By Mark Button · David Shepherd · Jeyong Jung

This paper explores the use of fake social media accounts for economic espionage. It focuses solely on the first step of the recruitment process, the link requests. There has been very little research on economic espionage and none on the use of fake social media profiles as a means of recruitment. The methodology is built upon an inductive approach based on a survey of 2,000 UK professionals who use social media for professional purposes to provide practical and theoretical insights into the problem drawn from a Qualtrics panel. The results illustrate that a quarter of professionals are ill-prepared for the threat of fake social media profiles for the purposes of espionage because they either do not check link requests or accept them even with risky attributes. It further finds a substantial minority are carelessly indifferent to information security and computer network security, and are so indifferent to the identities behind link requests that they auto-link with everyone. The paper also explores the homophily-heterophily orientation of professionals. It argues that homophily-orientated professionals tend to reject profiles with espionage characteristics, whilst heterophily-orientated professionals are susceptible because they embrace social difference. The practical implications are that employers need to strengthen their information security training programmes, the security services need to be more explicit in characterising the threats, and regulation is required to force the social media companies to focus on tackling the fake profle problem.

Security Journal (2025) 38:30

By George Herbert

This rapid research review provides an overview of the current state of knowledge on the scale and dynamics of trade-based money laundering (TBML) and key challenges and opportunities in relation to TBML, both globally and in relation to the United Kingdom (UK) specifically. The study took place over ten days in August and September 2022, and involved a review of existing literature, as well as two interviews with experts. Much of the literature reviewed originated from international organisations and publications by national governments, supplemented by news reports and publications by private sector firms.

K4D Emerging Issues Report 55.

Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. .2022.165p.

By Michael Skidmore and Beth Aikenhead

This study aims to improve our understanding of the most serious fraud offences perpetrated in the UK, specifically the diversity of methods for committing these crimes, the characteristics and pathways of offenders involved and where applicable, how the groups or networks of offenders operate. This is an exploratory study which used qualitative data taken from the documents compiled by police practitioners in 25 separate criminal investigations. The cases included in this analysis do not constitute a representative sample of frauds in England and Wales during this period. The selection of cases reflects the choices made by the research team to incorporate a diversity of methods, offenders and settings to capture the breadth of fraud. Furthermore, the sampling frame is the product of practitioner choices over which crimes to assign investigation by specialist teams; these are a limited resource and due to the challenges of international investigation, will likely prioritise offending that has a footprint in the UK. Furthermore, in focusing on frauds that were perpetrated (at least in part) from within England and Wales it does not represent fraud offending that emanates from other countries. The specific fraud cases were serious for different reasons; high financial losses (£100,000 or more), high volume offending (50 or more known victims) and high victim impact (assessed by the victim and/or police practitioner). These dimensions of harm reflect those used in practitioner assessments for deciding which frauds are high harm and a priority for intervention. Only three cases satisfied all three harm criteria, all of which involved the mis-selling of investments. Twelve cases satisfied only one criterion and those linked to each dimension of harm were associated with different methods and victims; all cases that fulfilled the high financial loss criterion had defrauded businesses, and two out of three that fulfilled the high-volume criterion involved taking advance payment from consumers In five cases the scale of victimisation and impact was hidden, but they were included because they involved high-risk offenders suspected of being engaged in serious and complex offending. There was considerable diversity in the methods for perpetrating serious fraud and this study borrows from a typology of acquisitive crime developed in a previous study (Naylor, 2002). This model provided a good fit for distinguishing serious frauds on the basis of two overarching models of offending, and this delineation simultaneously revealed distinctions in the situational context, victim and offender profiles: • Commercial frauds: perpetrated from within a legitimate or pseudo-legitimate business setting and included the sale of investments or the mis-selling of products or services online or face-to-face, and nearly all had victimised individual members of the public. • Predatory frauds: involved theft by impersonating legitimate individuals or organisations, mostly by offenders operating from outside of a business setting and without the pretence of a legitimate commercial exchange. The victim profile was more varied, and over half had victimised businesses (for example, payment diversion fraud). There was divergence in the types of fraud offence encompassed by each category of fraud.

London: Police Foundation 2023. 39p.

