By Brittany Cunningham, James Coldren, Benjamin Carleton, Richard Berk & Vincent Bauer

Purpose

Police officers in the USA are often put in harm’s way when responding to calls for service. This paper provides a demonstration of concept for how machine learning procedures combined with conformal prediction inference can be properly used to forecast the amount of risk associated with each dispatch. Accurate forecasts of risk can help improve officer safety.

Methods

The unit of analysis is each of 1928 911 calls involving weapons offenses. Using data from the calls and other information, we develop a machine learning algorithm to forecast the risk that responding officers will face. Uncertainty in those forecasts is captured by nested conformal prediction sets.

Results

For approximately a quarter of a holdout sample of 100 calls, a forecast of high risk was correct with the odds of at least 3 to 1. For approximately another quarter of the holdout sample, a forecast of low risk was correct with an odds of at least 3 to 1. For remaining cases, insufficiently reliable forecasts were identified. A result of “can’t tell” is an appropriate assessment when the data are deficient.

Conclusions

Compared to current practice at the study site, we are able to forecast with a useful level of accuracy the risk for police officers responding to calls for service. With better data, such forecasts could be substantially improved. We provide examples.

Camb J Evid Based Polic 8, 4 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41887-023-00094-1

By Josh Leung-Gagné

I use data linking counts of homicides by police to police department (PD) and jurisdiction characteristics to estimate benchmarked (i.e. risk-adjusted) police homicide rates in 2008–2017 among the 711 local PDs serving 50,000 or more residents, a sample with demographics resembling all mid-to-large Census places. The benchmarked rate estimates capture PD deadliness by comparing PDs to peers whose officers face similar risks while adjusting for access to trauma care centers to account for differential mortality from deadly force. Compared to existing estimates, differences in benchmarked estimates are more plausibly attributable to policing differences, speaking to whether the force currently used is necessary to maintain safety and public order. I find that the deadliest PDs kill at 6.91 times the benchmarked rate of the least deadly PDs. If the PDs with above-average deadliness instead killed at average rates for a PD facing similar risks, police homicides would decrease by 34.44%. Reducing deadliness to the lowest observed levels would decrease them by 70.04%. These estimates also indicate the percentage of excess police homicides—those unnecessary for maintaining safety —if the baseline agency is assumed to be optimally deadly. Moreover, PD deadliness has a strong, robust association with White/Black segregation and Western regions. Additionally, Black, Hispanic, foreign-born, lower-income, and less-educated people are disproportionately exposed to deadlier PDs due to the jurisdictions they reside in. Police violence is an important public health concern that is distributed unevenly across US places, contributing to social disparities that disproportionately harm already marginalized communities.

PNAS Nexus, 2024, 3, 1–10

By Mami Kajita; Daisuke Murakami, Seiji Kajita, Georgia Ribeiro, Genilson Zeferino, and Claudio Beato  

Optimizing urban resources, such as ride-sharing and logistics, improve efficiency by reducing waiting times and costs. Similarly, effective allocation of security resources enhances crime deterrence effect. However, measuring the net impact of security policy campaigns remains challenging due to the influence of various external factors. This study introduces a method using high-resolution GPS data from patrol activities to measure crime deterrence effects. We examined the impact of optimized patrol routes on crime prediction in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, over two months, observing a 68.5% reduction in crime compared to the previous period. Analysis of the GPS data revealed a spatial propagation of the deterrent effect to areas distant from the patrol locations. Our findings indicate that unique spatial-temporal patterns of the deterrent effects detected through sensor technology can be reduced into its net impact, potentially helping decision-makers to choose more informed options in security policies.

