By Summer Walker

What happens in America often reverberates globally. The complex global emergency of COVID-19 has now met waves of uprising around anti-racism, inequality and the systems that perpetuate them. Many policing tactics deployed in communities around the world derive from policy responses to curb illicit markets. Some of the most persistent and militarized responses in communities are predicated upon fighting transnational organized crime. And these often occur in communities of colour, immigrant neighbourhoods, and marginalized and lower-income areas. These current debates about power, use of force and inequality provide a lens to examine responses to transnational organized crime. This brief uses the concept of illicit markets to examine organized crime as the systems and actors that make up these markets, including the government responses to them. Transnational illicit markets, such as the illicit drug or wildlife trade, connect a wide range of actors – from farmers and fishermen to hitmen and cartel bosses. Organized criminal groups, the most common manifestation of how organized crime is carried out, include cartels, armed militias and gangs. But they can also include members of political parties, corporations, businesses and local governments. By looking at the markets more broadly and then identifying where responses are targeted, one can see how transnational organized-crime responses create their own logic of power and exclusion, and are deployed to manage communities. This policy brief begins by discussing the current US context of BLM protests, then situates the debate within the transnational organized-crime agenda, and addresses the implications for responses that align with calls for social and economic justice.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.2020. 21p.

By Gemma Dipoppa

The widespread presence of criminal organizations in strong states presents a theoretical and empirical puzzle. How do criminal organizations — widely believed to thrive in weak states — expand to states with strong capacity? I argue that criminal groups expand where they can strike agreements with local actors for the provision of illegal resources they control, and that this practice is particularly profitable in strong states where costs from prosecution are higher. Using a novel measure of organized crime presence, I show that (1) increases in demand for unskilled labor — and in criminals’ capacity to fill it by exploiting migrants — allowed southern Italian mafias to expand to the north, and that (2) mafia expansion gave a persistent electoral advantage to political parties collaborating with them. This suggests the need to reconceptualize criminal organizations not only as substitutes for weak states but as complements to strong states.

Preprint, 2021. 59p.

By Martin Ewi, Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Willem Els, Richard Chelin, Yussuf Adam and Elisa Samuel Boerekamp

Collaborative research between the Institute for Security Studies and the Judicial Training Institute of Mozambique revealed that people in Cabo Delgado see the discovery and poor governance of natural resources as a cause of the insurgency. The study also found few links between the insurgency and organised crime, and that regional rather than ethnic differences play a major role in the conflict.

 Key findings: The discovery and poor governance of natural resources such as rubies and liquefied natural gas have escalated terrorism. Regional inequities, not ethnicity, are a major grievance in Cabo Delgado. Despite resentment of the elite, who are blamed for the region’s poverty, there is no evidence that people are voluntarily joining the insurgency en masse. The criminal justice sector lacks basic resources and skills to prosecute the growing number of terrorist suspects. People in Cabo Delgado are more concerned about the threat of the Mashababos (Alu-Sunnah wal Jama'ah) than the Islamic State. Recommendations Government of Mozambique: Partner with local organisations to address legitimate grievances Develop a national strategy covering all aspects of the crisis Effectively manage the amnesty programme Establish a centralised national inter-agency counter-terrorism unit, and prioritise coordination and intelligence-led military operations Strengthen the criminal justice system to prosecute terrorism, organised crime and corruption Set up a commission of inquiry into the drivers of violent extremism Strengthen intelligence sharing with neighbouring countries SADC and Mozambique’s neighbours: Assist Mozambique to tighten border security Regularly share intelligence Mosques, Islamic centres and local markets are believed to be meeting points and areas of recruitment and radicalisation. Respondents fear that the violence could easily spread to other parts of Mozambique and countries in Southern Africa. Evidence of a nexus between terrorism and organised crime is weak.  Since the deployment of foreign forces, mass recruitment has stopped as Al Sunnah evolves into a professional, well-trained group, practising guerrilla warfare.

