By Iffat Idris

Conflict in eastern Ukraine has been underway since 2014: the February 2014 ouster of pro-Russia President Yanukovych was followed in March by Russian annexation of Crimea, and its support for insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) – the latter is ongoing. This paper is a rapid literature review of the links between corruption, crime and conflict in eastern Ukraine. While Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was rooted both in Moscow’s historic claims to the peninsula, as well as moves by Kiev to move closer to the European Union, the ongoing insurgency in the Donetz Basin (Donbas) stems from structural factors such as industrial decline. Russian support for the Donbas insurgents, alongside its failure to recognise the republics that they announced (Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic), suggests that Moscow’s real goal is to put pressure on the Ukrainian government and prevent its integration into Western structures. The paper assesses the impact of the conflict on the economy of Crimea and Donbas. Russia has tried to demonstrate the benefits to Crimea of annexation by pumping vast resources into the region, but this resource injection has been unable to overcome the effects of wide-ranging Western sanctions. Donbas’ economy has been even more badly affected by ongoing conflict, with thousands displaced and an economic blockade imposed by Kiev greatly limiting trade. Here too, Moscow has had to step in with subsidies and humanitarian assistance. The paper also looks at the involvement of organised criminal groups (OCGs) in the conflict, and the impact of the conflict on organised crime in the region. With regard to the former it finds that OCGs played a big role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, fighting alongside Russian forces (without their insignia) and other volunteers. This highlights the complementary and symbiotic nature of the connection between criminal groups and the Russian state. OCGs in the Donbas region had strong links with the Yanukovych government in Ukraine, ousted in 2014 – hence it is no surprise that these groups were heavily involved in the Donbas insurgency. With regard to how organised crime has been affected by conflict, the paper finds that corruption was a massive problem in Ukraine long before the conflict in the east. Moreover, it involved all levels of the government system and was strongly linked to organised crime. OCGs were especially prevalent in Crimea, while Donbas was even more notorious for criminality. Post-Crimea’s annexation, links between OCGs in Crimea and in Russia became even stronger. Ironically, due to the vast influx of Russian development funds, Crimea represented an opportunity for embezzlement and corruption for Russian and Crimean OCGs. Closer ties were even forged between Russian OCGs and those in Ukraine. Since the conflict in Donbas began – and given the economic blockade, and falling Russian funding support - the region has become heavily dependent on organised crime. The paper also finds that oligarchs, with close ties to organised crime, have benefited hugely from Crimea becoming part of Russia, e.g. seizing property belonging to pro Ukraine business elites. Ties with political elites are equally strong: gangs gain protection from political patronage, in turn giving kickbacks to politicians. One final aspect explored in the paper is transnational crime. It finds that this has risen since the annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, including a rise in smuggling of illicit goods into Europe, and a rise in organised crime in Ukraine. Sevastopol could potentially take over as a smuggling hub from Odesa, while Crimea and Ukraine could become a global money laundering centre. Criminality in Russia has also increased, seen in rises in drug and arms trafficking and criminal cases. The drop in cross-border cooperation to combat crime has contributed to greater criminality. The paper concludes that corruption, crime and conflict are heavily intermeshed in eastern Ukraine, with each reinforcing the other in what appears to be a downward spiral of escalation.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 2. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 26p/

What’s new? Each year, hundreds of thousands of migrants cross the Darién Gap, a strip of jungle between Central and South America, on their way to the U.S. With little state presence in the area, Colombia’s Gaitanista drug syndicate is overseeing human smuggling rackets while gangs in Panama perpetrate assaults on migrants. Why does it matter? Illicit profits are soaring as the flow of migrants swells, with much of the money going to organised crime. Efforts by Colombia and Pan ama to impede the movement of people or weaken the criminal groups’ hold have so far failed to curb murder, rape and other attacks on migrants. What should be done? The days when the Darién Gap was a meaningful bar rier to mass migration are over. Enhanced law enforcement, redoubled efforts to quell crises in the main countries of departure and reinforced humanitarian assistance in the Darién could form part of regional efforts to manage irregular migration and protect the vulnerable.

