By Mary Allen and Cristine Rotenberg

In December, 2014, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA) changed the laws related to the sex trade, shifting the focus of criminalization from those who sell their own sexual services onto those who purchase sexual services and those who benefit financially from others’ sexual services. This article examines changes in sex-trade-related crime reported by police before and after the change in legislation.Between 2010 and 2019, there was a 55% decline in sex-trade-related crime driven by a 95% decline in incidents of stopping or impeding traffic, or communicating for the purpose of offering, providing or obtaining sexual services. Most of this decline occurred prior to the adoption of the PCEPA in 2014.Fewer women were accused or charged in incidents of stopping or communicating offences after the introduction of the PCEPA. The number of men accused in incidents relating to stopping or communicating offences also dropped considerably between 2010 and 2014. Charging rates also declined for men accused in this type of incident, but not to the same extent.With the drop in charges for stopping or communicating offences, there was a large decline in the number of court cases involving these offences. Fewer women were tried in court for stopping or communicating offences in the five-year period after the new legislation than the five-year period preceding the change (-97%). In addition, far fewer women were found guilty, and, of those, none were sentenced to custody.The PCEPA placed a new focus on activities related to the purchasing of sexual services. Between 2015 and 2017, incidents of the new offence of obtaining sexual services from an adult increased sharply before declining for two consecutive years. Individuals accused in these incidents were mostly men.After the drop in the number of men accused in incidents of stopping or communicating offences prior to the PCEPA, the number of men accused increased once the new legislation was in place (obtaining sexual services from an adult). There was also an increase in men accused in incidents of obtaining sexual services from a minor. Most of the men accused of purchasing sexual services were charged. In the courts, over four in five men tried for obtaining services from a minor were found guilty, and this was the case for about one in seven cases of obtaining sexual services from an adult.The number of police-reported incidents related to profiting from the sexual services of others increased after the change in legislation, as procuring and receiving material benefit incidents reached a high point in 2019, almost double what was reported in 2010.Both before and after the change in legislation, men were more often accused in incidents related to procuring or receiving material benefit than women, even more so after the PCEPA (67% of accused were men prior to the PCEPA and 82% after). This shift was the result of the drop in women accused in these incidents, coupled with a substantial increase in the number of men accused. In the courts, among cases involving a charge related to profiting from sexual services, men were more likely than women to be convicted in the five-year period before and after the PCEPA. Most of those convicted in these cases were sentenced to custody. Though an infrequent offence in terms of the number of cases processed, advertising sexual services offences also saw high conviction rates.After the PCEPA, fewer sex-trade-related offences occurred on the street or in an open area and proportionally more took place in a home or a commercial dwelling unit such as a hotel. This was driven by a considerable decline in offences that are public by definition (i.e., stopping or impeding traffic or communicating offences). The increase in incidents occurring in a home or a commercial dwelling unit is mostly explained by the large increase in incidents of procuring or receiving material benefit as well as the creation of the new offence related to obtaining sexual services from an adult.

Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2021. 29p.

By Alan Martin

Illegal artisanal mining in South Africa is among the most lucrative and violent on the African continent, with lost production exceeding R14 billion (about USD$1 billion) a year. Current enforcement and policy responses, which criminalise illegal miners, are misguided, counterproductive and ignore the poverty and socio-economic drivers behind the phenomenon. A more holistic, nuanced and multi-faceted approach is required from government and industry to address the lack of formalisation and the marginalisation of the illegal mining sector. Key points ∙ Illegal mining in South Africa should be considered to be artisanal mining within large-scale mines, not separate from them. ∙ While Zama Zamas are members of, or associated with, criminal syndicates, they are not homogenous groupings. ∙ The violence and insecurity caused by the criminality associated with illegal mining makes some mining areas in South Africa more chaotic and conflict-ridden than those elsewhere in Africa. ∙ Rough estimates of Zama Zama outputs suggest that lost gold production may exceed R14 billion a year,2 making South Africa one of the biggest sources of illicit gold in Africa. ∙ The true cost of illegal mining activity includes damage to public and private infrastructure caused by vandalism or poor mining practices, as well as the costs of security upgrades undertaken by mining companies to address illegal breaches  

ENACT Africa, 2019. 12p.

