by Christopher Hernandez-Roy and Rubi Bledsoe

Drug trafficking, especially cocaine trafficking, from source countries in South America to Europe has produced alarming and lasting effects on both sides of the Atlantic. While various trafficking routes to Europe exist, transshipment through the Caribbean, including through the European territories in the region, is of growing concern. In Europe, the expanding cocaine market has brought a rise in homicides, kidnappings, and intimidation. In the city of Antwerp, for example, there were around 200 drug-related violent incidents in the past five years as competing gangs fought over control of territory. In the Caribbean, drug trafficking by organized crime has been associated with record homicide levels, corruption, democratic backsliding, and money laundering, among other pernicious effects. It has also prompted wars between gangs over the control of criminal economies, expanded illegal firearms trafficking, and exacerbated human trafficking both within the region and beyond. Shedding light on the complexity of the issue—while providing policy recommendations for increased cooperation between the United States, Europe, and Caribbean countries—is necessary as both continents seek regional and extra-regional security.

Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),, 2023. 11p

By Tibor Kiss & Ákos Szigeti

The process of illicit drug trafficking on darknet markets is highly affected by various trust factors. Although the factors potentially affecting customers’ risk perception can be identified based on previous research, cyber criminology has not produced empirical research ranking the importance of the specific factors. This study was designed to fill this gap by developing a tool that measures the importance of the various trust factors. To test out the measurement tool, a large-scale survey with projective situational questions was conducted among university students in Hungary. The sample (n = 5481) was compiled to include potential darknet market customers, respondents with above-average computer skills needed to access the darknet, and taking into account that university students are a group of society particularly exposed to drug consumption. The end product of this research is a trust matrix ranking the factors affecting illicit drug purchases on darknet markets. Among the factors, the survey’s target group ranked reliable and undamaged delivery of goods and the reliability of vendors as the most important. The measurement tool developed in this research will facilitate further criminological research on vendor reputation. Its findings also point to the need for further research on delivery providers and predict that influencing the delivery-related risk perception of potential customers could effectively reduce demand.

May 2023 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research

By Emilia Ziosi

Honduras has been Central America’s focal point for drug trafficking towards the United States for years as the region’s main transit country. Recent court cases held in the United States have revealed the symbiotic relationship between state actors, business elites and drug trafficking organisations in contemporary Honduras, uncovering the blurred boundaries between the licit and illicit, the upper and underworld in the country. In this article, a drug-trafficking family – ‘Los Cachiros’ transportista (transport) group – is analysed as a case study with the aim of exploring state actors’ involvement in cocaine trafficking.

Drawing on publicly available official judicial documents, this article explores the interpenetrations between formal and informal institutions in the country, arguing that state actors’ involvement in the drug trade in Honduras goes far beyond protection, and has evolved into a powerful network of public, private and criminal actors that has been able to capture the state’s basic sovereign functions with the aim of protecting and promoting their own private interests. In doing so, this article takes forward the state-crime nexus literature. Building on Hall’s (2018) networked approach in the study of illicit economies, this article proposes a conceptual framework to re-theorise the state-crime nexus as a transnationally networked set of relations, which considers the role of external states as actors of power within a country’s state-crime nexus. Looking at the unique relationship between Honduras and the United States, I argue that the concept is useful to understand the role of the United States as a transnational actor of power within the Honduran state-crime nexus.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 4(2), pp. 144–159.

By Max Gallien

This project explores the political economy of informal and illegal cross-border trade in North Africa, focusing in particular on Tunisia’s border with Libya, and Morocco’s North-East bordering Algeria and the Spanish enclave of Melilla. Based on extensive fieldwork, the project traces the informal institutions that regulate smuggling across the region, examines the resulting rent streams, and analyses their relationship to the region’s states through a political settlement framework. Following shifts in the domestic politics of Tunisia and Morocco as well as the regional border infrastructure, the project also traces the recent re-negotiation of the role of smuggling in the region. It argues that contrary to common assumptions, smuggling rarely occurs 'under the radar' of the state, but is instead embedded in a tight network of institutional regulation in which the regions' states play a key role. Furthermore, rather than subverting states, smuggling activities are a central feature of the region’s political settlements. The project highlights that the ability of different groups to navigate and negotiate the terms of their inclusion into these settlements is highly uneven, posing serious challenges for borderland populations.

London: The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2020. 333p.

By David Soud, Ian Ralby and Rohini Ralby: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Gold flows within Venezuela can be categorized under two broad headings: centralised and dispersed. The centralised flows carry a portion of production from the country’s myriad small mining operations to the government-monitored trading hubs. Centralised flows reportedly include gold transfers from the Venezuelan Central Bank to foreign governments and other entities in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and elsewhere. While these flows of gold out of Venezuela might be considered legal, companies are still expected to carry out enhanced due diligence to ascertain whether conditions of extraction and trade are associated with actual or potential risks of severe human rights abuses, conflict financing and other financial crimes as per the OECD Guidance, as well as environmental harm.

