By Max Gallien and Florian Weigand

Although  smuggling is  commonly  assumed to happen  in remote and difficult-to-access borderlands, in reality, smuggling is most prevalent in areas that states tightly control, including formal border crossings. To understand this puzzle, this article explores the relationship between states and smugglers at international borders. Based on extensive empirical research in various borderlands in North Africa and Southeast Asia, it argues that different kinds of smugglers prefer different types of relationships with the state. The article outlines six ideal types of such relationships. It contends that these types of relationships are the dominant factor in how different smuggling networks choose routes along a border. The findings have implications for our understanding of smuggling and policies that aim at addressing smuggling, especially regarding the effects of border fortifications and corruption prevention. bordFor over 400 kilometers, the border between Tunisia and Libya stretches across deserts, lakes, and mountains. The border provides a source of income for one of the largest smuggling economies in North Africa, with trading in everything from gasoline, fabrics, and electronics to cigarettes and narcotics. Its length and terrain make the border difficult to control for both Tunisian and Libyan security forces, and offer plenty of opportunities for the thousands of smugglers who cross the border everyday to stay undetected or leverage their superior knowledge of the terrain in high-speed car chases with soldiers and customs officers. And yet, most of these smugglers have chosen two particular points in the border to conduct their business: the formal border crossings as Ras Jedir and Dhiba. In fact, differ-ent smuggling networks prefer different routes: while those trading in mobile phones, bananas, or alcohol have typically preferred to play cat and Mouse.

SECURITY STUDIES, 2021, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 79–106

By OECD/  EUIPO

Illicit trade in fake goods is a significant and growing threat in a globalised and innovation-driven economy, undermining good governance, the rule of law and citizens’ trust in government. It not only has a negative impact on the sales and profits of affected firms and on the economy in general, but also poses major health and safety threats to consumers. To provide policy makers with solid empirical evidence about this threat, the OECD and the EU Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) joined forces to carry out a series of analytical studies that deepen our understanding of the scale and magnitude of the problem. The results have been published in a set of reports starting with Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact (2016), and including the most recent ones Trends in Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods (2019), and Illicit Trade in Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals (2020). The results are worrying. Trade in counterfeit and pirated goods amounted to up to 3.3 % of world trade in 2016; when considering only imports into the EU, fake goods amounted to up to 6.8 % of imports. Counterfeiters operate swiftly in the globalised economy, misusing modern logistical solutions and legitimate trade facilitation mechanisms and thrive in economies lacking good governance standards. Evidence shows that, while criminals continue to use all available modes of transport for illicit trade, seizures from commercial maritime container shipping continue to dominate in terms of volume and value of goods seized. The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the problem: criminal networks have reacted very quickly to the crisis and adapted their strategies to take advantage of the shifting landscape. This study provides a detailed analysis of economy- and industry-specific patterns in the misuse of containerised maritime transport by counterfeiters. Such information is crucially needed, not only for better understanding this threat, but also for developing effective governance responses to support post-COVID recovery. This study was carried out under the auspices of the OECD’s Task Force on Countering Illicit Trade, which focuses on evidence-based research and advanced analytics to assist policy makers in mapping and understanding the vulnerabilities exploited and created by illicit trade  

Paris: OECD, 2021. 81p.

By Anna Sergi

Abstract In large commercial seaports policing and security efforts to counter the drug trade, especially cocaine, do not appear to be effective beyond a mere displacement effect. In the port of Piraeus, Greece, (perceived) rising quantities of cocaine have led to calls for further securitisation of the port to curb illicit trafficking. This article will present the current trends of countering and disrupting cocaine at the port of Piraeus and question how these efforts, together with the growth of the port, are affecting the overall territory of and around the port. This article will first argue that the (perceived) increase in cocaine trade towards/in the port of Piraeus has activated a ‘utopia of security’ in the policing and security responses at the port. This utopia of security leads to paradoxes when it comes to being effective against organised crime in the port. The article will conclude by discussing the possibility of a different approach, one of displacement of countering efforts rather than of cocaine flows. This different approach can also rebalance the focus of policing and security authorities on the relationship between the port and its territory. 

