By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

To derive statistics about crime – to estimate its levels and trends, assess its costs to and impacts on society, and inform law enforcement approaches to prevent it - a conceptual framework for defining and thinking about crime is virtually a prerequisite. Developing and maintaining such a framework is no easy task, because the mechanics of crime are ever evolving and shifting: tied to shifts and development in technology, society, and legislation.

Interest in understanding crime surged in the 1920s, which proved to be a pivotal decade for the collection of nationwide crime statistics. Now established as a permanent agency, the Census Bureau commissioned the drafting of a manual for preparing crime statistics—intended for use by the police, corrections departments, and courts alike. The new manual sought to solve a perennial problem by suggesting a standard taxonomy of crime. Shortly after the Census Bureau issued its manual, the International Association of Chiefs of Police in convention adopted a resolution to create a Committee on Uniform Crime Records —to begin the process of describing what a national system of data on crimes known to the police might look like.

Report 1 performed a comprehensive reassessment of what is meant by crime in U.S. crime statistics and recommends a new classification of crime to organize measurement efforts. This second report examines methodological and implementation issues and presents a conceptual blueprint for modernizing crime statistics.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2018. 280p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.

To derive statistics about crime – to estimate its levels and trends, assess its costs to and impacts on society, and inform law enforcement approaches to prevent it – a conceptual framework for defining and thinking about crime is virtually a prerequisite. Developing and maintaining such a framework is no easy task, because the mechanics of crime are ever evolving and shifting: tied to shifts and development in technology, society, and legislation.

Interest in understanding crime surged in the 1920s, which proved to be a pivotal decade for the collection of nationwide crime statistics. Now established as a permanent agency, the Census Bureau commissioned the drafting of a manual for preparing crime statistics—intended for use by the police, corrections departments, and courts alike. The new manual sought to solve a perennial problem by suggesting a standard taxonomy of crime. Shortly after the Census Bureau issued its manual, the International Association of Chiefs of Police in convention adopted a resolution to create a Committee on Uniform Crime Records —to begin the process of describing what a national system of data on crimes known to the police might look like.

The key distinction between the rigorous classification proposed in this report and the “classifications” that have come before in U.S. crime statistics is that it is intended to partition the entirety of behaviors that could be considered criminal offenses into mutually exclusive categories. Modernizing Crime Statistics: Report 1: Defining and Classifying Crime assesses and makes recommendations for the development of a modern set of crime measures in the United States and the best means for obtaining them. This first report develops a new classification of crime by weighing various perspectives on how crime should be defined and organized with the needs and demands of the full array of crime data users and stakeholders.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2016. 286p.

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Reliable and valid forensic science analytic techniques are critical to a credible, fair, and evidence-based criminal justice system. There is widespread agreement that the scientific foundation of some currently available forensic science methods needs strengthening and that additional, more efficient techniques are urgently needed. These needs can only be met through sustained research programs explicitly designed to ensure and improve the reliability and validity of current methods and to foster the development and use of new and better techniques. This task is challenging due to the broad nature of the field.

Concerns have been raised repeatedly about the ability of the criminal justice system to collect and analyze evidence efficiently and to be fair in its verdicts. Although significant progress has been made in some forensic science disciplines, the forensic science community still faces many challenges. Federal leadership, particularly in regard to research and the scientific validation of forensic science methods, is needed to help meet the pressing issues facing state and local jurisdictions.

This report reviews the progress made by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to advance forensic science research since the 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward and the 2010 report, Strengthening the National Institute of Justice. Support for Forensic Science Research examines the ways in which NIJ develops its forensic science research priorities and communicates those priorities as well as its findings to the scientific and forensic practitioner communities in order to determine the impact of NIJ forensic science research programs and how that impact can be enhanced.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2015. 116p.

By National Research Council.