Unpublished paper. 2024, 17pg

By The Violence Policy Center

Silencers are devices that are attached to the barrel of a firearm to reduce the amount of noise generated by the firing of the weapon. By providing a larger contained space for the gases generated by the discharge of the gun’s ammunition round to dissipate and cool before escaping, silencers reduce the sound generated by the weapon’s firing. Since 1934, silencers have been regulated under the National Firearms Act (NFA).1 The NFA requires that transferees of silencers submit fingerprints and a photograph, pay a special tax, and undergo a background check. It also requires a “Chief Law Enforcement Officer” or CLEO to sign a statement confirming that a certifying official is satisfied that the fingerprints and photograph accompanying the application are those of the applicant and that the certifying official has no information indicating that possession of the silencer by the applicant would be in violation of state or local law. In January 2016, however, the Obama administration finalized a new rule that eliminates the CLEO sign-off requirement and replaces it with a requirement that local law enforcement need only be notified of the transfer of a silencer Hiram Percy Maxim is credited with patenting the first silencer in 1908. But a short time later their utility in crime was demonstrated in a tragic murder-suicide on Central Park West in New York City in 1915. In the decades that followed, silencers were used by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II for clandestine missions. Silenced handguns were also used in Vietnam for multiple purposes. According to a former Special Forces NCO, military units used suppressed pistols “for all sorts of sneaky ops, from dumping guards to out and out assassinations.”2 In 1967, a new generation of silencers was developed by Mitch WerBell for Sionics, a company that specialized in counterinsurgency equipment. The acronym Sionics stood for Studies in Operational Negation of Insurgency and Counter Subversion. The company supplied silencers and similar items for covert operations by military and “CIA-type” clandestine organizations.3 These next-generation silencers were more efficient than their turn-of-the century predecessors and could effectively be used on battle rifles and Carbines. Today’s military silencers are used by special operations units to reduce noise and muzzle flash. A relatively new priority for the gun lobby and firearms industry has been to expand the market for the legal use of silencers. In 42 states silencers are now legal. But the ultimate goal is to weaken federal law regulating the transfer and use of silencers. Legislation has been introduced in Congress to accomplish this goal. Misleadingly labeled the “Hearing Protection Act,” the bill would remove silencers from the list of NFAregulated firearms and accessories, making them subject only to the regulations that currently apply to hunting rifles. In their public statements, proponents of the bill would like the public and policymakers to believe that silencers are innocuous devices used merely to protect the hearing of shooters, including children. But in fact, the campaign to deregulate silencers is merely the latest attempt by the gun lobby and firearms industry, in the wake of declining household gun ownership, to market yet another military-bred product with little concern for its impact on public safety.4 In fact, because the “Hearing Protection Act” would allow silencers to be sold under the same standards as traditional hunting rifles, this would allow the gun industry to manufacture firearms with integral silencers, creating a whole new class of firearm that could be marketed to the general public. ,,,,, A ban on silencers for civilian use would enhance public safety. The explosion in the popularity of silencers has significantly increased the likelihood they will be used in crime. The advantages of using silencers, including reduced noise and increased accuracy, make them attractive to mass shooters, terrorists, and common criminals. In addition, the administrative burden placed on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives diverts resources from the agency’s more important regulatory and law enforcement responsibilities. Conversely, silencers serve no sporting purpose.

Washington, DC: Violence Policy Institute, 2019.  16p.  

By Rafael A. Mangual

  After a long period of continuous violent-crime declines throughout the U.S.—spanning from the mid-1990s through the early 2010s—many American cities are now seeing significant increases in violence. Nationally, in 2015 and 2016, murders rose nearly 11% and 8%, respectively. The national homicide rate declined slightly in 2017 and 2018, before ticking upward in 2019. In 2020, the nation saw its largest single-year spike in homicides in at least 100 years—which was followed by another increase in murders in 2021, according to CDC data and FBI estimates. In the last few years, a number of cities have seen murders hit an all-time high. In addition to homicides, the risk of other types of violent victimizations rose significantly, as well. While various analyses estimated a slight decline in homicides for the country in 2022, many American cities still find themselves dealing with levels of violence far higher than they were a decade ago. While violent crime—particularly murder—is the most serious due in large part to its social costs, there have also been worrying increases in crimes such as retail theft, carjacking, and auto theft, as well as in other visible signs of disorder in public spaces (from open-air drug use and public urination to illegal street racing and large-scale looting and riots). Although several contributing factors are likely, this general deterioration in public safety and order was unquestionably preceded and accompanied by a virtually unidirectional shift toward leniency and away from accountability in the policing, prosecutorial, and criminal-justice policy spaces. That shift is evidenced by, among other things, three major trends in enforcement: • A 25% decline in the number of those imprisoned during 2011–2212 • A 15% decline in the number of those held in jail during 2010–211 • A 26% decline in the number of arrests effected by law-enforcement officers during 2009–1914 Notable contributing factors to the decline in enforcement include: • A sharp uptick in public scrutiny and interventions—in the form of investigations and legal action taken by state attorneys general and the federal Department of Justice—against local law-enforcement agencies • The worsening of an ongoing police recruitment and retention crisis, particularly in large urban departments • The electoral success of the so-called progressive prosecutor movement, which, by 2022, had won seats in 75 jurisdictions, representing more than 72 million U.S. residents • Perhaps most important, the adoption of a slew of criminal-justice and policing reform measures at all levels of government Those who are skeptical of the criminal-justice reform movement have devoted most of their efforts to arguing against the movement’s excesses and explaining why it would be unwise to enact certain measures. Less effort has been devoted to the extremely important task of articulating a positive agenda for regaining what has been lost on the safety and order front. This paper seeks to add to that positive agenda for safety by proposing three model policies that, if adopted, would help, directly and indirectly, stem the tide of rising crime and violence, primarily by maximizing the benefits that attend the incapacitation of serious criminals (especially repeat offenders) and by encouraging the collection and public reporting of data that can inform the public about the downside risks that are glossed over by decarceration and depolicing activists ....