Bogota; New York: Latin America Report N°102 | 3 November 2023

International Crisis Group, 2023. 46p.

By Tuesday Reitano

Finding responses to illicit financial flows (IFFs) and preventing the extraction, movement and secretion of wealth from the licit global economy has become a growing policy preoccupation. The scale of IFFs and their continued growth has been linked to damaging consequences for governance and the building of peaceful, inclusive societies that achieve development for their citizens. This paper draws on the body of research by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) to demonstrate how and why responses to IFFs are falling short.

This wide-ranging review concludes that:

• The response to IFFs is too focused on the international financial system, and has failed to recognise and integrate the need to also strengthen oversight and integrity in trade flows, which is one of the dominant means by which illicit value is transferred.

• Informal economic activity, and the size and growth of the informal sector in many economies is undermining the efficacy of regulatory and oversight instruments.

• Political will to tackle the problem appears to be lacking – instead, in a number of key states policymaking has been captured to serve the interests of those for whom the offshore financial system and other legal and regulatory loopholes are of significant benefit. Moreover, state actors are both a significant part of the problem, both as a source of IFFs and as a conduit to enabling their continuation.

The implications of such extensive state involvement are profound, ranging from an overly technical approach to the challenge; the capture and distortion of multilateral processes; the failure to link policy to insecurity and violence, and a closing space for civil society manifested in legal, reputational and physical threat. In the absence of political will, and given the way that the traditional avenues for policy and programmatic response have been compromised, the paper concludes by proposing a few ways to strengthen the response, including by building a stronger and more active role for civil society as activists, whistleblowers and sources of oversight and response; promoting financial inclusion and reducing informality, and focusing on the role of non state actors as potential gatekeepers to guard against IFFs.

SOC ACE Research Paper No. 14. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham 2022. 45p.

By Alex Brill, Brian J. Miller, Stan Veuger

Federal legislation to legalize, regulate, and tax cannabis could have significant impacts on the federal budget. While the specific details of any potential cannabis legalization legislation are unknown at present, such reforms are likely to affect both tax receipts and federal outlays through a wide range of mechanisms including excise tax collections, changes in the size and composition of the labor force, and the major federal health care programs. We identify the main federal budgetary implications of legalizing cannabis and estimate their likely magnitude where possible.

AEI Economics Working Paper 2023-16 Updated March 2024   Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2024. 41p.

By Beau Kilmer, Michelle Priest, Rajeev Ramchand, Rhianna C. Rogers, Ben Senator, Keytin Palmer

Psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin mushrooms and LSD, have long been touted as holding promise for treating various mental health conditions, and the past decade has seen another round of enthusiasm for this hope. Although the clinical research and associated media reports on these substances continue to grow, what receives less attention is the changing policy landscape for some psychedelics in the United States. Despite the federal prohibition on supply and possession — outside approved clinical research, the Food and Drug Administration’s Expanded Access program, and some religious exemptions — some state and local governments are loosening their approaches to some psychedelics. In fact, some states are implementing or considering approaches that legalize some forms of supply to adults for any reason. It seems likely that more jurisdictions will consider and implement alternative policies to prohibit the nonclinical supply of some psychedelics, possibly including retail sales. The primary goal of this mixed-methods report is to present new data and analysis to help inform policymakers participating in these discussions in the United States, but much of this report should also be useful to decision-makers in other countries. These insights should also be useful to anyone interested in learning more about these substances and the public policy issues surrounding them.

Key Findings

• Unlike people who use cannabis and many other drugs, infrequent users of psychedelics account for most of the total days of use.

• The total number of use days for psychedelics — a proxy for the size of the market — is two orders of magnitude smaller than it is for cannabis.