Pretoria, South Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 2022. 52p.

By The International Crisis Group

The number of women active in Mexico’s criminal organisation has risen steadily in recent years. Women often view joining criminal groups as a way of protecting themselves from gender-based violence and acquiring the power and respect they lack in law-abiding society. Searing personal accounts, media reports and data analysis of the prison census all point to the conclusion that Mexican women are joining criminal outfits in greater numbers. Frequently from poor backgrounds and broken families, young women offenders report that they drifted into criminality through their partners or connections they forged at drug use hotspots. Male crime bosses tend to value women for their perceived competence, respect for hierarchy and ability to evade police attention. Women’s presence in illegal groups has strengthened these organisations. It has also more deeply embedded crime in the fabric of Mexican society and within families. Deterring women and children from lives of crime will require the state and non-governmental organisations to provide alternative pathways to earning a living through initiatives in, for example, jails, drug rehabilitation centres and schools. The ascent of women in Mexican crime groups represents a striking departure from how they have traditionally intersected with these organisations. Women and their bodies have long been targets of Mexican criminal outfits. When these organisations battle for turf, they often commit femicides and “disappearances” of women – namely, killing them and disposing of the remains – in part to demonstrate dominance in a geographical region. Witness how crimes against women have increased in areas where illegal organisations jockey for control: killing sprees erupted in the border city of Ciudad Juárez in the 1990s and more recently in Zacatecas, Puebla, Veracruz, the State of Mexico and other places where criminal groups are vying for power. But increasing numbers of women are attracted to the benefits they can reap from joining a criminal organisation. Gender-based violence is rife in Mexico, and judicial redress is virtually non-existent. Young women interviewed for this report almost uniformly experienced abuse in their homes and communities. Most noted that the support of criminal groups and the status they acquire within them can offer protection, recognition and even dignity – in addition, of course, to income.

Brussels: International Crisis Groups, 2023. 39p.

By Mark Lauchs

     Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs are receiving increased attention by academics around the world. However, the field is in need of global data on how, when, where and why clubs form before any generalised conclusions can be drawn. This paper begins this process by attempting to identify every club that has formed in the world by location and date. 18 months of searching online through websites and social media identified 5072 separate clubs, which were then grouped by region and date. This data shows different trends of club formation in different regions. The data shows Western Nations formed clubs much earlier than other regions, but that Scandinavia, South America and East Asia are continuing to form new clubs at an increasing rate. Despite the USA being the country of origin of the culture, it only has 18% of all clubs. This paper concludes with suggestions for future research questions illuminated by the data, that try to explain the popularity of the culture and the environmental circumstances that lead to club formation.

Brisbane, Australia. Queensland University of Technology, 2020. 29pg

By: Christian Klement

The number of outlaw bikers is growing globally. Despite this, little research exists on these groups and their alleged violent tendencies. To address this, the current paper uses unique data to examine whether gang violence causes outlaw biker violence. The period examined runs from mid-2008 until early 2012 during which violent clashes occurred between outlaw bikers and street gang members involved in an alleged conflict in Copenhagen, Denmark. A precise description of each individual act of violence would make it possible to identify whether specific acts were carried out in furtherance of the alleged conflict. This would allow one to determine whether outlaw bikers commit violence on behalf of their club. However, such knowledge is unavailable. The paper therefore takes a different approach by examining whether acts of violence committed by the two groups are statistically associated. In other words, it considers whether one or more acts can be described as retaliatory during the observation periods. The sample consists of 640 individuals involved with the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club or with non-biker street gangs–both of which are present in Copenhagen. Statistical models are used to predict 143 violent events committed by 196 outlaw bikers. The results suggest that violence committed by gang members predicts violence committed by outlaw bikers. This indicates that violent acts committed by outlaw bikers are at least partly a form of retaliation carried out on behalf of their club. The paper expands the literature on the kinds of inter-group, micro-level processes that can lead to reciprocal violence by including outlaw bikers in a literature that has previously focused on non-biker street gangs.

