By Caitlin Chin

Ten years ago, when whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed that U.S. government agencies had intercepted bulk telephone and internet communications from numerous individuals around the world, President Barack Obama acknowledged a long-standing yet unsettled dilemma: “You can’t have 100 percent security and also then have 100 percent privacy and zero inconvenience. There are trade-offs involved.” Snowden’s disclosures reignited robust debates over the appropriate balance between an individual’s right to privacy and the state’s interest in protecting economic and national security—in particular, where to place limitations on the U.S. government’s ability to compel access to signals intelligence held by private companies. These debates continue today, but the internet landscape—and subsequently, the relationship between the U.S. government and private sector—has evolved substantially since 2013. U.S. government agencies still routinely mandate private companies like Verizon and Google hand over customers’ personal information and issue non-disclosure orders to prevent these companies from informing individuals about such access. But the volume and technical complexity of the data ecosystem have exploded over the past decade, spurred by the rising ubiquity of algorithmic profiling in the U.S. private sector. As a result, U.S. government agencies have increasingly turned to “voluntary” mechanisms to access data from private companies, such as purchasing smartphone geolocation history from third-party data brokers and deriving insights from publicly available social media posts, without the formal use of a warrant, subpoena, or court order. In June 2023, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) declassified a report from January 2022—one of the first public efforts to examine the “large amount” of commercially available information that federal national security agencies purchase. In this report, ODNI recognizes that sensitive personal information both “clearly provides intelligence value” but also increases the risk of harmful outcomes like blackmail or harassment. Despite the potential for abuse, the declassified report reveals that some intelligence community elements have not established proper privacy and civil liberties guardrails for commercially acquired information and that even ODNI lacks awareness of the full scope of data brokerage contracts across its 18 units. Critically, the report recognizes that modern advancements in data collection have outpaced existing legal safeguards: “Today’s CAI [commercially available information] is more revealing, available on more people (in bulk), less possible to avoid, and less well understood than traditional PAI [publicly available information].” The ODNI report demonstrates how the traditional view of the privacy-security trade-off is becoming increasingly nuanced, especially as gaps in outdated federal law around data collection and transfers expand the number of actors and risk vectors involved. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan recently noted that there are also geopolitical implications to consider: “Our strategic competitors see big data as a strategic asset.” When Congress banned the popular mobile app TikTok on government devices in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), it cited fears that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could use the video-hosting app to spy on Americans. However, the NDAA did not address how numerous other smartphone apps, beyond TikTok, share personal information with data brokers—which, in turn, could transfer it to adversarial entities. In 2013, over 250,000 website privacy policies acknowledged sharing data with other companies; since then, this number inevitably has increased. In a digitized society, unchecked data collection has become a vulnerability for U.S. national security—not merely, as some once viewed, a strength. The reinvigorated focus on TikTok’s data collection practices creates a certain paradox. While politicians have expressed concerns about Chinese government surveillance through mobile apps, U.S. government agencies have purchased access to smartphone geolocation data and social media images related to millions of Americans from data brokers without a warrant. The U.S. government has simultaneously treated TikTok as a national security risk and a handy source of information, reportedly issuing the app over 1,500 legal requests for data in 2021 alone. It is also important to note that national security is not the only value that can come into tension with information privacy, as unfettered data collection carries broader implications for civil rights, algorithmic fairness, free expression, and international commerce, affecting individuals both within and outside the United States.

Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2023. 60p.