• Within the class of drugs generally classified as psychedelics, psilocybin has the highest past-year and past-month prevalence rates among U.S. adults. Of those ages 18 and older, 3.1 percent — or approximately 8 million people — used psilocybin in 2023.

• Among those reporting the use of psilocybin in the past year, nearly half reported microdosing the last time they used it.

• Scientific literature is limited in its understanding of the consequences of using psychedelics and preventing and mitigating adverse events.

• Most of the policy changes at the state and local levels focus on supporting research and deprioritizing the enforcement of certain laws about psychedelics, but a few states have legalized some forms of supply and others are considering it.

• There are many supply policy options between prohibition and legalizing production and sales by for-profit companies.

• The role of price as a regulatory tool may matter less for psychedelics compared with many other drugs.

  Recommendations

• Those participating in psychedelics policy debates and analyses should be specific about the changes being considered, implemented, or evaluated.

• Meaningful policy discussions should include Indigenous Peoples who are community-authorized to speak on these matters.

• Policymakers need to be thoughtful about the role of supervision and facilitators when considering changes to psychedelics policies.

• It is critical to improve the data infrastructure on psychedelics to better support policy analyses.

• Now is the time for U.S. federal policymakers to decide whether they want psilocybin and other psychedelic substances to follow in the footsteps of the for-profit cannabis model.

Psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin and LSD, have long been touted as holding promise for treating some mental health conditions. An increasing number of U.S. state and local governments are implementing or considering alternative policies to prohibit some of these substances for nonclinical purposes (i.e., adults can use them for any reason). The authors of this report present new data and analysis to inform these discussions.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024. 161p.

By Annette Idler | Frederik Florenz | Ajmal Burhanzoi John Collins | Marcena Hunter | Antônio Sampai

This paper contributes to research on the relationship between conflict and organized crime (the crime–conflict nexus), using Afghanistan as a case study. For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been plagued by internal armed conflict, influenced by local, national, regional, and international external actors, and the intricate relationships among them. To varying degrees, power, politics, and criminality informed these relationships. Organized crime provides actors in Afghanistan with significant political power, while powerful political actors are uniquely positioned to reap the profits of the country’s criminal markets. This paper gives an account of the existing literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, identifying some of the key insights that this literature has revealed. To do so, it uses a four-pronged framework, exploring how conflict has fuelled organized crime in Afghanistan; how organized crime has fuelled conflict; how conflict over the control of illicit markets has resulted; and how organized crime has contributed to the erosion of the state. By assessing the literature on Afghanistan’s crime–conflict nexus, the paper identifies knowledge gaps and suggests areas for future research.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. 36p.

By Luke Kelly

This annotated bibliography includes research and evidence on militarized approaches to combating serious and organized crime (SOC) in various contexts. Militarised approaches involve using military forces or methods to deter and disrupt SOC groups. These approaches have been employed in states facing high levels of violence, fragile and conflict-affected contexts, post-conflict settings, and against threats like piracy and wildlife crime. The research finds that the evidence on the effectiveness of militarised approaches is largely negative. While there are a range of militarised approaches, applied in a variety of contexts, most papers nevertheless agree that military force, or military techniques, can only address one facet of SOC at best, and need to be linked with a range of other measures such as policing, rule of law interventions and economic interventions, to effectively combat SOC. As well as drawing resources away from these other measures, militarised approaches have also been found to have a number of direct and indirect negative effects, such as human rights abuses, increases in violence, and undermining the rule of law.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2023. 44p.SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper 4.   

