By John Dunham & Associate

  The Buy Safe America Coalition represents a diverse group of responsible retailers, consumer groups, manufacturers, intellectual property advocates and law enforcement officials who support efforts at all levels of government to protect consumers and communities from the sale of counterfeit and stolen goods. One important issue facing US businesses is the massive growth in the availability and sales of illicit products, both from counterfeit imports — increasingly from China — and from products stolen from legitimate retailers and sold through online marketplaces, where the anonymity of a screenname has made it easier and more profitable to fence counterfeit and stolen goods. The Coalition asked John Dunham & Associates (JDA) to examine the data around these illicit sales to determine how they impact the US economy, federal tax revenues, and criminal activity. This is the first of a series of papers examining the issue of counterfeit and stolen goods and its effect on the United States economy. This analysis will focus on the importation of illicit products, notably counterfeits that violate producers’ intellectual property rights. Future analysis will examine the effects of domestic smuggling, the resale of stolen goods, and the effects of contraband on overall criminal activity. According to the analysis: • A large share of contraband items are delivered to US consumers by mail or by express consignment. These transactions account for over 60.8 percent of all seizures by the US customs service and over 90 percent of intellectual property rights (IPR) seizures. The growth in these types of shipments has increased along with the use of online marketplaces. Amazon, for instance, now derives more than 75 percent of their ecommerce revenue from marketplace sales. • In effect, as companies like the Chinese ecommerce marketplace Alibaba and the Amazon marketplace, have linked more consumers to more shippers, many companies producing illegitimate products have gained access to unwitting consumers in America. • The bulk of counterfeit products to the US come from China and its dependent territories, accounting for over 90.6 percent of all cargo with IPR violations. Of the $1.23 billion in total IPR violations intercepted, $1.12 billion was from China. • Examining just those data where CBP can provide an HS code, in some cases, the amount of contraband cargo is nearly equal to the entire import base. For example, imports of certain sweaters, jumpsuits and toys from China are almost 100 percent contraband, as are large amounts of handbags, jewelry and belts. • While there is substantial academic literature on the smuggling of narcotics, people and tobacco, there is very little written on counterfeit products. Using a very conservative model it is estimated that $44.3 billion in additional illicit cargo is escaping detection. • These lost sales alone mean that over 39,860 jobs in wholesaling and nearly 283,400 retail jobs are lost due to the impact of counterfeit goods skirting normal trade channels. All told, the sale of counterfeit items is expected to cost the wholesale and retail sectors of the US economy nearly 653,450 full-time equivalent jobs that pay over $33.6 billion in wages and benefits to US workers. • It is estimated that the smuggling of counterfeit goods costs the US government nearly $7.2 billion in personal and business tax revenues alone. • This analysis is based on the current level of CBP intercepts of illicit cargo. It is likely that the number of illegal imports is much larger than even estimated here.  

Washington, DC: Buy Safe America Coalition, 2021. 25p.

By Craig S Wright

Cybercrime has become a pervasive and complex issue in today’s interconnected world, posing significant threats to individuals, businesses, and governments. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the diverse aspects related to cybercrime, including its historical context, demographic and geographic dimensions, environmental influences, and preventive strategies. This review provides a holistic overview of the multifaceted dimensions of cybercrime. By understanding its historical context, demographic and geographic aspects, environmental influences, and preventive strategies, policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and researchers can work collaboratively to combat cyber threats effectively. Such a comprehensive approach will help create a safer digital environment and protect individuals, organizations, and societies from the adverse impacts of cybercrime. Moreover, through ongoing research and collaboration, it is possible to develop innovative solutions and adapt to the evolving landscape of cyber threats, ensuring a secure and resilient digital future.

Unpublished paper, 2023. 54p.

