By Huma Haider

Organised criminal actors can extend their influence over security sector officials through corruption, paying them to selectively enforce the law. In some cases, the rise of organised crime (OC) has eroded the state’s capacity to deliver security and justice. In other contexts, criminality is associated with a strong state that can protect corrupt officials and criminal actors. Strengthening the capabilities of corrupt security institutions can, in turn, be counterproductive in the fight against OC. The linkages between corruption, OC, the functioning of security and justice institutions, and their reform processes, call for integrated analysis, planning and implementation of initiatives to achieve security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and to counter OC. There is, however, a gap in scholarship analysing connections between SSR/G and OC. In seeking to address this gap, this paper adopts an inter-disciplinary approach, reviewing scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. Key findings from the evidence review include:

• Delayed or weak implementation of security sector reform (SSR) in transitional contexts can result in the entrenchment of corruption in security sectors, alongside new forms of corruption (for example, from privatisation processes), which in turn risks the rise of illicit activities.

• OC can thrive where state institutions are absent or weak and where they are present or strong. A binary focus on strong versus weak states, with inadequate attention to context, has led at times to counterproductive interventions aimed at strengthening state institutions and the capabilities of security forces.

• The political context in which SSR and initiatives to counter OC take place can have a significant influence on outcomes. Such reforms and initiatives require political will and support. Elites in authoritarian contexts may block reforms that could hold them accountable and undermine their ability to profit from OC.

• Many SSR studies indicate that programming often prioritises less politically sensitive capacity building interventions. Yet, reforms that increase deterrent capacity can reinforce militarisation and increase violent crime by OC actors.

• Higher levels of popular trust in the military have often been accompanied by greater state reliance on the military to perform civilian law enforcement and/or militarisation of the police to address OC and restore public order.

• The militarisation of law enforcement has typically failed to counter OC, producing greater violence and criminality in many fragile and violent contexts.

• Relying on armed forces to counter OC has often reduced incentives and resources for strengthening police institutions

• Community-oriented policing is often employed to improve public trust in the police, yet there is limited systematic or comparative evidence that this is achieved.

• Mass incarceration, from law and order approaches, has frequently strengthened the cohesion of organised crime groups (OCG), giving them a territorial base for power projection.

• Overcrowded prison facilities and insufficient state staffing levels have often resulted in the rise of criminal governance and prisoner syndicates as parallel powers.

• Inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants, or gang members in situations of urban violence, can encourage their involvement in criminal activities.

• Conventional approaches to investigating and prosecuting criminal activity can be ineffective against complex OC networks. A proactive approach is required that seeks to disrupt and dismantle such networks, beyond arresting individual criminals.

• Criminal justice actors need to recognise that women can be both victims and perpetrators in the context of OC, possibly allowing for legal leniency.

• Judicial reforms tend to be more effective when they produce institutional change and empower new personnel to push through reforms.

• Special courts, established to tackle OC and corruption, may divert resources from elsewhere in the judicial sector. It can also be challenging to reconcile accountability for past gross human rights violations and the need to counter contemporary OC.

• Transitional trials, selective prosecutions and vetting, which remove officials guilty of corruption, OC and/or human rights violations from security and justice institutions, can help to reform abusive institutions and build trust.

• There is evidence that failure to properly vet military officials and ex-combatants prior to their entry into a civilian police force has resulted in corrupt police forces with links to criminality.

• There is debate as to whether transitional justice activities enable institutional reform and rule of law programming that can help to counter OC, or whether they are isolated from domestic capacity building.

• Developing accountability and oversight of security sector institutions (for example, anti-corruption mechanisms and civilian oversight) can help to reduce OC infiltration.

• Citizen security, a concept that extends to non-security sectors (for example, education, infrastructure and livelihoods), can be a helpful lens in designing more comprehensive interventions required to counter OC.

• Where gender-responsive SSR is advocated, it is often reduced to adding women to programming and institutions, without addressing the structural, institutional and cultural barriers to meaningful engagement.

• An effective system for combatting transnational OC requires the development of entities and mechanisms aimed at building operational cooperation and coordination among the security agencies of different states.