By Cirenia Chávez, Victor Cebotari, María José Benítez, Dominic Richardson, Chii Fen Hiu and Juliana Zapata

The prevalence of school-related violence and bullying is a global issue that impacts educational outcomes negatively. Furthermore, bullying can have emotional and physical effects on the children experiencing it, both in the short- and long term. Although the evidence regarding bullying from low- and middle-income countries is less extensive in comparison to evidence on the effects of bullying from high-income countries, some findings from the Latin American and Caribbean regions show similar results connecting lower reading scores with a high prevalence of bullying victimization. This working paper uses data from UNESCO’s Third Regional Comparative and Explanatory Study to determine the correlation between bullying and learning outcomes in 15 countries of the LAC region. It also looks at ways to mitigate the impacts of violence.

Innocenti Working Paper WP-2021-02 New York: UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund, 202. 68p.

By María Victoria Llorente & Jeremy McDermott,  Raúl Benítez Manaut,  Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón,  John Bailey 

Transnational criminal organizations trafficking drugs from Mexico to the United States have existed since the Prohibition era in the United States. But the violence associated with this trafficking—and related movements of other illicit goods as well as undocumented migrants—increased exponentially beginning in the mid-2000s, threatening Mexico’s national security. During the six-year administration of President Felipe Calderón (2006-12) estimates of those killed in drug-related violence reached 70,000, with an additional 20,000 “disappeared.” The upsurge in violence in many areas of the country reflected a combination of fighting between rival drug trafficking organizations seeking territorial control of criminal markets and dominance of lucrative trafficking corridors, as well as clashes between the traffickers and government security forces. By 2010, some Mexican cities registered homicide rates that were among the highest in the world and the public began to seriously doubt the government’s strategy and its ability to guarantee public safety. The scope of the violence and its frequently gruesome and shocking character, and the government’s seeming inability to bring it under control, brought forth memories of an earlier period in Latin America, when Colombia was besieged by the violence of the Medellín and Cali drug trafficking cartels. The Colombian crisis of the 1980s and ’90s involved multiple ways the state was losing ground to guerrilla and paramilitary groups in addition to drug traffickers. But like Mexico, the cost in human lives and government legitimacy was huge Over the course of more than a decade, Colombia’s security situation has improved dramatically. With significant international cooperation, the guerrillas have been weakened militarily and coca cultivation and cocaine production have been reduced. Most analysts agree that at least some of the security crisis in Mexico (as well as Central America) is due to ways that security advances and improvements in state capacity in Colombia forced traffickers to search for new smuggling routes and ways to market their illicit product. This is true even though, as several chapters in this publication indicate, organized criminal groups remain an important source of instability in Colombia, having mutated and fragmented in response to government pressure. Former paramilitary fighters, who demobilized in the early 2000s as a result of peace talks with the government, are important actors in the new manifestations of organized crime. Colombia is now a major player in South-South security cooperation, offering training to over 2,500 Mexican military and police officials between 2010 and 2012, as well as to over 5,000 members of the security forces from Central America and the Caribbean and over 2,000 from South America during the same time period.1 A former director of the Colombian National Police, General Óscar Naranjo, served as an adviser to the administration of Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto. The United States funds some of Colombia’s programs abroad and U.S. officials have expressed satisfaction and pride in Colombia’s success. In a May 2013 visit to Colombia, Vice President Biden paid “personal tribute” to President Santos and “the people of Colombia for the remarkable, remarkable progress you’ve made…” in dealing with the country’s security concerns. Biden went on to mention Colombia’s training of “thousands of law enforcement officers and security officers from over 40 countries since 2009.”  But precisely what aspects of Colombia’s strategy and tactics for fighting organized crime in its own territory offer useful lessons for Mexico? What might Colombia’s steps and missteps offer by way of example or counter example? What is unique about each case such that comparisons are misleading? What do current security challenges in Colombia suggest about the threat posed by organized crime more generally? To reflect on these questions, the Latin American Program commissioned a series of papers from international experts with a wealth of experience on issues of security, violence, and transnational criminal organizations. This publication includes two chapters analyzing the usefulness of comparing Colombia and Mexico’s experiences in combatting organized crime, as well as the potential for using Colombia’s successes as lessons for Mexico’s security strategy. Maria Victoria Llorente of Fundación Ideas para la Paz and Jeremy McDermott of Insight Crime argue that Colombia does not represent a ready template for Mexico’s fight against violence and organized crime, although its long experience may provide insight into Mexico’s future. The second paper, by Raúl Benítez Manaut, a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), contends that Colombia does offer positive lessons about how reform of the defense sector and professionalization of the police can yield measurable results for Mexico. Commentaries by Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, former Minister of Defense of Colombia, and John Bailey of Georgetown University, deepen and take issue with the analyses provided by Llorente and McDermott and Benítez. .     

,Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014. 128p. Scholars

By  Chelsea Estancona and Luca Tiscornia

Most of what we know about organized criminal violence comes from research about illicit narcotics markets. Yet, these groups also fight to capture markets for licit commodities, as evidenced by Sicilian lemons and South African abalone. When do criminal groups violently expand into markets for licit goods? We argue that rapid increases in the share of a good’s export value create opportunities for immediate profit and future market manipulation. This provokes violence as groups expand their territorial holdings and economic portfolios. We test our argument cross-nationally using the Atlas of Economic Complexity, V-Dem, and UNODC. Increases in a country’s share of global export value for agricultural goods are associated with more homicides– but only where criminal groups are present. We then provide subnational evidence of our mechanism using data on avocado exports from Mexico and address reverse causality with Google Trends data about the popularity of avocado toast searches. 

Present at the UNU Wider Development Conference, October 2022. 55p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison

This article explores the construction – or reconstruction – of brokerage channels by violent actors in Mexico. It focuses on the construction of the Autodefensas de Michoacán (Self Defense Groups of Michoacán) and studies the process that put illegal armed leaders in active dialogue with the Mexican federal government, but also how they became brokers capable of controlling access to strategic political resources, economic markets, and the connections that tie local citizens and the central state. Through the concept of political inter-mediation, I investigate how coercion, as a skill and resource, has become central to governance in Mexico; and how this leads to consolidating intermediaries that participate in reproducing local, violent political order. This article shall contribute to the understanding of brokerage in contexts of violence, and shed new light on the political logic fueling the dynamics of violence in Mexico’s war on drugs. Keywords: drug cartels, brokerage, Mexico, war on drugs, state, violence.   

European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, No. 112 (July-December 2021), pp. 137-158  

By María Calderón 

When it comes to an understanding of political violence in Mexico, there is a risk of solely equating it with criminal groups' activities or exclusively attributing it to such groups. However, the political violence phenomenon in Mexico is complex and diverse, with a particular nexus to locally based illicit economies, for which an all-containing approach is insufficient. About half of the political violence that occurred in Mexico during the 2018 elections was directly attributed to organized crime. During such time, political figures were killed at a rate of one per week. These numbers support the growing concern about criminal groups' involvement in Mexican politics. Criminal groups have used political violence in several ways: directly manipulating and influencing elections, protecting incumbent candidates with whom they have struck an agreement, killing candidates who are perceived as a threat to their interests, intimidating poll workers, and attacking and stealing voting booths, among others. The decrease in the profitability of trafficking heroin and cannabis, the legalization of marijuana in many US states, and increased fentanyl usage have forced cartels to recalibrate strategies and markets. Nowadays, criminal groups have partially shifted towards locally based illicit economies, such as oil theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other illegal activities that require control of local territories. All these variables come into play when understanding that criminalized electoral politics is a predominantly local phenomenon in Mexico. Political violence by criminal groups in Mexico is motivated by multiple factors, including economic interests, political objectives, and vendettas. Criminal organizations often avoid open confrontation when attacking politicians or political candidates, opting for other less visible techniques to minimize the impacts on police and law enforcement agencies, such as corruption. Installing or co-opting candidates at the municipal level has afforded criminal groups direct influence over the actions of local and state police. Access to intelligence on pending arrests or other operations has also proven beneficial for criminal organizations. Political influence has allowed criminal groups to employ local security forces as appendages of their organizations to detain or kill targets and to protect the transportation of illicit goods. Moreover, criminal organizations have tapped into state finances by coopting government employees.

Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2024  6p.   

By Garan Ho/mqvist 

Crime is an increasingly worrying social phenomenon in the developing world in general and in Latin America in particular. As shown in Figure 1~, the crime rate (measured by homicide lOO 000, as reported to the UN crime surveys by national police authorities) has virtually exploded since the mid-1980s in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe. Latin America stands out as an exceptional case. Annually in Latin America, approximately 140,000 people are murdered (Londono & Guerrero 1999:27). Using other sources does not change this picture. Figure 2 confirms the exceptional position of Latin America, where the source in mortality statistics is collected from national health authorities instead of the police. Indicators of crime other than homicide are less reliable for international comparison, but estimates point in the direction of Latin America being way above the average for any other region of the world (Bourguignon 1999, Table 1). It has been estimated that 28 million Latin American families are victims of theft or robbery every year (Londono & Guerrero 1999:3). Crime and violence are now viewed as a development issue of importance, which was probably not the case two decades ago. Development agencies such as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have quite recently initiated ambitious research projects on crime and violence. Projects directed to the judicial system or police authorities have increased their share in the project portfolio of multilateral as well as bilateral development cooperation agencies. More importantly, crime is becoming a major concern in the daily lives of an increasing number of citizens in the developing world, manifesting itself in national political agendas, in higher crime-related expenditures, and, not the least, in human suffering. There are several reasons to regard crime as a social phenomenon with strong and complex ties to the development process in general. In Latin America, crime is a potential threat to what most people would regard as encouraging development trends, especially after ''the lost decade" of the 1980s, in terms of democratization and resumed growth. The following examples may illustrate how continuous progress in these areas is being made more difficult by the increasing crime levels: 

 Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Vol. XXX: 2 2000,pp. 23-53

By Jane Shim, and Alison Leal Parker

  Drug laws are being reformed across the United States to move away from the harsh punitive approaches of the war on drugs, but federal immigration law continues to treat drug offenses, including decades-old offenses, as grounds for deportation of immigrants. Those harmed, authorized and unauthorized immigrants alike, often have deep connections to the country, where they have formed families, attained education, and built their lives. “Disrupt and Vilify” analyzes new federal government data from 2002 to 2020, finding the US has deported 500,000 people whose most serious offense was drug-related. Of these, 240,000 were deported between 2013 and 2020, amounting to about one of every five deportations of immigrants with a criminal conviction for that period. A conviction for even minor drug offenses—for example, drug possession (including marijuana)—can carry devastating immigration consequences that far outstrip the criminal sentence imposed. Some would not be criminal offenses if committed today or involve conduct that is now legal under state law. There are significant racial disparities in the imposition of immigration penalties. One out of five noncitizens facing deportation on criminal grounds is Black. Human Rights Watch and the Drug Policy Alliance call on the US Congress to reform federal law to ensure that immigrants with criminal convictions, including drug offenses, are not subject to “one-size-fits-all” deportations. Instead, immigration judges should have the discretion to make individualized decisions. Congress should impose a statute of limitations on deportations for past offenses. Drug policy reforms should prioritize evidence-based policies rooted in public health and human rights to address the root causes of the overdose crisis and problematic drug use, and not continue the vilification of immigrants.  

 New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 97p.