By Iffat Idris

This report gives the findings of a ‘quick scan’ review of available literature on political will and serious organized crime (SOC). It covers the five broad themes of the SOC Anti Corruption Evidence (ACE) research program: i) political will and SOC; ii) political will, SOC, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; iii) political will, SOC, and sanctions; iv) political will and trafficking; v) political will, SOC and COVID-19. Noting that political will is often used as a ‘catch all’ explanation for the failure of reforms or policies, the report begins by discussing definitions of political will. The literature generally describes it as the willingness and commitment of decision-makers to carry out reforms or implement policies to address particular problems. Malena (2009: 19) defines it as the sum of political want, political can, and political must. Reflecting the complexity of the phenomenon, political will has numerous enabling factors, notably implementation capacity, quality of governance, organizational set-up and functioning, and societal factors. With regard to the measurement of political will, there is consensus that mere statements, policies, or legislation are not enough – political will has to be manifested in concrete action. Political will and SOC: The review finds that political will is highly relevant to SOC, both because SOC and corruption often involve political leaders or government officials, and because political will is a necessary condition for effective efforts to combat SOC and corruption. Increasing recognition of the scale of SOC, and the need to combat it, is reflected in national and international commitments, frameworks, and so on. However, key implementation challenges include lack of coordination between different agencies or across different frameworks, and the fact that those tasked with implementation are often involved in SOC themselves. Measurement challenges include the clandestine nature of SOC. Capacity indicators, ‘objective’ situation indicators, and public perception indicators are three sets that can facilitate the measurement of political will to combat SOC. Political will, SOC, kleptocracy and illicit finance: The review finds that SOC is strongly connected to both kleptocracy (in which political leaders use their power to increase their wealth) and illicit financial flows (IFFs) (whereby funds are illegally transferred out of a country). The literature stresses the importance of political will to combat kleptocracy and IFFs. While there has been a rise in laws and regulatory frameworks to curb money laundering, implementation of these has been weak. The UK exemplifies this: it is one of the biggest global financial hubs and a major destination for IFFs, but despite laws and policies targeting IFFs and kleptocracy, progress has been limited. The report finds that the political will in Washington to curb illicit finance appears strong, but it is too early to assess the impact of this. Political will, SOC, and sanctions: Sanctions can be used to combat SOC, in particular transnational SOC, and by targeting individuals or groups rather than the general population, harm to ordinary citizens can be averted. However, while relatively easy to impose, the review finds that they are not the ultimate solution and a number of caveats apply to their use; for example, they are not a replacement for other law enforcement measures, and they do nothing to address root causes of SOC. The paper looks at the experience of the US, which has long used sanctions as a tool to combat SOC and human rights abuses, and of the UK, which is also making increasing use of these to target corruption, kleptocracy, and human rights abuses. Political will, SOC, and trafficking: Trafficking (for example, drugs, human trafficking for labor or sex) is one of the main forms of SOC, and traditional approaches to combat it fall into prevention, protection, and prosecution. The review finds that political will is especially relevant in combatting trafficking in two regards: a) determining the focus of efforts (supply-side versus demand-side) and b) determining which interventions are carried out. To date, the focus has been on supply-side interventions despite these showing limited effectiveness. The decision is largely a political one. The paper illustrates this by looking at approaches by the US to tackling drug trafficking, and approaches by both origin and destination countries to tackling trafficking in persons for forced labor. Political will, SOC, and COVID-19: The review finds that, as with conflicts and humanitarian emergencies, the COVID-19 pandemic has created new opportunities for SOC; for example because of increased online activities, scarcity of certain goods (such as healthcare products) and the economic downturn. Human trafficking and health sector-related crime are especially up. The paper highlights a number of factors likely to affect (diminish) political will to combat SOC related to the pandemic, including lack of public resources, and prioritization of dealing with the health impact of COVID-19. The review demonstrates the importance of political will for effectively tackling SOC, illicit finance, and transnational corruption, but also shows why it is challenging to find political will, measure it, and create demand for it.   

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2022. 56p.    SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 1. 