Tobacco use has declined because of measures such as high taxes on tobacco products and bans on advertising, but worldwide there are still more than one billion people who regularly use tobacco, including many who purchase products illicitly. By contrast to many other commodities, taxes comprise a substantial portion of the retail price of cigarettes in the United States and most other nations. Large tax differentials between jurisdictions increase incentives for participation in existing illicit tobacco markets. In the United States, the illicit tobacco market consists mostly of bootlegging from low-tax states to high-tax states and is less affected by large-scale smuggling or illegal production as in other countries. In the future, nonprice regulation of cigarettes - such as product design, formulation, and packaging - could in principle, contribute to the development of new types of illicit tobacco markets.

Understanding the U.S. Illicit Tobacco Market reviews the nature of illicit tobacco markets, evidence for policy effects, and variations among different countries with a focus on implications for the United States. This report estimates the portion of the total U.S. tobacco market represented by illicit sales has grown in recent years and is now between 8.5 percent and 21 percent. This represents between 1.24 to 2.91 billion packs of cigarettes annually and between $2.95 billion and $6.92 billion in lost gross state and local tax revenues.

Understanding the U.S. Illicit Tobacco Market describes the complex system associated with illicit tobacco use by exploring some of the key features of that market - the cigarette supply chain, illicit procurement schemes, the major actors in the illicit trade, and the characteristics of users of illicit tobacco. This report draws on domestic and international experiences with the illicit tobacco trade to identify a range of possible policy and enforcement interventions by the U.S. federal government and/or states and localities.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2015. 240p.

By Hernando Zuleta González

The increase in the area cultivated with coca in Colombia has cast doubt on the country’s anti-drug strategy and has encouraged skepticism about the possibility of a complete and definitive peace. Furthermore, this perception of failure has given rise to policy proposals based on the idea that illicit crops are a criminal issue, not a development one. This paper is a complete review of the available evidence and aims at organizing the information related to this debate and shedding light on the convenience or inconvenience of certain policies. There are six highly relevant facts: (i) With respect to reducing cocaine supply, the efforts in seizures and destruction of infrastructure are more efficient than the efforts in eradication. (ii) Seizures and destruction of infrastructure may help in reducing coca plantations. (iii) There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the consumption of cocaine in Colombia has increased. (iv) Most regions of the country have seen a decrease in the amount of coca crops. However, at least one armed group is present in the regions where the cultivated area has increased. (v) Coca growing municipalities are, on average, poorer than the rest of the country. These municipalities have a low tax revenue, and reduced levels of connectivity and institutional development. (vi) The increase in the consumption of cocaine in the United States is concentrated in a specific age group and in certain states. This fact makes it difficult to relate the increase in consumption to an exogenous increase in the supply.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2019. 40p.

By Ted Enamorado, Luis-Felipe López-Calva, Carlos Rodríguez-Castelán, and Hernán Winkler

The relationship between income inequality and crime has attracted the interest of many researchers, but little convincing evidence exists on the causal effect of inequality on crime in developing countries. This paper estimates this effect in a unique context: Mexico's Drug War. The analysis takes advantage of a unique data set containing inequality and crime statistics for more than 2,000 Mexican municipalities covering a period of 20 years. Using an instrumental variable for inequality that tackles problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, this paper finds that an increment of one point in the Gini coefficient translates into an increase of more than 10 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants between 2006 and 2010. There are no significant effects before 2005. The fact that the effect was found during Mexico's Drug War and not before is likely because the cost of crime decreased with the proliferation of gangs (facilitating access to knowledge and logistics, lowering the marginal cost of criminal behavior), which, combined with rising inequality, increased the expected net benefit from criminal acts after 2005.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014. 31p.

By Philip Keefer, Norman V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares

This paper reviews the unintended consequences of the war on drugs, particularly for developing countries, and weighs them against the evidence regarding the efficacy of prohibition to curb drug use and trade. It reviews the available evidence and presents new results that indicate that prohibition has limited effects on drug prevalence and prices, most likely indicating a combination of inelastic drug demand (due to its addictive properties) and elastic supply responses (due to black markets). This should turn the focus to the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. First, the large demand for drugs, particularly in developed countries, generates the possibility of massive profits to potential drug providers. This leads to the formation of organized crime groups, which use violence and corruption as their means of survival and expansion and which, in severe cases, challenge the state and seriously compromise public stability and safety. Second, prohibition and its derived illegal market impose greater costs on farmers than on drug traffickers. In many instances, this entails the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to rich (and ruthless) traders. Third, criminalization can exacerbate the net health effects of drug use. These consequences are so pernicious that they call for a fundamental review of drug policy around the world.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 36p.