By the Nashville Community Oversight Board

National and local high-profile police killings have brought greater scrutiny to police use of force and have spurred conversations about police accountability across the country and in Nashville. As Metro Nashville Community Oversight (MNCO) itself was born from community outcry in response to multiple fatal police shootings, MNCO believes it is imperative to track and analyze trends in the Metro Nashville Police Department’s (MNPD’s) use of force and to propose policy that will reduce excessive force interactions. This report is thus the first annual use of force report that will assess the types of force used by MNPD and how frequently they are used. We will track policy implementation and make further recommendations each year. Using existing datasets provided to MNCO by MNPD weekly, MNCO researchers began investigating MNPD’s current use of force incidents and identifying patterns within these force interactions. Key findings include that Black and Hispanic subjects, both adults and youth, are more likely to be recipients of use of force (especially firearm displays and soft empty hand control techniques); white and male officers are more likely to use force; subject resistance level is a significant predictor of force used; Black people are more likely to have force used against them when they are not coded as resisting officer commands; force usage concentrates in non-white and high-poverty areas of Nashville; and youth who had force used against them by school resource officers were 96% Black and 58% female in 2023. These findings prompted the COB to make the following recommendations: MNPD should include all soft empty hand control usages (regardless of injury status), firearm displays, Taser displays, and accidental discharges in departmental use of force analyses when there is a subject present, including on MNPD’s Use of Force Dashboard. MNPD should revisit and modify its use of force training and reporting mechanisms to include more consistent tracking of resistance levels across all Form 108 types (108, 108F, 108T, and 108NC). To accomplish this, MNPD should update the MNPD Manual to define all terms in the “Subject’s NonCompliance” section in Form 108s. Further, the data provided to MNCO should be updated to reflect this change. MNPD should randomly audit instances from 2022 onward in which officers use force and resistance was not tracked, or was coded as no resistance. This is to include all Form 108, 108F, 108T, and 108NCs. If officers are determined to have used a disproportionate level of force, MNPD should take appropriate disciplinary action. MNPD should create a Peer Review Panel where supervisors or peers can anonymously report officers who they believe are involved in an above-average number of violent encounters. This panel should be supported by part-time staff who, in addition to serving on the panel, study policecommunity violence and create interventions that would combat such violence. MNPD should use a comparative method based on their force and resistance continuums to evaluate when officers are using force that is disproportionate to resistance, even when force levels are low. The establishment of such a method should be done in consultation with MNCO and with community input such that community perception of force is prioritized in MNPD’s assessment of force and resistance. This comparative method should be incorporated into MNPD’s Early Intervention System and should flag officers who repeatedly use a level of force disproportionate to resistance. Additionally, a review of each officer’s use of force from the prior year should be included in their annual performance evaluation to identify officers who are involved in a disproportionate number of force incidents or who are frequently using excessive force. MNPD should develop use of force policies and training specific to interactions with youth, modeled after best practice policies from organizations like Strategies for Youth. These policies and training should discuss de-escalation, officer presence, communication style, allowed/disallowed uses of force, disparate force across race and gender, and other topics as deemed necessary. Such policies must address that force of any kind must be consistent with the age, body size, disability status, relative strength, and risk posed by the youth. MNPD should electronically notify MNCO staff every time MNPD staff use force in Metro Nashville Public Schools. Such notification should be delivered in a monthly report that includes information including but not limited to officer name, incident number, school location, subject demographics, type of force used, and incident report narrative. MNPD should modify its implicit bias training to address the bias officers may have against entire neighborhoods based on the racial and socioeconomic makeup of those neighborhoods. These trainings should include paid representatives and trainers from the Nashville community who can serve as consultants and speak to the histories of their community and the issues they face, and should be precinct- and neighborhood-specific. MNPD should train recruits and officers in procedural justice principles, focusing on both internal and external standards. Such training should be standalone, repeated annually, and follow evidence-based standards demonstrated to be efficacious. MNPD should modify its use of force forms to include checkboxes for all de-escalation techniques (as outlined in section 11.10.030(M)) used by officers. These techniques should be tracked and analyzed as to how they relate to officer use of force. MNPD should modify its de-escalation policy and training to include specific stipulations on procedural justice. These should address active/empathetic listening, nonverbal communication, word choice, and de-escalation techniques that are grounded in procedural justice principles such as rapport-building. MNPD should continue to focus recruitment on non-white and female candidates until all ranks of the department are staffed with representation at levels significantly closer to Nashville’s demographic makeup. While this report provides a comprehensive overview of current use of force patterns within MNPD, MNCO researchers hope to continue investigations into topics such as use of force by school resource officers, the impact of precision policing tactics on use of force patterns, and community perceptions around police use of force.

Nashville, TN: Community Oversight Board, 2023. 43p

By Robert A. Blair, Guy Grossman and Anna M. Wilke

Throughout the developing world, citizens often distrust the police and hesitate to bring crimes to their attention—a situation that makes it difficult for police to effectively combat crime and violence. Community policing has been touted as one solution to this problem, but evidence on whether it can be effective in developing country contexts is sparse. We present results from a large-scale field experiment that randomly assigned a home-grown community policing intervention to police stations throughout rural Uganda. Drawing on close to 4,000 interviews with citizens, police officers, and local authorities and on administrative crime data, we show that community policing had limited effects on core outcomes such as perceptions of police, crime, and insecurity. We attribute this finding to a combination of low levels of compliance and resource constraints. Our study draws attention to the limits of community policing’s potential to reduce crime and build trust in the developing world. EDI WORKING PAPER SERIES