New York: Manhattan Institute. 2023, 19pg

By Danilo Souza, Mateus Maciel

In the context of increasing violence, public security reforms are commonly advocated as a solution to the problem despite the lack of empirical evidence. We address this question by evaluating the effect of the Pacto pela Vida program, a comprehensive reform on the public security of the state of Pernambuco, Brazil. We document a reduction of 16 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants following the program implementation. We show that a reduction in crimes occurring on the streets and associated with young males and firearm availability are likely to have contributed to the program’s effect.

Unpublished paper. 2024, 11pg

By Josephine Wonsun Hahn, Ram Subramanian and Tiffany Sanabia

Minor offenses, including drug possession, shoplifting, disorderly conduct, vandalism, misdemeanor assault, and driving with a suspended license, make up the vast majority of cases in the American criminal justice system. Misdemeanors — the most common type of minor offense — amount to roughly three-quarters of cases filed each year. Enforcement consumes significant government resources, and the overall public safety benefit is questionable. For people charged with minor offenses, resolving cases requires months of court appearances. And minor offense charges have lifelong consequences: arrests alone restrict access to jobs, places to live, health care, and education. Low-income Black and Latino communities disproportionately bear these burdens. Brennan Center researchers examined minor criminal offense trends in New York City between 2016 to 2022. The resulting report highlights changes in enforcement, the prevalence of common offenses, and case outcomes, as well as racial disparities in minor offense case rates that persist despite reforms implemented over the last decade.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2024.

By Anna Stenkamp and Michael Rempel

The purpose of this study is to assess recent trends in criminal summons practices by the New York City Police Department (NYPD), including if and how they disproportionately impact low income and/or Black and Brown communities.

Key Findings

Overall Summons Trends:

Steep Decline Until 2022: Criminal summonses plummeted by 90% from 2013 to 2022 (from 375,707 to 36,621). However, for the first time in a decade, criminal summonses increased by 62% in the most recent year from 2021 to 2022 (from 22,603 to 36,621).

Most Summonses Issued in Bronx and Brooklyn: The Bronx and Brooklyn emerged as hotspots for summonses, with over 60% issued in these boroughs from 2020 to 2022. The Bronx alone accounted for 30% across these years, despite Bronx residents comprising only 17% of NYC’s population.

Few Convictions: In 2022, just 9% of criminal summonses ended in a conviction. (Straight dismissals accounted for 63%, with 28% receiving an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal.) With less than one out of ten cases disposed as guilty, criminal summonses largely do not involve formal accountability but, rather, a “process is punishment” effect, including lost time, income or other challenges from people having to appear in court.

Racial and Socioeconomic Disparities:

Widening Racial Disparities: From 2020 to 2022, the NYPD issued over 85% of criminal summonses to Black or Hispanic people, who combine for 52% of NYC’s population. Relative to their numbers in the general population, police issued summonses at a rate 8.9 times higher for Black than white people in 2020, increasing to 11.4 times higher in 2022.

Income Disparities: The NYPD issued over 60% of summonses to people living in zip codes that fell below the median household income. Further, within communities of every income bracket, the NYPD disproportionately issued criminal summonses to their Black and Hispanic residents. For example, in zip codes with a median household income below $35,000, police issued 97% of summonses to Black and Hispanic people, though they made up just 44% of the population. And in affluent zip codes with a household income over $100,000, police issued 73% of summonses to Black and Hispanic people, though they comprise 24% of the population.

Neighborhood Disparities:

Disparities Based on Zip Code: Residents of 40 (22%) of the City’s 178 zip codes accounted for over half of criminal summonses in 2022. Thirty-four of these 40 zip codes (85%) were majority or plurality Black or Hispanic.

Racial Disparities Within Zip Codes: Across all 178 zip codes, 89% had a larger proportion of summonses issued to Black residents and 67% had a larger proportion issued to Hispanic residents than their respective shares of the zip code’s general population. Thus, NYC police are both disproportionately issuing summonses in predominantly Black and Hispanic neighborhoods; and within virtually all neighborhoods citywide, police are disproportionately issuing summonses to Black and Hispanic residents.

The disproportionate issuance of summonses targeting Black and Hispanic communities highlights systemic biases that perpetuate inequality within the criminal justice system. Addressing these disparities is crucial to fostering a fair and equitable approach to law enforcement, ensuring justice for all residents of New York City

New York: Data Collaborative for Justice, 2024. 45p.