This Evidence Review Paper demonstrates the importance of adopting an OC-informed perspective in SSR/G and a SSR/G-informed perspective in addressing OC. By exploring the interlinkages, complementarities and trade-offs between security and justice sectors and their reforms, on the one hand, and countering OC, on the other, this paper seeks to provide insights into these perspectives.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 05. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham 2024. 97p.

By Alana M. Vivolo-Kantor; Christine L. Mattson, Maria Zlotorzynska,

Ketamine, a Schedule III controlled substance* that is Food and Drug Administration (FDA)–approved for general anesthesia, can produce mild hallucinogenic effects and cause respiratory, cardiovascular, and neuropsychiatric adverse events (1). In 2019, a form of ketamine (esketamine) was approved by FDA for use in treatment-resistant depression among adults† (2). Ketamine use, poison center calls for ketamine exposure, and ketamine drug reports from law enforcement have increased through 2019 (3), but recent trends in ketamine involvement in fatal overdoses are unknown. Data from CDC’s State Unintentional Drug Overdose Reporting System (SUDORS) were analyzed to describe characteristics of and trends in overdose deaths with ketamine detected or involved during July 2019–June 2023.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2024;73:1010–1012

By: Arantza Alonso Berbotto and Spencer Chainey

The theft of refined oil products provides criminal groups with significant financial resources that threaten the environment and socio-economic stability of countries where it occurs. Violence is also associated with this criminal activity. Using crime script analysis, a detailed interpretation of the theft of oil via the illegal tapping of pipelines in Mexico was constructed. The analysis revealed the roles performed by members of criminal groups, the recruitment of individuals outside of the criminal group to provide information about the pipelines and perform technical activities, and the supporting role of citizens and businesses from local communities. The analysis also revealed the decision-making necessary for the successful commission of oil theft via the illegal tapping of pipelines. The use of situational crime prevention measures and improvements in the use of deterrence are identified as offering opportunities for preventing this criminal activity.

GLOBAL CRIME 2021, VOL. 22, NO. 4, 265–287https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2021.1925552© 2021