Oxford Policy Management, 2021. 56p

By Nicholas Paul

While there is a substantial body of placed-based evaluations of drug enforcement strategies, little is known about the nature and effectiveness of the routine tactics used by local police to target individual drug offenders. This study used a mixed-method approach to build on existing research on the efficacy of drug enforcement by documenting the nature and consequences of street-level drug enforcement at the local level. First, a focus group of drug enforcement experts was conducted to identify the tactics used to generate arrests and various types of evidence believed to strengthen drug cases. Next, official data in the form of police reports and court records were coded from one year of proactive felony drug arrests in a large, urban police department. The relationship between offender-focused drug enforcement tactics and various court outcomes (e.g., felony prosecution, formal conviction, and incarceration) were examined through logistic regression analyses. Results indicate traffic stops were the most frequently used tactic to generate felony drug arrests. However, buy-walks were more effective than traffic stops at receiving felony prosecutions. In contrast, search warrants were significantly less likely to result in prosecution. Implications for research and policy are discussed.

Orlando: University of Central Florida , 2022. 167p.

By Chris Giacomantonio https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3634-911 ch451698@dal., Yael Litmanovitz, Craig Bennell, and Daniel J Jones

Scholars and practitioners who develop evidence-based crime policy debate on how best to translate criminological knowledge into better criminal justice practices. These debates highlight the counterpoised problems of over-selling the contribution of scientific evidence; or, alternately, overemphasizing the limitations of science. This challenge attends any attempt to translate research findings into practice; however, and problematically, in criminology this challenge is rarely approached in a theoretically coherent fashion. This article therefore seeks to theorize uncertainty in criminology by examining insights on communicating scientific uncertainty in other fields, and applying these insights specifically to the field of Evidence-Based Policing (EBP). Taking the position that all science is inherently uncertain, we examine the following four aspects of the field: the particular uncertainties of criminology, variance in receptivity to research, the lack of evidence regarding effective communication, and the boundaries of evidence. Building on this analysis, we set out the normative challenge of how researchers should characterize and balance the implications and limits of scientific findings in the decision-making process. Looking ahead, we argue for the need to invest in an empirical project for determining meaningful strategies to express research evidence to decision-makers.

Criminology & Criminal Justice 1–19 © The Author(s) 2022

By Karen Bullock, Aiden Sidebottom, Rachel Armitage , Matthew P.J. Ashby, Caitlin Clemmow, Stuart Kirby, Gloria Laycock and Nick Tilley

This article analyses and critically reflects on the position of problem-oriented policing within England and Wales. Problem-oriented policing is a framework for improving police effectiveness. Its adoption has consistently been shown to be associated with sizable reductions in a wide range of crimes and public safety issues. However, many studies also find that problem-oriented policing is difficult to embed and sustain within police organisations. This article draws on the experiences and perspectives of 86 informed stakeholders to critically examine the position and practice of problem-oriented policing 40 years after its original formulation by Herman Goldstein in 1979. We argue that despite evidence of renewed interest in problem-oriented policing, the approach is not habitually conducted within police organisations in England and Wales. Where it is conducted, the practice of problem-oriented policing is found to lack discipline, the processes tend not to be faithfully followed, and there are weaknesses at all stages of the process. Implications of the findings for future research and police practice are discussed.

Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(4): 2021

By Karen Bullock, Aiden Sidebottom, Rachel Armitage, Matthew P.J. Ashby, Caitlin Clemmow, Stuart Kirby, Gloria Laycock & Nick Tilley

Evidence shows that the application of problem-oriented policing can be effective in reducing a wide range of crime and public safety issues, but that the approach is challenging to implement and sustain. This article examines police perceptions and experiences regarding organisational barriers to and facilitators of the implementation and delivery of problem-oriented policing. Drawing on surveys of (n = 4141) and interviews with (n = 86) police personnel from 19 police forces in England and Wales, we identify five key barriers and facilitators to problem-oriented policing: leadership and governance, capacity, organisational structures and infrastructure, partnership working and organisational culture. These factors provide important indicators for what police organisations need to do, or need to avoid, if they are to successfully embed and deliver problem-oriented policing. The article generates critical information about the processes that drive change in police organisations and offers recommendations for police managers who may wish to implement or develop problem-oriented policing. The paper also proposes a research agenda aimed at addressing evidence gaps in our understanding of the implementation and sustenance of problem-oriented policing.

Policing and Society, 32:9, 1087-1102, 2021.