By David Spencer

‘The Wicked and the Redeemable’ reveals that:

• Despite representing nine percent of the nearly six million people convicted of a criminal offence between 2000 and 2021 prolific offenders receive over half of all convictions.

• The Crown Prosecution Service is taking far longer to charge suspects than ever before. It now takes an average of nearly 44 days compared to 14 days seven years ago. These delays are putting vulnerable victims at risk of considerable harm as a result of wholly unnecessary bureaucracy.

• The number of cases that have been outstanding for more than 6 months (the expected standard) has quadrupled in the last four years to 30,384 cases. This is part of the biggest ever Crown Court backlog in history (with 64,709 cases now outstanding – double the number four years ago).

• Despite already having more than 45 previous convictions, ‘Hyper-Prolific Offenders’ are sent to prison on less than half of all occasions (47.3%) on conviction for an indictable or either-way offence. For ‘Prolific Offenders’, those with 16 previous convictions or more, the number falls to less than a quarter being sent to prison on conviction (24.4%) for an indictable or either-way offence.

London: Policy Exchange, 2023. 54p

By Jason Tan de Bibiana, Kerry Mulligan, Aaron Stagoff-Belfort, Daniela Gilbert

Communities across the country have been harmed by violence for decades, and government leaders have struggled to deliver impactful solutions. In particular, an overreliance on policing has not produced the safety that communities need and deserve. Community organizers working to address violence have long recognized that a different approach is needed—one that comes from a deep understanding of a community’s needs, uses data to guide strategies, and prioritizes prevention and intervention rather than punishment. One innovative way for governments to incorporate these tenets into policy and practice—and to provide better, more sustainable support to community-based efforts—is by building centralized local offices of violence prevention or neighborhood safety (OVP/ONS). These offices have the potential to radically transform governmental approaches to public safety. This report summarizes the current state of OVP/ONS nationally and identifies promising practices and recommendations to create and support these offices.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2023. 73p.

By Aliza Hochman Bloom

In December of 2019, a woman was robbed in Jersey City, and she quickly reported it to a 911-dispatcher. When the dispatcher asked her whether the suspect was “Black, white or Hispanic,” she responded that she did not know. But when relaying the description to a police officer, the dispatcher improperly added to the woman’s account that the suspect was a “Black male.” This error appears to have been inadvertent, a mistake reflecting the pernicious implicit bias linking Blackness with criminality. William L. Scott subsequently challenged the constitutionality of the police stop leading to his arrest, arguing that the improper injection of race into the be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) description violated New Jersey’s constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. The appellate court agreed, emphasizing the importance of “deterring discriminatory policing in all of its permutations,” and suppressed all evidence obtained from the unlawful stop.

Though purporting to prohibit racial discrimination in policing, Equal Protection doctrine has not halted the racialized selection process funneling our criminal legal system. Meanwhile, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in a way that facilitates racially disproportionate policing. Scholars have hoped that courts could allow selective enforcement claims that include officers’ implicit racial bias. Within this treacherous doctrinal landscape, Sate v. Scott did just that.

Scott is the first court to hold that evidence of implicit racial bias in policing establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination justifying the exclusion of evidence. But the remedy that it used to deter future police misconduct—suppression of evidence—is unlikely to deter implicit bias. And the court’s praiseworthy desire to halt racist policing rests on unproven assumptions—including that bias training could ameliorate implicit racial bias. Recognizing that present doctrine permits policing decisions that yield systemically racist outcomes, this article argues that courts should adopt an outcome focused approach, where discretionary policing decisions that result in consistently racialized results are scrutinized without requiring proof of discriminatory intent.

University of Illinois Law Review (forthcoming 2025), 50pg

By Robin S. Engel, Hannah D. McManus, and Gabrielle T. Isaza

In post-Ferguson America, police departments are being challenged to implement evidence-based changes in policies and training to reduce fatal police-citizen encounters. Of the litany of recommendations believed to reduce police shootings, five have garnered widespread support: body-worn cameras, de-escalation training, implicit bias training, early intervention systems, and civilian oversight. These highly endorsed interventions, however, are not supported by a strong body of empirical evidence that demonstrates their effectiveness. guided by the available research on evidence-based policing and informed by the firsthand experience of one of the authors in implementing departmental reforms that followed the fatal shooting of a civilian by an officer, this article highlights promising reform strategies and opportunities to build the evidence base for effective use-of-force reforms. We call upon police executives to engage in evidence-based policing by scientifically testing interventions, and we call on academics to engage in rapid research responses for critical issues in policing.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 687(1), 146–165. 2020

