns, the exact size of the effect is far from clear. We surveyed 111 studies published over three decades, from which we collected 480 estimates from event studies. Then, we perform a thorough meta-analysis based on the most recent available techniques. We show that the negative abnormal returns found in the literature seem to be exaggerated by more than three times. Hence, the “punishment” effect, including a reputational penalty, suffers from a serious publication bias. After controlling for this bias, negative abnormal returns suggest the existence of an informational effect. We also document that accounting frauds, crimes committed in common-law countries such as the United States, and allegations are particularly severely sanctioned by financial markets, while the information channels and types of procedures do not influence market reactions.

Munich : Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo, 2023. 82p.

By Karen Allen and Isel van Zyl

This paper explores the links between digital vigilantism and organised crime in South Africa and Kenya.

Social media platforms have become powerful tools to amplify and share narratives. Like many evolving technologies, platforms such as Twitter or Facebook may be used for social good or for ill. Digital vigilantism (whereby social media platforms are used for organised shaming, hounding or doxing of a target deemed by the online community to have transgressed norms) may have real-world consequences. In extreme cases this may result in acts of ‘terrorism’ or other forms of unlawful killing. Yet while digital vigilantism may appropriate traditional law enforcement mechanisms, in some cases it may also try to hold law enforcement to account.

ENACT-Africa, 2020. 16p.

By Michael Levi

Money laundering has ascended the enforcement and criminological agenda in the course of this century, and has been accompanied by an increased focus on legal professionals as ‘enablers’ of crime. This article explores the dynamics of this enforcement, media and political agenda, and how the legal profession has responded in the UK and elsewhere, within the context of ignoring the difficulties of judging the effectiveness of anti money laundering. It concludes that legal responses are a function of their lobbying power, the determination of governments to clamp down on the toxic impacts of legal structures, and different legal cultures. However, it remains unclear what the effects on the levels and organization of serious crimes for gain are of controls on the professions.

Trends in Organized Crime volume 24, pages96–110 (2021)

By Marie Ouellet, David Décary-Hétu, and Andréanne Bergeron

Criminal capital theory suggests more experienced offenders receive higher returns from crime. Offenders who accrue skills over their criminal career are better able to minimize detection, increase profits, and navigate illegal markets. Yet shifts in the offending landscape to technologically-dependent crimes have led some to suggest that the skills necessary to be successful in conventional crimes no longer apply, meaning ‘traditional’ criminals may be left behind. The recent turn of drug vendors to online markets provides an opportunity to investigate whether ‘street smarts’ translate to success in technologically-dependent crimes. This study surveys 51 drug vendors on online drug markets to compare individuals who began their drug-selling career in physical drug markets with vendors whose onset began on digital platforms. The focus is on their criminal earnings while comparing the scope and management of their networks. The results inform potential spillover effects from offline drug-selling into online marketplaces.

GLOBAL CRIME. 2022, VOL. 23, NO. 1, 65p

By Julia Yansura

Proceeds from extortion in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador amount to more than US$1.1 billion annually according to a new study by Global Financial Integrity (GFI). The report, which examined data for individuals and businesses, also reveals that an estimated 330,000 people in the Northern Triangle region of Central America fall victim to extortion each year. Extortion against individuals is estimated at US$40 million – $57 million a year in Guatemala, US$190 million – $245 million a year in El Salvador, and $30 million – $50 million a year in Honduras. Data on extortion paid by businesses is not comparable across countries due to significant gaps in data availability. The report, titled Extortion in the Northern Triangle of Central America: Following the Money, assesses the value of this activity and seeks to better understand how the proceeds of extortion are used and laundered. It also considers whether anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) strategies are being effectively utilized to combat extortion.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2022. 39p.

By Marisol Cruz Cain, Gretta L. Goodwin

Cybercrime, such as hacking and ransomware attacks, is increasing in the United States—leading to billions of dollars in losses and threatening public safety. Several federal agencies work to detect, investigate, and prosecute cybercrimes. Agencies vary in how they collect data on these crimes, and there is no official definition of cybercrime. As a result, this data may not be consistent or complete. In 2022, Congress required the Department of Justice to develop definitions and categories for cybercrimes in its national crime reporting system—which should help law enforcement agencies comprehensively track and monitor these crimes.

Washington DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2023. 40p.

By Anthony Morgan and Isabella Voce

This paper draws on data from a large national survey conducted in 2021 to examine the prevalence of data breaches among Australian computer users and the relationship between data breaches and other forms of cybercrime victimisation. Almost one in 10 respondents (9.3%) said they were notified their information was exposed in a data breach in the 12 months prior to the survey. Nearly one-third of these respondents (28.0%) had also been a victim of identity crime in the same period. Respondents who had been notified of a data breach were 34 percent more likely than other respondents to have been a victim of identity crime in the 12 months prior to the survey. They were also more likely to have been a victim of online scams or fraud and ransomware. Measures to protect individuals whose information has been exposed in a data breach from other potentially related cybercrimes are essential and should be prioritised when data breaches occur.