By Camilo Pardo-Herrera 

The environment is under increasing pressure from global economic dynamics and the constantly increasing demand for raw materials. In this context, environmental crimes in general, and illegal mining in particular, play a key role as they disregard any consideration for sustainable resource extraction. In the Amazon region, one of the most vital ecosystems around the world, illegal gold mining has been identified as the most critical threat to the sustainability of the life of its ecosystems. There is evidence of large quantities of illegal mining production both in Colombia (two-thirds of all production) and Peru (25 to 30 percent of all production). However, since gold is extremely valuable, and portable, it stores value —even under extreme market conditions—, it can be reshaped in any way thinkable, and is not intrinsically illegal, introducing illicitly extracted gold into official supply chains is fairly easy. Once introduced, it flows freely through national, regional, and global markets, and its proceeds do so through the international financial system. It is estimated that illegal mining accounts for up to USD 48 billion a year in criminal proceeds.1 In this context, organized crime associated with the illegal extraction of gold in the Amazon continues to grow in number, size, and scope in response to the insatiable global demand, and thanks to the possibility of laundering and reinvesting their proceeds through illicit financial flows. Thus, an efficient response to the challenges posed by illegal gold mining should be comprehensive and include not just efforts to curb illegal mining, but also, more importantly, efforts to address the illegal flows of money taking place through the gold trade. Although it only analyzes a small sample of the entire global gold market, this paper provides substantive evidence of the illegal flows of money through the gold trade from Peru and Colombia into the United States. While this report is in no position to assert the commission of crimes —since it is only analyzing data— it presents enough evidence to identify points of entry for further criminal investigations and potential judicial action. There is evidence of companies smuggling gold from Venezuela into Colombia, which is then exported to the United States. Between 2010 and 2021, a total of 68,2 tons of gold worth a total of 2.6 billion US dollars, were smuggled through the border in vicinities of Cucuta. Three companies, one in Colombia (CIJ Gutierrez) and two in the United States (Asahi Refining USA Inc., and Johnson Matthey Inc.) concentrate over 90 percent of this trade. Gold trade through this route stopped after 2018 when an Executive Order was signed targeting all parties involved in the trade of Venezuelan gold. There is also evidence of gold and mercury smuggling along the border between Peru and Bolivia and illegal gold production shifting geographies after policy decisions are made. Data show an inexplicable spike in Bolivian gold export in 2014 —with no increases in production— which coincides both, with a ban on mercury by Peru, and a decrease in Peruvian production and exports. This suggests the shifting of illegal mining from Peru into Bolivia, and also of gold smuggling in the same direction. There are clear indications of mis-invoicing of gold trade between these three countries. Peruvian data show significantly higher weight values than those reported at US destinations between 2016 and 2018. A very similar pattern can be seen in Peruvian total exports to the world. Concurrently, trade data show that 29 percent of all shipments from Peru to the US were priced at 70 percent or less than the actual international price during that same time. Although available data does not permit us to assert whether it is a case of overstating the weight of the gold or undervaluing its value, the temporal coincidence of weight and value discrepancies allows us to suggest a general case of mis-invoicing during this time. Colombian data also suggests potential cases of mis-invoicing. Between 2015 and 2016, US statistics reported weight about 50% above those reported by Colombian customs. Price data show that in nine percent of the shipments —approximately 16 tons— gold was paid at 70 percent or less of the global gold price at the time of the transaction. Only a handful of businesses on both sides of the transactions explain most of this trade and are identified — 85 percent of the undervalued shipments are executed by five Colombian firms, and six businesses on the US side concentrate 86 percent of undervalued purchases. Trade in overpriced gold is also identified. Data analysis suggests irregular patterns in the rate between net and gross weights, which could respond to fraudulent reporting and concurrent illicit flows of value. For example, while most shipments use 0.2 grams (or less) of packaging per every gram of gold sent, an important percentage report uses three and up to five times that weight. Of these irregular shipments, over 90 percent were sent by one company in Colombia —Metales Procesados Industriales— to two businesses in the US —Atomic Gold Inc., and United Precious Metal Refining Inc. The analysis also raises warnings as to how certain reports are made. This is the case of the volume of shipments reported by Colombian customs, which is not the result of a measurement, but of an estimation using the net weight of the shipment. Instead of measuring the volume of each shipment, this field is populated using the density of gold, which is a constant, derived from the net weight of the shipment. Although not the result of fraud, but a standard procedure, this hinders transparency and the possibility of monitoring the trade between Colombia and the US. There is evidence of a trend to create shell companies to engage in the trade in gold; presumably of illegal gold. Peruvian tax data shows large numbers of companies participating in the trade in a very sporadic fashion, which contradicts stable and long-lasting trade relationships usual in the international gold market. These companies have a very short legal life, and concentrate all of their commercial activity within a few months, only to cease to exist shortly after. Between 2016 and 2021, these companies traded gold for a total of 230 million USD. 

The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center. George Mason University. Arlington, Va. 2022. 34p.

By Layla Hashemi, Edward Huang & Louise Shelley 

 Over 58 million counterfeit respirators of substandard quality unable to protect individuals from infection have been seized globally since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. These seizures have primarily occurred in urban warehouses and ports around the world according to analysis of public and corporate data shared with the authors. The presence of tens of millions of respirators in storage facilities prior to distribution demonstrates that urban areas are key elements of illicit supply chains. Data suggests that the concept of urban insecurity needs to be reconsidered in light of illicit supply chains for counterfeit respirators and their role in facilitating disease transmission in urban areas. The analysis presented in this article suggests that threats to human life should not be confined narrowly to violent acts or the consumption of drugs. Human life can also be threatened through the massive distribution of counterfeit N95 masks during a pandemic, a problem that has become more acute with more contagious mutations of COVID-19. 

Urban Crime - An International Journal Vol. 3-No 2-September 2022 

By Mahmut Cengiz  and Oguzhan Omer Demir 

Because of supply and demand factors, human trafficking for sexual exploitation has always been a profitable industry. Turkey, as a host country for immigrants from both former Soviet countries and the Middle East, combines supply and demand, attracting illicit business. Few studies have been conducted in the previous two decades to investigate the organized criminal element of human trafficking in this region. This research is based on ethnographic research in which trafficking victims (N = 11) were interviewed, and on-site observations were made. Our findings revealed that the trafficking industry in our study area was carried out by persons who were only loosely related to one another. There was no sophisticated, long-lasting sex trafficking organization. Membership was not severely limited, and individuals did not identify themselves as members of a well-known criminal organization. We provided policy recommendations and proposals for future research to address female trafficking for sexual exploitation

Social Sciences 11: 511. 2022. 