Aalborg, Denmark. Department of Sociology and Social Work, May 8th, 2019. 27pg

By Paul Larsson

This article deals with the policing of biker groups in Norway. It describes the two idealtypical approaches of dialogue and confrontation. It tries to explain why the police use certain methods. It finds that policing is rarely based on knowledge of what works or the causes of a problem. Instead the approaches chosen seem to reflect certain styles of policing described in cultural studies of the police.

Norway, CrossMark. June 11, 2018. 17pg

By  Anthony Morgan, Christopher Dowling and Isabella Voce 

Using national data on the criminal histories of 5,669 known outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members from 39 gangs, this paper explores the prevalence of violent and organised crime offending among Australian OMCGs. Violent and profit-motivated offending was common among OMCG members. One in four had been apprehended for a recent offence involving violence and intimidation, and one in eight for organised crime-type offences. Offending and associated harm was concentrated among a relatively small group of members. Half of all chapters and three-quarters of gangs had members recently involved in organised crime-type offending. In 11 gangs, both office bearers and other members were involved in organised crime, indicative of their status as criminal organisations. These gangs were also among those with the highest prevalence of violence and intimidation offences. 

Australia, Australian Institute of Criminology. Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice, #586. February 2020. 18pg

By Christopher Dowling, Dominic Boland, Anthony Morgan, Julianne Webster, Yi-Ning Chiu and Roger Lowe 

This study explores changes to the internal culture of a sample of Australian outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs). We analysed data from 39 in-depth interviews with former OMCG members in Queensland to discern changes in recruitment practices, hierarchies and governance processes, as well as values, norms and relationships experienced and observed while members of an OMCG. Structurally, clubs changed little, although participants described how members were increasingly using the structures and systems of clubs for their own benefit. Changes were noted in recruitment practices, which were seen as increasingly geared towards enlisting violent, criminally-inclined men. There was also a perceived erosion of loyalty and camaraderie within OMCGs, with a shift towards younger, newer members who were seen as self-interested and financially motivated. These changes were contributing factors in decisions of many former members to disengage from OMCGs. 

Australia, Australia Institute of Criminology. Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 615. February 2021. 16pg

By Timothy Cubitt, Christopher Dowling and Anthony Morgan 

This study examines the trends in and spatial distribution of recorded offending by Australian outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) affiliates at the onset of a territorial conflict between two clubs in the state of New South Wales. Results show an increase in recorded offending by OMCG affiliates involved in the conflict and based in the disputed territory. Comparable increases in recorded offending by these clubs were not detected in the areas surrounding this territory or in the rest of New South Wales, and there was little mobility into the conflict region by those outside of it. There was a smaller, short-lived increase in recorded crime by affiliates of other gangs in the conflict region but not elsewhere. In short, changes in offending patterns were largely limited to the clubs involved in the conflict and localised to the territory in dispute. This research can help guide focused law enforcement responses during periods of gang conflict. 

Australia, Australian Institute of Criminology. Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 667. 2021. 18pg

By Timothy Cubitt and Anthony Morgan 

Risk assessment tools are used widely in the criminal justice response to serious offenders. Despite growing recognition that certain outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members and their clubs are likely to be involved in crime, particularly serious crime, this is not an area where risk assessment tools have been developed and validated. The nature of offending by OMCGs, and policing responses to OMCGs, requires a novel approach to risk assessment. This study uses machine learning methods to develop a risk assessment tool to predict recorded high-harm offending. Results are compared with those of a model predicting any recorded offending. The model predicted high-harm offending with a high degree of accuracy. Importantly, the tool appeared able to accurately identify offenders prior to the point of escalation. This has important implications for informing law enforcement responses. 