By Peter Reuter

The production of cocaine and heroin, the two most important drugs economically, has been concentrated in a small number of poor nations for 25 years. A slightly larger number of developing nations have been affected by large-scale trafficking in these two drugs. This paper reviews what is known about drug control programs and considers non-traditional options. The usual array of programs for suppressing drug problems, enforcement, treatment, harm reduction and prevention have been assessed almost exclusively in wealthy nations. Although treatment has been shown to be cost-effective, it is of minimal relevance for reducing the drug problems of nations such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico or Tajikistan, which are primarily harmed by production and trafficking rather than consumption. Efforts to reduce drug production and trafficking have not been subject to systematic evaluation but the best interpretation of the available evidence is that they have had minimal effect on the quantities produced or trafficked. It is reasonable to conclude that international drug control efforts can do more to affect where these drugs are produced rather than the quantity. If that is the case, and given that spreading a specific level of production or trafficking to more rather than fewer nations probably decreases global welfare, it may be appropriate to consider a less aggressive stance to current producers and to make strategic decisions about the location of an industry producing a global bad.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 38p.

By Daniel Mejia and Carlos Esteban Posada

The main purpose of this paper is to summarize the information currently available on cocaine production and trafficking. The paper starts by describing the available data on cocaine production and trade, the collection methodologies (if available) used by different sources, the main biases in the data, and the accuracy of different data sources. Next, it states some of the key empirical questions and hypotheses regarding cocaine production and trade and takes a first look at how well the data match these hypotheses. The paper states some of the main puzzles in the cocaine market and studies some of the possible explanations. These puzzles and empirical questions should guide future research on the key determinants of illicit drug production and trafficking. Finally, the paper studies the different policies that producer countries have adopted to fight against cocaine production and the role consumer countries play in the implementation of anti-drug policies.

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008. 62p.

By Daniel Mejía and Pascual Restrepo

This paper provides a thorough economic evaluation of the anti-drug policies implemented in Colombia between 2000 and 2006 under the so-called Plan Colombia. The paper develops a game theory model of the war against illegal drugs in producer countries. We explicitly model illegal drug markets, which allows us to account for the feedback effects between policies and market outcomes that are potentially important when evaluating large scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia. We use available data for the war on cocaine production and trafficking as well as outcomes from the cocaine markets to calibrate the parameters of the model. Using the results from the calibration we estimate important measures of the costs, effectiveness, and efficiency of the war on drugs in Colombia. Finally we carry out simulations in order to assess the impact of increases in the U.S. budget allocated to Plan Colombia, and find that a three-fold increase in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia would decrease the amount of cocaine that successfully reaches consumer countries by about 17%.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE, 2008. 60p.

By Juan Camilo Castillo

Experience from the last decade in Colombia and Mexico suggests that violence increases when governments achieve their objective of beheading and fragmenting drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). In this paper I provide a theoretical framework to understand this behavior. Drawing elements from industrial organization, I model DTOs as firms that collude by not attacking each other in order to increase their profits. DTOs always collude when they interact repeatedly; thus, previous analyses focusing on a static Nash equilibrium miss an important part of the dynamics between DTOs. I show that a peaceful equilibrium arises if there are only a few DTOs that care enough about the future. Policies resulting either in a larger number of DTOs or in more impatient leaders increase violence between DTOs without reducing supply. On the other hand, policies that reduce the productivity of DTOs, without directly attacking their leaders and fragmenting them, are more desirable since they can curb supply, although this comes at the cost of increased violence if the elasticity of demand is below a certain threshold. I calculate this threshold, which is a refinement of the value suggested by Becker et al. (2006) for consumer markets.

Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes–Facultad de Economía–CEDE2013. 52p.