By Louise I. Shelley

In 1994, the second full year of Demokratizatsiya’s publication, I analyzed the impact of organized crime on the development of post-Soviet states in an article entitled “Post-Soviet Organized Crime: Implications for Economic, Social, and Political Development.”1 This article was written at a time when many in the West were sure that the future course of development for Russia and other post-Soviet states was one of free markets and democracy. Most research on organized crime and high-level corruption in Russia would not be published until much later.2 My article provided a very different and contrarian approach to this rosy scenario for Soviet successor states. In the article’s introduction, I asserted that the infiltration of organized crime into the state would ensure that organized crime would “play a significant role in determining the future course of developments in the Soviet successor states.” In my view, organized crime represented an amalgam of traditional criminals, members of the state security apparatus, former military personnel, and law enforcement officials. I did not associate post-Soviet organized crime exclusively with the very v zakone, the traditional thieves in law or professional criminals. I was especially concerned at the time that the rapid and non-transparent privatization of state property to the benefit of corrupt politicians, organized crime, and their business partners would have persistent and deleterious long-term consequences, leading to the monopolization of key sectors of post-Soviet economies rather than the competitive economies needed for growth.

Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Volume 30, Number 4, Fall 2022, pp. 411-419

Organized Theft Groups (OTG) and Organized Retail Crime (ORC) .  A Comprehensive Educational Guide for Law Enforcement and Financial Crime Investigators  

By Lauren Kohr and Tiffany Polyak,

Organized retail crime (ORC) remains at the forefront of most major news channels across the United States. High-profile “smash-n-grab” robberies, and nationwide cases involving major retailers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, garner the headlines. Recent hearings by the United States Congress, that discuss and debate proposed legislation, target the ability of criminal organizations to resell stolen goods online with relative anonymity.1 ORC is a low-risk, high-reward business line for transnational criminal organizations’ portfolios that presents a significant financial and public safety risk. While retailers and law enforcement partner to investigate ORC cases and provide education on the misconceptions and misunderstandings, it is clear there is a missing link in these partnerships, and that link is financial institutions. Criminal organizations need to launder the nearly 70 billion US dollars of illicit proceeds gained from ORC activities annually. These organizations are looking to launder their billions through the formal financial sector, unregulated payment processors, and online marketplaces. 1. The Brand Protection Professional, Professional Pointer: What Is ORC And Is It Related To IPRC? To combat ORC and take down organized theft groups (OTGs) more effectively, first, financial institutions must be brought into the awareness and education triangle. Second, public-private partnerships and information-sharing channels between retailers, law enforcement, and financial institutions need to be created. Third, as law enforcement and retailers prioritize investigations involving ORC, financial institutions should look to reasonably enhance their anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) programs to detect and report illicit proceeds stemming from these crimes. Financial institutions should ensure proper controls are in place to detect and report illicit activities tied to or involving ORC. While not specifically addressed in the National AML/CFT Priorities issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on June 20, 2021, it should be addressed that ORC has been tied to many of the priorities issued and other heinous crimes, as reflected in this guide.  

ACAMS and Homeland Security Investigations, 53p.

By Spencer P. Chainey & Arantza Alonso Berbotto 

Crime script analysis is becoming an increasingly used approach for examining organized crime. Crime scripts can use data from multiple sources, including open sources of intelligence (OSINT). Limited guidance exists, however, on how to populate the content of a crime script with data, and validate these data. This results in crime scripts being generated intuitively, restricts them from being scrutinized for their quality and limits the opportunity to combine or compare crime scripts. We introduce a practical process for populating the content of a crime script that involves simple coding procedures and uses document analysis to quality assure data that are extracted from open sources. We illustrate the process with the example of the theft of oil from pipelines in Mexico committed by organized crime groups. The structured methodical process we introduce produces a crime script of high quality, helps to improve the systematic analysis of decision-making performed by members of organized crime groups, and can improve the identification of opportunities for crime control.