By  Nina Tvede Korshøj  , Thomas Friis Søgaard

Research exploring online-mediated drug dealing has gained momentum in recent years. Much existing research is characterized by a primary focus on the “online” aspects of drug sales facilitated by social media, resulting in a divide between “on”- and “offline” drug dealing. We wish to bridge this gap, by focusing on the hybridity of dealing drugs via social media and by arguing for a more holistic understanding of contemporary drug dealing. Methods: This article is based on in-depth digitally facilitated oral interviews with 25 individuals with experience in dealing drugs via social media platforms and encrypted messaging apps and on observational data from different apps and platforms. Results: We found that many sellers start by dealing offline and gradually drift into sales using social media technology. While the internet offers drug sellers new opportunities to expand their business, many sellers are not technological exclusionists but rather adopt a multichannel approach where they sell both via social media and occasionally or regularly also through in-person and technologically analog means. Additionally, many sellers do not draw clear-cut distinctions between whether they use social media, SMS, or encrypted apps, but rather see their “drug sales phone” as one medium for all sales-related communication. Findings also show that local offline power dynamics continue to influence sellers’ ability to build and expand their online business and that offline as well as online networks play a crucial role in sellers’ hiring of helpers and their bulk drug sourcing. Conclusion: We discuss how our findings have analytical, conceptual, and methodological implications for the development of a more nuanced and holistic approach in the study of drug sales involving online technologies. 

International Journal of Drug Policy. Volume 130, August 2024, 104509

By Huma Haide

Organized crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organized crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organized crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organized crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines.1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organized crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilize. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ for a criminal group and to achieve a complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthen criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organized crime groups that extend beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude, and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilize was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organized crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognized as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.   

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham.2023. 88p.

By Gian Maria Campedelli, Gianmarco Daniele, Marco Le Moglie

Detection is one of the main challenges in the fight against organized crime. We show that machine learning can be used to predict mafias infiltration in Italian local governments, as measured by the dismissal of city councils infiltrated by organized crime. The model successfully predicts up to 96% of out-of-sample municipalities previously identified as infiltrated by mafias, up to two years earlier, making this index a valuable tool for identifying municipalities at risk of infiltration well in advance. Furthermore, we can identify “high-risk” local governments that may be infiltrated by organized crime but have not been detected by the state, thereby improving the efficacy of detection. We then apply this new time-varying measure of organized crime to investigate the underlying causes of this type of rent-seeking. As criminals infiltrate politics to capture public resources, we study how a positive shock in public spending (European Union transfers), affects this phenomenon. Employing a geographic Difference-in-Discontinuities design, we find a substantial and lasting increase in the predicted risk of mafia infiltration (up to 14 p.p.), emphasizing the unintended effects of delivering aid where criminal organizations can appropriate public funds.

Unpublished paper, 2024. 103p.

By The New South Wales Crime Commission

Tracking devices are a growing enabler of serious and organized crime in NSW. Accessible, inexpensive, and easily concealed – they are used by organized crime networks to monitor, locate, and ultimately attack their rivals. An initial review of joint operations between the Commission and partner agencies identified frequent and increasing use of tracking devices to facilitate murders, public place shootings, kidnappings, violent drug thefts, and drug trafficking, and tracking devices are extensively being used by high-risk domestic and family violence offenders. 

By matching sales data against criminal histories and intelligence records, Project Hakea identified that:

• 37% of customers who had purchased tracking devices were adversely known to police

• 25% of customers had a history of domestic and family violence

• 15% had a history of serious and organized crime

•  9% of customers had a history of both domestic and family violence and serious and organized crime.

In addition to the extensive use of tracking devices by organized criminals, their widespread use by domestic and family violence offenders creates an urgent need to address the issue. 

UNITED STATES. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

From the document: "America is facing the deadliest drug threat in our history. Over the last 25 years, drug overdose deaths in the United States from synthetic opioids, including fentanyl, have risen to more than 100 times their 1999 levels. The rate of fatal overdoses from other drugs, including cocaine and methamphetamine, has also surged. The overdose crisis calls for bold action. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has outlined vital steps for attacking two drivers of this crisis. [...] ONDCP's 2024 '[National Drug Control] Strategy' looks to the future this Nation needs. That future is one with greater access to prevention, treatment, harm reduction and recovery support services; with a focus on equity and equal justice; with support for incarcerated individuals, as well as post-incarceration reentry assistance; with a SUD [substance use disorder] and health care workforce that meets our Nation's needs; with a payment system that sufficiently funds care; and with a concerted transnational effort to hold drug traffickers, their enablers, and facilitators accountable. [...] The 2024 'Strategy' is aimed at addressing the overdose crisis from multiple angles. This includes preventing youth substance use, expanding access to life-saving medications like naloxone, expanding access to evidence-based treatment, building a recovery-ready Nation, and ramping up efforts to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking."