European Journal of Criminology 1–21 © The Author(s) 2023 

By  Anna Sergi

This project involved qualitative primary research into criminality within seaports, by observing how ports, as microcosmic realities run through formal and informal relationships and have specific security vulnerabilities, which facilitate different types of illegal or deviant behaviours. Research has been carried out in two European ports (Liverpool and Genoa) and three non-European ones (Montreal, New York and Melbourne), which are either targets of, or transit zones for, criminal activities and criminal networks.  The main aim of this comparative research project was to improve policy understanding of how the complex relationships within ports act as conduits or facilitators in how criminal networks operate in the territory of and around the ports. With specific attention to the changing geopolitical conditions surrounding the port of Liverpool within the Brexit scenario, the study has looked at what could be learned in the British experience from international ones both in terms of security and in terms of transnational risk assessments. 

London: University of Essex, 2020.    230p.

by Stephanie Brewer and Ana Lucia Verduzco

Mexico’s federal government is increasingly militarizing civilian tasks within and outside the realm of public security. Previous presidents presented militarization as a temporary measure that would allow time to strengthen civilian institutions—though in practice, military deployment became the permanent model, largely at the expense of prioritizing other security and justice strategies and institutions. The current government, however, promotes a broad militarization of civilian tasks in the long term, including through the militarization of the National Guard. The power and roles of the armed forces are growing without effective civilian controls over their actions. While the levels of serious human rights violations attributed to the military have fallen following the end of former president Felipe Calderón’s term, such violations continue to occur. More broadly, Mexico continues to experience historic levels of violence, and the vast majority of crimes go unpunished. Without minimizing positive reforms and steps forward, access to justice remains a fundamental challenge. In this context, it is crucial to improve criminal investigations and strengthen the capacities and accountability of the country’s police institutions. The military’s growing list of civilian tasks is a trend that will not be easily reversed, but demilitarizing public security and consolidating civilian institutions is the necessary route to strengthen the rule of law. In the meantime, the government must install effective civilian controls over the armed forces.

Mexico: WOLA- Adovcacy for Human Rights in Mexico, 2023, 61p.

By Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Celeste Barry and Luke Trinka

The United States experienced a 25% decline in its prison population between 2009, its peak year, and 2021. While all major racial and ethnic groups experienced decarceration, the Black prison population has downsized the most. But with the prison population in 2021 nearly six times as large as 50 years ago and Black Americans still imprisoned at five times the rate of whites, the crisis of mass incarceration and its racial injustice remain undeniable. What’s more, the progress made so far is at risk of stalling or being reversed.

Washington, DC, Sentencing Project. 2023, 34pg

By Rasmus Munksgaard and James Martin 

  A growing share of drug distribution takes place through cryptomarkets—illicit online drug markets which supply the lower levels of the drug trade. Though the economy at large is well understood and the motivations and demographics of buyers as well, the population of drug sellers has received less scrutiny. In this study we address this research gap through the largest qualitative study of cryptomarket vendors to date. We find that sellers begin their careers in varying ways, some moving their business online, others moving into cryptomarket distribution from buying, reselling or supplying friends or from other cybercrimes. We further observe that economic and non-economic motivations frequently overlap, and that strategies for managing risk vary extensively. We conclude with a discussion of our findings from a policy perspective, focusing on the implications for policing drug markets and health policies.  

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2020. 44p.

By Richard L. Harries, Caitlyn Norman, Robert Reid, Niamh Nic Daeid, Lorna A. Nisbet

The administration of new psychoactive substances (NPS), in particular synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists (SCRAs), via e-cigarettes, within prison settings has been well publicized. This study provides an overview of five e-cigarette case samples seized from Scottish prisons between May 2022 and July 2023 where the anabolic-androgenic steroids (AASs) mestanolone and oxandrolone were identified following gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) analyses. These e-cigarette samples represented 2.9% of all samples containing e-cigarette cartridges (n = 170) and 9.4% of all samples found to contain AASs (n = 53) seized during the same time period. The AASs were detected in combination with other drugs, including cocaine, Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (Δ9-THC), SCRAs and nicotine. This represents a new and novel route of administration for AASs.