Published: 23 August 2021, Trends in Organized Crime, Volume 25, pages 272–300, (2022)

Edited by Erica Charters, Marie Houllemare, and Peter H. Wilson

This is the first extensive analysis of large-scale violence and the methods of its restraint in the early modern world. Using examples from Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe, it questions the established narrative that violence was only curbed through the rise of western-style nation states and civil societies. Global history allows us to reframe and challenge traditional models for the history of violence and to rethink categories and units of analysis through comparisons. By decentring Europe and exploring alternative patterns of violence, the contributors to this volume articulate the significance of violence in narratives of state- and empire-building, as well as in their failure and decline, while also providing new means of tracing the transition from the early modern to modernity.

Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,  2020.  317p.

By Jonah Rexer

Multinationals in the extractive sectors of weak states may face resource theft by armed groups. This criminality is often abetted by state corruption, even though firms are willing to pay for protection. I study indigenization in Nigeria's oil sector, which increased participation by Nigerian firms substantially. Despite evidence that local firms are of lower quality, localization increases output and reduces oil theft. A bargaining model illustrates that political connections align law enforcement incentives, solving commitment problems. Data on raids by government forces show that local firms receive preferential law enforcement protection. I find that connections to military elites drive the local advantage.

.Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2022. 113p  

By Christian Gunadi; Yuyan Shi,

Recreational cannabis legalization (RCL) has been advocated as a way to reduce the number of individuals interacting with the US criminal justice system; in theory, however, cannabis decriminalization can achieve this objective without generating the negative public health consequences associated with RCL. It is still unclear whether RCL can bring additional benefits in terms of reducing cannabis possession arrests in states that have already decriminalized cannabis. OBJECTIVE -  To examine whether RCL was associated with changes in cannabis possession arrests in US states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period and whether these changes differed across age and racial subgroups. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS - This repeated cross-sectional study used cannabis possession arrest data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCRP) for US states from 2010 through 2019. Statistical analysis was conducted from October 6, 2021, to October 12, 2022. EXPOSURES -  Implementation of statewide RCL. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES - Cannabis possession arrest rates per 1000 population per year were assessed with a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design and were used to estimate the association of RCL with arrest rates in RCL states that had or had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. This association was also examined in subgroups for age (adults vs youths) and race (Black vs White). RESULTS - This study included UCRP data for 31 US states, including 9 states that implemented RCL during the study period (4 without and 5 with decriminalization) and 22 non-RCL states. In the 4 states that had not decriminalized cannabis before legalization, RCL was associated with a 76.3% decrease (95% CI, −81.2% to −69.9%) in arrest rates among adults. In the 5 states that had already decriminalized cannabis, RCL was still associated with a substantial decrease in adult arrest rates (−40.0%; 95% CI, −55.1% to −19.8%). There was no association of RCL with changes in arrest rates among youths. In addition, changes in arrest rates associated with RCL did not differ among Black and White individuals. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE -  In this repeated cross-sectional study, RCL was associated with a sizable reduction in cannabis possession arrests among adults in states that had already decriminalized cannabis during the study period (2010-2019), albeit the magnitude was smaller compared with states that had not decriminalized cannabis before RCL. In addition, RCL did not seem to be associated with changes in arrest rates among youths or disparities in arrest rates among Black and White individuals. 