By Julia Anne Yesberg and Ben Bradford

Collective efficacy is a neighbourhood social process that has important benefits for crime prevention. Policing is thought to be one antecedent to collective efficacy, but the mechanisms by which police activity and officer behaviour are thought to foster collective efficacy are not well understood. This article presents findings from a rapid evidence assessment conducted to take stock of the empirical research on policing and collective efficacy. Thirty-nine studies were identified and examined. Overall, trust in police was the aspect of policing most consistently associated with collective efficacy. There was also some evidence that community policing activities, such as visibility and community engagement, predicted collective efficacy. Police legitimacy, on the other hand, was relatively unrelated to collective efficacy: a finding which suggests perceptions of police linked to the ‘action’ of individual officers may be more enabling of collective efficacy than perceptions of the policing institution as a whole. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

International Journal of Police Science & Management , 2021. vol.23(4):417-430

By Cynthia Lum, Christopher S. Koper, and Xiaoyun Wu

The protests following the killing of George Floyd in the summer of 2020 led to contentious discussions and debates in many cities about policing, with some calling to “defund the police.” However, this debate has generally proceeded without adequate research about either the scale or nature of issues that the police handle and the potential consequences of the proposed reform efforts. To respond to this research gap, we analyze millions of 911 calls for service across nine U.S. agencies. We report on the types of calls for service that the police handle, including how frequently different calls arise, how much time agencies spend on different categories of calls, and the outcomes of those calls. We find that the amount and types of incidents for which people call the police are voluminous, with the vast majority not obviously transferable to other organizations or government sectors without significant resource expenditures or adjustments. However, if the police retain these responsibilities, they also need to reconsider how they can more effectively address community concerns.

Police Quarterly 2022, Vol. 25(3) 255–280

By Claudia Gross Shader, and David G. Jones

In recent years, the characteristics of retail crime have shifted and become more sophisticated. There is some emerging evidence that organized retail crime (ORC) has increased due, in part, to an increased use of online marketplaces for selling stolen goods. This audit is focused on fencing operations related to ORC. ”Fencing” is the practice of reselling stolen goods through online marketplaces, unregulated markets such as illegal street markets, storefronts that buy stolen goods, and by shipping goods for sale outside of the U.S. What We Found This audit presents seven steps for the City to improve its approach to addressing the organized fencing operations that underpin ORC in Seattle: . Support City participation in collaborative efforts among agencies, including collaboration with the new Organized Retail Crime Unit in the Washington State Attorney General’s Office. Leverage federal and state crime analysis resources. Use in-custody interviews of “boosters”—people who steal on behalf of fencing operations—to gather information on fencing operations. Explore new uses of technology to address ORC. Use place-based approaches to disrupt unregulated street markets. Follow the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office “prosecution checklist” for ORC cases. Consider City support of legislation that addresses ORC. Recommendations For each step, we have included specific recommendations for actions that the City could take to improve its approach to ORC. Given the City’s current resource constraints, especially for the Seattle Police Department (SPD), our recommendations largely focus on leveraging new and existing collaborations, using existing expertise and resources, and exploring new technologies.

Seattle Office of City Auditor . 2023. 43p.

By Marie Pryor, Kim Shayo Buchanan, and Phillip Atiba Goff

Swencionis & Goff identified five situations that tend to increase the likelihood that an individual police officer may behave in a racially disparate way: discretion, inexperience, salience of crime, cognitive demand, and identity threat. This article applies their framework to the realities of police work, identifying situations and assignments in which these factors are likely to influence officers’ behavior. These insights may identify opportunities for further empirical research into racial disparities in such contexts and may highlight institutional reforms and policy changes that could reduce officers’ vulnerability to risks that can result in racially unjust actions.

Annual Review of Law and Social Science , 16: 341-360. 2020.

By Charles Fain Lehman

In 2019, the Chicago Police Department (CPD)—one of the most controversial police departments in the nation—was placed under a federally enforced consent decree that mandates sweeping reforms and subjects the department to the supervision of a court-appointed independent monitor. Although implementation of the decree is still ongoing, this report reviews the preliminary evidence of its effects. Across a variety of indicators, it seems that the consent decree has not had an appreciable effect on police conduct or public perception of the department. And there is at least some evidence that the process leading up to the consent decree exacerbated Chicago’s already-substantial crime problem. While prior research on consent decrees suggests that they can sometimes have an effect, that outcome is far from certain, casting further doubt on the prospects of Chicago’s decree. Why is the consent decree having little or no measurable impact? It may be the result of unwillingness on the part of CPD and the city to embrace reform. Alternatively, the consent decree’s ineffectiveness may be attributed to preexisting reforms that CPD had already implemented on its own before the decree took effect. Both of these explanations, however, cast doubt on the viability of the federal investigation and consent decree process as a tool for achieving police reform.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2023. 21p.