Australia, Australian Institute of Criminology. Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 646. March 2022. 18pg

By Lucas Bartolomé -Chairperson, Mihnea Dorneanu -Chairperson

At the present time, the demand for drugs is growing as strong as ever, and to meet this demand, criminal organizations set up drug production operations, particularly in politically unstable regions, often with the collaboration of local militias. These operations help fund the violence and many other criminal activities committed by these organizations, including money laundering, wildlife trading, smuggling, prostitution, human trafficking, and modern-day slavery. Furthermore, the kind of drugs grown are harmful both to the growers of the raw material in the origin country, as they are often trapped in cycles of poverty which inhibit economic development, as well as to the users, due to the societal harm addiction causes upon the population. Therefore, it is essential to fight against the drug trade and find ways to mitigate its effect; however, this is notoriously difficult. Typically, the mechanism for these kinds of operations is the following: farmers in politically unstable regions are forced to grow the plants from which drugs are extracted as they are the only ones from which they are able to make a living; they do this under the protection of local warlords or militias, to whom they often have to pay tax to. Raw opium is delivered, generally through local middlemen, to the criminal organizations that handle the refining and distribution to the rest of the world. This is usually done with either the tacit acceptance of the government, which might consider the militias as strategically useful, or by bribing corrupt government officials who will turn a blind eye. Nowadays in Asia, there exist two main areas where drug production is rampant. These are the socalled "Golden Crescent" and "Golden Triangle". The Golden Crescent covers parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, though production is nowadays mostly concentrated in Afghanistan. The area has had a long history of cultivating poppies in order to extract opium at a small scale; nonetheless, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, many mujahideen guerrillas turned to poppy farming and opium refining as a source of income, and this continued and increased throughout the end of the Soviet occupation, and the beginning of Taliban rule, as Afghanistan became the world's major source of opioids and replaced Iran and Pakistan's dominance in the region. This lasted right up until the Taliban introduced a ban on poppy farming in 2001, which was brutally enforced and caused a sharp drop in poppy farming with an accompanying skyrocketing of the price. This was short-lived as the September 11th attacks soon occurred and the ensuing invasion of the country by the United States yet again plunged the area into conflict and poppy production once more became the only source of income for many farmers. Despite many attempts by the democratic Afghan government, to this day Afghanistan continues to be the world's largest producer of opioids, which mostly get trafficked to Europe and North America, and the end of the Afghan War and resumption of Taliban rule don't seem to have put a stop to it. Despite nominally being against the drug trade, the Taliban has been accused of using poppy farming to secure its own funding and of intentionally causing the spike in price in 2001 to sell its own reserves at a higher price. The democratic government seemed more inclined to genuinely try to solve the problem; however, local corrupt officials severely undermined its efforts. Though the Golden Crescent's main export is opium, recent forays into the production of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines have been reported, and the region is also the top exporter of cannabis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Model United Nations of Bucharest, 2023. 30p.

By Adam Baird , Matthew Louis Bishop , Dylan Kerrigan

The Southern Caribbean became a key hemispheric drug transhipment point in the late 1990s, to which the alarmingly high level of homicidal violence in Trinidad is often attributed. Existing research, concentrated in criminology and mainstream international relations, as well as the anti-drug policy establishment, tends to accept this correlation, framing the challenge as a typical post-Westphalian security threat. However, conventional accounts struggle to explain why murders have continued to rise even as the relative salience of narcotrafficking has actually declined. By consciously disentangling the main variables, we advance a more nuanced empirical account of how ‘the local’ is both inserted into and mediates the impact of ‘the global’. Relatively little violence can be ascribed to the drug trade directly: cocaine frequently transits through Trinidad peacefully, whereas firearms stubbornly remain within a distinctive geostrategic context we term a ‘weapons sink’. The ensuing murders are driven by the ways in which these ‘residues’ of the trade reconstitute the domestic gangscape. As guns filter inexorably into the community, they reshape the norms and practices underpinning acceptable and anticipated gang behaviour, generating specifically ‘residual’ forms of violence that are not new in genesis, but rather draw on long historical antecedents to exacerbate the homicide panorama. Our analysis emphasises the importance of taking firearms more seriously in understanding the diversity of historically constituted violences in places that appear to resemble—but differ to—the predominant Latin American cases from which the conventional wisdom about supposed ‘drug violence’ is generally distilled.