In contrast, dispersed flows are those that leave the country from mining areas by various other routes. The Venezuelan military and political elites, Colombian militant groups, and domestic gangs are reported to be key actors in both categories of domestic gold flows. Gold from dispersed flows departing Venezuela appears to be laundered primarily within the Latin America and Caribbean region, mainly in one or more key regional transit hubs. Laundering networks can, however, extend across the globe and actors connected in other continents. Since many of the high-risk gold flows out of Venezuela involve regional transit hubs as well as distant transit countries and destination markets, any approach to mitigating the risks tied to Venezuelan gold should include regional and international coordination among both government and industry actors. This consideration is heightened by the evident involvement of transnational criminal organisations and designated terrorist groups in exploiting mining communities, extracting gold and laundering it into the legitimate supply chain. The resulting picture is preliminary but also revealing. The role of the maritime space in high-risk gold flows needs more attention; so does the role played by Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in facilitating gold flows and related financial crimes. A few recommendations on how best to address the risks that characterise Venezuelan gold flows conclude the report.

Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021. 68p.

By Marcena Hunter

Exploitation and criminal capture of the ASGM sector is multifaceted and complex.

The development potential of the African artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector is undermined by criminal consortia across the continent who exploit it for economic and political ends at the expense of vulnerable populations. Yet, much of the discourse around ASGM in Africa has not directly addressed criminality, instead being framed within development or conflict frameworks. In an effort to fill this gap, this report seeks to unpack how criminal consortia manipulate ASGM and associated gold flows to secure illicit rents and capture the sector. The findings highlight the need for nuance, especially regarding the role of informal and traditional actors in the sector. Through a more holistic understanding of the challenge, policymakers will better be able to identify and combat criminal consortia in ASGM.

ENACT - Africa, 2019. 44p.

By Fawzi Banao, Bertrand Laporte

The actions of terrorist groups destabilize border states and economies. The presence of mining activities, such as gold extraction, favors the illicit export of this ore to finance terrorist groups. Using COMTRADE data, we estimate gold customs fraud with mirror analysis (gold export missing) for 50 African countries between 2000 and 2019. We use ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares, generalized method of moments, and local impulse strategy in our empirical strategies to estimate the impact of terrorism on gold customs fraud. Our results suggest that states affected by terrorism must pay more attention to the trafficking of gold, as this is a valued mineral for terrorist groups. The response to conflict with terrorist groups cannot be solely military. The State must necessarily get the various state services to work together, particularly the army, the police, and customs. The institutionalization of this cooperation remains a real challenge for these states. Regarding customs administration efficiency, data analysis is at the core of customs modernization programs. Only internal and external trade data have been used in risk management systems. Cooperation with the armed forces must allow the acquisition of tools and skills to analyze other data sources, such as satellite data. Customs could then carry out all of its missions at the borders: collecting duties and taxes but also protecting the local/border economy and cutting off the funding sources for terrorist groups.

Clermont-Ferrand, France Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2022. 27p.

By Roman Grynberg, Jacob Nyambe & Fwasa Singogo

The article reviews recent research and controversies surrounding the quantification of illicit financial flows (IFF) in the gold mining sector in Africa. It is argued that the methodology and data used in the quantification of the most frequently analysed technique, i.e., export undervaluation, is flawed not only because of the recognized weakness of the international trade data, but also because it focuses only on one aspect of IFF, and does not attempt to address issues pertaining to actual under measurement or misspecification of volumes. It is argued that estimates of tax evasion activities can only be determined through forensic economic and accounting techniques, and not through macro-economic or trade data. The last section considers the increased evidence of gold smuggling to the UAE from various African countries, some of which produce no gold of any significance, but appear to export in very large volumes; and at unit import values well below world market prices.

Tanzanian Economic Review, Vol. 9 No. 1, 2019: 35–59

By Prem Mahadevan

India’s socio-economic realities have evolved significantly over the past four decades, particularly as far as attitudes to wealth accumulation are concerned. Gold is today no longer negatively associated with crooked businessmen, but rather positively with the consumerist aspirations of middle-class India. It is used to project enhanced family status at events such as the ‘great Indian wedding’, and is perceived as a high-return investment and a hedge against inflation. Demand for gold has consistently risen 14% annually since 2001, with prices altogether increasing eight-fold. The Indian love affair with gold continues even as the economy strains under the weight of gold imports that degrade the fiscal balance. Gold is metaphorically to many Indians what opium was to the Chinese in the 19th century: an addictive escape from institutional decay and social stagnation. But hoarding gold pits the individual and their family against the government and its need to keep liquidity flowing in order to grow the economy.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2020. 49p.