By Amy Nivette,Christof Nägel &Emily Gilbert

High-profile incidents of police misconduct can have serious conse-quences for public trust in the police. A recent study in the British Journal of Political Science found that Eric Garner’s death in NYC led to more negative attitudes towards the police in London among Black residents compared to White and Asian residents. The current study aimed to replicate this transnational effect by assessing the impact of George Floyd’s death on Londoners’ perceptions of police. Using the same data and methodological approach, we did not replicate the immediate effect on Black Londoners’ attitudes. We did find that attitudes across ethnic groups became more negative when using a wider temporal bandwidth. However, we discovered violations to the excludability assumption, meaning we cannot be certain that the effect is solely due to the murder of George Floyd, or at least partly due to different dynamics, like the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying policies. This means that while it is possible that police killings in other contexts play a role in shaping attitudes towards local police, these effects are difficult to disentangle from other global and local factors. misconduct can reduce trust and confidence in the police among the wider public (Kochel, 2019; Nägel & Lutter, 2021; Reny & Newman, 2021).

Police Practice and Research, 2023.

By Paul J. Hirschfield

Police in the United States stand out in the developed world for their reliance on deadly force. Other nations in the Americas, however, feature higher or similar levels of fatal police violence (FPV). Cross-national comparative analyses can help identify stable and malleable factors that distinguish high-FPV from low-FPV countries. Two factors that clearly stand out among high-FPV nations are elevated rates of gun violence—which fosters a preoccupation with danger and wide latitude to use preemptive force—and ethnoracial inequality and discord. The latter seems to be tied to another fundamental difference between the United States and most other developed nations—the “radically decentralized structure of U.S. policing” (Bayley & Stenning 2016). Hyperlocalism limits the influence of external oversight, along with expertise and resources for effective training, policy implementation, and accountability. However, elevated rates of FPV among some Latin American countries with relatively centralized policing demonstrate that decentralization is not a necessary condition for high FPV. Likewise, relatively low FPV in Spain and Chile suggests that achieving low FPV is also possible without the extensive resources and training that appear to suppress FPV in wealthy Northern European nations.

Annu. Rev. Criminol. 2023. 6:471–98

By Anthony A. Braga, Rod K. Brunson, and Kevin M. Drakulich

The police need public support and cooperation to be effective in controlling crime and holding offenders accountable. In many disadvantaged communities of color, poor relationships between the police and residents undermine effective policing. Weak police–minority community relationships are rooted in a long history of discriminatory practices and contemporary proactive policing strategies that are overly aggressive and associated with racial disparities. There are no simple solutions to address the complex rift between the police and the minority communities that they serve. The available evidence suggests that there are policies and practices that could improve police–minority community relations and enhance police effectiveness. Police departments should conduct more sophisticated analysis of crime problems to ensure that crime-control programs are not indiscriminate and unfocused, engage residents in their crime reduction efforts by revitalizing community policing, ensure procedurally just police contacts with citizens, and implement problem-solving strategies to prevent crimes beyond surveillance and enforcement actions.

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2019. 45:535–55

By Anthony A. Braga, Brandon C. Welsh, Cory Schnell

Disorderly conditions are seen as a precursor to more serious crime, fear of crime, and neighborhood decline. Policing disorder is associated with reductions in crime, but only when community and problem-solving tactics are used. Aggressive, order maintenance based approaches do not seem to be effective.

What is this review about?

Policing social and physical disorderly conditions is rooted in the broken windows approach: disorder is a precursor to more serious crime, fear of crime, and neighborhood decline. Addressing disorder has become a central fixture of policing, especially in the United States. Yet, evaluations of the effectiveness of disorder policing strategies in controlling crime yield conflicting results.

Policing disorderly conditions can be divided into two main strategies: (a) order maintenance or zero tolerance policing, where police attempt to impose order through strict enforcement and (b) community policing and problem-solving policing, where police attempt to produce order and reduce crime through cooperation with community members and by addressing specific recurring problems.