By Mohamed Osman, and Laetitia Bader  

  Since conflict broke out in Sudan’s capital Khartoum in April 2023, between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), both sides, particularly the RSF, have committed widespread sexual violence against women and girls, which are war crimes. Both warring parties, in violation of international humanitarian law, have attacked local responders, and obstructed aid, doubly victimizing survivors. Based on 42 interviews conducted between September 2023 and February 2024 with service providers to survivors of sexual violence, including healthcare workers, within and outside of the local responders, as well as aid workers, “Khartoum is not Safe for Women!” documents conflict-related sexual violence in Khartoum and its sister cities of Bahri and Omdurman, since April 2023. Service providers described how the warring parties have subjected women and girls, aged 9 through 60 to rape, gang rape, as well as forced and child marriages. Men and boys have also been victims of sexual violence. Despite the serious harm to the health of survivors described in the report, it finds that the actions of both warring parties have prevented survivors from accessing critical and comprehensive emergency health care. SAF has restricted humanitarian supplies imposing a de facto blockade on drugs entering RSF-controlled areas of Khartoum since October 2023, in violation of international humanitarian law. The RSF has pillaged medical supplies and occupied medical facilities. Both warring parties have intimidated and arbitrarily arrested doctors, nurses, and volunteers because of their work. The United Nations and African Union should deploy a civilian protection mission to Sudan tasked with monitoring human rights abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence and willful aid obstruction, and ensure that those responsible for rape and attacks on healthcare and local responders are held to account.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 100p.

By Patricia Gossman  

The 26-page report, “Double Betrayal: Abuses against Afghan Policewomen Past and Present,” documents threats from Taliban authorities since August 2021 that have forced many former policewomen to go into hiding out of fear of being identified. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Taliban authorities have threatened Afghan women who had served in the police under the previous government. As Taliban forces carried out hundreds of revenge killings of those who had served in the former government’s security forces, many former policewomen went into hiding out of fear of being identified. Several have been killed, either by relatives who opposed their work as “shameful” or under unclear circumstances. The Taliban have not conducted credible investigations into these murders. While employed by the former government, many policewomen experienced sexual harassment and assault by their male supervisors. They described abuses including rape as well as demands from superiors for sex in exchange for promotion or avoiding dismissal. The widespread nature of these abuses was well-known since at least 2013, including among countries supporting the ngovernment, but police officers responsible for abuse were not held accountable. Women reported mental health effects from this abuse and their fear of the Taliban, but have been unable to find or afford psychosocial support. Human Rights Watch calls on the Taliban to cease all threats and abuse of policewomen and others who worked for the former government. The US and other countries that supported programs to train and hire women in the police should ensure that those seeking protection are deemed eligible on the same level as other vulnerable categories. The US, UK, Canada, and the European Union and its member states should increase Afghan refugee resettlement places, prioritizing women at risk.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 34p.

By Dorothy Kronick 

Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after the counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years before this policy change, lethal violence trends were similar; afterward, outcomes diverged: violence increased more along the trafficking route than elsewhere. Together with qualitative accounts, these findings illuminate the conditions under which profits fuel violence in illegal markets. 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1499-1523 ª The Author(s) 2020 

By Juan Camilo Castillo and Dorothy Kronick

Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers’ profits and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These results help explain empirical patterns of violence in the drug war, which is less studied than interstate or civil war but often as deadly 

American Political Science Review (2020) 114, 3, 874–887 

By Max Smeets

This report is based on chapter one of Max Smeets’ book titled “Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security,” forthcoming with Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishers. Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government's crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies. This report discusses significant milestones in the development of ransomware, and what turned them into a significant threat to human and national security. It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups. 

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2024. 18p.