Forensic Science International, (2024)

By Mladenova, Radmila

Drawing on a number of paradigmatic works of art, the book explores the motif of ‘gypsy’ child-theft and its visualisations. The analytical focus is on the colour coding of bodies in texts and images and their racialised/anti-gypsy uses. Offering a comprehensive survey of the motif’s adaptations to different visual media, the author elaborates on its multiple layers of meaning and functions. The analysis starts with a critical review of Cervantes’ tale “La gitanilla”, moving through seventeenth-century Dutch history painting to take a cursory look at nineteenth-century printed images, and end up with an annotated filmography of 49 cinematic works.

Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Publishing (heiUP), 2019. 122p.

By Nicholas Farrelly | Alice Dawkins | Patrick Deegan

  The streets and beaches of Sihanoukville, Cambodia’s infamous party town, are under-discussed areas in the global effort against transnational organized crime. Sihanoukville is known to most readers as a gambling hub and shabby tourist hotspot. But these pre-pandemic clichés do little to explain the role of a city that washes millions – if not billions – of dollars worth of funds from across Cambodia, South East Asia and beyond. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Sihanoukville’s sinister underbelly of criminality has tilted into public view, thanks to thorough local and regional reporting on the city’s underground criminal enterprises and their interconnected interests in wildlife trafficking, human trafficking and contraband. Spotlighting Sihanoukville, therefore, offers a case study to readers on pressing trends in pandemic-era criminal methods, and a perspective on how a cautious China seeks to stamp out the overseas criminal activity of its citizens in a high-priority Belt and Road partnership. This report interprets Sihanoukville’s hub status for transnational organized crime in four areas. The first section explores Sihanoukville's role in the global supply chain of illicit environmental commodities. While few environmental commodities are sourced from Sihanoukville, forest products from other regions of Cambodia have found their way to the port before being trafficked onwards. Sihanoukville is also a destination for wildlife products from abroad (largely, Africa), with ivory and pangolin scales having been sourced for the local market or for sale and onward transport to consumers – primarily in China. Analysis of the ivory trade in Cambodia highlights Sihanoukville’s relevance to the global supply chain of illicit environmental commodities. Section two examines the recent features of Sihanoukville’s criminal landscape. The emergence of new forms of criminality, including online scams, highlights the underlying themes in this report: the attractiveness of Sihanoukville for criminal enterprise, the adaptability and changing nature of criminality, and the relative impunity that criminal enterprises enjoy. Section three analyzes the features of Sihanoukville’s political economy that have led to the city’s status as a dynamic and enduring hub for a myriad of interconnected criminal activities. A deep seaport paired with a large Special Economic Zone (SEZ) enables international trade and the movement of goods with limited oversight. Large-scale real estate developments facilitate capital flight and money-laundering activities. As section four explores, these factors, in combination with elite capture and weak local enforcement, have made Sihanoukville a safe haven for criminal enterprises

The report concludes by outlining policy implications from this research. We conclude that the Chinese government’s serious interest in cleaning up the overseas image of Chinese corporations, especially in strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) locations, means that a window of opportunity exists to nest environmental-crime enforcement within existing and robust Sino-Cambodian counter-crime efforts.   

Geneva, SWIT:  The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2022.  35p.

By Sone Nkoke

Cameroon harbours important populations of both the Critically Endangered Forest Elephant and the Endangered Savannah Elephant. However, well-documented evidence shows that elephant numbers have plummeted due to a variety of factors, especially poaching and illegal trade in ivory. The actors driving this scourge are also varied, ranging from low-level opportunistic poachers to non-state heavily armed militia groups supplying local ivory traders, carvers, domestic black markets, and Asian-run, African-based transnational crime syndicates operating along illegal trade chains that link Cameroon with neighbouring Central and West African countries to distant end-use consumers primarily in Asia, especially Viet Nam and China. 

Cambridge, UK: TRAFFIC International, 2024. 108p.

By Mouhamadou Kane and Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo

  In West Africa, communities increasingly engage in illicit economies to cope with the severe impacts of climate change. However, the environmental impacts of illicit economies magnify the harms of climate change. This report explores these interlinked phenomena in communities peripheral to Senegal’s Niokolo-Koba National Park and proposes responses. Recommendations Local communities have a major role to play in any measures to address the interlinked challenges of illicit economies and climate change. Moreover, their exclusion has impacts beyond conservation and climate change, threatening the legitimacy of the state. Such measures should seek to: l Strengthen the social compact between communities and local governance authorities. l Address corruption in the management of national parks and protected spaces. l Mitigate the negative impacts of securitising protection in national parks. l Support community resilience to climate change impacts through adaptation projects and/or climate resilient livelihoods. l Advance policies to provide feasible pathways to formalise artisanal gold mining.