Political Geography. Volume 106, October 2023, 102966

By David Lewis

Despite Ukraine's ongoing counter-offensive, in September 2023 Russia still controlled around 17% of Ukrainian territory, an area roughly the size of Denmark. Russia's occupation of these Ukrainian territories relied primarily on repression and violence, but economic levers also played an important role in consolidating Russian rule. This paper details Russia's illicit economic activity in the occupied territories and calls for more international attention to this aspect of Russia's invasion.

Since Russia occupied large parts of south-eastern Ukraine in March 2022, it has worked rapidly to incorporate these regions into Russia's economic and financial system. Key elements in this 'economic occupation' include:

• The seizure of many Ukrainian businesses and assets. The occupation authorities 'nationalised' many companies and reregistered them as Russian businesses with new management.

• The imposition of the Russian currency, financial and tax system, and the forced closure of Ukrainian banks.

• The forcible takeover of farms or pressure on farmers to cooperate with the occupation authorities. Russian officials oversaw the illegal export of Ukrainian grain from the occupied territories.

The reconstruction of cities such as Mariupol, the city destroyed by Russian forces in spring 2022, in a multi-billion-dollar government programme that is profiting well-connected Russian companies.

These acts were all illegal under Ukrainian law and some may constitute potential war crimes under international law.

Research Paper 20. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 43p.

By Jirka Taylor, Shann Corbett, Fook Nederveen, Stijn Hoorens, Hana Ross, Emma Disley

The illicit tobacco trade is a global phenomenon with significant negative health, social and economic consequences. This study is intended to support efforts to better understand the scope and scale of the illicit tobacco market. The primary objective was to develop a reliable, robust, replicable and independent methodology to measure the illicit market that can be applied by the EU and its Member States. The key requirements were that the methodology would capture the total volume of the illicit trade and distinguish between the legal and illegal market, ideally distinguishing between types of tobacco products, and types of illicit trade. Based on in-depth literature reviews and interviews with key informants, we constructed a longlist of 11 methodologies that have been or could be used to measure the illicit tobacco market and assessed them against a standardised set of criteria. This resulted in a shortlist of five preferred methods (i.e. discarded pack survey, comparison of sales/tax paid and self-reported consumption, consumer survey with and without pack inspection/surrender, econometric modelling). As individual approaches, these shortlisted methods were not sufficient to meet the minimum criteria. Accordingly, these shortlisted methods were then used to formulate options for combination of methodologies corresponding to various levels of resource intensity.

Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 197p.

By Summer Walker

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) researches the political economy of organized crime in many countries, including those on the United Nations Security Council’s agenda. The GI-TOC also analyzes how the Security Council responds to illicit economies and organized crime through its agenda, including through an annual review of resolutions that tracks references to organized crime. We use the term ‘illicit economies’ here to include the markets and actors involved. This series, UN Security Council Illicit Economies Watch, draws on research produced by the GI-TOC regional observatories and the Global Organized Crime Index to provide insights into the impacts of illicit economies for Council-relevant countries through periodic country reports. As the United Nations develops its New Agenda for Peace, there is a need to consider the impacts of illicit economies in the search for sustainable peace and preventing conflict. The UN Secretary-General called for a New Agenda for Peace in his report Our Common Agenda, saying that to protect peace, ‘we need a peace continuum based on a better understanding of the underlying drivers and systems of influence that are sustaining conflict, a renewed effort to agree on more effective collective security responses and a meaningful set of steps to manage emerging risks’.1 One of these key underlying drivers is illicit economies and a more effective response will need to account for this. The Security Council will play a critical role in any renewed effort. This brief provides an overview of how the Council addresses illicit economies and offers ideas for advancing the agenda. It first examines how specific crimes are addressed by the Council, expands into a wider analysis of the dynamics of illicit economies and conflict, and offers thinking around how illicit economies can be considered in the context of the New Agenda for Peace.

