Editors: John K. Roman, Philip Cook

One of the great policy successes of the last decade is the increasing role of rigorous, objective, and transparent data and research in policymaking. Developing and implementing a data-driven government in which valid and reliable evidence informs solutions to our nation’s most pressing health and safety challenges is more critical than ever as those challenges are ever more complex. Nowhere is that data foundation more needed than in the realm of firearms violence. Trustworthy data is a much-needed bridge to effective policymaking that can reduce the number of firearm accidents, suicides, homicides, and assaults. In an age of intense partisanship, shared facts are the cornerstone for building a shared purpose. The shared purpose of modernizing firearms data infrastructure is to improve public safety by reducing gun violence. In the fall of 2020, Arnold Ventures, a philanthropy dedicated to maximizing opportunity and minimizing injustice, and NORC at University of Chicago, an objective nonpartisan research institution, released the Blueprint for a US Firearms Infrastructure (Roman, 2020)1 . The Blueprint is the consensus report of an expert panel of distinguished academics, trailblazing practitioners, and government leaders. It describes 17 critical reforms required to modernize how data about firearms violence of all types (intentional, accidental, and self-inflicted) are collected, integrated and disseminated. This project, which is also supported by Arnold Ventures, takes the conceptual priorities described in the Blueprint and proposes specific new steps for implementation. The first step in building a better firearms data infrastructure is to acknowledge where we currently stand. In The State of Firearm Data in 2019 (Roman, 2019)2 , the expert panel found that while there are a substantial number of data sources that collect data on firearms violence, existing datasets and data collections are limited, particularly around intentional injuries. There is some surveillance data, but health data on firearms injuries are kept separately from data on crimes, and there are few straightforward ways to link those data. Data that provide context for a shooting—where the event took place, and what the relationship was between victim and shooter—are not available alongside data on the nature of injuries. Valuable data collections have been discontinued, data are restricted by policy, important data are not collected, data are often difficult to access, and contemporary data are often not released in a timely fashion or not available outside of specialized settings. As a result, researchers face vast gaps in knowledge and are unable to leverage existing data to build the evidence base necessary to adequately answer key policy questions and inform firearms policymaking.

By Victor Weedn , Alon Steinberg , Pete Speth 

We postulate that most atraumatic deaths during police restraint of subjects in the prone position are due to prone restraint cardiac arrest (PRCA), rather than from restraint asphyxia or a stress‐induced cardiac condition, such as excited delirium. The prone position restricts ventilation and diminishes pulmonary perfusion. In the setting of a police encounter, metabolic demand will be high from anxiety, stress, excitement, physical struggle, and/or stimulant drugs, leading to metabolic acidosis and requiring significant hyperventilation. Although oxygen levels may be maintained, prolonged restraint in the prone position may result in an inability to adequately blow off CO2, causing blood pCO2 levels to rise rapidly. The uncompensated metabolic acidosis (low pH) will eventually result in loss of myocyte contractility. The initial electrocardiogram rhythm will generally be either pulseless electrical activity (PEA) or asystole, indicating a noncardiac etiology, more consistent with PRCA and inconsistent with a primary role of any underlying cardiac pathology or stress‐induced cardiac etiology. We point to two animal models: in one model rats unable to breathe deeply due to an external restraint die when their metabolic demand is increased, and in the other model, pressure on the chest of rats results in decreased venous return and cardiac arrest rather than death from asphyxia. We present two cases of subjects restrained in the prone position who went into cardiac arrest and had low pHs and initial PEA cardiac rhythms. Our cases demonstrate the danger of prone restraint and serve as examples of PRCA.

By ALISSA SKOG AND JOHANNA LACOE 

Research series examining second look policies in California The five policy briefs and overview report in this series describe the characteristics and recidivism rates of individuals affected by second look policies in California. Committee on Revision of the Penal Code Before 2019, people who participated in certain felonies that resulted in a death could be convicted of murder, even if the person had neither committed the killing nor intended for it to occur. These convictions were based under the felony murder rule or the “natural and probable consequences” doctrine, which both allowed for broad liability. To address concerns about fairness and excessive punishment, Senate Bill 1437 (2018) narrowed or eliminated the application of these doctrines and allowed individuals convicted under them to petition for resentencing. In recognition that other serious convictions were similarly affected, Senate Bill 775 (2021) expanded eligibility to include those convicted of manslaughter or attempted murder under these legal theories. This brief examines who was resentenced under felony murder reform, the offenses for which they were originally convicted, and their recidivism rates following release. Key findings • Nearly 1,200 people were resentenced after these changes to the felony murder rule. As of December 2024, 1,172 people initially convicted under the felony murder rule have had those charges vacated, and were resentenced based on the remaining charges in their cases. Of those resentenced, 78% have since been released from prison. • Most people convicted of felony murder were young at the time of the offense, and for many, it was their first admission to prison. The median age at the time of the offense was just over 21, and for 75% of those resentenced, that conviction was their only prison sentence. • Women made up a larger share of those resentenced under felony murder reform (9%) than the share of all people released from prison in fiscal year 2018–19 (7%). • Recidivism rates for those resentenced under felony murder reform (9%) than the share of all people released from prison in fiscal year 2018–19 (7%). • Recidivism rates for those resentenced under felony murder reform were notably low. New conviction rates were consistently lower than the total releases (3% within one year, 7% within two years, and 10% within three years, compared to 21%, 33%, and 42%). Of those resentenced and released, most new convictions were misdemeanors. • Very few people were convicted of a new serious or violent felony after resentencing under felony murder reform. Fewer than five people were convicted within one- and two- years, and only 2% (n=5) were convicted within three years. However, we can only assess full three-year outcomes for 25% of people who have been released (n=274).