By Folahanmi Aina and John Sunday Ojo

Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) use social media platforms to promote extremist content and coordinate agendas.  The use of digital platforms to disseminate information and coordinate activities by VEOs in Nigeria has grown considerably in recent years. This report analyses the adoption of social media before and after attacks by Boko Haram, Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru. In the post-attack environment, Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru use platforms to claim responsibility and display their strengths against the state’s security forces. By demonstrating their capacity to attack state security forces, the three groups aim to erode the public’s confidence in the state military’s capacity to safeguard national security. The key findings of this report are as follows: Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru previously leveraged popular social media platforms, including YouTube, Facebook, Telegram and Instagram. These platforms were used to promote propaganda and create awareness regarding upcoming attacks. However, all three groups have now had their use of these platforms restricted or banned. ISWAP has switched to using WhatsApp as a secure platform for communication before, during and after attacks. Rocket.Chat and Telegram have also been instrumental in ISWAP’s information dissemination. Boko Haram uses Telegram to share its activities in the pre-attack and post-attack environments. Ansaru has yet to appear on social media platforms due to its underground activities, which are hard to monitor. The recent acquisition of high-speed satellite internet has enhanced ISWAP’s communication with its audience and enabled coordinated attacks. Combating the exploitation of social media platform by VEOs requires a multidimensional approach. Effective collaboration with technology companies becomes imperative to identify extremist content. Building technological infrastructure for the state requires synergistic collaboration with the military and intelligence agencies to enable the removal of extremism from social media platforms. Devising multilingual and specialised algorithms to detect coded extremism messages and audio-visual content is essential for effective counter-extremism digital architecture. Investing in current technology through research and algorithm development must be prioritised to identify violent extremist content in Nigeria and beyond.

London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 2023. 30p.

By Galen Englund and Jessica White

This report provides a review of the research on the exploitation of gaming and gaming‑adjacent platforms by violent extremists and the policies seeking to mitigate the impact of that exploitation. There is increasing interest in the nexus of online gaming and (violent) extremism. This report builds on the work of the Extremism and Gaming Research Network (EGRN) to provide a primer for those new to this space and an updated state of play of the cutting‑edge research taking place among members of the network and beyond. The report is divided into three sections. First, it lays out the online gaming ecosystem. The report identifies gamers, the unique individual and community identity formations that can happen in these spaces and the multifaceted environment in which this takes place, including games, gaming‑adjacent spaces and beyond. Second, it builds upon and enhances a typology of potential harms in the online gaming ecosystem. This typology allows clarification of the different ways in which extremism can both spread through these spaces and how extremists can specifically exploit these spaces and communities. Third, it provides an overview of some of the efforts that are currently ongoing to mitigate these potential harms. This includes efforts in the tech industry to reinforce policies and moderation efforts, by game designers to address potential challenges at an early stage and by practitioners who use online gaming engagement or gamification to prevent and counter violent extremism effectively. Finally, the report concludes by looking to the future of this exponentially expanding space. It offers some recommendations for research, policy and practice to better understand and address the threat of extremism within online gaming to protect and enhance online gaming as a positive engagement space.

London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 2023. 36p.

By Suzanne Newcombe, Sarah Harvey, Jane Cooper, Ruby Forrester, Jo Banks and Shanon Shah

The word ‘cultic’ is applied to a diverse range of online activity. This label is not always intended to convey a negative judgement; for example, individual influencers, music groups and brands aspire to a ‘cult following’. However, the use of the words ‘cult’ or ‘cultic’ is usually intended by the speaker as a judgement to draw attention to something that may have some elements typically associated with religion (for example, idealisation of a particular individual, a specific worldview and/or ritual practices) as well as the potential to cause harm and violence. This report proposes three ideal-typical groupings of online cultic activity that can glorify and inspire violent extremisms: ‘Cultic’ Religious Groups, ‘Online Cultic Milieus’ and ‘Cultic Fandoms’. This is not an exhaustive description of online activity that has been termed ‘cultic’ in popular culture, but it provides a good starting point for further analysis. This report argues that the understanding of ‘cults’ and online activity needs to be carefully nuanced; the complexities of online and offline activities that might result in violent extremism need to be analysed and risk assessed at the level of both group/social movement and individual. It is important to understand that there are a range of ways individuals interact with these cultic online environments that may or may not represent warning signs or pathways into violent extremism. A holistic understanding of both the nature of the cultic online milieu and an individual’s engagement with that environment is warranted before making assumptions about the nature of any individual’s engagement.