UNITED STATES. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE; UNITED STATES. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; . MAY, 2024. 124p.

FREEMAN, BEN; CLEVELAND-STOUT, NICK

From the document: "This brief takes a deep dive into a newly available tranche of data tracking foreign influence in the U.S. political process. The new data was released in early 2024 following reforms to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which made access to all foreign registrants' political activities and campaign contributions publicly available. The brief unearths a complex web of foreign influence in the United States -- with countries like Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Azerbaijan reaping the benefits of massive political influence campaigns."

QUINCY INSTITUTE FOR RESPONSIBLE STATECRAFT. Quincy Brief No. 59. 2024.

By Jakob Manthey, Jürgen Rehm,and Uwe Vertheina

With the enforcement of the Cannabis Act on 1 April 2024, Germany has adopted one of the most liberal legal approaches to cannabis on the continent. The German model prioritises a non-profit approach and precludes legal market mechanisms. We believe these are the main drivers for increasing cannabis use and related health problems, based on observations following cannabis legalisation in Canada and many states in the U.S. Although legalising cannabis possession and cultivation may not immediately eliminate the illegal market, it is expected to serve public health goals. Despite the overall positive evaluation of the Cannabis Act in Germany, there are three potential areas of concern: the potential for misuse of the medical system, the normalization of cannabis use, and the influence of the cannabis industry. The German model may herald the beginning of a new generation of European cannabis policies, but concerted efforts will be required to ensure that these policy reforms serve rather than undermine public health goals.

The LANCET Regional Health - Europe, Vol 42 July, 2024

By Sana Khan,, Emily West and Stephanie Rosof

   In recent years, cities and counties across the country have made great strides to strategically reduce jail incarceration without jeopardizing community safety. To keep this momentum going, it is critical to examine the safety implications of these jail population reform efforts. This is especially true against the backdrop of COVID-19 era increases in violent crime, with unsubstantiated hypotheses suggesting that increases in violent crime were a result of efforts to reduce jail populations and not of the major socio economic impacts of lockdowns. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Safety and Justice Challenge (SJC) presents a unique opportunity to explore the relationships between criminal legal reform, the COVID-19 pandemic, and violent crime. Since 2015, jurisdictions participating in the SJC have planned and implemented data-driven reform strategies to both safely reduce unnecessary jail incarceration and advance equity across the criminal legal system. These jurisdictions serve as models for pursuing data-driven criminal legal system reform. The SJC allows for comparisons of jail populations and crime pre- and post-reforms; SJC timelines also provide a look at how reforms were associated with violent crime before, during, and after the pandemic. As the lead data and analytic partner for the initiative, the Institute for State and Local Governance at the City University of New York (CUNY ISLG) has been studying the community safety implications of the SJC over time. This has resulted in a series of reports exploring trends in crime, incarceration, and returns to jail custody in 16 participating cities and counties. The first two reports were issued in 2021 and 2023, covering individuals in jail through 2020. This brief presents the most up-to-date data— through April 2023—on the outcomes of individuals released from jails after SJC reforms were passed. Additionally, this brief expands on previous work by distinguishing returns to jail that involve a new alleged criminal offense and those that involve administrative reasons only, such as failing to appear in court or violating a condition of release. Findings include: • Two years out from COVID-19’s peak, there continues to be no apparent correlation between changes in incarceration and violent crime. Most individuals released from jail on pretrial status did not return to jail custody, and local violent crime rates varied regardless of changes to the jail population—suggesting that jail reduction reforms can be implemented safely. • About 80 percent of people who were released on pretrial status were either not rebooked into jail at all (75 percent) or were returned to jail for administra tive reasons (7 percent)—therefore, not a threat to public safety. • The pandemic-era increase in violent crime was not caused by jail reduction reforms; people released pretrial were very unlikely to return to jail charged with a violent crime, about 2% of indi viduals released pretrial returned with a new violent crime charge. This rate has remained consistent for almost a decade, predating reform efforts.    