y Fawzi Banao, Bertrand Laporte

The actions of terrorist groups destabilize border states and economies. The presence of mining activities, such as gold extraction, favors the illicit export of this ore to finance terrorist groups. Using COMTRADE data, we estimate gold customs fraud with mirror analysis (gold export missing) for 50 African countries between 2000 and 2019. We use ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares, generalized method of moments, and local impulse strategy in our empirical strategies to estimate the impact of terrorism on gold customs fraud. Our results suggest that states affected by terrorism must pay more attention to the trafficking of gold, as this is a valued mineral for terrorist groups. The response to conflict with terrorist groups cannot be solely military. The State must necessarily get the various state services to work together, particularly the army, the police, and customs. The institutionalization of this cooperation remains a real challenge for these states. Regarding customs administration efficiency, data analysis is at the core of customs modernization programs. Only internal and external trade data have been used in risk management systems. Cooperation with the armed forces must allow the acquisition of tools and skills to analyze other data sources, such as satellite data. Customs could then carry out all of its missions at the borders: collecting duties and taxes but also protecting the local/border economy and cutting off the funding sources for terrorist groups.

Clermont-Ferrand, France Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International, 2022. 27p.

By Roman Grynberg, Jacob Nyambe & Fwasa Singogo

The article reviews recent research and controversies surrounding the quantification of illicit financial flows (IFF) in the gold mining sector in Africa. It is argued that the methodology and data used in the quantification of the most frequently analysed technique, i.e., export undervaluation, is flawed not only because of the recognized weakness of the international trade data, but also because it focuses only on one aspect of IFF, and does not attempt to address issues pertaining to actual under measurement or misspecification of volumes. It is argued that estimates of tax evasion activities can only be determined through forensic economic and accounting techniques, and not through macro-economic or trade data. The last section considers the increased evidence of gold smuggling to the UAE from various African countries, some of which produce no gold of any significance, but appear to export in very large volumes; and at unit import values well below world market prices.

Tanzanian Economic Review, Vol. 9 No. 1, 2019: 35–59

By INTERPOL

All countries in the region have imported civil explosives and initiators, increasing the risks of diversion. In Central African countries, explosive substances, explosive precursor chemicals and initiators are controlled products and special authorization is needed to import, use, and transport or store them. However, some of these products are diverted, and used to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs), or in activities such as illegal mining or blast fishing. Criminal actors are involved in the illicit flows of explosives. Some are the illegal final users of explosives, which constitute the last step of the illicit supply chain. These are the non-state armed groups (NSAGs) using explosives as weapons, such as Boko Haram and, its rival offshoot, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) in the Lake Chad Basin (Chad and Cameroon), the separatist NSAGs active in the North West and South West regions in Cameroon, the Retour, Réclamation et Rehabilitation (3R) NSAG in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) active in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Other actors include illegal mining sector players, Illegal dealers, thieves and smugglers.

ENACT-Africa, 2023. 47p.

By Prem Mahadevan

India has seen a tripling of demand for sand from 2000 to 2017, creating a market worth 150 billion rupees, or just over two billion US dollars. The country has the third-largest construction industry in the world, following those of China and the United States, accounting for 9 per cent of its two-trillion-dollar economy and employing more than 35 million people. Given the dizzying rate of India’s construction boom, guesstimates indicate a massive shortage of licitly mined sand.

This paper looks at patterns of sand mining in India and the impact that it may have on governance, security, the environment and the growth of entrenched criminal networks. The conclusions suggest that civil administration is retreating before a mafia-like nexus of political, business and bureaucratic interests, which connive to flout judicial orders. The secondary and tertiary effects of such activity bode ill for societal stability, even though a certain amount of (tenuous and often exploitative) employment is generated by illicit sand mining. The paper also highlights a policy conundrum: can India, which, paradoxically, combines widespread economic backwardness with sky-high consumer aspirations, find a model of environmentally sustainable development? Or is it doomed to exacerbate the harshness of already abysmal living standards experienced by its rural population (who make up two-thirds of its population) to satisfy the needs of its urban middle class?

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2019. 27p.

By Eric Scheye

Using country specific formulae in three categories – water and electrical utilities, tax administration and land management – this paper presents an empirical methodology to measure state actors' political will to reduce organised crime.

A lack of political will is often used as an excuse by policymakers, donors and development practitioners to explain failures in policies and programmes. While this is true for most development programming, it is particularly salient with regard to anti-corruption, the rule of law, and efforts to combat organised crime. Indeed, political will is vital if governments are to reduce the deleterious activities of organised crime; without it, crime proliferates. Using country specific formulae in three categories, water and electrical utilities, tax administration and land management, this paper presents an empirical methodology to measure the political will possessed by state actors to reduce organised crime.