By Robert Leiter

  In debates over the Second Amendment, the conventional view is that the government ought to possess a monopoly of legitimate force, subject to the right of individuals to act in emergency self-defense. Many treat the non-defensive circumstances in which our system decentralizes force as holdovers from the days of nonprofessional police and soldiers. When it comes to the Second Amendment, many believe that the only legitimate reason individuals may bear arms today is for individual self-defense against isolated criminal violence (e.g., to resist a home invasion). This Symposium Essay attacks the monopoly-of-force account, justifying the continued relevance of American law’s decentralization of legitimate force. This Essay argues that decentralization of force remains important for three reasons. First, despite the rise of professional police, American law enforcement still enforces core crimes below desirable levels, particularly in disadvantaged and rural communities and during times of civil unrest. Decentralization of force mitigates this underenforcement problem. And decentralization may be a better solution than providing more police because many areas where law is under-enforced also (paradoxically) suffer from the effects of overcriminalization. Second, American law has a mismatch between public duties and private rights. Providing effective law enforcement is only a public duty. Individuals have no private claim that the government adequately enforce the law or protect them against unlawful violence. Self-help and private law enforcement are the best remedies when governments undersupply needed levels of police protection. Third, even if the government has a monopoly of force, it does not follow that government officers are the only ones in whom the government’s monopoly may be vested. The “government” is an incorporeal entity whose power must be exercised by human agents. Agents do not perfectly carry out the tasks of their principals; some government officers commit malfeasance and nonfeasance. The decentralization of force provides a remedy for such abuses of office. Ultimately, this Essay concludes that the individual right to bear arms still has relevance for public defense and security. This fact should warrant consideration when determining the scope of the right, including that the  arms protected by the Second Amendment should continue to include those arms that are primarily useful for public security.   

 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 35 (2021), 46p.

By Peter Leasure and Robert Kaminski

The current study used a time series design with Ohio State Highway Patrol and Ohio Department of Public Safety data to explore whether sales of recreational marijuana increased incidents of operating a vehicle while impaired (OVI) in Franklin County, Ohio and vehicle crashes in Columbus, Ohio. Two different statistical models were used to ensure the robustness of the results (a generalized linear model and Linden's itsa). In other words, we would want to see the same results from both models for moderate support of a particular finding. The results were mixed regarding the impact of recreational marijuana sales on total OVIs in Franklin County, Ohio. The generalized linear model showed a statistically significant increase in OVIs after recreational sales began, but the itsa model failed to replicate that finding. The results were also mixed regarding the impact of recreational marijuana sales on marijuana OVIs in Franklin County, Ohio. The generalized linear model showed a statistically significant increase in marijuana OVIs after recreational sales began, but the itsa model failed to replicate that finding. However, both models failed to find that recreational sales increased vehicle crashes in Columbus, Ohio, meaning that there is modest evidence that recreational sales did not increase vehicle crashes in Columbus, Ohio. A sensitivity analysis that used a balanced time series (91 days before the intervention and 91 days after) was also utilized, and those results largely confirmed the above findings.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 915

Columbus, OH Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law

By Moises Rendon, Linnea Sandin, and Claudia Fernandez

While the economic, humanitarian, and political crisis in Venezuela worsens, criminal groups—including gangs, Colombian guerrilla groups, and colectivos (paramilitary groups)—are competing for control of the country’s valuable mineral resources. These resources include bauxite, coltan, diamonds, and, particularly, gold. Illegal mining is causing irreversible damage to the environment, fueling human rights abuses, and creating significant security threats for Venezuela and the region.

At the same time, as significant sanctions and diplomatic isolation have not yet impacted Nicolas Maduro’s hold on power, illegal mining raises three fundamental issues for policymakers: (1) the implications of further instability in an already failed state, (2) the impact on sanctions policies, and (3) the challenge of getting these territories back from armed groups once there is a transition.

Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020. 9p.