JAMA Netw Open. 2022 Dec 5;5(12):e2244922

By Yvon DanduranA discussion of organized crime and governance is not complete until it addresses the question of police governance and its impact on the fight against organized crime, illicit markets and money laundering. Given the relative failure of law enforcement to control organized crime and contain illegal markets, a focus on police governance forces us to consider how law enforcement priorities are set and law enforcement strategies adopted and implemented. This in turn may lead us to conclude, as I am about to suggest, that we me need to both increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts and reduce our expectations with respect to the impact that law enforcement can really have on controlling organized crime and illicit markets. In our discussions thus far, we acknowledged that public awareness of organized crime and its consequences is an important starting point, but that we also need to find more effective ways to control organized crime and counter its activities. Most of us recognize that law enforcement and regulatory enforcement are crucial elements of effective action against organized crime, yet we must also recognize that the actual impact of law enforcement is usually quite limited. Countering organized crime requires establishing effective police governance and accountability. Governance includes key management issues such as policy formation and implementation, the determination of priorities and strategies, the allocation of resources, deployment strategies and decisions, the implementation of standards, the prevention of corruption internally, and the maintenance of internal discipline. It follows that weak governance can undermine the effectiveness of police actions against organized crime. At the same time, transnational organized crime entails policing in a transnational context and, with this, come the pressing and complex governance and accountability issues presented by the growth of cross-border policing,  transnational policing, and the growing reliance on multi-jurisdictional police teams. In many instances, one is not talking about a single police force, but broad and ill-defined security networks.3 As Walsh and Conway explained, “(m)achinery that is struggling to cope with the governance and accountability challenges presented by the domestic operations of home based police forces may well prove seriously deficient when confronted with the formers’ activities on other sovereign territories, or domestic operations by foreign based police forces  

Vancouver, BC: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2020. 15p.

By Mary Allen and Cristine Rotenberg

In December, 2014, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA) changed the laws related to the sex trade, shifting the focus of criminalization from those who sell their own sexual services onto those who purchase sexual services and those who benefit financially from others’ sexual services. This article examines changes in sex-trade-related crime reported by police before and after the change in legislation.Between 2010 and 2019, there was a 55% decline in sex-trade-related crime driven by a 95% decline in incidents of stopping or impeding traffic, or communicating for the purpose of offering, providing or obtaining sexual services. Most of this decline occurred prior to the adoption of the PCEPA in 2014.Fewer women were accused or charged in incidents of stopping or communicating offences after the introduction of the PCEPA. The number of men accused in incidents relating to stopping or communicating offences also dropped considerably between 2010 and 2014. Charging rates also declined for men accused in this type of incident, but not to the same extent.With the drop in charges for stopping or communicating offences, there was a large decline in the number of court cases involving these offences. Fewer women were tried in court for stopping or communicating offences in the five-year period after the new legislation than the five-year period preceding the change (-97%). In addition, far fewer women were found guilty, and, of those, none were sentenced to custody.The PCEPA placed a new focus on activities related to the purchasing of sexual services. Between 2015 and 2017, incidents of the new offence of obtaining sexual services from an adult increased sharply before declining for two consecutive years. Individuals accused in these incidents were mostly men.After the drop in the number of men accused in incidents of stopping or communicating offences prior to the PCEPA, the number of men accused increased once the new legislation was in place (obtaining sexual services from an adult). There was also an increase in men accused in incidents of obtaining sexual services from a minor. Most of the men accused of purchasing sexual services were charged. In the courts, over four in five men tried for obtaining services from a minor were found guilty, and this was the case for about one in seven cases of obtaining sexual services from an adult.The number of police-reported incidents related to profiting from the sexual services of others increased after the change in legislation, as procuring and receiving material benefit incidents reached a high point in 2019, almost double what was reported in 2010.Both before and after the change in legislation, men were more often accused in incidents related to procuring or receiving material benefit than women, even more so after the PCEPA (67% of accused were men prior to the PCEPA and 82% after). This shift was the result of the drop in women accused in these incidents, coupled with a substantial increase in the number of men accused. In the courts, among cases involving a charge related to profiting from sexual services, men were more likely than women to be convicted in the five-year period before and after the PCEPA. Most of those convicted in these cases were sentenced to custody. Though an infrequent offence in terms of the number of cases processed, advertising sexual services offences also saw high conviction rates.After the PCEPA, fewer sex-trade-related offences occurred on the street or in an open area and proportionally more took place in a home or a commercial dwelling unit such as a hotel. This was driven by a considerable decline in offences that are public by definition (i.e., stopping or impeding traffic or communicating offences). The increase in incidents occurring in a home or a commercial dwelling unit is mostly explained by the large increase in incidents of procuring or receiving material benefit as well as the creation of the new offence related to obtaining sexual services from an adult.

Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2021. 29p.