by Rafael A. Mangual

After a long period of continuous violent-crime declines throughout the U.S.—spanning from the mid-1990s through the early 2010s—many American cities are now seeing significant increases in violence. Nationally, in 2015 and 2016, murders rose nearly 11% and 8%, respectively.[1] The national homicide rate declined slightly in 2017 and 2018, before ticking upward in 2019.[2] In 2020, the nation saw its largest single-year spike in homicides in at least 100 years—which was followed by another increase in murders in 2021, according to CDC data and FBI estimates.[3] In the last few years, a number of cities have seen murders hit an all-time high.[4] In addition to homicides, the risk of other types of violent victimizations rose significantly, as well.[5] While various analyses estimated a slight decline in homicides for the country in 2022,[6] many American cities still find themselves dealing with levels of violence far higher than they were a decade ago. While violent crime—particularly murder—is the most serious due in large part to its social costs,[7] there have also been worrying increases in crimes such as retail theft,[8] carjacking,[9] and auto theft,[10] as well as in other visible signs of disorder in public spaces (from open-air drug use and public urination to illegal street racing and large-scale looting and riots).[11] Although several contributing factors are likely, this general deterioration in public safety and order was unquestionably preceded and accompanied by a virtually unidirectional shift toward leniency and away from accountability in the policing, prosecutorial, and criminal-justice policy spaces. That shift is evidenced by, among other things, three major trends in enforcement: A 25% decline in the number of those imprisoned during 2011–22[12], A 15% decline in the number of those held in jail during 2010–21[13], A 26% decline in the number of arrests effected by law-enforcement officers during 2009–19[14]. Notable contributing factors to the decline in enforcement include: A sharp uptick in public scrutiny and interventions—in the form of investigations and legal action taken by state attorneys general and the federal Department of Justice—against local law-enforcement agencies[15]. The worsening of an ongoing police recruitment and retention crisis, particularly in large urban departments[16]. The electoral success of the so-called progressive prosecutor movement, which, by 2022, had won seats in 75 jurisdictions, representing more than 72 million U.S. residents[17]. Perhaps most important, the adoption of a slew of criminal-justice and policing reform measures at all levels of government[18]. Those who are skeptical of the criminal-justice reform movement have devoted most of their efforts to arguing against the movement’s excesses and explaining why it would be unwise to enact certain measures.[19] Less effort has been devoted to the extremely important task of articulating a positive agenda for regaining what has been lost on the safety and order front.[20] This paper seeks to add to that positive agenda for safety by proposing three model policies that, if adopted, would help, directly and indirectly, stem the tide of rising crime and violence, primarily by maximizing the benefits that attend the incapacitation of serious criminals (especially repeat offenders) and by encouraging the collection and public reporting of data that can inform the public about the downside risks that are glossed over by decarceration and depolicing activists. The three policies proposed here, which draw on policies proposed and adopted throughout the country in recent history: Modified “Three Strikes”—Creating a points system for various offenses as well as a points threshold that will trigger a mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement, in order to improve deterrence for those beneath the threshold and to maximize incapacitation for those who step over it. “Truth in Sentencing”—Setting a floor for how much of a given sentence must be served before a convicted felon becomes eligible for initial release into community supervision, in order to maximize incapacitation for those who have been convicted of a serious offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. “Data Transparency”—Identifies several types of crime-related data that jurisdictions will be encouraged to collect and report in a standardized manner to address the problem of making and evaluating policing and criminal-justice policies without the benefit of reliable, relevant data. These model policies should be viewed flexibly; policymakers should see them as starting points, feeling free to make changes that reflect the various concerns and idiosyncrasies specific to their respective jurisdictions.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 19p.

By Ben Struhl, Alexander Gard-Murray

Many American communities are wrestling with how to reform their approach to public safety in the wake of police killings, particularly of Black men. There are many ideas for what the right reforms might be, ranging from minor policy tweaks to wholesale replacement of departments. To help communities as they sort through these ideas, we review real experiences with policing reform, highlighting wherever possible the best scientific evidence on the subject.  

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Crime and Justice Policy Lab, 2022. 23p.