By The Children's Commission of the UK

“Maybe young girls will not post what they want to post or do something they would like to do just in case there’s this fear of ‘Oh I might be abused, this might be turned into a bit of sexual content’ when it shouldn’t have been.” – Girl, 17, focus group Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) is transforming the online world. AI models can generate text, images, videos, and hold conversations in response to a handful of prompts and are rightly being seen as a development with huge potential for the enhancement of people’s lives. However, these tools are also being misused at an alarming cost to children’s online and offline safety. ‘Nudification’ tools are apps and websites that create sexually explicit deepfake images of real people, and at the time of writing, this technology is legal in the UK. GenAI, which is often free to use and easy to programme, has supercharged the growth of these tools. Despite this being a relatively new technology, the high risk of harm it presents to children is increasingly evident. Children told the Children’s Commissioner’s Office (CCo) team that the very existence of technology, that could strip people of their clothes, frightened them. In a series of focus groups held with children in their schools (quoted throughout this report), the team heard girls describe how they were trying to reduce the chance of featuring in a sexually explicit deepfake by limiting their participation in the online world- a space which could enhance their social lives, play and learning, if it were safe for them. This report identifies the threat that sexually explicit deepfake technology presents to children. Currently, it is illegal to create a sexually explicit image of a child. Yet, the technology that is used to do so remains legal and accessible through the most popular parts of the online world, including large social media platforms and search engines. After analysing what is known about this new technological threat, assessing what it looks like in the online landscape, and speaking to children about what it means for them, this report has found: • Nudification tools and sexually explicit deepfake technologies present a high risk of harm to children: o Nudification tools target women and girls in particular, and many only work on female bodies. This is contributing to a culture of misogyny both online and offline. o The presence of nudification technology is having a chilling effect on girls’ participation in the online world. Girls are taking preventative steps to keep themselves safe from being victimised by nudification tools, in the same way that girls follow other rules to keep themselves safe in the offline world – like not walking home alone at night. o Children want action to be taken to tackle the misuse of AI technology. One girl questioned what the point of it was, if it only seemed to be used for bad intentions: “Do you know why deepfake was created? Like, what was the purpose of it? Because I don't see any positives” – Girl, 16. • Nudification tools and sexually explicit deepfake technologies are easily accessible through popular online platforms o Search engines and social media platforms are the most common way that users access nudification apps and technologies. o GenAI has made the development of nudification technology easy and cheap. o Open-source AI models that are not primarily designed to create overtly sexually explicit images or videos still present a risk of harm to children and young people The Children’s Commissioner wants GenAI technology, and future AI technology, to be made safe for children, and calls on the Government to: 1. Ban bespoke nudification apps. 2. Bring in specific legal responsibilities for the companies developing GenAI tools to screen their tools for nudifying risks to children and mitigate them. 3. Provide children with an effective route to have sexually explicit deepfake images of themselves removed from the internet. 4. Committo making the online world safer for girls, by recognising sexually explicit deepfake abuse - and bespoke services used to carry this out - as acts of violence against women and girls 

London: The Children's Commissioner, 2025. 34p.

By International Justice Mission (IJM) in partnership with the U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP Office) and the Philippine InterAgency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT)

Online Sexual Exploitation of Children (OSEC) is a complex hidden crime that is particularly challenging for the global community to measure and address. The lack of global OSEC data, the inconsistency in data collection, sharing and analysis across agencies, and the complexity of internet-facilitated crimes has made it almost impossible to accurately study and understand this crime. Yet, accurate information about its nature and scale is critical for informing and measuring the impact of stakeholder interventions to protect vulnerable children from ongoing exploitation and more effectively prevent this crime. To both set a baseline of the existing global data and catalyze future research efforts, International Justice Mission (IJM) brought together leading agencies from across multiple disciplines as well as research experts to collaboratively take on this challenge: examine existing data sources and research methodologies in order to provide meaningful information about this crime that would be valuable for understanding its scale as well as informing interventions to combat it. This report presents the results of a 2019 study into the nature and scale of OSEC in the Philippines. This study was led by IJM, in partnership with the Philippine Government and a variety of stakeholders, under the U.S.-Philippine Child Protection Compact (CPC) Partnership between the U.S. Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons and the Government of the Philippines. IJM is grateful for the extraordinary participation of the 15 partners representing governments, law enforcement, researchers, and non-governmental organizations, who generously shared their data and case histories, consulted on study methodology, and shared their expertise in the implementation and review of this study. This collaboration sets a strong foundation for future efforts to more effectively study and combat this global and local crime. For the purposes of this study, OSEC is defined as the production, for the purpose of online publication or transmission, of visual depictions (e.g., photos, videos, live streaming) of the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor for a third party who is not in the physical presence of the victim, in exchange for compensation.

Washington DC: International Justice Mission, 2020. 164p.