OCWAR-T Research Report 11

OCWAR-T Organised Crime: West African Response to Trafficking . 2023. 28p.  

By David Lewis

Despite Ukraine's ongoing counter-offensive, in September 2023 Russia still controlled around 17% of Ukrainian territory, an area roughly the size of Denmark. Russia's occupation of these Ukrainian territories relied primarily on repression and violence, but economic levers also played an important role in consolidating Russian rule. This paper details Russia's illicit economic activity in the occupied territories and calls for more international attention to this aspect of Russia's invasion. Since Russia occupied large parts of south-eastern Ukraine in March 2022, it has worked rapidly to incorporate these regions into Russia's economic and financial system. Key elements in this 'economic occupation' include: • The seizure of many Ukrainian businesses and assets. The occupation authorities 'nationalised' many companies and re-registered them as Russian businesses with new management. • The imposition of the Russian currency, financial and tax system, and the forced closure of Ukrainian banks. • The forcible takeover of farms or pressure on farmers to cooperate with the occupation authorities. Russian officials oversaw the illegal export of Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories. • The reconstruction of cities such as Mariupol, the city destroyed by Russian forces in spring 2022, in a multi-billion-dollar government programme that is profiting well-connected Russian companies. These acts were all illegal under Ukrainian law and some may constitute potential war crimes under international law. There should be more attention paid to these economic crimes internationally – with clear warnings for Russian business about the consequences under international law of seizing Ukrainian businesses and assets. Although international sanctions have targeted many officials in the Russian occupation structures, the approach should be more coordinated and systematic to raise the costs of Russian occupation. More international attention now would also assist in eventual reintegration and reconstruction of these regions. For example, a database of business seizures and economic crimes in the occupied territories would help to resolve legal issues and ensure business restitution in the aftermath of the war, while also serving as a potential basis for sanctions and eventual prosecutions. The economic aspects of occupation also raise complex questions of transitional justice for those who lived under Russian occupation. Ukrainian society is discussing how to define and respond to acts of collaboration in the occupied territories. International experience could help to inform legal and political solutions that meet the needs of justice but also seek to unite post-war Ukrainian society  

SOC ACE Research Paper No 20. 

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham , 2023. 43p.

By Jay P. Kennedy

 Nearly every type of product that has ever been produced has been counterfeited. While the most counterfeited goods tend to be footwear, luxury items, watches, and jewelry, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the prevalence of pharmaceutical counterfeits. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines counterfeit medicines as “medicines that are mislabeled deliberately and fraudulently”, yet counterfeit medicines are generally discussed alongside other forms of harmful medical products such as adulterated, expired, substandard, stolen, and falsified medicines. Each of these products moves through a mix of illegitimate and legitimate intermediaries and distribution channels before making their way into healthcare systems and ultimately to patients. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals harm patients, the healthcare system, legitimate companies, and society. While their presence within the legitimate supply chain is increasing, the threats posed by these illicit goods can be countered through focused action and collaboration amongst industry, healthcare, and law enforcement. This paper discusses three primary risks to consumers and the healthcare infrastructure of Texas: (1) the infiltration of counterfeit drugs into the legitimate supply chain; (2) the direct threat posed by counterfeit pharmaceuticals; and (3) the risks posed by counterfeit drugs to national security and the legitimate supply chain. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy and anti-counterfeiting strategy recommendations aimed at addressing each of the identified risks and protecting Texans, Americans, and the healthcare supply chain.   

Huntsville, TX: Institute for Homeland Security, Sam Houston State University, 2023. 18p.

By Europol

Europol's spotlight report on online fraud highlights that online fraud schemes represent a major crime threat in the EU and beyond as online fraudsters generate multiple billions in illicit profits every year to the detriment of individuals, companies and public institutions.
Fraud schemes are perpetrated with the intention of defrauding victims of their assets using false and deceitful pretexts, or with the use of cyberattack techniques. This results in the voluntary or involuntary transfer of personal or business information, money or goods to criminals.