By Aaron Chalfin, Greg Ridgeway, John MacDonald, Rachel Ryley

The Philadelphia Police Department began distributing 435 mobile smartphones to officers in police districts 22, 24, and 25 in February 2021. At the same time PPD established Crime Information Centers (CICs) to facilitate analysis and information sharing. We compared changes in police-related outcomes in districts 22, 24, and 25 with six districts (12, 14, 15, 19, 35, 39) that received no phones and had similar levels of serious crime. The smartphones provided officers with improved access to information and a convenient technology to receive requests for intelligence crucial to investigations, report street-level intelligence, and communicate directly with members of the community. Mobile phones/CICs have public safety benefits • An increase in the violent crime clearance rate from 24% to 30% • An increase in the likelihood that a stop resulted in an arrest — from 10% to 28% — suggesting more surgical policing, without increasing the number of stops conducted Mobile phones substantially ease regular PPD officers’ tasks • Greatly increased the amount and variety of evidence collected – Weekly uploads increased 40% after at least one SIG detective received a phone • Facilitated 311 reports to address physical disorder in districts • Made officers more willing and able to create intelligence reports • Enhanced basic communication between police and community members through calls and text messages, including direct contact about the location of illegal firearms • Can improve the completeness and timeliness of NCIC/PCIC checks, patrol logs, and court notices PPD has more to gain from mobile IT and CICs • More incentives are needed to promote smartphone use among officers. A few officers in each of the pilot districts were more active users of the smartphones – 5/7 squads use the phones a lot, others were infrequent users  – 3 officers submitted half of the 311 requests – 86% of officers submitted no intelligence reports at all – Usage has essentially ended in District 22 • Regular use of phones among officers could support mission-directed patrol – Monitoring the time spent in mission areas – Documenting mission-related business checks and home visits – Promote intelligence reports in mission areas • PPD could encourage additional phone usage – Encourage officers to share information and give feedback on how their intel reports and 311 reports are solving community problems – Emphasize phone usage in CompStat by tracking key metrics ∗ Time spent in strategic areas ∗ Number of leads connected to shootings or priority incidents ∗ Volume of direct calls/messages from community leading to crime clearances – Establish a clear policy on expected phone use, monitor use, and provide feedback to command staff and officers on the successful uses of technology  

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Crime and Justice Policy Lab, 2022. 43p.

By Ruth Moyer

This evaluation suggests “the current GVI implementation in Philadelphia has been associated with significant reductions in group member involved firearm violence. The continued effectiveness of the implementation will likely depend on a range of factors, including necessary adjustments to evolving group activity and firearm violence.” Between January 2020 and May 2022, at least 1,147 Group Member-Involved shootings have occurred in Philadelphia. Approximately one out of every five of these shootings results in a death (23.1%). The current implementation of Group Violence Intervention (GVI) in Philadelphia has produced significant reductions in Group Member-Involved (GMI) firearm violence at the group-unit level during the study period, January 2020 to May 2022. It has also produced significant reductions in GMI firearm violence at the census tract-level during the study period. Importantly, due to COVID-19-related restrictions on public gatherings, the current GVI implementation in Philadelphia departed from the usual call-in meeting model. Instead, Mobile CallIn Team (MCIT) custom notification visits provided the primary means of GVI implementation. Given the results indicating a reduction in firearm violence, a GVI implementation through MCIT custom notification visits appears to maintain the effectiveness of GVI. Post-Treatment relative to Pre-Treatment, a group-unit, on average, experienced a significant 38.6% reduction in shootings per week. Notably, receiving 2 doses of treatment relative to 0 doses of treatment produced a significant 50.3% reduction in shootings per week for a group-unit. A census tract experienced a non-significant 25.1% reduction (p=0.07) in GMI shootings per week, Post-Treatment relative to Pre-Treatment. Importantly, however, where a census tract received 4 or more doses relative to 0 doses (Pre-Treatment), there was a significant 44.4% reduction (p=0.03) in GMI shootings per week. The effects of GVI on individual outcomes such as victimization and offending merit further research. A longer study period in prospective research will provide an opportunity to more precisely detect the effect of GVI on individual behavior and victimization risk. Enforcement actions were associated with a reduction in GMI shootings. Once it was subject to an enforcement action, a group experienced a significant 42.8% reduction (p=0.04) in shootings. Future research should identify the particular levers in an enforcement action that are most effective. This Evaluation conducted qualitative research to inform the quantitative findings. The qualitative research components were the following: (1) informal telephone conversations with GVI recipients; (2) surveys given to Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) officers involved in MCIT custom notifications; and (3) informal surveys distributed at two Philadelphia Roadmap for Safer Communities community meetings.   

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2023. 80p.