New York: CUNY Institute for State & Local Governance, 2024. 23p.

By Daniel Eizenga and Amandine Gnanguênon

HIGHLIGHTS • Extremist violence in the Sahel is spilling over into coastal West African countries. • Governments in coastal West African countries play the leading role in responding to this threat by proactively strengthening ties with local communities in vulnerable regions. • Regional security cooperation can bolster national defenses through intelligence sharing, coordinating border patrols, and training focused on community protection. • Forging a multitiered strategy—linking support to communities with regional and international bodies—would help contextualize local responses while sustaining regional cooperation to address the mplex threat posed by violent extremist groups 

   .

Africa Security Brief no. 43

 Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024. 12p.

By Vincent Freigang and Maíra Martini

Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ignited a global reckoning over the dangers of kleptocracy and the international community’s decades-long complicity. The initial response of the advanced Western economies was to unleash new waves of targeted sanctions against Kremlin-linked individuals. But denying safe haven to Russian kleptocrats calls for multilateral efforts, including tracking down the illicit wealth they have diligently hidden across the globe.

In a welcome step, several governments – primarily Western economies such as those making up the G7 – are now joining efforts to share intelligence and cooperate across borders as part of a dedicated task force. This study assesses how well countries leading multilateral efforts to freeze and seize kleptocrats’ assets are equipped to deliver on their objectives. The comparative analysis covers eight countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Transparency International, 2022. 52p.

By Maíra Martini and Theo Van der Merwe

The decision of where to invest in real estate will depend on the stability and reliability of the real estate market in the country, as well as on the risks of having a dirty deal uncovered and punished. Not surprisingly, the corrupt and criminal favour stable markets with inadequate anti-money laundering laws and where anonymity is guaranteed.

Investigations show real estate data can be a powerful tool to detect potential money laundering and other criminal activities. Access to property-related data – such as legal and beneficial ownership, historical ownership data, value and dates of purchase – can go a long way towards exposing key red flags for authorities, journalists and activists.

In 2017, Transparency International published an analysis of anti-money laundering and corruption prevention mechanisms in the real estate sector in four key markets. The report – Doors wide open – identified ten main problems that have enabled corrupt individuals and other criminals to easily purchase luxurious properties anonymously and hide their stolen money in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. Now, our new report analyses the availability of key real estate data in these four significant property markets.

The limited availability of real estate data and of beneficial ownership data, in particular, means that we still know very little about who owns properties, and whether they have been purchased with dirty money. This continues to be the case in the four markets – Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Transparency International Australia, 2020. 18p.

A call for civilian reserves in hybrid warfare

By Dan Svantesson

Australia’s cyber environment is under constant attack. The threats are multi-faceted and growing. Beyond the well-known cybercrime and cybersecurity challenges, we face a barrage of online mis- and dis-information aimed at undermining our social cohesion. Despite increased emphasis on the cyber domain, our existing public and private capacity is likely insufficient to counter the full range of threats we face in cyberspace.

Against this background, Australia must adopt a whole-of-society approach to the defence of the cyber environment. This discussion paper seeks to canvass options for an Australian ‘cyber intelligence and information militia’; that is, a ‘crowdsourced’ civilian volunteer cyber reserve capability fit to engage in open-source intelligence (OSINT) and information warfare. Such a resource could play an important role in supplementing existing or developing capabilities.

Canberra: Australian Capital Territory, Social Cyber Institute, 2024.