By The Youth Justice Board (UK)

Key findings The Serious Incident Annual Report provides a comprehensive overview of 438 serious incidents notified to the Youth Justice Board (YJB) in 2023-24 and the 546 children involved, highlighting key themes and recommendations. Whilst serious incident reporting has been mandatory for youth justice services (YJSs) since April 2022, this is the first year of published findings. A summary of the key findings is below. Whilst there are limitations to this data (please see section 2.1 Data Limitations), this report underscores the importance of addressing exploitation, knife crime, and the vulnerabilities of children with special educational needs or who are neurodivergent. It also highlights the need for timely, effective interventions which address underlying causes, and support to prevent children from being involved in serious incidents. To learn more about the notification process itself, please see the Serious incidents notification: standard operating procedures for YJSs - GOV.UK Criminal exploitation • 41% of all children notified were said to be gang affiliated, criminally exploited, or involved with the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) process1; 42% of all boys and 29% of all girls. • 20% of all children notified had exploitation concerns identified relating to the charge, of these; 58% an NRM referral was due to be made and 42% had a previous NRM referral but were awaiting a decision. Offence types • 55% of all notifications were for Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH), 16% for Rape, 13% for Murder/Manslaughter, 9% Attempted Murder and 3% Terrorism offences. • 56% of incidents notified were knife/blade enabled. • 92% of Attempted Murder notifications indicated there was knife or blade involvement, 84% of Murder/Manslaughter, and 62% of Grievous Bodily Harm incidents. • Rape charges increased from 8-13% of overall notifications when compared to the previous year. Contact with services • 36% of all children charged were under the supervision of a youth justice service at the time of the incident. • 24% were not known to YJSs, nor were they engaged in support from any other local authority service at the time of the incident. • 49% of children notified had no previous cautions and convictions, increasing to 92% for children charged with terrorism offences. • 71% of children notified for murder were not supervised by a youth justice service at the time of the incident, but were known to other agencies, social care, education, health. • 63% had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or Children and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS), of these 24% were engaged with both the youth justice service and one or more other services at the time of the incident. Safeguarding and vulnerabilities • Of the 63% who had some kind of previous contact with a local authority or CAMHS service; o 29% were identified as Children in Need or in Wales, Children with care and support needs o 19% were subject of a Child Protection Plan o 27% were in the care of the local authority as a looked after child, with 48% of these reported to have gang involvement and/or exploitation concerns. • 23% of children reported had identified Special Educational Needs, in Wales Additional Learning Needs/Neurodiversity. Of these; • 19% had an Education Health Care Plan (EHCP) or in Wales Individual Development Plans • 48% were diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) or Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) or Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) • 53% reported risks associated with exploitation. • 43% of children notified due to their death whilst under the supervision of the youth justice service were victims of murder and 19% died by suicide. Demographics and over-representation • 96% of the children notified were boys • 68% of the children notified were 16-17 years old; 99% of these were boys. • 48% of all children notified were from ethnic minority backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (27%) • 17% of children reported were from Black backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) • 17% of children reported were from Mixed backgrounds and significantly overrepresented compared to the general 10-17 population (6%) Timeliness of investigations and decision making • Rape offences took the longest from offence to charge, averaging 380 days, followed by terrorism offences at 230 days. • 32% of all incidents took longer than 180 days from offence to charge. • 17% of children notified were reported as being on bail for another matter at the time of the incident.

London: YJB, 2025. 38p.

By Sara T. Thompson

Banditry is a current problem in Nigeria. Historically, banditry has been a problem around the world. A review of the trends of banditry can help to identify and understand patterns that are present related to such criminal activity. To further understand and analyze this problem, this paper outlines the methodology for the systematic collection and creation of one major dataset that provides detailed information about bandit attacks in Nigeria. A review of around 1200 publications from peer-reviewed journals, news articles, and other relevant publications containing information about bandit attacks in Nigeria resulted in a dataset containing a sample of almost 1000 bandit attacks over the course of a decade in Nigeria. Upon analysis of this dataset, there are spatial concentrations related to where bandit attacks occurred as well as the identifcation of common types of bandit attacks. This paper concludes with recommendations for future research.

Security Journal, 2025, 17p.

By Anna Stenkamp, Joanna Weill, and Michael Rempel

This report examines how New York’s 2020 discovery reform law has been implemented across New York City, the four downstate suburban counties (Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, and Rockland), and the 53 remaining “upstate” counties. The law was designed to increase fairness in the criminal legal process by requiring prosecutors to exercise early sharing of evidence to the defense. Prosecutors must file a Certificate of Compliance (COC) within 20 or 35 days of arraignment (depending on whether a person is held pretrial or released), with a possible 30-day extension. This report evaluates whether the law has contributed to more case dismissals and whether case processing times have changed. In a first-ever analysis, this report also examines prosecutors’ compliance with the reform’s legal timelines for sharing evidence.