By  Peter Leasure, Hunter M. Boehme, and Robert J. Kaminski

Police traffic stops for minor violations have gained considerable attention among scholars and advocates, and some research has found evidence of racial disparities in who is stopped for certain traffic violations. Recognizing the potential for racial disparities and other issues, various jurisdictions have sought to limit traffic stops. On January 14, 2022, the Seattle (Washington) Police Chief Adrian Diaz stated that the Seattle Police Department (SPD) would discontinue stopping individuals for various traffic violations. While these policies were enacted in part to reduce racial disparities and other outcomes that may flow from such stops, some have argued that limiting stops may lead to increased crime rates and traffic accidents due to the reduced investigatory reach of law enforcement. Another possibility is that some crimes, which may have been discovered during a routine traffic stop, could go undetected after a jurisdiction implements a traffic stop restriction policy. The current study explored whether the Seattle traffic stop restriction policy resulted in a decrease in the number of driving under the influence (DUI) and drug crime incidents. The results did not show statistically or substantively significant declines in the number of DUI or drug crime incidents in Seattle after the implementation of the traffic stop restriction policy. Replication is recommended before strong conclusions are drawn.

Drug Enforcement and Policy Center. May 2023, 52pg

By Lindsay Turner, Julie Atella, Virginia Pendleton, Sophak Mom

When Minneapolis police officers killed George Floyd in May 2020, the nearby city of Brooklyn Park began urgent work, including convening listening sessions and tasking city commissions with creating a work plan to improve the Brooklyn Park Police Department.

In December 2020, the City of Brooklyn Park hired Wilder Research to uncover the root causes of violence in Brooklyn Park, understand community perceptions of the Brooklyn Park Police Department, create research-driven recommendations to improve community safety, and develop a tool to assess and improve the Brooklyn Park Police Department’s performance. Wilder Research reviewed existing research on community safety and policing, analyzed Brooklyn Park specific community survey data related to the root causes of violence, and conducted interviews with residents and employees of Brooklyn Park.

High-level findings:

• There are risks of violence when people are not economically secure or connected to their community.

• There are disparities in Brooklyn Park that likely contribute to violence and disorder.

• Improving traditional policing may not improve safety.

• Brooklyn Park Police Department policies and interviewee themes support that procedural justice is a key strength; even so, some BPPD policies and Minnesota laws conflict with best practices.

Recommendations:

• Focus on prevention. To improve safety, the city should address inequities, and ensure that the social conditions where safety thrives are equally distributed across races and places in Brooklyn Park.

• Improve interventions. The city should explore using community-based mental health and substance use responses, school-based safety workers, and other efforts to reimagine police responsibilities. The city should also partner with community stakeholders to expand focused deterrence initiatives, and interventions including treatment and restorative justice.

• Assess BPPD for improvements. We developed a scorecard to measure BPPD performance. We recommend the city, BPPD, and community members impacted by systemic marginalization and police contact partner to assess and recommend changes to BPPD.

St. Paul MN: Wilder Research, 2021. 115p.

By Lindsay Turner

Background

Two legal doctrines in Minnesota – aiding and abetting liability and felony murder – converge to allow anyone who contributes to a felony to be charged with and punished for murder if a death occurs during the course of the felony, even if that person did not cause death, cause any injury to the deceased, nor intend for anyone to die. Aiding and abetting liability means that people are criminally liable for the crime of another if the first person aids, advises, counsels, or conspires to commit that crime (Minnesota Statutes 2021, section 609.05). Under the doctrine of felony murder, anyone who kills another during the course of committing a felony is liable for murder, even if they did not intend for death to result (Minnesota Statutes 2021, section 609.185 and 609.195). Taken together, this means that people in Minnesota can be punished for murder when they did not kill, injure, or even intend harm, so long as they contribute to a felony, and a death results during the course of the felony (called “aiding and abetting felony murder”).

In June 2021, the Minnesota Legislature established the Task Force on Aiding and Abetting Felony Murder (Task Force) (Laws of Minnesota 2021, 1st Spec. Sess. chapter 11, article 2, section 53) in order to understand any benefits and unintended consequences of Minnesota’s aiding and abetting felony murder doctrine. The Task Force organized into three subcommittees. One to collect and analyze data about charges, convictions, and sentences under the doctrine, one to review statutes and case law across the 50 states, and one to invite input from victims’ loved ones and those impacted by the current doctrine. In November 2021, the Task Force hired Wilder Research to review literature, aid in data analysis, and write the report to the legislature. This report summarizes this task force’s work, findings, and recommendations.

Key findings:

Studies on deterrence, incarceration’s lack of impact on re-offense, and adolescent brain development raise concerns with this doctrine.

To contextualize the issue, Wilder Research staff reviewed research on deterrence, incarceration’s impact on reoffense, and adolescent brain development. Decades of studies show that the threat of punishment alone does not deter crime (Rocker, 2021), that incarceration compared to non-custodial sanctions has no impact on reoffense or tends to increase the risk that the person who experiences incarceration will reoffend (Petrich et al., 2021), and that those in their teens through mid-20s are in a unique stage of brain development that make them less capable to assess risk and consequences, and more apt to be motivated by emotion and peer pressure than those older (Dobscha, 2019; Johnson et al., 2009). With this, Task Force members were concerned that Minnesota’s aiding and abetting felony murder doctrine does not deter behavior, does not reduce the risk of re-offense, and may especially harm those in their mid-20s and younger who are held liable under this doctrine.