London: Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), July 2023.

By Julia Kupper and Reid Meloy

This pilot study examines the correlation of online and on-the-ground behaviours of three lone-actor terrorists prior to their intended and planned attacks on soft targets in North America and Europe: the Pittsburgh synagogue shooter, the Buffalo supermarket shooter and the Bratislava bar shooter. The activities were examined with the definition of the proximal warning indicator energy burst from the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18), originally defined as an acceleration in frequency or variety of preparatory behaviours related to the target. An extensive quantitative and qualitative assessment of primary and secondary sources was conducted, including raw data from different tech platforms (Gab, Discord and Twitter–now X) and open-source materials, such as criminal complaints, superseding indictments and court trial transcripts. Preliminary findings of this small sample suggest an inverse relationship between the online and offline behaviours across all three perpetrators. The average point of time between the decision to attack and the actual attack was five months, with an elevation of digital activities in the three months leading up to the incident, along with some indications of offline planning. In the week prior to the event, social media activity decreased–specifically on the day before the acts of violence with two subjects going completely dark–while terrestrial preparations increased. On the actual day of the incident, all assailants accelerated their tactical on-the-ground actions and resurfaced in the online sphere to publish their final messages in the minutes or hours prior to the attack. It appears that the energy burst behaviours in the digital sphere and the offline actions can be measured in both frequency and variety. Operational implications of this negative correlation are suggested for intelligence analysts, counter-terrorism investigators and threat assessors.

London: The Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET), 2023. 36p.

By Nafees Hamid and Cristina Ariza

Question: Are those radicalised offline or online more of a threat? Which group is harder to detect, more successful in completing attacks, and more lethal when they do so? Is the pattern different for youth versus older perpetrators and for men versus women? This report investigates these questions. Database: We created a database containing 439 perpetrators involved in 245 attacks between 1 January 2014 and 1 January 2021. It includes every publicly known completed attack and an extensive sampling of thwarted attacks. Attacks were all jihadist‑linked in eight Western countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Type of radicalisation: In our database, radicalisation primarily happens offline; over half the individuals in our database had been radicalised via offline networks. Success and lethality: Individuals who were radicalised offline were three times more likely than individuals radicalised online to complete an attack successfully. Those radicalised offline are 18 times more lethal than individuals in the online category. Those radicalised online are almost eight times more likely to fail than to succeed. Group attacks: Individuals who were radicalised offline are almost three times more likely to attack or plot in groups than individuals radicalised online. Success of group attacks: While groups were more likely to be thwarted by the police than to succeed (regardless of how individuals had been radicalised), successful groups of people radicalised offline were more lethal than their lone actor counterparts (15%). Family and friends: Some 87% of those with radicalised friends and 74% with radicalised relatives plotted or attacked together. Foreign fighters: Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), who were mostly radicalised offline, have the same success rate as non‑FTFs. But success rate increases if they have spent more than a year in a terrorist training location. Age: Online radicalisation is on the rise for young people (born from the 2000s onwards), although most individuals, including young people, are still radicalised offline. Gender: Women appear to be more likely to have been radicalised online. Bottom line: Those radicalised offline are greater in number, more successful in completing attacks and more deadly than those radicalised online.  

London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London. 2022. 40p.

By Rebecca A. Delfino

Deepfakes—audiovisual recordings created using artificial intelligence (AI) technology to believably map one person’s movements and words onto another—are ubiquitous. They have permeated societal and civic spaces from entertainment, news, and social media to politics. And now deepfakes are invading the courts, threatening our justice system’s truth-seeking function. Ways deepfakes could infect a court proceeding run the gamut and include parties fabricating evidence to win a civil action, government actors wrongfully securing criminal convictions, and lawyers purposely exploiting a lay jury’s suspicions about evidence. As deepfake technology improves and it becomes harder to tell what is real, juries may start questioning the authenticity of properly admitted evidence, which in turn may have a corrosive effect on the justice system. No evidentiary procedure explicitly governs the presentation of deepfake evidence in court. The existing legal standards governing the authentication of evidence are inadequate because they were developed before the advent of deepfake technology. As a result, they do not solve the urgent problem of how to determine when an audiovisual image is fake and when it is not. Although legal scholarship and the popular media have addressed certain facets of deepfakes in the last several years, there has been no commentary on the procedural aspects of deepfake evidence in court. Absent from the discussion is who gets to decide whether a deepfake is authentic. This Article addresses the matters that prior academic scholarship on deepfakes obscures. It is the first to propose a new addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence reflecting a novel reallocation of fact-determining responsibilities from the jury to the judge, treating the question of deepfake authenticity as one for the court to decide as an expanded gatekeeping function under the Rules. The challenges of deepfakes—problems of proof, the “deepfake defense,” and juror skepticism—can be best addressed by amending the Rules for authenticating digital audiovisual evidence, instructing the jury on its use of that evidence, and limiting counsel’s efforts to exploit the existence of deepfakes.