ENACT-Africa, 2020. 20p.

By Edward Wanyonyi and Lucia Bird

As the development of communications infrastructure accelerates, good governance and security are often sacrificed in the interest of a speedy rollout.

While Africa’s growing communications infrastructure and increasing internet penetration offer significant developmental benefits, they offer parallel opportunities to organised crime, which exploit the continent’s enhanced connectivity. These opportunities are set to grow with nascent research already indicating that the continent is an increasingly important source of both cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crime. It is a crucial and already tardy moment to take stock of how these vulnerabilities manifest, and how they can best be addressed. If they remain ignored and unmitigated, organised crime will increasingly undermine progress and development, compromising the achievement of the very goals that enhanced infrastructure seeks to achieve.

ENACT-Africa, 2021. 20p.

By Mark Shaw

Foreign criminals are a significant presence in Africa. Four typologies of foreign criminal actors are identified, allowing an exploration into why some actors develop more successful criminal enterprises than others. Success appears to be the result of a slow embedment in the local criminal economy, avoiding displays of wealth and the targeted corruption of officials. It also depends on the expansion of ethnic networks where high levels of trust or coercion of members prevent law enforcement penetration. Eroding these successful criminal operations requires an ability to disrupt recruitment into the networks and ultimately their more effective integration into legitimate economic activities.

ENACT-Africa, 2028. 24p.

By Mohamed Daghar

Kenya faces a scourge of illegal and unregulated sand mining, a crime which is leaving irreversible scars on ecosystems, lives and livelihoods. Sand mining has been driving inter-communal conflict and has ushered in a violent cartel market protected and controlled by state actors. Weak legislation, ineffective controls and an insatiable demand for sand, fuelled mainly by the construction industry, all contribute to the problem. With lack of a formidable alternative, sand remains the only option for mass concrete production. But it must be harvested sustainably and not mined – as promising practices in communities suggest. Key findings • The sand trade is driven by organised criminal cartels that enjoy protection from powerful state actors. • Communities play a crucial role in ensuring sustainable sand harvesting, which can provide long-term employment opportunities and help to reduce job scarcity for Kenya’s youth. • Sand mining in Kenya is fuelling environmental degradation, affecting livelihoods and increasing inter-communal conflict. • A lack of strong regulations and sufficiently mandated authorities means that there is no effective framework to oversee sand activities. • Properly regulated sand harvesting and trading could generate much-needed revenue for local governments.

ENACT-Africa, 2022. 24p.

By Olwethu Majola and Darren Brookbanks

This paper uses data and analysis to assess the UNTOC's effectiveness in addressing transnational organised crime on the continent. The international community prescribed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) as the treatment to slow the global spread of TOC. However, current diagnoses suggest that this has not been as effective as anticipated. This paper assesses the efficacy of the UNTOC and recommends some changes to the treatment that are likely to yield more successful results.

ENACT-Africa, 2023. 32p,

By Raouf Farrah

The civil society of the Libyan northwest city of Zuwara has led several efforts over the last years to tackle criminal governance with notable successes and failures. In 2014-2015, Zuwara’s CSOs took an impressive stand against human smuggling, providing assistance to migrants, raising awareness of the impact and dangers of smuggling, and leveraging elites to strengthen local taboos against human smuggling. Although community efforts continue to fight against criminal governance through awareness-raising and education campaigns via media, religious discourse and university campuses, the 2014-2015 momentum has been lost. Zuwara’s civil society has the means to reignite its stance against criminal governance. To do so, it needs more political recognition, more assistance from international stakeholders and better cooperation between local stakeholders with clearer boundaries between law enforcement and CSOs.

Geneva: e Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) and Migrant Network., 2021. 29p.

Juan Diego Cárdenas - Javier Lizcano Villalba - Lara Susana Loaiza - Laura Alonso , etc.

There were always going to be dissident elements from the FARC, from those who were unconvinced by the peace deal or simply refused to consider it. However, the ex-FARC mafia is now growing at such a rate that Colombia’s entire peace process is at risk. Almost every peace process has had combatants who refuse to give up their arms. There was no reason that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) should be any different. Looking abroad first, the Northern Ireland peace process saw the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, more commonly known as the IRA) reach the “Good Friday Agreement” with the British government in April 1998. It did not take long for the “Continuity IRA” and the “Real IRA,” which has now morphed into the “New IRA,” to appear. But while a series of bombs have been set off and some isolated killings have taken place, Irish dissident groups have been unable to win any significant support or rebuild the military capacity of the PIRA. …

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2019. 72p.