From ATM attacks and account takeovers to skimming and shimming, the wide availability of crime-as-a-service has made this criminal activity more accessible. Criminals show great versatility and adaptability in adjusting their modi operandi and modelling their narratives around socio-economic trends as well as current crises, taking advantage of emergency situations to create charity scams.

This report is an accompanying module to Europol’s IOCTA, which aims at providing and understanding of modern cybercrime to equip law enforcement with the knowledge to tackle it and keep people safe. It delves into the complexities of online fraud schemes and sheds light on how different schemes overlap and victimise targets multiple times.

Key findings:

Relay attacks targeting payment card chips (shimming) are increasingly detected.

Charity scams leveraging emergency situations have increased. This was visible during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the earthquake in Türkiye and Syria.

Logical attacks on ATMs still occur in the EU, with criminal networks testing ways to exploit new vulnerabilities at the ATMs they target.

Fraudsters display sophisticated modi operandi, which are usually a combination of different types of fraud. Victims of fraud are often re-victimised within the same criminal scheme.

Social engineering techniques that fraudsters use have been growing in complexity. Criminals adapt their techniques according to the profile of the victim and the typology of fraud.

Spotlight Series Report.

The Hague: EUROPOL, 2023. 20p.

By Kirsty S Lee, Dieter Wolke, Till Bärnighausen, Lucienne Ouermi, Mamadou Bountogo, Guy Harling

Background Sexual victimisation and peer victimisation are pervasive and increase risk for mental illness. Longitudinal studies that compare their unique and cumulative effects are scarce and have been done predominantly in highincome countries. The aims of this study were to examine the prevalence, prospective associations, and gender differences in sexual and peer victimisation and mental health in a low-income, African setting. Methods In this prospective cohort study, data were obtained from the 2017 ARISE Adolescent Health Study, a population-representative, two-wave, prospective study of adolescents (aged 12–20 years) from Burkina Faso. A random sample of adolescents was drawn from ten villages, selected to capture the five main ethnic groups, and from one of the seven sectors of Nouna town, Burkina Faso, at two timepoints: Nov 12 to Dec 27, 2017, and Nov 15 to Dec 20, 2018. Standardised interviews were conducted in French or a local language by trained researchers. We measured victimisation exposure as sexual victimisation, peer victimisation, and polyvictimisation, using lifetime frequency of exposure, and we measured mental health symptoms and disorders using the Kutcher Adolescent Depression Scale, the Primary Care Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder screen IV and 5, and a question on lifetime selfharm and number of incidents in the past year. We calculated prevalence of victimisation and mental health symptoms and disorders at the two timepoints, and we used lifetime victimisation at the first timepoint to predict mental health at the second timepoint using logistic and negative binomial regressions. Gender differences were examined using interaction terms. Findings Of 2544 eligible adolescents, 1644 participated at time 1 and 1291 participated at time 2. The final sample with data at both timepoints included 1160 adolescents aged 12–20 years (mean 15·1, SE 0·2), of whom 469 (40·4%) were girls and 691 (59·6%) were boys. The majority ethnic group was Dafin (626 [39·1%]), followed by Bwaba (327 [20·5%]), Mossi (289 [16·0%]), Samo (206 [13·0%]), Peulh (166 [9·7%]), and other (30 [1·6%]). After survey weight adjustment, sexual victimisation (weighted percentages, time 1, 256 [13·8%] of 1620; time 2, 93 [7·2%] of 1264) and peer victimisation (weighted percentages, time 1, 453 [29·9%] of 1620; time 2, 272 [21·9%] of 1264) were common, whereas polyvictimisation was more rare (weighted percentages, time 1, 116 [6·6%] of 1620; time 2, 76 [5·7%] of 1264). Longitudinally, sexual victimisation was associated with probable clinical disorder (adjusted odds ratio 2·59, 95% CI 1·15–5·84), depressive symptoms (adjusted incidence rate ratio [aIRR] 1·39, 95% CI 1·12–1·72), and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (aIRR 2·34, 1·31–4·16). Peer victimisation was associated with symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (aIRR 1·89, 1·13–3·17) and polyvictimisation was associated with depressive symptoms (aIRR 1·34, 1·01–1·77). Girls reported more sexual victimisation (weighted percentages, 130 [17·3%] of 681 vs 126 [11·4%] of 939), boys reported more peer victimisation (weighted percentages, 290 [33·1%] of 939 vs 163 [25·2%] of 681), and there was a significant interaction between lifetime victimisation and gender for probable clinical disorder (F [degrees of freedom 7, sample 376] 2·16; p=0·030). Interpretation Sexual and peer victimisation were common in the study setting and increased risk for mental health problems. Adolescent girls who have been sexually victimised are especially at risk of mental health problems. Interventions targeting sexual and peer violence in low-income settings are needed.  