Hastings Law Journal, 2023. 57p.

By Taurus Myhand

The proliferation of deepfake videos has resulted in rapid improvements in the technology used to create them. Although the use of fake videos and images are not new, advances in artificial intelligence have made deepfakes easier to make and harder to detect. Basic human perception is no longer sufficient to detect deepfakes. Yet, under the current construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence, trials judges are expected to do just that. Trial judges face a daunting challenge when applying the current evidence authentication standards to video evidence in this new reality of widely available deepfake videos. This article examines the gatekeeping role trial judges must perform in light of the unique challenges posed by deepfake video evidence. This article further examines why the jury instruction approach and the rule change approaches proposed by other scholars are insufficient to combat the grave threat of false video evidence. This article concludes with a discussion of the affidavit of forensic analysis approach, a robust response to the authentication challenges posed by deepfakes. The AFA approach preserves most of the current construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence while reviving the gatekeeping role of the trial judge in determining the admissibility of video evidence. The AFA will provide the trial judges with the tools necessary to detect and exclude deepfake videos without leaving an everlasting taint on the juries that would have otherwise seen the falsified videos.

Widener Law Review, 2023. 19p.

By Elizabeth Simpson

Technology-facilitated violence (TFV) such as doxing, swatting, or cyberstalking is a cybercrime that harms victims via use of the internet and mobile technology. This publication is a resource that will assist state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies in addressing these issues. It begins with an overview of TFV crimes, including definitions and examples of offenses. It also presents tools to identify and measure the problem at a local level, as well as strategies for crime prevention and crime investigation. Finally, it includes data and resources to illustrate the complexity of cybercrimes and violence against vulnerable populations, with a focus on victim-centered response.Washington DC: Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, 2024. 40p.

By Jack Mark Whittaker, Matthew Edwards, Cassandra Cross & Mark Button

  Online shopping has now become very common, with consumers increasingly opting to purchase products on the World Wide Web instead of visiting traditional “bricks and mortar” stores, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. This has, however, also provided significant opportunities for offenders to abuse the inherent trust- based nature of online shopping, whereby consumers typically do not see the products physically prior to purchasing them. As such, this article sets out to examine the actions and behaviors that individuals take to prevent online shopping fraud and what, if any, discrepancy exists between prevention messaging and consumer behavior. To accomplish this, the study utilizes secondary survey data (n = 3478 respondents) obtained from a private-sector initiative called ScamAdviser. The results find that many respondents do not use appropriate behaviors to reduce their risk when shopping online and that furthermore there is reason to believe that consumers are not served well by the online safety advice that they are given. The paper argues that there is scope to increase guardianship through better prevention advice being communicated to online shoppers.
Victims & Offenders 

An International Journal of Evidence-based Research, Policy, and Practice

Volume 18, 2023 - Issue 7: Special Thematic Issue: Scams, Cons, Frauds, and Deceptions; Guest Editors: Sean Byrne and James Byrne

By Steven Kemp, David Buil-Gil, Asier Moneva, Fernando Miró-Llinares, and Nacho Díaz-Castaño