By Pryce S. Michener, Elyse Bianchet, Shannon Fox, Elizabeth A. Evans & Peter D. Friedmann 

Background

Opioid-related overdose is the leading cause of death for people recently released from incarceration, however treatment with medications for opioid use disorder (MOUD) during incarceration can reduce the mortality risk. This study seeks to qualitatively analyze perceptions of post-release overdose risk from the perspectives of people who received MOUD while incarcerated in one of eight Massachusetts jails during 2021–2022 using the Risk Environment Framework to guide analyses.

Methods

N = 38 participants with lived experience of MOUD treatment during incarceration who are now living in the community were interviewed on factors that may contribute to or protect against post-release overdose risk. Themes were identified inductively and deductively using the Risk Environment Framework and its domains, which organizes themes along physical, social, economic, and policy environments on both the micro- and macro- scales.

Results

The physical risk environment included loss of opioid tolerance during incarceration, polysubstance use, and the toxicity of the regional drug supply as key producers of increased risk for post-release overdose. Social drivers of risk included peer group risk norms—including peer-driven harm reduction practices and interpersonal relationships between drug sellers and buyers—as well as macro-level social determinants of health such as housing insecurity and availability of mental health services. Economic drivers of post-release overdose risk included lack of income generation during incarceration and employment challenges. Participants discussed several aspects of policy that contribute to post-release overdose risk, including availability of harm reduction supplies, public health services, and broader policy around MOUD.

Conclusions

The perspectives of people with lived experience are vital to understanding the disproportionate risks of overdose for those recently released from incarceration. Our results highlight the intersectional factors that produce and reproduce the post-release overdose risk environment, providing support for interventions across each domain of the Risk Environment Framework. By capturing perspectives from people with lived experience of OUD and incarceration during this critical period of risk, we can better identify interventions that target and mitigate overdose-related harm in this population.

Harm Reduction Journal (2024) 21:138

By Adam Teperski, Stewart Boiteux, and Callan Brown

Aim: To examine trends in drug driving charges, roadside drug testing, and population drug use in New South Wales (NSW) between 2008 and 2023. METHOD Data on drug driving proceedings and roadside drug testing were obtained from the NSW Police Force. Focusing on the period between 2008 and 2023, we describe trends in the number of drug driving charges laid by police, as well as changes in the volume of roadside drug tests undertaken by police and the detection rate over time. We also examine the profile of drivers who are proceeded against after testing positive and any differences in key characteristics over time. Finally, to support the interpretation of these results, we assess changes in drug use from two population drug use monitoring systems and consider associated trends in self-reported drug driving behaviours. RESULTS Between 2008 and 2023, the number of drug driving charges rose from an average of 102 per quarter in 2008 to 3,296 in 2023. This significant growth in charges followed the announcement of two expansions of the NSW Mobile Drug Testing (MDT) program, which resulted in a rapid increase in testing volumes from around 20,000 to 156,000 tests per year in 2008 and 2019 respectively. While the MDT expansions aimed to increase police capacity to detect and deter drug driving behaviours, we found a weak relationship between total testing volumes and subsequent detection rates, with the average detection rate varying between 2% and 18%. This suggests that the number of drug driving charges over this 15-year period was not simply a function of the number of tests conducted, but also related to when, where, and for whom tests were used. When we compared drug driving offenders charged in 2019 with those charged in 2023, we found that the 2023 cohort were more likely to be older, test positive for methamphetamine, reside in regional areas and have a prior drug driving charge. During the period we study, population-level drug use has remained relatively consistent. Meanwhile, the self-reported prevalence of drug driving has decreased at a steady rate, with this downward trend commencing prior to the start of the MDT program in NSW. CONCLUSION Sequential expansions of the MDT program have led to a considerable increase in the number of offenders charged with drug driving offences in NSW between 2008 and 2023. Recent growth in the roadside drug test detection rate and subsequent charges may be driven by police targeting of repeat drug driving offenders, and motorists who offend in regional areas. 

Bureau Brief, No. 172 Sydney, NSW: NSW Bureau of Crime  Statistics and Research. ....2024. 23p.