Lancet Psychiatry 2024; 11: 134–42

By  Felipe Botero Escobar

For years, Ecuador enjoyed a relative degree of peace, as its neighbors, Colombia and Peru, were wrangling with internal conflicts as chief protagonists in the international supply of cocaine. However, things have changed dramatically in recent times. On 9 January 2024, the recently elected president, Daniel Noboa, said that the country was in a state of ‘internal armed conflict’ against 22 criminal groups that he described as ‘narco-terrorists’.

One of the most visible incidents of Ecuador’s growing problem with violence occurred in August 2023 when presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated at a campaign rally in Quito just weeks before the elections. Since Villavicencio’s murder, several incidents have occurred, including the arrest of the Colombian hitmen involved in his death and their subsequent murders in a prison, which has deprived the authorities of crucial evidence in the investigation.6 The year 2023 ended as the most violent recorded in the history of Ecuador.

The situation in Ecuador is complex, and more research into the political-economic factors behind how this once stable country descended into violent, crime-driven chaos needs to be undertaken if we are to fully comprehend the situation. Nevertheless, there are some key features of Ecuador’s criminal landscape that we do understand, and which can at least partly explain how the country has arrived at this critical juncture.

The existence of at least three intertwined criminal markets, the presence of transnational organized crime groups as well as local criminal networks, and the country’s poor resilience capacity to respond to and mitigate the effects of organized crime are all pivotal to understanding the complex criminal ecosystem that has emerged in force in recent years. In the last edition of the Global Organized Crime Index, published in September 2023, scores for Ecuador’s criminal markets and criminal actors are revealed.

This analysis provides but an initial understanding of the background. A more comprehensive assessment of how intersecting criminal markets, like arms trafficking and extortion, operate in the country will be essential in formulating sustainable, practicable responses to the crisis.

By the Brookings-AEI Working Group on Criminal Justice Reform

U.S. criminal justice figures continue to make us numb, elected officials and citizens alike. Yes, we know the U.S. incarcerates more people per capita than any other country in the world. Yes, we know that when we rank the per capita rate of incarcerations, the U.S. is followed closely by countries like El Salvador and Turkmenistan. We know that our recidivism rates are too high, and that we police our racial/ethnic minority communities too much and too often with tragic results. We know our fellow citizens, mainly people of color, living in those communities continue to suffer from higher rates of crime and police violence. And, lastly, we know these conditions prevail even though U.S. crime rates have fallen to 50-year lows (even considering the recent COVID-era surge) making America about as safe as it was in the 1950s. It is almost as if over policing, prosecution, and imprisonment are habits that the United States just cannot break. 

For two decades now, there has been a bipartisan effort to tackle these systemic problems. Action by President George W. Bush in the mid-2000s to foster improved reentry pathways for men and women returning from prison opened the door to the passage of the bipartisan Second Chance Act and hundreds of millions of dollars in investment in programs designed to reform numerous aspects of the criminal justice system including mandatory minimum sentences and felony hiring initiatives. President Barack Obama expanded and accelerated these initiatives adding his own programs including  Banning the Box, presidential commissions on 21st century policing and mass incarceration, as well as pilot programs to reinstitute access to Pell Grants for prisoners. Just last year, President Trump signed the First Step Act beginning the process of reforming sentencing practices and providing funding for training and vocational education for incarcerated people to be more prepared for the labor market after prison. And now President Joe Biden has promised to accelerate criminal justice policy with an eye toward reforming the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, of which he was a principle author, to reduce crime and incarceration. By slow and steady steps, we are moving away from “tough on crime” policies that created the world’s largest prison population and one of its costliest and, from the perspective of rehabilitation and recidivism, most ineffective criminal justice systems. George Floyd’s death at the hands of police last spring and the frequent, though less-noticed, events like it in other American cities, towns, and rural areas, has added new urgency and momentum to the drive to reform our criminal justice system. Unfortunately, the debate has too often collapsed into an unhelpful binary: “support the blue” or “abolish the police.” Either of these poles would tend to have a negative impact on the very communities who have suffered disproportionately under our current criminal justice and law enforcement policies. Excessive policing and use of force, on one hand, and less public safety and social service resources on the other, can both be detrimental to communities that are exposed to high levels of criminal activity and violence. We must find a path of genuine reform, even transformation, that fosters safer, more peaceful, and more resilient communities.   