By Marcel Boyer and Rachidi Kotchoni

Connor and Lande (2006) conducted a survey of cartel overcharge estimates and found an average in the range of 31% to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010b) finds a median of 23.3% for all type of cartels and a mean of 50.4% for successful cartels. However, the data used in these studies are estimates rather than true observations, since the true illegal profits of cartels are rarely observable. Therefore, these data are subject to model error, estimation error and publication bias. A quick glance at the Connor database reveals that the universe of overcharge estimates is asymmetric, heterogenous and contains a number of influential observations. Beside the fact that overcharge estimates are potentially biased, fitting a linear OLS model to the data without providing a careful treatment of the problems raised by the publication bias, outliers, asymmetry, and heterogeneity will necessarily produce distorted results. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and Bolotova (2006), but providing a sound treatment of the matters raised above. We find for cartels with initial overcharge estimates lying between 0% and 50%.a bias-corrected mean overcharge estimate of 13.6% with a median of 13.6% and for all cartels of all types a bias-corrected mean of 17.5% with a median of 14.1%

Paris: Institut de Polytechnic Paris, Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique, 2011. 60p.

By Marie-Laure Allain, Marcel Boyer, Rachidi Kotchoni and Jean-Pierre Ponssard

The determination of optimal fines to deter the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of competition policy. We provide an analysis of static and dynamic frameworks to characterize the restitution and deterrence properties of fines: cartel stability depends on their ability to prevent deviation by firms, while the benefit of a deviation depends on the fines to be imposed in case of detection by the antitrust authority. We show that the proper consideration of the dynamics of competition has a major impact on the determination of optimal dissuasive fines: our results suggest that a clear majority of fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective.

Paris: Ecole Polytechnique Centre National De La Recherche Scientifique, 2011. 38p.

By Patrick Guillaumont and Frédéric Puech

Relying on samples taken from developing and developed countries, several recent papers, such as those by Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Soares (2004) and Neumayer (2003, 2005), have emphasized the influence of macro-economic variables on crime. Those studies highlight the impact of the average level of income and of its growth rate. But none of them consider the impact of its instability. This paper argues that the factors corresponding to economic shocks or macro-economic instability have a significant and robust influence on crime. It suggests that this influence comes from disappointed anticipations, formed during periods of rapid increase of income, which, to some extent, generates frustration and possibly crime. It also suggests that illegal activities are used by some agents to compensate their loss of income and, in this way, smooth their consumption. It mainly deals with the direct effect of instability on crime. Nevertheless, since macro instability reduces growth, as it has been largely substantiated in literature, and growth has been found to have a negative impact on crime, it can also be supposed to have an indirect effect on crime through the growth rate.

CERDI - Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2006. 26p.

By Davin Nina and Péan Maxence

Money laundering is an activity that consists of legitimizing the proceeds of crime by integrating them into the economic system. The primary objective of this process is to conceal the origin of money from illegal activities (drug trafficking, insider trading, corruption, etc.). The proceeds of these crimes take different forms. It can be cash, financial assets or material objects (works of art, jewelry, etc.). Money laundering is most often carried out in three distinct stages: placement, layering and integration. The placement stage consists of placing the dirty money in the financial system. Most often, criminal organizations come through companies to increase the inflow of capital, which is then deposited in a banking institution. Afterwards, the stratification process takes place, which consists of a large series of conversions and movements of funds in order to mask the origin of these products. Finally, once the money is laundered, it is reused by criminals to finance their activities. Today, the emergence of new information and communication technologies (NICT) in particular is giving a new boost to money laundering activities. The advent of online payment systems, crypto-currencies and dematerialized cash transfers make it even more difficult to track down illegal money transfers. Moreover, the multiplication of online auctions or gambling sites greatly facilitates money laundering. Faced with the development of these new methods, the authorities of European countries are trying to set up a new system to fight against money laundering, in particular by strengthening their cooperation. In addition, following the numerous attacks that occurred in the decade 2010-2020, the fight against the financing of terrorism has become the focus of these institutions. Despite the strengthening of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT), the latter "has weaknesses1". These weaknesses are based on "institutional fragmentation and insufficient coordination at the European Union level2" but also because the EU bodies have "limited tools". Furthermore, following the work of many researchers, it is estimated that today the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is liberticide. Indeed, as early as 2003, a report by the CNIL pointed out the numerous liberticidal measures to fight against money laundering. In this paper, we will first present the framework of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the European Union (I), then we will describe the main flaws of this system (II), and finally we will demonstrate that this fight is today deeply liberticidal, notably because of the tools it uses (III)

IEP Aix-en-Provence - Sciences Po Aix - Institut d'études politiques d'Aix-en-Provence, 2022. 22p.