  The unprecedented changes in routine activities brought about by COVID-19 and the associated lockdown measures contributed to a reduction in opportunities for predatory crimes in outdoor physical spaces, while people spent more time connected to the internet, and opportunities for cybercrime and fraud increased. This article applies time-series analysis to historical data on cybercrime and fraud reported to Action Fraud in the United Kingdom to examine whether any potential increases are beyond normal crime variability. Furthermore, the discrepancies between fraud types and individual and organizational victims are analyzed. The results show that while both total cybercrime and total fraud increased beyond predicted levels, the changes in victimization were not homogeneous across fraud types and victims. The implications of these findings on how changes in routine activities during COVID-19 influenced cybercrime and fraud opportunities are discussed in relation to policy, practice, and academic de  

 Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 2021, Vol. 37(4) 480 –501

By Europol

  Due to their intrusive nature, financial and economic crimes are among the most challenging criminal activities to investigate and tackle. A fragmented landscape sees different criminal actors interact with one another, making criminal operations more complex and tangled. Key players typically remain anonymous and operate independently from established criminal structures, often from criminal safe havens. Meanwhile, their techniques and tools advance rapidly. Some recent investigations, including those exploring encrypted communications among criminals, gave unprecedented insight into the system that sustains the finances of organised crime. While law enforcement is untangling the complexity of this underground financial ecosystem, information sharing, investigative focus on key criminal actors, development of technical knowledge and expertise, and public-private partnerships are essential tools for winning the fight against financial and economic crimes. The European Financial and Economic Crime Threat Assessment describes the complexities of financial and economic crimes, and the criminal ecosystem that virtually sustains and links all other criminal activities. The report analyses all financial and economic crimes affecting the EU, such as money laundering, corruption, fraud, intellectual property crime, and commodity and currency counterfeiting. It also illustrates the power of asset recovery in the fight against financial and economic crimes. The analytical findings of this report rely on a combination of operational insights and strategic intelligence contributed to Europol by EU Member States and Europol’s partners, who provided crucial information regarding the criminals’ business models. The report is intended to capture the pervasiveness and destructiveness of financial and economic crimes affecting the EU, and to support all relevant stakeholders in untangling the large variety of financial and economic crimes.   

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg., 2023. 58p.

By Cassandra Cross ,  Matthew Edwards , Mark Button , Jack Whittaker

Online fraud includes dating or romance scams, deceptive sales of products and services, dishonest investment schemes, lottery or inheritance scams, working from home scams or lottery fraud involving false prize draws or sweepstakes. These frauds are costly not only in their financial impact on business and government, but also because of the detrimental impact they have on victims. To gain a better understanding of online consumer fraud, the Australian Institute of Criminology worked with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to compare a matched sample of victims and non-victims. This study aimed to identify and quantify the factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to consumer fraud than others. It was found that greater familiarity with online activities resulted in a reduced likelihood of victimisation and that victims were more likely to have used money wire transfers and electronic funds transfers to send money in response to scam invitations than other forms of payment. These findings support the development of targeted awareness-raising campaigns focusing on the online behaviour most likely to lead to fraud victimisation. It offers policymakers and consumer affairs organisations opportunities to better target fraud prevention and education initiatives.

Research Report no. 16. 

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2019. 98p.

By Lynn Langton; Edward Preble; Daniel Brannock; Erin Kennedy

To address gaps in intervention research, RTI International and the University of Minnesota conducted the Mass Marketing Elder Fraud Intervention (MMEFI) Study with collaboration and support from the USPIS. This study found that the ways in which victims begin responding to scams and their reasons for stopping (or not stopping) their involvement are quite varied. As such, there is likely no one intervention that would work for every type of victim. Thus, the MMEFI team will use findings from these interviews to create intervention materials that target the problem in various ways. This multiphase research project included a secondary analysis of USPIS administrative data on prior scams and a randomized controlled trial test of the efficacy of two variations of a mailed intervention for preventing revictimization by mail fraud. The overall objective was to provide specific policy recommendations to the USPIS and other consumer protection agencies regarding the effectiveness of a mailed intervention. 

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI, 2023. 145p.