UN Security Counci. 2023, 22p.

By Matt Herbert | Rupert Horsely | Emadeddin Badi

Libya has been a key focus of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since the country’s 2011 revolution. A June 2023 UNSC meeting on Libya focused on the country’s political process, the need to hold elections and support work around the reunification of security and defence forces.1 That same month, the Council re-authorized its arms embargo on the country2 and in late 2023 it is set to renew the UN mission in Libya. The UNSC has sought to advance an effective political process, reunify the country’s divided institutions and address threats to peace and security, and human rights abuses. To effect this change, the UNSC authorized and draws on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), a sanctions committee and linked Panel of Experts, and the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operations Sophia and IRINI.3 Despite these efforts, Libya remains a highly fragile country. Although large-scale violence has ebbed since the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)’s loss in the 2019–2020 war for Tripoli, the country remains divided. The Government of National Unity (GNU) – the internationally recognized government in Tripoli led by Abd al-Hamid Dabaiba – exerts direct influence over limited areas of the country’s territory, mainly in Tripolitania. Most territory, including Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, is held by the LAAF, led by Khalifa Haftar. Attempts to bridge these divides, hold elections and forge a broadly legitimate government have repeatedly failed, most recently in December 2021.4 Nonetheless, UNSC efforts in this regard continue, reflecting an international consensus that the way out of Libya’s protracted instability is likely to be found in the political track, through the establishment of a government capable of superseding the current divides and exercising sovereign control over the country.5 However, the distribution of power within Libya challenges efforts to stabilize the country through the political track alone. Belying the simple narrative of national bifurcation, the GNU and LAAF have limited and contingent control over their respective areas. Instead, armed groups rooted in municipal or tribal groupings dominate local power. Governance and security often hinge on deals and agreements continually being renegotiated between these groups and the GNU or the LAAF.

Libya’s thriving illicit economies, and their links to armed groups and political actors throughout the country, compound the challenges to the UNSC’s efforts to promote a stable peace and the rule of law.6 Profits from these markets provide a crucial funding source for armed groups, enabling and incentivizing pushback against state efforts to assert control, and drive conflicts between groups over control of key markets and routes.7 They also fuel petty and large-scale corruption, stymying efforts to rebuild rule of law and security-force effectiveness in the country.8 Efforts to prevent criminal penetration of the Libyan state have failed. Actors linked to illicit economies have increasingly become embedded within the security forces, while others seek opportunities for high-level positions and political influence. This raises the risk that criminal interests, predation and corruption will be fused into the state. Equally problematically, it risks poisoning citizen trust in and possible acceptance of future governance and security structures involving compromised actors. For these reasons, understanding how illicit economies function in Libya and their impacts, and how they are changing, is essential for the UNSC as it seeks to promote political solutions and stability in the country. This brief provides the UN and member states with a snapshot of how Libya’s illicit economies have developed over the last three years and the impact those shifts have had. In the interest of length, the brief does not detail all changes or offer a full description of the structural elements in all markets. Rather, it focuses on the most salient aspects for policymakers assessing the challenge of illicit markets. The brief begins by detailing the impact illicit economies have on armed groups and political dynamics. Next, it assesses the state of play of the main illicit markets in the country: fuel smuggling, drug trafficking, mercenaries, arms and ammunition smuggling, and migrant smuggling and trafficking. It ends with a brief set of recommendations.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime , 2023. 35p.

By The Venezuela Investigative Unit

The blood streamed down Eduardo Labrador’s face and splattered across his shirt. “Film me! Film me!” he shouted at the journalist who had come to check on him. As he addressed the camera, he was defiant, angry even. Today, he said, they had come out to defend democracy in Venezuela. And this was the result.