Young people, people charged by Hennepin County, Black people, and males with little to no prior criminal history make up the largest groups of people charged, convicted, and sentenced under this doctrine.

From 2010 through 2019, there have been 130 people charged with aiding and abetting felony murder across Minnesota, and 84 people convicted of aiding and abetting felony murder as the most severe conviction. The Task Force analyzed patterns in charges, convictions, and sentences, and found that people 25 years and younger, people in Hennepin County, Black people, and people with little to no criminal history are those most frequently impacted by aiding and abetting felony murder liability. The Task Force was concerned with geographic, race, and age disparities that have happened under this doctrine.

Recent national trends are to limit aiding and abetting felony murder liability, not expand it.

The Task Force reviewed felony murder and aiding and abetting liability statutes from the 50 states, and also seminal state appellate or state Supreme Court cases relevant to aiding and abetting felony murder liability in Minnesota and around the country. The Task Force also heard presentations about whether other common law countries apply felony murder liability. The United States is the only common law country that has not yet abolished felony murder liability generally, and past decades have seen U.S. state legislatures and review courts abolish and otherwise limit aiding and abetting felony murder liability.

Victims and those convicted under the doctrine support limiting aiding and abetting felony murder liability, with avenues for retroactive relief.

The Task Force invited connection with victims’ families through contacting 37 victim/survivor organizations, and heard from victims’ families through the Minnesota Alliance on Crime (MAC). MAC is a statewide coalition of victim/survivor advocate organizations; 75% of their membership are victim-witness programs in county attorney offices, and the rest are community-based organizations. The Task Force also heard from 10 people convicted under this doctrine, and one person who rejected a deal to plead guilty to aiding and abetting felony murder. MAC expressed support for retroactive reform such that aiders and abettors of an underlying felony are not punished for the homicidal acts of another, and said that such retroactive reforms would be supported by the vast majority of its members. Impacted individuals expressed accountability for their role in the underlying felony and shared many difficulties stemming from being held criminally liable for the homicidal acts of another. Those impacted individuals who spoke on the subject strongly supported retroactive reforms to limit aiding and abetting felony murder liability.

The adverse consequences of Minnesota’s aiding and abetting felony murder doctrine outweigh its benefits.

After analyzing the above key findings, the Task Force agreed that the adverse consequences of the current aiding and abetting felony murder doctrine outweigh its benefits.

St. Paul, MN: Wilder Foundation, 2022. 222p.

By Anna Granias, Ryan Evans, Daniel Lee, Nicole MartinRogers, Emma Connell, With expert consultant Jose Vega

On May 25, 2020, a Black Minneapolis resident, George Floyd, was murdered by a Minneapolis police officer, Derek Chauvin. The officer kneeled on Mr. Floyd’s neck for over nine minutes, while two other Minneapolis police officers helped pin him down for a portion of that time. Another police officer prevented several bystanders from intervening as they watched Mr. Floyd die.

Vigils and peaceful protesting began immediately after the murder, at the scene (38th Street and Chicago Avenue) and in other locations, and continued through June 7, 2020. Civil unrest, including violence and destructive behavior, started within 24 hours at the scene and in other parts of Minneapolis and Saint Paul, in the state of Minnesota, around the U.S., and internationally. Looting and arson were widespread, and local police and emergency responders could not respond to many calls for help— either because they couldn't safely access the area or were too overwhelmed. Minnesota State Law Enforcement Agencies, including the Minnesota State Patrol, Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Law Enforcement Division, and other agencies, along with the Minnesota National Guard were called upon by the governor to provide services outside of their specific jurisdiction and training. Although these state-level entities were better equipped to respond to this particular crisis than local jurisdictions due to their training, equipment, and number of officers, they did not have experience responding to a large-scale civil disturbance and extended period of civil unrest such as what occurred in Minneapolis after Mr. Floyd’s murder.

External review commissioned

In February 2021, the Minnesota Department of Public Safety (DPS) contracted with Wilder Research to conduct an external review of the state’s response to civil unrest that occurred May 26-June 7, 2020, following the murder of George Floyd. DPS requested that the review:

• Objectively evaluate what the state did well and did not do well.

• Identify actions and options that may have produced different, or possibly better, outcomes.

• Provide recommendations to the Commissioner of Public Safety to assist state and local governmental units, including cities and counties, in responding effectively to potential periods of regional or statewide civil unrest in the future.

St. Paul: Wilder Foundation, 2022. 129p.