This review examined the effects of disorder policing strategies compared to traditional law enforcement actions (e.g., regular levels of patrol) on the rates of crime, including property crime, violent crime, and disorder/drug crime. This review also examined whether policing disorder actions at specific locations result in crime displacement (i.e., crime moving around the corner) or diffusion of crime control benefits (i.e., crime reduction in surrounding areas).

Campbell Systematic Reviews, Volume 15, Issue 3. September 2019

By Anthony A. Braga

Clearance rates for fatal and nonfatal shootings, especially cases involving gang- and drug-related violence, are disturbingly low in many American cities. Low clearance rates undermine police efforts to hold offenders accountable, to disrupt cycles of gun violence, and to provide justice to victims. The prevailing view has been that follow-up investigations are of limited value because crimes are primarily cleared by patrol officers making on-scene arrests and through eyewitnesses and forensic evidence at the crime scene. Other research, however, suggests that the work of criminal investigators can increase the likelihood that crimes might be cleared through arrest. After years of homicide clearance rates that were lower than the national average, the Boston Police Department engaged a research and development enterprise to improve their posthomicide criminal-investigation processes and practices. A rigorous evaluation found that the intervention significantly increased key investigative activities and improved clearance rates relative to existing homicide clearance trends in other Massachusetts and U.S. jurisdictions. This research enterprise was extended to compare city investigative resources invested in clearing gun-homicide cases relative to nonfatal gun assaults. The study found that gun homicides and nonfatal shooting cases shared very similar characteristics. However, higher clearance rates for gun homicides relative to nonfatal shootings were primarily a result of sustained investigative effort in homicide cases made following the first two days. Police departments should invest additional resources in the investigation of nonfatal gun assaults. When additional investigative effort is expended, law enforcement improves its success in gaining the cooperation of key witnesses and increases the amount of forensic evidence collected and analyzed.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2021. 15p.

By Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich and Zachary Shemtob

This article examines issues related to training as it pertains to domestic terrorism in general and responding to far-right extremists in particular. First, it hightlights current training practices and training focused on the far right. Second, it details knowledge about the nature and extent of the threat posed by far-right extremists. Third, a review of the empirical research indicates that training could be enhanced if three key issues are emphasized: Future training should promote a better understanding of the contours of the far right; discuss the unique geographic, crime-incident, and structural characteristics of the far right; and describe the need to examine all ideologically motivated crimes, regardless of whether they are also defined as terrorist. The conclusion discusses how training could be enhanced by strategically integrating the existing knowledge base.

Criminal Justice and Behavior 2009; 36; 1305 DOI: 10.1177/0093854809345630.

By Lindsay, Greg; Brown, Jason C.; Johnson, Brian David; Owens, Christopher; Hall, Andrew; Carrott, James H.

From the document: "Microtargeting is the practice of collecting and analyzing personal data to create highly specific messaging for advertising, marketing, and influence campaigns. With microtargeting, the adversary's goal is to destabilize the leadership and decisionmaking of federal institutions tasked with protecting the population. This report describes how, in the coming decade, state and non-state adversaries will use microtargeting tactics to attack high-value individuals (HVIs) in military, law enforcement, and civilian leadership to stigmatize, extort, and even assassinate figures crucial to the security and stability of the United States. Adversaries will also use microtargeting tactics to manipulate and exploit individuals in proximity to HVIs when the HVI is unreachable (e.g., physical proximity, familial ties, business associates, and/or friends)."

Army Cyber Institute, West Point; United States. Secret Service; Arizona State University. Threatcasting Lab. 2023. 88p.

USED BOOK. MAY CONTAIN MARK-UP

By Jovana Jezdimirovic Ranito

FROM THE INTRODUCTION: “…September 16, 2007, Nisour Square in Baghdad, Iraq: Blackwater contractors, working under a State Department contract, kill 17 civilians and injure 20 during a firefight. Fast forward to September 11, 2009, Washington, DC: a Court of Appeals dismisses the charges against contractors and claims they were under US government contractor immunity. More recently, in 2014, after a number of appeals regarding the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court's decision about Abu Ghraib, which ended with a dismissal of charges, detainees filed a suit against contractors again, but still without a favorable outcome. Also, in 2015, in Washington, DC, four of the Blackwater contractors involved in the Nisour Square Massacre received a sentence from a federal judge after years of dismissals and new trials. These lengthy sentences were thrown out on August 4, 2017, by Federal Appeals Court and it ordered a new trial.

These examples are just the most reported ones, but they illustrate well the state of the US regulation regarding private security contractors operating in combat zones overseas…”

Switzerland. Palgrave Macmillan. 2019. 233p.