By Maurice Ogbonnaya 

What began as a struggle for the political and economic autonomy of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has morphed into organised crime of transnational dimensions that has turned the West African coast and the Gulf of Guinea into one of the most unsafe maritime zones in the world and is decimating Nigeria’s economy. The crimes include kidnapping for ransom, maritime piracy, armed robbery at sea, the theft and smuggling of oil and other contraband products, illegal oil refining and bunkering. This report analyses the current drivers of organised crime in the region, arguing that crime has become a fundamental element of the struggle. Key findings • The Niger Delta region accounts for most of Nigeria’s estimated daily oil production of 2.5 million barrels, which makes the country Africa’s largest producer of oil and the sixthlargest oil-producing country in the world. • State repression, poverty and widespread inequality, politics, greed and institutional corruption in the oil and maritime sectors have shaped the evolution of the struggle from a nationalist movement to an organised criminal enterprise. • The Nigerian government must tackle issues of environmental degradation, infrastructural underdevelopment, poverty, the lack of job- and income-generating opportunities, especially for the youth, and institutionalised corruption in the oil and maritime sectors.  

ENACT Africa, 2020. 22p.

By Oluwole Ojewale

Mining and the illicit trade in minerals have long been the source of social and environmental upheaval in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and coltan, a mineral essential to modern electronics, has become a particular focus of criminal networks. This study reveals a network of organised crime involved in the production and supply chain of coltan, and its connections to legitimate businesses in advanced economies. It raises awareness of the implications of this illicit trade and suggests multi-stakeholder interventions to prevent criminal networks from operating in the Great Lakes Region. Key findings • As 5G technology grows, the demand for coltan increases. • Much of the coltan produced by artisanal mining remains unaccounted for due to the government’s inability to access and regulate mines in remote territories. • Coltan smuggling is enabled by state collusion and corrupted networks of social relations. • Coltan smuggling flourishes because of the differences between the prices set in mining areas and those on the black market. • Environmental impact assessments are seldom carried out before exploration for coltan begins. • Sites of historical heritage and indigenous norms are violated by artisanal miners and foreign companies. • Exploitation of children, rape and gender-based violence are common at coltan mining sites.

ENACT Africa, 2022. 20p.

By Romi Sigsworth and Shaun Shelly

South Africa’s prohibitionist and punitive response to people who cultivate, sell and use drugs has failed to reduce the supply, demand or harms related to the use and trade in scheduled drugs. This report explores the universal costs and consequences of prohibition before providing a global contextualisation of current drug policy debates. It then outlines the historical context of drug policy in South Africa and suggests what might be done differently in the present and future to reduce the burden of drugs and drug policy in the country. Key findings • Despite the vast expenditure on a prohibitionist and criminal justice approach to drugs globally over more than five decades, drugs are more readily available at lower prices, drug use has increased significantly and the social and health harms associated with current policies and responses to drugs are substantial. • In South Africa, the criminalisation of people who use drugs is a massive burden on the police, courts and correctional services, as well as a significant barrier to resolving the economic, social and health challenges that communities face in developing an equitable and just society. • The current societal and political attitude towards people who use drugs, however, means that any changes to drug policy are unlikely to be radical or rapid until communities are  able to see the benefits of alternative approaches.

ENACT Africa, 2020. 28p.  

By Alan Martin

Illegal artisanal mining in South Africa is among the most lucrative and violent on the African continent, with lost production exceeding R14 billion (about USD$1 billion) a year. Current enforcement and policy responses, which criminalise illegal miners, are misguided, counterproductive and ignore the poverty and socio-economic drivers behind the phenomenon. A more holistic, nuanced and multi-faceted approach is required from government and industry to address the lack of formalisation and the marginalisation of the illegal mining sector. Key points ∙ Illegal mining in South Africa should be considered to be artisanal mining within large-scale mines, not separate from them. ∙ While Zama Zamas are members of, or associated with, criminal syndicates, they are not homogenous groupings. ∙ The violence and insecurity caused by the criminality associated with illegal mining makes some mining areas in South Africa more chaotic and conflict-ridden than those elsewhere in Africa. ∙ Rough estimates of Zama Zama outputs suggest that lost gold production may exceed R14 billion a year,2 making South Africa one of the biggest sources of illicit gold in Africa. ∙ The true cost of illegal mining activity includes damage to public and private infrastructure caused by vandalism or poor mining practices, as well as the costs of security upgrades undertaken by mining companies to address illegal breaches  

ENACT Africa, 2019. 12p.