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice at John Jay College, 2025. 37p.

By Michael Picard and Colby Goodman

As armed conflicts surge and organised crime activity rises, a new report from Transparency International Defence & Security (TI-DS) and Transparency International US (TI-US) reveals how corruption is quietly but consistently enabling weapons to fall into the wrong hands.

Under the Radar: Corruption’s Role in Fueling Arms Diversion investigates over 400 cases of diversion across 70 countries and shows how corruption, including bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of authority, serves as a key enabler of illicit arms flows.

The report’s release comes at a time of intensifying global concern over weapons diversion. It shows how corruption-fuelled diversion has empowered organised crime, fuelled armed conflict and violence, weakened military effectiveness, and undermined governance and security around the world.

“Despite greater recognition of corruption’s corrosive effect on arms control policies, corruption has often been sidelined in efforts to assess risks of arms diversion like a detective ignoring key clues in a recurring crime,” said Colby Goodman, Senior Researcher at TI US and TI-DS and one of the report’s authors. “Some states’ actions in recent years to add corruption risk assessments are a critical first step to better tackling this global scourge.”

The report provides critical information and tools for states to help identify and mitigate corruption-fuelled arms diversion as they develop new national arms control policies and engage in ongoing discussions within the United Nations on curbing arms diversion.

“The vast amounts of weapons diverted to terrorist groups in the past war on terror is a stark reminder of what happens when governments lose sight of corruption risks in the name of national security,” said Dr. Francesca Grandi, Head of Advocacy at Transparency International Defence & Security. “As demand for arms imports grows amid increasing global insecurity, this report offers practical and effective tools for arms exporting countries to strengthen integrity in their export control systems. It should also help spark more serious conversations globally, at the United Nations and in other fora, about sharing corruption-related information to prevent arms diversion.”

Some of the reports key findings include:

• The theft or embezzlement of state-owned weapons for private gain is the most common type of corruption-fuelled diversion, accounting for over 350 cases. Bribery and abuse of authority remain a serious concern for diversion.

• Corruption facilitates diversion at each stage of a weapon’s lifecycle, including production, international transfers, active use and storage, and disposal. The active use and storage stage had the most corruption-fuelled diversion cases followed by the disposal, international transfer, and production stages.

• Many of the corruption-fuelled diversion cases resulted in devastating consequences for civilians. In more than 200 cases, military or security personnel reportedly colluded with illicit actors, such as insurgents or terrorists, in connection with arms diversion, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries.

To address this urgent issue, the report offers key analysis and recommendations for states engaged in arms exports and imports:

• Strengthen national policies by explicitly identifying corruption as a key risk for arms diversion and developing implementation guidelines that incorporate targeted risk assessment questions that measure key, often overlooked defence and security institutional controls.

• Improve international collaboration on corruption in arms transfers by sharing information on corruption risks in arms transfers within the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) framework and establishing working groups within the ATT and other multilateral for deeper discussions on the topic.

• Support research and foreign aid to curb corruption-fuelled arms diversion, including funding studies on related issues and efforts to strengthen the integrity of defence and security institutions.

London: Transparency International, 2025. 50p.

By Sierra Smucker, Jirka Taylor, Ivy Todd, Emily Hoch, Monique Martineau, Deven Clark, Meagan E. Cahill, Esther M. Friedman

s the number of older adults in the United States increases, there will be a corresponding increase in the need for services to prevent elder abuse and intervene in cases where it has already occurred. However, there are a limited number of evidence-based interventions to support victims of elder abuse. To encourage the rigorous evaluation of one intervention—Elder Abuse Shelters (EASs)—RAND researchers developed three research designs and assessed the preparedness of the well-established Weinberg Center's EAS in New York to undertake them. Researchers found that the Weinberg Center's EAS is well established, and the program model was organizationally and programmatically ready to be evaluated, though data collection practices should be strengthened before implementing the suggested evaluation designs. These evaluation designs could be generalized and implemented at EASs across the country as the number of shelters continues to grow.

Key Findings

The Weinberg Center's client numbers have fluctuated over time but are typically between 16 and 34 per year. Clients mostly identify as women, are ethnically and racially diverse, and are from the New York City area. Many clients have cognitive impairment and limited financial resources.

The COVID-19 pandemic corresponded with a decrease in the number of clients by decreasing potential clients' desire to stay in long-term care facilities and increasing turnover in referring agencies.