One year later, he grasped for an analogy for what it felt like to be beaten. “I don’t know if you’ve ever experienced an explosion, you feel it there, so close to your ears — Boom! For hours I heard that boom in my ears,” he told InSight Crime.

The image of Labrador, blood-streaked and indignant, shattered the façade of an orderly and peaceful election that the Venezuelan government had been desperate to present to the world.

Labrador had been attacked by armed men as he tried to carry out his duties as the campaign director for the political opposition during local and regional elections in November 2021. The assault, he says, was part of a premeditated campaign of voter intimidation in the municipality of San Francisco in the northwestern state of Zulia. And behind that campaign, he alleged, was Zulia’s then-governor Omar Prieto.

Labrador had witnessed Prieto’s rise firsthand as a political ally within the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela – PSUV) and member of his cabinet. He was often seen as Prieto’s right-hand man.

But over time, Labrador watched the socialist project he had once believed in descend into what another former high-level PSUV insider described to InSight Crime as “a project of crime in power.”

That project saw Prieto and his cronies carry out extortion, embezzlement, theft, and smuggling rackets from within the state, while deploying a criminalized police force as a private militia to protect their interests.

It was a project very much of that moment in Venezuela’s history.

When Prieto became governor in 2017, Venezuela was on the brink of economic collapse, and President Nicolás Maduro was under political siege. Desperate to maintain the loyalty of a fractured PSUV, underpaid security forces, and military and political elites unhappy with their dwindling corruption profits, Maduro granted territories to the different poles of power within the Chavista political movement. And then he gave them permission to squeeze whatever criminal profits they could from those territories.

Prieto was granted power in Zulia as a scion of the most important political faction within Chavismo outside of Maduro’s own network. And for the duration of his term, he pushed that permissiveness to its limits.

But by the time he was standing for reelection in 2021, that moment was beginning to pass. Venezuela had a measure of stability. Maduro’s presidency had survived, and his objectives were shifting. He wanted to reenter the international community both politically and economically. He wanted to consolidate his personal power and neuter his rivals within the PSUV. And he wanted to bring order to the mafia state that had grown up during the crisis.

Which is why Maduro invited international observers to monitor the 2021 elections, in the hopes that they would tell the world the elections were free and fair. And why even when it became clear the PSUV was going to lose Zulia, he made no intervention to help Prieto, who had overstepped the conventional limits on criminality and corruption.

Venezuela’s 2021 elections were problematic but largely peaceful. The violence in Zulia, which left one dead and three — including Labrador — injured, was a shocking exception. But it was entirely predictable. Prieto, the gangster governor, was never likely to go quietly.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 39p.

By The Venezuela Investigative Unit

Ten years ago, Tren de Aragua was a little more than a prison gang, confined to the walls of the Tocorón penitentiary and largely unheard of outside its home state of Aragua in Venezuela. Today, it is one of the fastest-growing security threats in South America.

Tren de Aragua’s transnational network now stretches into Colombia, Peru, Chile, and beyond. It has established some of the most far-reaching and sophisticated migrant smuggling and sex trafficking networks seen in the region. And it has spread terror in host countries and among the Venezuelan migrant population, which it has ruthlessly exploited.

But the seizure of Tocorón by Venezuelan authorities in September 2023 directly attacked the nerve center of this network. Now, a new, more uncertain, era is beginning for Venezuela’s most notorious criminal export.

Washington DC: InSight Crime, 2023. 28p.

by Julia Stanyard

The development of transport infrastructure boosts trade and stimulates economic growth. However, this infrastructure can also benefit criminal networks, which use air transport to traffic illicit goods such as drugs, wildlife and gold. Their activities are disguised from regulatory bodies, and many act in collusion with corrupt officials. However, this can be countered by implementing effective oversight measures. This is crucial considering the substantial expansion of African air traffic in recent years, forecasts that Africa will continue to be one of the fastest-growing regions in the world for aviation, and the challenges that the aviation sector globally is facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

ENACT Africa, 2023. 18p.