Statistical Bulletin no. 40. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2022. 16p.

By Merran McAlister, Emily Faulconbridge, Isabella Voce and Samantha Bricknell

This study presents findings from the Australian Cybercrime Survey related to identity crime and misuse. Thirty-one percent of respondents experienced identity crime in their lifetime and 20 percent in the past 12 months. Almost half of identity crime victims reported that suspicious transactions appeared in their bank statements or accounts. The type of personal information most commonly misused was names, followed by credit or debit card information. While one quarter of respondents did not know how their information was obtained, 16 percent believed it to be due to the hacking of a computer or device. Twenty-nine percent of past 12 month victims experienced a financial loss. The median amount initially lost was $300. Nineteen percent of victims had money reimbursed, the median amount being $250.

Statistical Bulletin 42. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 18p.

By Isabella Voce and Anthony Morgan

This is the first report in the Cybercrime in Australia series, which aims to provide a clearer picture of the extent of cybercrime victimisation, help-seeking and harms among Australian computer users. It is based on a survey of 13,887 computer users conducted in early 2023. In the 12 months prior to the survey, 27 percent of respondents had been a victim of online abuse and harassment, 22 percent had been a victim of malware, 20 percent had been a victim of identity crime and misuse, and eight percent had been a victim of fraud and scams. Overall, 47 percent of respondents experienced at least one cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey—and nearly half of all victims reported experiencing more than one type of cybercrime. Thirty-four percent of respondents had experienced a data breach. Cybercrime victimisation was not evenly distributed, with certain sections of the community more likely to have been a victim, and certain online activities associated with a higher likelihood of victimisation.

Most cybercrime victimisation went unreported to police or to ReportCyber, meaning official statistics significantly underestimate the size of the problem. Satisfaction with the outcomes of these reports was mixed, and relatively few reports resulted in an offender being apprehended. Rates of help-seeking varied and were influenced by the perceived seriousness of cybercrime and knowledge of how and where to report it.

The financial losses experienced by victims were wide ranging. Some victims reported losing large sums of money, but most victims reported relatively small financial losses. This report measures, for the first time, the harms experienced by individual victims and small businesses that extend beyond these financial costs. Twenty-five percent of respondents were negatively impacted by cybercrime in the 12 months prior to the survey, while 22 percent of respondents who owned or operated a small to medium business said their business was negatively impacted by cybercrime.

Statistical Bulletin, 43. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2023. 113p.

By Peter Tinti

Despite 8 years of violent insurgency in northern Mali, the region continues to be a transit zone for regional and global drug-trafficking networks. The networks have endured by ingratiating themselves with a rotating cast of actors whose tactics are based on pragmatic local conditions rather than ideology. For example, an implicit nonaggression pact among key elements of the CMA, Plateforme, and jihadist groups enables traffickers to continue unmolested. International partners should help regional governments better understand and dismantle these networks.

ENACT-- Africa, 2020. 24p.

By David Soud, Ian Ralby and Rohini Ralby: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Gold flows within Venezuela can be categorized under two broad headings: centralised and dispersed. The centralised flows carry a portion of production from the country’s myriad small mining operations to the government-monitored trading hubs. Centralised flows reportedly include gold transfers from the Venezuelan Central Bank to foreign governments and other entities in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and elsewhere. While these flows of gold out of Venezuela might be considered legal, companies are still expected to carry out enhanced due diligence to ascertain whether conditions of extraction and trade are associated with actual or potential risks of severe human rights abuses, conflict financing and other financial crimes as per the OECD Guidance, as well as environmental harm.

In contrast, dispersed flows are those that leave the country from mining areas by various other routes. The Venezuelan military and political elites, Colombian militant groups, and domestic gangs are reported to be key actors in both categories of domestic gold flows. Gold from dispersed flows departing Venezuela appears to be laundered primarily within the Latin America and Caribbean region, mainly in one or more key regional transit hubs. Laundering networks can, however, extend across the globe and actors connected in other continents. Since many of the high-risk gold flows out of Venezuela involve regional transit hubs as well as distant transit countries and destination markets, any approach to mitigating the risks tied to Venezuelan gold should include regional and international coordination among both government and industry actors. This consideration is heightened by the evident involvement of transnational criminal organisations and designated terrorist groups in exploiting mining communities, extracting gold and laundering it into the legitimate supply chain. The resulting picture is preliminary but also revealing. The role of the maritime space in high-risk gold flows needs more attention; so does the role played by Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in facilitating gold flows and related financial crimes. A few recommendations on how best to address the risks that characterise Venezuelan gold flows conclude the report.

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021. 68p.