This volume is a “down payment” on the policy debate America needs right now to continue moving toward a criminal justice system—police, courts, prison, reentry, community supervision—that is focused on the safety, health, and well-being of communities rather than on maintaining a harsh, semi-militarized revolving door system from which, for too many, there is often no escape. The essays in this volume are intended to provide policymakers in Congress and the Biden Administration with research-grounded guidance and insight on core issues and strategies that can sustain bipartisan support for critically needed criminal justice reforms. Our authors come from a broad spectrum of domains and policy perspectives. In fact, most chapters paired scholars, practitioners, and thought leaders from different disciplines and political ideologies. In this regard, each of their chapters concisely summarize the state of research on a given topic and offer bipartisan recommendations for short-, medium- and long-term reforms that will move each of the key sectors of the criminal justice system toward a more humane and effective footing.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2021. 95p.

By Ryan C. Berg

Key Points

• Much of Brazil’s deadly urban violence is the direct result of territorial battles involving the country’s powerful transnational organized crime groups, many of which trace their origins to the country’s dangerous and overcrowded prisons.

• The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), or First Capital Command, took shape in São Paulo during the early 1990s, as inmates organized against poor prison conditions to impose order and preserve lives. Eventually, the PCC developed an ability to project its influence and control well beyond prison walls and into Brazil’s sprawling urban slums.

• The PCC has vanquished many of its domestic rivals, enjoys a footprint in every state in Brazil, runs operations in almost every country of South America, and is now more globally minded than ever before, recruiting guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Venezuelan refugees and partnering with European mafia groups and Lebanese Hezbollah.

• Law-and-order strategies that “stuff” Brazil’s crowded prisons with new inmates may actually exacerbate the problem, given that the PCC has effectively converted the country’s prisons into logistical hubs and training centers of illicit activity. To fight the PCC, the US should designate it as a transnational organized crime group to confer the benefits of multiple pieces of legislation and seek extradition of key PCC leaders.

Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2020. 36p.

By Thomas Hofmarcher, Anne Leppänen, Anna Månsdotter, Joakim Strandberg, Anders Håkansson

Background: Illegal drug use is a public health concern with far-reaching consequences for people who use them and for society. In Sweden, the reported use of illegal drugs has been growing and the number of drug-induced deaths is among the highest in Europe. The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date estimation of the societal costs of illegal drug use in Sweden, relying as much as possible on registry and administrative data. Methods: A prevalence-based cost-of-illness study of illegal drug use in Sweden in 2020 was conducted. A societal approach was chosen and included direct costs (such as costs of health care, social services, and the criminal justice system), indirect costs (such as lost productivity due to unemployment and drug-induced death), and intangible costs (such as reduced quality of life among people who use drugs and their family members). Costs were estimated by combining registry, administrative, and survey data with unit cost data. Results: The estimated societal costs of illegal drug use were 3.7 billion euros in 2020. This corresponded to 355 euros per capita and 0.78 % of the gross domestic product. The direct and intangible costs were of similar sizes, each contributing to approximately 40 % of total costs, whereas indirect costs contributed to approximately 20 %. The largest individual cost components were reduced quality of life among people who use drugs and costs of the criminal justice system. Conclusion: Illegal drug use has a negative impact on the societal aim to create good and equitable health in Sweden. The findings call for evidence-based prevention of drug use and treatment for those addicted. It is important to address the co-morbidity of mental ill-health and drug dependence, to develop low-threshold services and measures for early prevention among children and young adults, as well as to evaluate laws and regulations connected to illegal drug use.

International Journal of Drug Policy, Volume 123, January 2024, 104259