The Weinberg Center has a clear program logic model that connects inputs and outputs with measurable short- and long-term outcomes.

Organizationally and programmatically, the Center is ready to embark on an evaluation, with scores of 77 and 84 percent, respectively, in those areas of the evaluability assessment.

However, a low score for evaluation readiness of 43 percent, driven largely by currently insufficient data collection processes, indicates that the Center would need to strengthen its data collection capacity to complete a rigorous evaluation.

Three evaluation designs could help the Weinberg Center's EAS and other EAS models rigorously evaluate its impact: (1) a quasi-experimental design using non-random self-selection into the program, (2) a propensity score matching design that pairs clients with Adult Protective Services, and (3) a robust pre- and post-evaluation design.

When conducting an evaluation of an EAS, researchers must consider equity, data safety, and consent. The experience of elder abuse and the tools needed to help someone heal will differ across individuals depending on their background and cultural expectations.

Recommendation

Because the Weinberg Center is largely ready to embark on an evaluation, its leadership should review the proposed designs and consult with partners and potential evaluation teams as needed to decide how to proceed. Federal and state partners interested in protecting victims of elder abuse should consider funding one of these evaluation designs to determine whether EASs should be supported and encouraged to proliferate as the population ages.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2023, 77p.

By Emily Grant, Lena Dechert

Wyoming is home to a little over 16,000 Indigenous residents, who make up nearly 3% of the state's population. However, Indigenous people in Wyoming continue to experience disproportionately high rates of homicide and disappearances compared to White residents. This means they go missing and are killed more often than their population size alone would predict. The Wyoming Missing and Murdered Indigenous Persons (MMIP) Task Force is dedicated to tracking and sharing data on these cases. This fifth-annual publication includes the latest available information on Indigenous homicide victims and missing persons in Wyoming, along with updates on efforts to improve law enforcement protocols for missing person cases.

Laramie: Wyoming Survey & Analysis Center, University of Wyomingm 2025. 7p.

By Emily Grant, Lena Dechert, Laurel Wimbish, Andria Blackwood

HOMICIDE 105 Indigenous people (34 females, 71 males) were victims of homicide between 2000 and 2020. Indigenous homicide victims were 21% of the total homicide victims in Wyoming between 2000 and 2020. Between 2010 and 2019, the homicide rate per 100,000 for Indigenous people was 26.8, eight times higher than the homicide rate for White people. The homicide rate for Indigenous females was 15.3 per 100,000, 6.4 times higher than the homicide rate for White females. MISSING Between 2011 and September 2020, 710 Indigenous persons were reported missing. Some Indigenous people were reported missing more than once during the time period, resulting in a total of 1,254 missing person records for Indigenous people. Eighty-five percent were juvenile, and 57% were female. They were reported missing from 22 counties in Wyoming. Ten percent of missing Indigenous people are found within the same day they are reported missing, 50% are found within one week. One-fifth of the Indigenous people reported missing were missing for 30 or more days, which is a higher percentage than White people missing for 30 or more days (11%). Currently, 10 Indigenous people are listed as missing (3 females and 7 males). MEDIA COVERAGE Only 30% of Indigenous homicide victims had newspaper media coverage, as compared to 51% of White homicide victims. Indigenous female homicide victims had the least amount of newspaper media coverage (18%). MEDIA PORTRAYAL The newspaper articles for Indigenous homicide victims were more likely to contain violent language, portray the victim in a negative light, a nd provide less information as compared to articles about White homicide victim COMMUNITY BARRIERS Lack of trust in law enforcement and the judicial system, no single point of contact during an investigation, and lack of information during the investigation and after the final outcome were seen as barriers in the community related to the reporting and response to MMIP. RECOMMENDATIONS Develop consistent protocols and data systems for MMIPs to inform both law enforcement and families. Pay particular attention to documenting tribal affiliation in official records, coroner reports, and vital records. Create an Indigenous advocacy position/response team to help families navigate the reporting and investigation process. The advocate can serve as a communication point person, helping to reduce the emotional burden for families of repeating incident details to multiple agencies. Raise community awareness about the prevalence of MMIP, contributing risk and protective factors, and available resources. Distribute a list of community resources and efforts

Laramie: Wyoming Survey & Analysis Center University of Wyoming , 2021. 51p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is proud to release a practical resource designed to empower law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and stakeholders in tackling cryptocurrency-related crimes. The guide "Decoding Crypto Crime: A Guide for Law Enforcement" simplifies complex concepts like blockchain technology and virtual assets, offering best practices for investigating common crypto crimes such as investment scams, extortion, and phishing.