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By Thomas Bourveau, Renaud Coulomb and Marc Sangnier

This paper investigates whether political connections affect individuals’ propensity to engage in illegal activities in financial markets. We use the 2007 French presidential election as marker of change in the value of political connections, in a difference-indifferences research design. We examine the behavior of directors of publicly listed companies who are connected to the future president through campaign donations or direct friendships, relative to that of other non-connected directors, before and after the election. We uncover indirect evidence that connected directors do more illegal insider trading after the election. More precisely, we find that purchases by connected directors trigger larger abnormal returns, and that connected directors are more likely not to comply with trading disclosure requirements and to trade closer to major corporate events.

Italy: Aix Marseille University, 2016. 36p.

By Thomas Friis Søgaard, Marie Højlund Bræmer, and Michael Mulbjerg Pedersen

This report provides an analysis of current drug supply models and the related violence and exploitation of vulnerable groups in Denmark. Recent years have seen a growth in criminals’ exploitation of vulnerable groups for drug-related crimes. This development appears to be driven by several structural factors, including increased drug market competition and a proliferation of more labour-intensive supply models. Based on the findings of this study, we identify some priorities for future research to understand the impact of digital developments in retail-level drug distribution on vulnerable individuals and to inform responses to reduce criminal exploitation.

Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA); Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 55p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The report provides a regional analysis of the key trends and emerging developments of the synthetic drugs and NPS market as well as options for response in Latin America and the Caribbean. Over the past years, the synthetics drug market has experienced a massive expansion and diversification in the region and seen a rapid emergence of a wide range of NPS.

The latest developments include an expanding methamphetamine market, growing concerns around the non-medical use of ketamine, the emergence of fentanyl and MDMA manufacture, as well as new “ecstasy” trends such as higher dosed MDMA tablets and new forms of presentation such as crystalline MDMA. Moreover, the report sheds light on the comparatively high prevalence of use of hallucinogens in the region and the high prevalence of use of tranquilizers among women.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021. 56p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The present case digest contains an analysis of cases of cyber organized crime. The digest is global in scope and attempts, to the extent possible, to ensure an equitable representation of cases from different geographical regions and legal systems. On the basis of more than 100 cases from more than 20 jurisdictions, observations are made about the ways in which cyber organized crime is identified in case law and how this illicit activity is investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated across jurisdictions. The case digest examines the structure and organization of cyber organized criminal groups, tools used by perpetrators of cyber organized crime, types of cyber organized crime and procedural issues relating to the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of cyber organized crime cases. The case digest contains summaries of relevant judicial proceedings concerning cyber organized crime, organized according to theme. The ultimate goals of the digest are to identify cases involving cyber organized crime and the manner in which such crime has been investigated, prosecuted and adjudicated in different areas of the world. The digest concludes by identifying challenges to investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating cases involving cyber organized crime, as well as the lessons learned for criminal justice professionals, including some of the challenging aspects of criminal justice responses to such crime.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021.144p.

By Alex P. Schmid

Following terrorist attacks, governments are often quick to express their solidarity with victims of terrorism but as the memory of a terrorist atrocity fades, political attention for the victims also ebbs away – in both government and society. In this Research Paper, Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the roles of victims of terrorism. The paper looks at various definitions of what it means to be a “victim” and also traces the various initiatives aimed at supporting victims over the last two decades. In many cases, the paper finds, such initiatives have been weak. Victims of terrorism are often one of the best positioned actors to counter violent extremism and their role in this respect is also analysed. While the importance of victims is slowly being recognised, this Paper concludes that there is still a lot more work to be done. The Paper ends with several recommendations which could enhance and improve the position of victims and their role in countering violent extremism

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism , 2012. 28p.