By Steven Dudley, María Fernanda Ramírez, Anastasia Austin and Gavin Voss

This report aims to better understand the criminal dynamics in Durán. Located in the southwest coastal province of Guayas, Durán is a municipality, or cantón, as they are known in Ecuador, of over 300,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom live in the city bearing the same name.1 It has long been known as a commercial hub and small industrial center. But it is also home to a chaotic mix of shrimp farms, poorly-planned residential developments and favela-like land invasions, and unzoned areas of factories and warehouses that produce and store goods, many of which leave Guayaquil’s various maritime ports en route to all corners of the world. More recently, Durán has become a violent epicenter of criminal activity. Criminal groups use the municipality as a staging area for cocaine exiting on cargo ships through Guayaquil’s ports, while also peddling drugs on a local level. Systemic corruption, underdevelopment, and extreme poverty have facilitated this rise in criminality. More than half of Durán’s residents do not have running water or plumbing. The municipality is bereft of schools and a public university. And recent efforts to revive Durán have waned amid local and national neglect and a series of economic crises. To many residents, Durán is but a ciudad dormitorio (sleeping quarters): They work, shop, and relax in neighboring Samborondón and Guayaquil, returning to Durán to spend the night. Part of what keeps them away these days is insecurity: Durán’s homicide rate reached 147 per 100,000 in 2023 — its highest recorded rate — as crime has metastasized. Once a bustling railroad depot and industrial hub, Durán is now the poster child for the country’s rapid decline into the criminal abyss. Major Findings • Many social, economic, and political factors have converged to make Durán a violent criminal hub. Rapid, uncontained population growth, coupled with widespread corruption and malfeasance, has left a good portion of the municipality bereft of basic services such as potable water and a working sewage system. Unplanned, informal, and criminal urban development has scarred the area and jaded its residents, who have few civil society and religious organizations upon which they can channel their grievances and even fewer political options. And, like so many other parts of the country, the municipality lacks security, judicial, and regulatory forces that can effectively prosecute high-impact criminal activities. • Durán has two primary criminal organizations: the Chone Killers and the Latin Kings. These two engage in an increasingly violent battle for the municipality’s territory and its criminal economies, which include local and international drug trafficking activities. Their ties to transnational criminal networks, however, appear to be sporadic and opportunistic, rather than systemic and long-lasting. Perhaps more alarming is their penetration of the municipal government, where at least one of these groups secured public works contracts, as well as control of key government institutions that preside over everything from land tenure issues to traffic tickets. • Land trafficking is at the core of Durán’s criminal ecosystem. The illegal seizure and development of urban and rural land, often with the direct participation of corrupt officials, offers a deep well of potential profit, ranging from the sale of property to the administration of various public services. Illegal settlements also serve as staging areas for various criminal activities, including transnational drug trafficking, retail drug sales, as well as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. Legalizing illegal settlements brings with it lucrative government contracts and the opportunity for corrupt officials to profit from kickbacks and criminal actors to launder their dirty money. It also leads to violence, including against public officials. • Ecuador’s growing role in transnational drug trafficking has significantly impacted Durán’s criminal, political, and economic landscape. By serving larger national drug trafficking networks, local gangs have gained access to substantial financial resources. Drawing from this new revenue stream, gang leaders have acquired legitimate businesses such as laundromats, hair salons, and construction companies. This interplay of criminal, economic, and political capital has also changed the political landscape, offering local gangs an entry point into the municipal government via campaign contributions, as evidenced by their systematic penetration into key government posts and public works contracts. • Durán’s gangs have a complex and varied relationship with the local communities where they operate. While some gangs exploit residents, the most sophisticated gang leaders offer them protection and other social and economic services, filling the void left by absent, corrupt, or inept state institutions, and providing a semblance of security and opportunity. This calculated approach engenders support that allows them to operate in relative safety, as well as use the community infrastructure and draw employees from a vast pool of recruits. • Homicide trends in Durán largely follow patterns seen in Ecuador over the last several years, including the type of victim, weapons employed, and the place where the murders occur. And, in some ways, Durán is a reflection of the extreme swings in violence in cities along the country’s coast. But Durán’s record 2023 homicide spike was more extreme, in part due to local events, like the murders of key criminal power brokers and the rise of a wayward, volatile new leader. These factors point to gang violence as the primary driver of homicides in the municipality   

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 74p.