By: Felix Soldner, Bennett Kleinberg, and Shane D Johnson

Counterfeits harm consumers, governments, and intellectual property holders. They accounted for 3.3% of worldwide trades in 2016, having an estimated value of $509 billion in the same year. While estimations are mostly based on border seizures, we examined openly labeled counterfeits on darknet markets, which allowed us to gather and analyze information from a different perspective. Here, we analyzed data from 11 darknet markets for the period Jan-2014 and Sep-2015. The findings suggest that darknet markets harbor similar counterfeit product types as found in seizures but that the share of watches is higher and lower for electronics, clothes, shoes, and Tobacco on darknet markets. Also, darknet market counterfeits seem to have similar shipping origins as seized goods, with some exceptions, such as a relatively high share (5%) of dark market counterfeits originating from the US. Lastly, counterfeits on dark markets tend to have a relatively low price and sales volume. However, based on preliminary estimations, the original products on the surface web seem to be worth a multiple of the prices of the counterfeit counterparts on darknet markets. Gathering insights about counterfeits from darknet markets can be valuable for businesses and authorities and be cost-effective compared to border seizures. Thus, monitoring darknet markets can help us understand the counterfeit landscape better.

Crime Science (2023) 12:18

By Coen Teunissen and Sarah Napier

We analysed the chat logs of seven Australia-based men who had committed 145 child sexual abuse (CSA) live streaming offences, to examine the overlap between this offending, contact sexual offending and engagement with child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

Four CSA live streaming offenders attempted to travel to offend against victims in person, in that they discussed travelling or actually booked flights in order to meet these children. Offenders also requested or received images and videos of victims they had viewed over live stream, and recorded live streams to produce CSAM.

Travelling to offend against children, use of CSAM and CSA live streaming appear to be interrelated and should be considered by law enforcement as potential risk factors for one another. Further, detection and removal of new CSAM, and scanning of live streams for abusive content, should be a priority for all electronic service providers.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 671. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 16p.

By Charlotte Hunn, Paul Watters, Jeremy Prichard, Richard Wortley, Joel Scanlan, Caroline Spiranovic and Tony Krone

Online CSAM offending is a challenge for law enforcement, policymakers and child welfare organisations alike. The use of online warning messages to prevent or deter an individual when they actively search for CSAM is gaining traction as a response to some types of CSAM offending. Yet, to date, the technical question of how warning messages can be implemented, and who can implement them, has been largely unexplored. To address this, we use a case study to analyse the actions individuals and organisations within the technology, government, non-government and private sectors could take to implement warning messages. We find that, from a technical perspective, there is considerable opportunity to implement warning messages, although further research into efficacy and cost is needed.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 669. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 14p.

By Isabella Voce and Anthony Morgan

This study analyses data from a survey of Australian adult computer users conducted in June 2021 to examine the influence of online routine activities and life stressors on the likelihood of profit-motivated cybercrime victimisation.

Compared with non-victims, victims spent more time online, more frequently engaged in recreational online activities and were more likely to employ higher-risk online practices. Small-to-medium enterprise owners working from home were more likely to be victims. Respondents who had experienced recent increases in financial stress and gambling and negative impacts on interpersonal relationships during the COVID-19 pandemic were also more likely to be a victim of cybercrime.

Being accessible online and a lack of personal and physical guardianship are associated with an increased risk of being a victim, but other factors may influence the susceptibility of computer users to cybercrime victimisation. This has important implications for cybercrime responses

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 675. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 18p.

By Danni Zhang, Regina Frei, P.K. Senyo, Steffen Bayer, Enrico Gerding, Gary Wills and Adrian Beck

The growth of online retailing has exceeded expectations over the last few years. This has resulted in high product return rates, which retailers are struggling with due to complex and costly returns processing, logistics, and financial implications. Additionally, online returns come with increased opportunities for returns fraud. During the pandemic, new types of returns fraud have emerged and returns fraud rates have increased across all channels. Based on a series of semi-structured interviews with retailers and retail experts, we investigate factors that enable fraudulent returns from consumers' and retailers’ perspectives and outline strategies for retailers to combat product returns fraud in a multichannel environment, leading to a framework for retail fraud. We contribute critical insights to research and practices on understanding and addressing a growing problem that has economic, social and environmental implications.

Journal of retailing and consumer services, Vol.70, 2023. 103145