It provides actionable steps for collecting critical evidence, interacting with Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), and utilizing blockchain analytics tools. Recognizing the challenges victims face, the guide also offers support strategies and emphasizes the importance of cross-jurisdictional collaboration. While not exhaustive, this guide serves as a foundational tool to bridge the knowledge gap and enhance law enforcement’s ability to navigate the rapidly evolving world of crypto crime. Download the guide today to strengthen your capacity to combat digital financial crime and ensure a safer digital landscape.

Prague: OSCE, 2025. 64p.

By The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)

Introduction The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) has developed 13 indicators on intimate partner violence and domestic violence to guide the data collection efforts of the police and the justice sector. EIGE’s indicators support EU Member States to measure intimate partner violence and domestic violence and to assess the progress made to combat and monitor these forms of violence. Ultimately, the indicators enhance the comparability of national administrative data on intimate partner and domestic violence in alignment with the minimum requirements of Directive (EU) 2024/1385 on combating violence against women and domestic violence; Directive 2012/29/EU on establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime; and the Council of Europe convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention). Between 2018 and 2020, EIGE used the 13 indicators to measure intimate partner violence across the EU. Between 2021 and 2022, EIGE revised and simplified the 13 indicators, the data collection tool used to populate the indicators and the data collection methodology. Between 2023 and 2024, EIGE conducted a new EU-wide data collection exercise to measure intimate partner violence and domestic violence using the updated indicators, data collection tool and methodology. This document describes the methodological approach for the 2023–2024 data collection exercise. The structure of this report is as follows. • The following section provides an overview of EIGE’s data collection exercise, indicators and data collection tool and provides general methodological details. • The remaining sections provide indicator-specific details on the methodological approach used to collect data on EIGE’s 13 indicators on intimate partner violence and domestic violence. • The annexes present mapping tables with further information on the availability and comparability of the data collected, and the sources of the data.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025, 152p.

By The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

This report presents the findings of research conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on existing child protection systems across all EU Member States. The 27 national reports, commissioned from Franet, the agency’s multidisciplinary research network, are available online on the agency’s website. These reports offer a wealth of additional data beyond what is included here. In April 2024, the European Commission adopted a Recommendation on developing and strengthening integrated child protection systems in the best interests of the child. It calls on authorities at all levels of government, civil society and other stakeholders to cooperate to protect children from violence by means of better-integrated systems. Its aim is to enforce a ‘culture of zero-tolerance for violence against children’ (recital 7) while also emphasising ‘Child protection as a global priority of the Union’ (p. 21). In developing the Recommendation, the Commission consulted children by means of the EU Children’s Participation Platform, and more than 1 000 children provided their views. Based on these data and the Commission Recommendation, this report suggests practical me

Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights ,2025. 118p.

By Marwa Alnasaa, Nikolay Gueorguiev, Jiro Honda, Eslem Imamoglu, Paolo Mauro, Keyra Primus, and Dmitriy Rozhkov 