By Marie Lynam, David Keatley, Garth Maker, John Coumbaros

Little is known about the prevalence of incapacitating substances present in drug-facilitated sexual assaults (DFSA). Presented here is a literature review conducted to provide background information, such as symptoms, exacerbations, and drug interactions, on drugs typically implicated in DFSA, namely gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD), ketamine, diazepam, oxycodone, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Literature found through Scopus and Pubmed was reviewed to determine the current prevalence of these substances in DFSA with a focus on Australian data. The global literature revealed that there is a wide variety of substances used in DFSA and the prevalence varies by country. For example, it was found that in Northern Ireland, opioids were most prevalent whereas in France, benzodiazepines were most prevalent. In Australia, the review revealed a lack of contemporary data with the most recent report in Victoria using data collected during 2011–2013. The literature also revealed there can be an important difference between self-reported substance use and substances discovered via toxicological analysis. This can be due to the challenges of biological detection, reliability of self-reporting, and the possibility of a substance being introduced to a person’s food or drink without their knowledge. This review highlights the need for the collection and analysis of current data about DFSA reports and the drugs detected, and due to the constantly evolving picture of both licit and illicit drug use, an assessment of the role of prescription medications in DFSA due to drug-drug interactions as well as potential to incapacitate is warranted.  

Forensic Science International: Synergy 9 (2024) 100545  

By Jorge Santos-Hermoso, José Luis González-Álvarez, Miguel Ángel Alcázar-Córcoles, Enrique José Carbonell-Vayá 

This investigation studied the interaction between seven risk factors included in the police risk assessment of the VioGén System and found that these factors formed groups based on the dimensions of violence and psychopathology. The 171 femicides analyzed were categorized into four groups: normalized (23.4%), violent (25.7%), pathological (18.7%), and pathological/violent (32.2%). These groups exhibited significant differences concerning their psychosocial profile and relationship dynamics. One of the main findings is the identification of the pathological type that had not been detected in previous typologies, thus highlighting the importance of the psychological factor when classifying the perpetrators of femicide. These results have important practical implications, as the classification of the aggressor could be a preliminary step taken before the risk assessment, which would make it possible to individualize predictions and improve the protection of the victims as well as the therapies and intervention programs. 

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2024) 30:521–543 

By The Mixed Migration Centre

Drawing on more than 1,000 surveys with refugees and migrants, this infographic examines their perceptions of dangerous locations, direct experiences of abuse and harsh conditions and their interactions with and perceptions of smugglers. Additionally, it explores the sources of information that refugees and migrants relied on before and during their journey, as well as their access to assistance.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 6p.

Edited by Pablo Policzer

Making Sense of Haiti's State Fragility and Violence : Combining Structure and Contingency? / Andreas E. Feldmann -- Operation Condor as an International System of State Violence and Terror : A Historical-Structural Analysis / J. Patrice McSherry -- Written in Black and Red : Murder as a Communicative Act in Mexico / Pablo Piccato -- Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner --Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner -- The Police Ombudsman in Brazil as a Potential Mechanism to Reduce Violence / Anthony W. Pereira -- Democracy, Threat, and Repression : Kidnapping and Repressive Dynamics during the Colombian Conflict / Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín -- To End the War in Colombia : Conversatorios among Security Forces, Ex-Guerrillas, and Political Elites, and Ceasefire Seminars-Workshops for the Technical Sub-Commission / Jennifer Schirmer.

Calgary, Alberta, Canada : University of Calgary Press, [2019]

By Russell G Smith and Amelia Hickman

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. This is the third in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of organised crime in 2016–17. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. While the current estimates were undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic and may reflect changes in criminality resulting from the pandemic, the full economic impact of serious and organised criminal offending committed during the pandemic will not be known for some time. It is clear, however, that the impact of serious and organised crime on the Australian economy is substantial.  

Statistical Report No. 38 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2022 73p.