  The emergence of crypto-assets (private digital assets that depend primarily on cryptography and distributed ledger technology for record keeping) has unleashed a plethora of financial innovation that will likely revolutionize the form of money and the ways it is used. These developments create opportunities as well as risks. As noted, for example, by a group of G-20 policymakers, “…technological innovation, including that underlying crypto-assets, has the potential to improve the efficiency and inclusiveness of the financial system and the economy more broadly,” but “crypto-assets […] raise issues with respect to consumer and investor protection, market integrity, tax evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing.” The pseudonymity of crypto-assets (whereby transactions require only digital identities) makes them a potential vehicle for illicit flows, including flows of proceeds from corruption. This pseudonymity is not an intrinsic feature of the underlying technology, but rather a choice made in the design and practice of most currently existing crypto-assets. Whereas cash provides full anonymity and large denomination bills have long been considered an aid for crime and tax evasion (Rogoff 2017, Chodorow-Reich et al. 2020), crypto-assets in their current form make it possible to move even larger amounts speedily and with greater ease, including across national borders (Graf von Luckner et al., 2021). As crypto-assets rapidly gain macroeconomic relevance (International Monetary Fund 2021) and policymakers consider the optimal degree of regulation, it is urgent to bring empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether crypto-assets facilitate corruption. Likewise, it is helpful to explore the extent to which crypto-assets are used to circumvent capital controls, for countries where these are in place, and whether crypto-assets are more likely to gain traction in countries where the local currency has historically not been a secure store of value. There are also potential benefits of the technologies that crypto-assets are based on. In particular, prudently designed central bank digital currencies could offer additional resilience, safety and availability with lower costs. These technologies could also be used to improve transparency and record-keeping for procurement or other payments related to government projects, thereby increasing accountability, and reducing the scope for corruption. Likewise, property and registry systems could be enhanced, reducing red tape, and streamlining processes. However, these initiatives are currently less advanced or widespread than crypto-assets. Empirical investigation of the factors underlying the growing usage of crypto-assets is in its infancy, owing to data limitations. In this paper, we present a simple cross-country analysis drawing on recently released survey-based data. We explore the correlation of crypto-asset usage with indicators of corruption, capital  controls, a history of high inflation, and other factors. We find that crypto-asset usage is significantly and positively associated with corruption and capital controls. Whereas the small sample size and uncertain quality of the data on crypto-assets implies that our results must be interpreted with caution, it is also worth recalling that measurement error tends to reduce the likelihood of finding a significant empirical association; significant results with low-quality data are thus worth paying attention to. With these caveats in mind and considering the urgency of acting before it is too late, rather than waiting for conclusive evidence, we believe that, on balance, our results add to the case for regulating crypto-assets, including know-your-customer approaches, as opposed to taking a laissez-faire stance. 

Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2022. 19p.

By Marcena Hunter and Lynda Lawson

Known for their beauty, coloured gemstones have been used in jewellery, to adorn clothing and in religious ceremonies for centuries. Fuelled by demand from jewellers and investors, the coloured gemstone sector is an international trade linking supply countries in Africa and traders in Thailand and elsewhere in Asia. Today, there are more than 50 source countries and over a hundred gemstone varieties. In 2015, a conservative estimate of the global annual market for rough coloured gemstones – the term used to describe uncut, unpolished stones – valued the sector at between US$17 billion and US$23 billion. Africa is a prominent supplier of gemstones, which are shipped across the Indian Ocean to Asia for beneficiation. Rough coloured gemstones are mined throughout Africa, largely by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) operators. Small-scaling mining will continue to be a vital source of gemstones for the international market because many gem deposits are small, which means they are short-lived and therefore not appropriate for large-scale mining operations. From Africa, the rough stones are shipped mainly to Thailand, India and Sri Lanka, which are home to long-established, traditional processing centres, and are the main global hubs for cutting and polishing stones for the global retail market. China is also expanding its market share of this industry through increasing use of machine cutting (a process traditionally done manually). Dubbed the ‘ruby trading kingdom’, Thailand is one of the world’s major processing centres for coloured gemstones. The country has been the world’s leading exporter of precious coloured gemstones for the last eight years consecutively,5 with overall exports in 2017 valued at US$1.9 billion. Thailand plays an especially prominent role in ruby and sapphire supply chains. The Thai gemstone industry is known to be heavily dependent on African rough coloured gemstones (see the map); however, official trade records fail to reflect the immense scale of the trade. This is because of the clandestine nature of flows, which are of both an informal and illegal nature. Most African coloured gemstones are moved undeclared through informal channels or are under-declared in official channels. African rough-gemstone traders play a significant role in these supply chains, and have been able to exploit their knowledge of the gemstone industry, as well as their close social and ethnic networks, to buy and export stones from Africa to Asia with ease. In Thailand it is openly acknowledged that the country’s import figures for coloured gemstones from Africa are underreported. For example, according to participants in this research, Madagascar has been an important source of sapphires and other gemstones supplying the Thai industry for over 20 years. After the discovery of brilliant-blue sapphires in the 1990s, numerous gem rushes ensued and Madagascar became the centre of the sapphire universe, but has only recently started to be included as a source country in official Thai trade records. The informal nature of the coloured-gemstone trade, combined with the inherent difficulty in valuing rough stones at the site of extraction, provides ample opportunity for criminal and corrupt actors to exploit and profit from it. This includes large-scale smuggling of stones, resulting in significant underreporting of export and trade figures. Based on Thai trade figures and estimates of authorities and stakeholders, there is a strong likelihood that hundreds of millions of dollars of coloured gemstones are smuggled annually from Africa to Thailand. According to authorities and those engaged in the trade, coloured gemstones may also be being used in money-laundering schemes.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) 2020. 56p.